area handbook series 

Saudi Arabia 

a country study 



Saudi Arabia 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Helen Chapin Metz 
Research Completed 
December 1 992 




On the cover: The shahada or Muslim confession of faith: 
"There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his 
Prophet." 



Fifth Edition, First Printing, 1993. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Saudi Arabia : a country study / Federal Research Division, Library 
of Congress ; edited by Helen Chapin Metz. — 5th ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) (DA 
pam ; 550-51) 

"Supersedes the 1984 edition of Saudi Arabia: a country study, 
edited by Richard F. Nyrop." T.p. verso. 
"Research completed December 1992." 
Includes bibliographical references (pp. 303-324) and index. 
ISBN 0-8444-0791-7 

1. Saudi Arabia. I. Metz, Helen Chapin, 1928- . II. Library 
of Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Area handbook for 
Saudi Arabia. IV. Series. V. Series: DA pam ; 550-51. 
DS204.S3115 1993 93-28506 
953.8— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-51 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared by 
the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under 
the Country Studies/ Area Handbook Program sponsored by the 
Department of the Army. The last page of this book lists the other 
published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign country, 
describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and national 
security systems and institutions, and examining the interrelation- 
ships of those systems and the ways they are shaped by cultural 
factors. Each study is written by a multidisciplinary team of social 
scientists. The authors seek to provide a basic understanding of 
the observed society, striving for a dynamic rather than a static 
portrayal. Particular attention is devoted to the people who make 
up the society, their origins, dominant beliefs and values, their com- 
mon interests and the issues on which they are divided, the nature 
and extent of their involvement with national institutions, and their 
attitudes toward each other and toward their social system and 
political order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not 
be construed as an expression of an official United States govern- 
ment position, policy, or decision. The authors have sought to 
adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. Corrections, 
additions, and suggestions for changes from readers will be wel- 
comed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, D.C. 20540 



in 



Acknowledgments 



The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the writers 
of the 1984 edition of Saudi Arabia: A Country Study, edited by 
Richard F. Nyrop. Their work provided general background for 
the present volume. 

The authors are grateful to individuals in various government 
agencies and private institutions who gave of their time, research 
materials, and expertise in the production of this book. These in- 
dividuals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country 
Studies — Area Handbook program for the Department of the 
Army. The authors also wish to thank members of the Federal 
Research Division staff who contributed directly to the prepara- 
tion of the manuscript. These people include Sandra W. Meditz, 
who reviewed all drafts and served as liaison with the sponsoring 
agency; Marilyn Majeska, who supervised editing and managed 
book production; Andrea Merrill, who reviewed tables and figures; 
and Barbara Edgerton and Izella Watson, who performed word 
processing. 

Also involved in preparing the text were Peter Tietjen, who edited 
chapters; Catherine Schwartzstein, who performed the prepubli- 
cation editorial review; and Joan C. Cook, who compiled the index. 
Malinda B. Neale of the Library of Congress Composing Unit pre- 
pared the camera-ready copy under the supervision of Peggy Pixley. 

Graphics were prepared by David P. Cabitto, and Timothy L. 
Merrill prepared map drafts. David P. Cabitto and the firm of 
Greenhorne and O'Mara prepared the final maps. Special thanks 
are owed to Farah Ahannavard, who prepared the illustrations on 
the title page of each chapter, and David P. Cabitto, who did the 
cover art from original calligraphy by Aftab Ahmad. 

Finally, the authors acknowledge the generosity of the Saudi Ara- 
bian Information Office, the Armed Forces Office of the Royal 
Saudi Arabian Embassy in Washington, and the Saudi Arabian 
Oil Company (Saudi Aramco), who allowed their photographs to 
be used in this study. 



v 



Contents 



Page 



Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xi 

Country Profile xiii 

Introduction xxi 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting i 

William Smyth 

THE SETTING OF SAUDI ARABIA 3 

THE PRE-ISLAMIC PERIOD 5 

THE EARLY ISLAMIC PERIOD, 622-700 6 

THE MIDDLE AGES, 700-1500 10 

THE AL SAUD AND WAHHABI ISLAM, 1500-1818 13 

NINETEENTH-CENTURY ARABIA 16 

THE RISE OF ABD AL AZIZ, 1890-1926 20 

NATION BUILDING: THE RULE OF ABD AL AZIZ, 

1926-53 24 

THE REIGNS OF SAUD AND FAISAL, 1953-75 28 

THE REIGN OF KHALID, 1975-82 37 

THE REIGN OF FAHD, 1982- 43 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 45 

Eleanor Abdella Doumato 

GEOGRAPHY 49 

External Boundaries 49 

Topography and Natural Regions 51 

Climate 57 

The Environment and the 1991 Persian Gulf War ... 58 

POPULATION 59 

Saudis and Non-Saudis 59 

Diversity and Social Stratification 62 

Cultural Homogeneity and Values 64 

Structure of Tribal Groupings 68 

Tribe and Monarchy 69 

Beduin Economy in Tradition and Change 71 

RELIGION 74 

Early Development of Islam 74 



vii 



Tenets of Islam 77 

Wahhabi Theology 80 

Shia 84 

Islamism in Saudi Arabia 86 

Pilgrimage 91 

EDUCATION 96 

HEALTH 104 

URBANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT 106 

Chapter 3. The Economy m 

Fareed Mohamedi 

ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE 

ECONOMY 117 

Fundamental Factors That Transformed the Economy 117 

Economic Policy Making 119 

Five- Year Plans 128 

Changing Structure of the Economy 132 

LABOR 133 

OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY 134 

Brief History 134 

Oil Industry in the 1990s 141 

NON-OIL INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 157 

Utilities 158 

Mining and Quarrying 160 

Manufacturing 162 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS ... 167 

Transportation 167 

Telecommunications 168 

AGRICULTURE 171 

Traditional Agriculture and Pastoral Nomadism 171 

Modern Agriculture 174 

MONEY AND BANKING 177 

EXTERNAL TRADE AND FINANCE 183 

Foreign Trade 183 

Current Account 184 

Capital Account 184 

Foreign Assets and Liabilities 185 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 189 

Eric Hooglund 

STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT 193 

The King 194 

The Royal Diwan 198 

The Council of Ministers 199 



Vlll 



The Civil Service and Independent Agencies 201 

The Legal System 201 

Local Government 203 

POLITICAL DYNAMICS 204 

The Royal Family 204 

The Ulama 208 

Other Groups 209 

MEDIA 211 

FOREIGN POLICY 212 

Regional Security 213 

Relations with the United States 222 

Arab Nationalism 224 

Islam 227 

Chapter 5. National Security 229 

Jean R. Tartter 

HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE ARMED FORCES 234 

Armed Struggle of the House of Saud 234 

The Ikhwan Movement 235 

World War II and Its Aftermath 237 

Naval Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 1987 238 

Persian Gulf War, 1991 239 

SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AND POLICIES 241 

The Military Threat 241 

Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation 

Council 244 

THREATS TO INTERNAL SECURITY 247 

THE ARMED FORCES 250 

Royal Saudi Land Forces 251 

Royal Saudi Air Force 256 

Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces 258 

Royal Saudi Naval Forces 259 

Saudi Arabian National Guard 260 

Training 264 

Personnel and Conditions of Service 265 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 268 

Military Justice 268 

DEFENSE EXPENDITURES 272 

FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT AND INFLUENCE 273 

Cooperation with the United States 273 

Cooperation with Other Countries 275 

Western Cooperation in Domestic Arms Production . . 277 

PUBLIC ORDER AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 278 

Law Enforcement 279 



IX 



Criminal Justice System 282 

Crime and Punishment 283 

Prison Conditions 285 

Human Rights 286 

Appendix. Tables 289 

Bibliography 303 

Glossary 325 

Index 329 

List of Contributors 35 1 

List of Figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Saudi Arabia, 1992 xx 

2 Nineteenth-Century Arabia 18 

3 Abbreviated Genealogy of the House of Saud with Order 

and Duration of Rule, 1992 22 

4 Topography 54 

5 Population by Age and Sex, 1990 60 

6 Major Oil Fields, 1992 150 

7 Transportation System, 1992 170 

8 Government Organization, 1992 200 

9 Major Military Installations, 1992 246 

10 Organization of National Security, 1992 252 

11 Officer Ranks and Insignia, 1992 270 

12 Enlisted Ranks and Insignia, 1992 270 



x 



Preface 



This edition of Saudi Arabia: A Country Study replaces the previ- 
ous edition published in 1984. Like its predecessor, the present book 
attempts to treat in a compact and objective manner the dominant 
historical, social, economic, political, and national security aspects 
of contemporary Saudi Arabia. Sources of information included 
scholarly books, journals, and monographs; official reports and 
documents of governments and international organizations; and 
foreign and domestic newspapers and periodicals. Relatively up- 
to-date economic data were available from several sources, but the 
sources were not always in agreement. Most demographic data 
should be viewed as estimates. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book; brief com- 
ments on some of the more valuable sources for further reading 
appear at the conclusion of each chapter. Measurements are given 
in the metric system; a conversion table is provided to assist those 
who are unfamiliar with the metric system (see table 1 , Appen- 
dix). The Glossary provides brief definitions of terms that may be 
unfamiliar to the general reader. 

The transliteration of Arabic words and phrases posed a partic- 
ular problem. For many of the words — such as Muhammad, Mus- 
lim, Quran, and shaykh — the authors followed a modified version 
of the system adopted by the United States Board on Geographic 
Names and the Permanent Committee on Geographic Names for 
British Official Use, known as the BGN/PCGN system; the modifi- 
cation entails the omission of all diacritical markings and hyphens. 
In numerous instances, however, the names of persons or places 
are so well known by another spelling that to have used the 
BGN/PCGN system may have created confusion. For example, 
the reader will find Mecca rather than Makkah and Medina rather 
than Al Madinah. In addition, although the government of Saudi 
Arabia officially rejects the use of the term Persian Gulf and refers 
to that body of water as the Arabian Gulf, the authors followed 
the practice of the United States Board on Geographic Names by 
using Persian Gulf or gulf. 

Saudi Arabia uses the lunar Islamic calendar, in which the first 
year was that of the Prophet's migration to Medina in A.D. 622. 
The year has 354 days in twelve lunar months, a month being the 
time between two new moons, approximately twenty- nine and one- 
half days. Months alternately consist of twenty-nine and thirty days; 
to adjust for a slight overlap, an additional day is added eleven 



xi 



times during normal years. Months thus have no fixed relation to 
the seasons but make a complete circuit every thirty-three Gregorian 
years; Gregorian years are used in this book. 



xn 



Country Profile 




Country 

Formal Name: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
Short Form: Saudi Arabia. 

Term for Nationals: Saudi(s) or Saudi Arabian(s); adjectival 
forms — Saudi or Saudi Arabian. 

Capital: Riyadh. 



NOTE — The Country Profile contains updated information as available. 



Xlll 



Geography 



Size: Estimates vary between 2,149,690 and 2,240,000 square 
kilometers. 

Boundaries: Most land boundaries not demarcated, some not de- 
fined; twelve nautical miles territorial limit. 

Topography: No rivers or permanent bodies of water. Highest 
peak 3,133 meters. 

Climate: Hot desert climate except for Asir Province; coastal cit- 
ies subject to high humidity. 

Society 

Population: Figures vary; 1992 Saudi census, published Decem- 
ber 1992, gave total population of 16.9 million, of whom 12.3 mil- 
lion Saudi nationals, 4.6 million resident foreigners. Annual rate 
of growth in 1992 was 3.3 percent. 

Ethnic Groups and Languages: All Saudis are Arab Muslims, 
as are over half the foreigners. In 1990 foreign work force included 
large numbers of Egyptians, Yemenis, Jordanians, Bahrainis, 
Pakistanis, Indians, and Filipinos, in that order. Arabic language 
of all Saudis. 

Religion: Strict Wahhabi interpretation of Sunni Islam, the offi- 
cial faith of about 95 percent of Saudis. Remainder are Shia, most 
of whom reside in vicinity of Al Ahsa and Al Qatif in Eastern 
Province. Public worship by non-Muslims prohibited. 

Education and Literacy: Education system experienced massive 
growth in 1970s and 1980s. Attendance not compulsory. Females 
accounted for close to 44 percent of public school student total of 
2.6 million in 1989. About 130,000 students in 1989 enrolled in 
nonvocational institutions of higher learning, 9,000 in vocational 
institutions; about 4,000 enrolled abroad. Literacy estimated at 62 
percent of those over age fifteen in 1990, 73 percent for males and 
48 percent for females. 

Health: Infant mortality declining, twenty-one per 1,000 births 
in Ministry of Health hospitals in 1990. Immunization of infants 
and young children compulsory. Health care facilities underwent 
huge expansion in 1970s and 1980s. Official policy to provide com- 
prehensive medical care free or at nominal fee. Introduction of epi- 
demic control system in 1986 eliminated cholera, plague, and yellow 
fever. Incidence of malaria and bilharzia reduced to 1.6 and 1.9 



xiv 



percent respectively of total 1988 population. Despite trachoma 
campaigns, disease remained a major cause of blindness. 

Economy 

Budget: Latest available budget is for FY 1993 (December 31 , 1992, 
to December 30, 1993). Revenues: SRI 69 billion (US$45.2 bil- 
lion); expenditures: SR197 billion (US$52.6 billion); budget deficit: 
SR28 billion (US$7.5 billion). Persistent budget deficits since early 
1980s; estimated government domestic debt at end 1992 was SR213 
billion (US$57.0 billion). 

Gross Domestic Product (real GDP-1990 prices): US$100.5 bil- 
lion; US$10,338 per capita in 1992, up from US$9,933 per capita 
in 1990. Rapid rise in oil production and earnings combined with 
post-Persian Gulf War private sector financed mini-boom caused 
GDP to rise 12.9 percent in 1991. 

Oil Industry: Largest crude oil producer in the world (8.4 mil- 
lion barrels per day in 1992) and largest crude oil exporter (7.0 
million barrels per day in 1992). World's largest crude oil reserves 
(261 billion barrels at end 1990, about 25.8 percent of the world's 
reserves) and reserves to current production ratio of 83.6 years. 
Rapidly increased production and exports following United Na- 
tions embargo on Iraq and Kuwait in August 1990. Began major 
production-capacity expansion plan in 1989 with intent to raise sus- 
tainable crude oil output capacity to between 10.5 million and 11 
million barrels per day by 1995. Also initiated refinery upgrading 
program in 1991. 

Industry: Including manufacturing, utilities, and construction, 
industrial sector accounted for 21 percent of GDP in 1990. 
Government-funded industrial capacity grew sharply in 1980s. 
Major nonoil refining industries concentrated in petrochemical and 
chemicals sector. In early 1990s, private sector developing domes- 
tic light manufacturing. Petrochemical production capacity slated 
to increase 40 percent by 1995 compared with 1990. 

Agriculture: After decade of massive government incentives, 
agricultural sector accounted for about 10 percent of GDP in 1990, 
up from under 1 percent of GDP in 1982. Rapid growth in output 
led to some food self-sufficiency (particularly food grains) but caused 
depletion of scarce underground water resources. 

Inflation: Early 1990s inflation estimates 3.5 percent per annum. 

Fiscal Year (FY): December 31 to following December 30, as of 
1986. 



xv 



Exports: Total exports rose from US$27.7 billion in 1989 to 
US$44.4 billion in 1990 and increased to US$51 .7 billion in 1991. 
Higher crude oil exports main reason for increase, but since 
mid-1980s exports of chemicals and other manufactured goods have 
grown to just under US$2 billion per annum. 

Imports: Total imports rose rapidly in early 1990s spurred by 
domestic investment boom. Despite increase of imports to US$24.1 
billion in 1990 (from US$21 . 1 biUion in 1989) and further increases 
to US$34.6 billion in 1991, import level sharply down from early 
1980s oil-boom period. Major imports consumer goods, industrial 
inputs, and transport items. Military imports, estimated at US$10 
billion in FY 1990 and 1991, not included in these figures. 

Transportation and Communications 

Roads: About 100,000 kilometers, of which in 1991 over 35,000 
kilometers paved and 65,000 kilometers improved earth. Trans- 
Arabian Highway, a multilane expressway, crossed peninsula from 
Ad Dammam to Jiddah via Riyadh and Mecca. 

Railroads: 571 kilometers standard gauge (1.435 meters) from 
Riyadh to port at Ad Dammam; also shorter rail line linking Riyadh 
and Al Hufuf. 

Ports: Jiddah, principal port, handled 60 percent of cargo. Ad 
Dammam, second largest port, and Ras Tanura handled most of 
the kingdom's petroleum exports. Al Jubayl, Yanbu al Bahr, and 
Jizan smaller ports. 

Airports: Three international airports in Jiddah, Riyadh, and 
Dhahran. 

Telecommunications: Good modern system with radio-relay, co- 
axial cable, and satellite facilities; network expanding. 1 .6 million 
telephones in 1991 ; more than forty AM radio, and more than 100 
television stations; five International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Corporation (Intelsat) and two Arab Satellite Communications 
Organization (Arabsat) ground stations. 

Government and Politics 

Government: Absolute monarchy that based legitimacy on strict 
interpretation of Islamic law. King head of state and head of govern- 
ment; no written constitution or elected legislature. Crown prince 
deputy prime minister; other royal family members headed im- 
portant ministries and agencies. Political system highly centralized; 



xvi 



judiciary and local officials appointed by king through Ministry 
of Justice and Ministry of Interior. 

Politics: Political parties, labor unions, and professional associa- 
tions banned. Informal political activity centered around estimated 
4,000 princes of Al Faisal branch of Al Saud ruling family. On im- 
portant policy matters, king sought consensus among senior princes 
of major Al Saud clans. King also consulted senior ulama (religious 
scholars) of Al ash Shaykh family and leaders of main tribal fam- 
ilies. Western-educated professional and technocratic elite had re- 
stricted influence through alliances with various Saudi princes. 

Foreign Relations: Founding member of United Nations (UN), 
League of Arab States, Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Participated in UN special- 
ized agencies, World Bank, Nonaligned Movement, Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, and Organization of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries. Security, Arab nationalism, and 
Islam main foreign policy concerns. Objective to prevent radical 
Arab nationalist or radical Islamic movements from threatening 
stability of Arabian Peninsula. Most active Arab participant in war 
against Iraq, 1991. Historically had close ties with United States, 
despite differences over Israel. Closest regional allies fellow mem- 
bers of GCC and Egypt. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Consisted of army, navy, air force, and air defense 
force, plus Saudi Arabian National Guard, although latter primarily 
for internal security. Estimated strengths in 1992: army — 73,000; 
navy — 11,000, including 1,500 marines; air force — 18,000; air 
defense force— 4,000; national guard— 55,000 active, 20,000 tribal 
levies. Four regular armed forces recruited volunteers; national 
guard used system of tribal levies. 

Military Units: Army in 1992 included eight brigades — two ar- 
mored, five mechanized, one airborne. Field artillery battalions 
and antiaircraft batteries (gun and missile) provided fire support. 
Navy deployed vessels in Persian Gulf and Red Sea, primarily from 
major bases at Al Jubayl and Jiddah. Air force had six fighter/ 
ground-attack, five air defense, one reconnaissance, one early warn- 
ing, three transport, and two helicopter squadrons. Air defense force 
had surface-to-air missile batteries. 

Equipment: Most armor and other weaponry in army and na- 
tional guard of United States manufacture. Naval vessels primarily 



xvn 



from United States, France, and Germany. Navy had four French- 
manufactured frigates and four United States-manufactured cor- 
vettes, and attack craft (missile- and torpedo-armed). Combat air- 
craft mostly United States F-15s and F-5s, plus British Tornadoes. 

Foreign Military Relations: Member of GCC. Special military 
relationship with United States since late 1940s. Many foreign cor- 
porations, particularly British, French, and United States, had con- 
tracts for supply of hardware, construction of military facilities, 
maintenance of equipment, and training of personnel. 

Police: Police and security forces controlled by central government 
through Ministry of Interior. Saudi Arabian National Guard most 
prominent internal security force, subordinated directly to king. 
Coast Guard, Investigation, Special Security Force, and Public 
Security directorates operated under Ministry of Interior. Public 
Security Police, nationwide police force, and Frontier Force also 
under Ministry of Interior. 

Paramilitary Forces: Saudi Arabian National Guard, Coast 
Guard, Frontier Force, and Special Security Force considered 
paramilitary. 



xvin 




XX 



Introduction 



SAUDI ARABIA OBSERVED in 1992 the sixtieth anniversary 
of its existence as a state and the tenth anniversary of King Fahd 
ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud's accession to the throne. Rather than 
adopting the title of king, Fahd was styled in Arabic Khadim al 
Haramayn, or "custodian of the two holy mosques," thereby stress- 
ing the Islamic aspect of his governance. In this regard, he echoed 
the partnership between the religious and political elements of so- 
ciety established in 1744 by Muhammad ibn Saud, the amir (see 
Glossary) in Ad Diriyah near Riyadh, and Muhammad ibn Abd 
al Wahhab, the shaykh who had come to the area to promote the 
doctrine of the oneness of God in true Islam. As a result of this 
cooperation and based on the strict Hanbali interpretation of Is- 
lamic law, political rule was the province of the House of Saud 
(Al Saud), whose leader was also given the title of imam, and reli- 
gious authority was in the hands of the Al ash Shaykh (the family 
of the shaykh, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab). This arrangement, 
however, did not give unchecked political power to the ruler be- 
cause in accordance with the precepts of Abd al Wahhab, based 
on the political theory of Taqi ad Din ibn Taimiya, secular authority 
must conform to divine law and produce civil order in order to 
be legitimate. 

Historically, the collaboration of the Al Saud and the Al ash 
Shaykh resulted in Al Saud dominion in Najd, the central region 
of the Arabian Peninsula, for more than two centuries, except for 
the brief period from 1891 to 1902 when the Al Rashid exiled the 
Al Saud to Kuwait. Because it has never been subjected to foreign 
rule and the consequent dissolution of its homogeneity, Najd has 
exerted an unusually strong influence on the jurisdiction of the Al 
Saud. In addition, because the region lacked large cities and the 
strong leadership they could provide, an interdependent relation- 
ship developed among Najdi towns, which paid tribute, and tribes, 
which provided protection. Traditionally, Najdi political power lay 
with the tribal shaykhs, who, when they became amirs, or gover- 
nors of a wider area, endeavored to dissociate themselves from their 
tribal roles because they were ruling a more diverse population. 

The prominence of the Al Saud is reflected in the name Saudi 
Arabia; the country is the only one to be named for the ruling fam- 
ily. The present kingdom of Saudi Arabia derives its existence from 
the campaigns of its founder, Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman 
Al Saud, who initially captured Riyadh with his beduin followers 



xxi 



in 1902. Thereafter, with the aid of the Ikhwan, or brotherhood, 
a fervent group of Wahhabi beduin warriors, he retook the rest 
of Najd, defeating the Al Rashid forces at Hail in the north in 1921 , 
and in 1924 conquering the Hijaz, including Mecca and Medina. 
Chosen as king of the Hijaz and Najd in 1927, Abd al Aziz was 
obliged to defeat the Ikhwan militarily in 1929 because in their zeal 
the Ikhwan had encroached on the borders of neighboring states, 
thereby arousing the concern of Britain, in particular. In 1932 Abd 
al Aziz proclaimed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which covered 
an area approximating the territory of the present state. The dis- 
covery of oil in 1938 ultimately transformed the kingdom and the 
lives of its inhabitants. During his reign, however, Abd al Aziz 
sought to obtain "the iron of the West without its ideas," as the 
king phrased it; he sought to make use of Western technology but 
at the same time to maintain the traditional institutions associated 
with Islamic and Arab life. 

Upon Abd al Aziz's death in 1953, his son Saud ibn Abd al Aziz 
Al Saud succeeded to the throne. Saud proved to be an ineffective 
ruler and a spendthrift, whose luxurious life-style, together with 
that of the advisers with whom he surrounded himself, rapidly led 
to the depletion of the kingdom's treasury. As a result, the Al Saud 
obliged Saud in 1958, and again in 1962, to give his brother, Crown 
Prince Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, executive power to con- 
duct foreign and domestic affairs. In 1964 the royal family, with 
the consent of the ulama, or religious leaders, deposed Saud and 
made Faisal king, appointing Khalid ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, 
another brother, as crown prince. 

Faisal, a devout Muslim, sought to modernize the kingdom, es- 
pecially in regard to economic development, education, and defense, 
while simultaneously playing a key role in foreign policy. For in- 
stance, during the October 1973 War between Israel and the Arab 
states of Syria, Jordan, and Egypt, Faisal helped to initiate an oil 
embargo against those countries that supported Israel; the embargo 
led to the tripling of oil prices. He supported the education of girls 
and the opening of government television stations to promote edu- 
cation. Tragically, Faisal was assassinated in 1975 by a deranged 
nephew. 

Crown Prince Khalid ibn Abd al Aziz became king (and de facto 
prime minister) immediately; his brother, Fahd ibn Abd al Aziz 
Al Saud, served as deputy prime minister and another brother, 
Abd Allah ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, as second deputy prime 
minister. Khalid dealt primarily with domestic affairs, stressing 
agricultural development. He also visited all the gulf states, and 
took a keen interest in settling Saudi Arabia's outstanding boundary 



xxn 



disputes, including that of the Al Buraymi Oasis with the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1975. (The area near Al Buraymi dis- 
puted with Oman had been resolved in 1971.) Fahd became the 
principal spokesman on foreign affairs and oil policy. Khalid's reign 
was an eventful one; it saw the attempt by strict Islamists (also 
known as fundamentalists), who criticized the corrupting influence 
of Western culture on the royal family, to take over the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca in 1979, riots by Eastern Province Shia (see Glos- 
sary) also in 1979 and 1980, and the formation of the Gulf Cooper- 
ation Council (GCC) in 1981. 

Upon Khalid's death in 1982, Fahd assumed the throne, with 
Abd Allah becoming crown prince. Fahd soon faced the impact 
on the kingdom of the fall in oil revenues, which ended in the 1986 
oil price crash. Recognizing the need for a more united Arab front, 
particularly in view of the deteriorating economic situation, he 
reestablished diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1987; relations had 
been broken in 1978 as a result of Anwar as Sadat's signing of the 
Camp David Accords, creating a separate peace between Egypt 
and Israel. Fahd also played a mediating role in the Lebanese civil 
war in 1989, bringing most of the members of the Lebanese Na- 
tional Assembly to At Taif to settle their differences. 

To understand the forces that have shaped Saudi Arabia in the 
early 1990s, one must consider the roles of geographic factors, tribal 
allegiance and beduin life, Islam, the Al Saud, and the discovery 
of oil. Tribal affiliation has been the focus of identity in the Arabian 
Peninsula, approximately 80 percent of which is occupied by Saudi 
Arabia. Well into the present century, several great deserts, in- 
cluding the Rub al Khali, one of the largest in the world, cut tribal 
groups off from one another and isolated Najd, particularly, from 
other areas of the country. As a result, a high degree of cultural 
homogeneity developed among the inhabitants; the majority fol- 
low Sunni Wahhabi Islam and a patriarchal family system. Only 
about 5 percent of the Saudi population adheres to the Shia sect. 
The Shia, in general, represent the lowest socioeconomic group 
in the country, and their grievances over their status have led to 
protest demonstrations in the 1970s, and again in 1979-80, that 
have resulted in government actions designed to better their lot. 

Saudi tribal allegiance and the beduin heritage have been 
weakened, however, since the mid-twentieth century by the in- 
creased role of a centralized state, by the growth of urbanization, 
and by the industrialization that has accompanied the finding of 
oil. At the same time, the impact of Islam on different elements 
of the population has varied. Many of the educated younger tech- 
nocrats have felt a need to adapt Islamic institutions to fit the 



xxm 



demands of modern technology. Other young people, more con- 
servatively inclined, as well as a number of their elders and those 
with a more traditional beduin life-style, have deplored the alien- 
ation from Muslim values and the corruption that they believe 
Western ways and the presence, according to 1992 census figures, 
of some 4.6 million foreigners (in contrast to an indigenous popu- 
lation of 12.3 million) have brought into the kingdom. Their ac- 
tivist Islamism was reflected in the 1979 attempt by extremists to 
take over the Grand Mosque in Mecca and by other aspects of the 
Islamic revival, such as the prominent wearing of the hijab, or long 
black cloak and veil by women, and the more active role of the 
Committees for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice 
(mutawwiin) in enforcing standards of public morality. The govern- 
ment found itself caught between these two trends. On the one hand, 
it feared the extremism of some of the traditionalists, which could 
well undermine the economic, education, and social development 
programs that the government had been implementing and which 
also constituted a threat to internal security. On the other hand, 
as guardian of the holy places of Islam, the sites of the annual pil- 
grimage for Muslims the world over, the government needed to 
legitimate itself as an "Islamic government." 

The government therefore has sought to achieve political and 
social compromises. Repeated announcements have been made 
regarding the royal family's intention to create a consultative coun- 
cil, first proposed by King Faisal in 1962, as a means of giving 
a greater voice to the people. On August 20, 1993, Fahd announced 
the appointment of sixty men to the Consultative Council. Mem- 
bers of the council were primarily religious and tribal leaders; 
government officials, businessmen, and retired military and police 
officers were also included. An additional small step was King 
Fahd's decree of March 1992 establishing a main, or basic, code 
of laws that regularizes succession to the throne (the king chooses 
the heir apparent from among the sons and grandsons of Abd al 
Aziz) and sets forth various administrative procedures concerning 
the state. Fahd also issued a decree concerning the provinces, or 
regions, of the kingdom. Each region is to have an amir, a deputy, 
and a consultative council composed of at least ten persons ap- 
pointed by the amir for a four-year term. The code does not, 
however, protect individual rights in the Western sense, as many 
professionals and technocrats had desired. Rather, it says that "the 
state protects human rights in accordance with the Islamic sharia." 

The Saudi concept of legitimacy is akin to the beduin concept 
of tribal democracy in which the individual exchanges views with 
the tribal shaykh. Saudi rulers and most traditionalists reject 



xxiv 



Western participatory democracy, because the latter establishes the 
people as the source of decision rather than the will of God as found 
in the sharia and as interpreted by the ulama. Moreover, in their 
view, democracy lacks the stability that a Muslim form of govern- 
ment provides. For these reasons, the government has tended to 
repress dissent and jail dissidents. Such repression applied to stu- 
dents and religious figures who belonged to such organizations as 
the Organization of Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula, 
active in January and February 1992 in criticizing the ruling fam- 
ily and the government. 

Socially, the education of girls, although placed under the su- 
pervision of the religious authorities, has led over the four decades 
that girls' schools have existed to a considerable number of women 
graduates who were seeking employment in various sectors and 
who increasingly were making their presence felt. This trend oc- 
curred at a time of rising unemployment for Saudi males, particu- 
larly for graduates in the field of religious studies, and posed a 
further potential source of dissidence. In addition, growing urbani- 
zation was tending to increase the number of nuclear as opposed 
to extended families, thereby breaking down traditional social struc- 
tures. There were also indications that drug smuggling and drug 
use were rising; twenty of the forty executions that occurred be- 
tween January 1 and May 1, 1993, were drug related. 

The Al Saud played the central role in achieving the needed com- 
promises in the political, social, and foreign affairs fields, as well 
as in directing the economy with the support of the technocrats 
and the merchants. The control exercised by the Al Saud is demon- 
strated by the fact that as of 1993 the amirs, or governors, of all 
fourteen of Saudi Arabia's regions were members of the royal 
family. Some members of the family, such as King Fahd and his 
full brothers Sultan, Nayif, and Salman, were considered to be, 
however, more aligned with the modernizers; King Fahd's half 
brother Crown Prince Abd Allah, was more of a traditionalist. 
Specifically, the crown prince enjoyed the support of the tribal ele- 
ments and headed the Saudi Arabian National Guard, a paramili- 
tary body composed largely of beduin soldiers that served as a 
counterbalance to the regular armed forces, which were headed 
by Minister of Defense and Aviation Amir Sultan ibn Abd al Aziz 
Al Saud. The nation's police force reported to Minister of Inter- 
ior Amir Nayif ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud. 

The crown prince was also considered closer than the king to 
the religious establishment, or the ulama. Thirty to forty of the 
most influential ulama, mainly members of the Al ash Shaykh, con- 
stituted the Council of Senior Ulama, seven of whose members 



xxv 



were dismissed by the king in December 1992 on the pretext of 
"poor health. ' ' The actual reason for their dismissal was their failure 
to condemn July criticisms (published in September) of the govern- 
ment by a group of religious scholars who called themselves the 
Committee for the Defense of Rights under the Sharia. The king 
named ten younger and more progressive ulama to replace them. 

In a further move, in July 1993 the king named Shaykh Abd 
al Aziz ibn Baz general mufti of the kingdom with the rank of 
minister and president of the Administration of Scientific Research 
and Fatwa. Abd al Aziz ibn Baz was also appointed to preside over 
the new eighteen-member Higher Ulama Council. Based on Abd 
al Aziz ibn Baz's advice, instead of the Ministry of Pilgrimage Af- 
fairs and Religious Trusts, the king created two new ministries: 
the Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, Call, and Guidance 
and the Ministry of Pilgrimage; this action gave the religious sec- 
tor an additional voice in the Council of Ministers. 

In addition to holding conservative domestic views, the crown 
prince was more oriented than Fahd toward the Arab world. After 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, however, he joined the king 
and other more pro-Western members of the royal family in ask- 
ing the United States to send forces to the kingdom. 

In the foreign policy arena, Saudi Arabia historically has sought 
to walk a narrow line between East and West. Because of its strong 
commitment to Islam, the kingdom abhorred the atheist policy of 
the former Soviet Union and therefore tended to be somewhat pro- 
Western concerning defense matters. However, Saudi Arabia also 
strongly opposed what it considered to be the pro-Zionist policy 
of the United States with regard to Israel and the rights of the Pales- 
tinians. At one time, the kingdom had relatively close relations with 
Jordan, a fellow monarchy, but Jordan's failure to support Saudi 
Arabia in the 1991 Persian Gulf War soured those relations and 
resulted in the expulsion from the kingdom of thousands of Pales- 
tinians and Jordanians. In the war, Saudi Arabia also experienced 
a lack of support by Sudan and Yemen, both of which countries 
it had aided substantially. In 1993 relations with Yemen were some- 
what tense because the kingdom expelled about 1 million Yemenis, 
as well, during the Persian Gulf War. In addition, as of late 1992, 
Saudi Arabia had revived a dispute with Yemen over an oil-rich 
border area. 

Initially, Saudi Arabia saw both Iran and Iraq as neighbors pos- 
ing potential threats. After the Persian Gulf War, however, Saudi 
Arabia's concern over containing Iraq increased, and the kingdom 
set aside some of its reservations about Iran's form of Shia Islam 
and began to normalize relations. Despite some border disagreements 



xxvi 



with its Persian Gulf neighbors, for example, Qatar in 1992 and 
early 1993, the kingdom's concern for regional security caused its 
closest relations to be with other members of the GCC; certain ten- 
sions existed in the organization, nevertheless, because of Saudi 
Arabia's position as the "big brother." 

Saudi Arabia had taken the lead in 1970 in establishing the Or- 
ganization of the Islamic Conference to bring together all Muslim 
countries. In addition, the kingdom followed a policy of support- 
ing Islamic countries in Africa and Asia and providing military 
aid to Muslim groups opposing secular governments in Afghanistan, 
Ethiopia, and, formerly, in the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (now part of Yemen). 

Saudi Arabia's concern for regional security and its active role 
in supporting the GCC were understandable in view of its rela- 
tively small population and the resultant constraint on the size of 
its armed forces. To compensate for these limitations, the king- 
dom consistently has endeavored to buy the most up-to-date mili- 
tary materiel and especially to concentrate on developing its air 
force and air defense system. For more than twenty-five years, Saudi 
Arabia has had the highest ratio of military expenditures in rela- 
tion to military personnel of any developing country. Following 
the Persian Gulf War, the kingdom increased its 1993 defense ex- 
penditures 14 percent over those of 1992. Defense purchases in- 
cluded at least 315 United States M1A2 main battle tanks to 
upgrade materiel of the ground forces as well as seventy-two United 
States F-15C Eagles and forty-eight British Tornadoes for the air 
force. Furthermore, the Saudi navy was considered of good quality 
in relation to naval forces of the region, and the navy's facilities 
were excellent. In spite of these policies, Saudi Arabia recognized 
its vulnerability because it has the world's largest oil reserves and 
extensive oil-processing facilities. 

The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in 1938 was the 
major catalyst that transformed various aspects of the kingdom. 
The huge revenues from the sale of oil and the payments received 
from foreign companies involved in developing concessions in the 
country enabled the government to launch large-scale development 
programs by the early 1970s. Such programs initially focused on 
creation of infrastructure in the areas of transportation, telecom- 
munications, electric power, and water. The programs also ad- 
dressed the fields of education, health, and social welfare; the 
expansion and equipping of the armed forces; and the creation of 
petroleum-based industries. From this beginning, the government 
expanded its programs to drill more deep wells to tap underground 
aquifers and to construct desalination plants. These water sources, 



xxvn 



in turn, enabled ventures to make the country more nearly self- 
sufficient agriculturally; in many instances, however, such under- 
takings seriously depleted groundwater. 

In pursuit of industrial diversification, the government created 
the industrial cities of Al Jubayl in the Eastern Province and Yanbu 
al Bahr (known as Yanbu) on the Red Sea (see fig. 1). The govern- 
ment also encouraged the establishment of nonoil-related indus- 
tries, anticipating the day when Saudi Arabia's oil and gas resources 
would be depleted. Furthermore, the kingdom also has some 
promising copper, lead, zinc, silver, and gold deposits that have 
received little exploitation. 

The kingdom's economic plans, including the Fifth Development 
Plan (1990-95), continued to emphasize training the indigenous 
labor force to handle technologically advanced processes and hence 
to enable Saudi Arabia to reduce the number of its foreign workers. 
The fifth plan also encouraged the creation of joint industrial en- 
terprises with GCC member states and other Arab and Islamic 
countries and the development of industrial relations with foreign 
countries in order to attract foreign capital and transfer technology. 

Saudi Arabia's economic goals were reflected in the national 
budget announced for 1993, which set expenditures at US$52.6 
billion and revenues at US$45. 1 billion, thereby reducing the deficit 
from US$8.0 billion in 1992 to US$7.5 billion in 1993. The con- 
tinued existence of a deficit, which has characterized the Saudi econ- 
omy since 1983, was a source of concern to some observers. Major 
budgetary 7 expenditure items were US$9. 1 billion for education (in- 
cluding funds to establish six new colleges and 800 new schools), 
US$8.2 billion for public organizations (not further identified), and 
more than US$3.7 billion for health and social development (in- 
cluding funds for setting up 500 new clinics). Another major ex- 
penditure announced in March 1993 was that substantial funds, 
most of which would be obtained from private borrowing, would 
be invested in oil facilities in order to raise the kingdom's oil produc- 
tion capacity to between 10.5 and 11 million barrels per day by 
1995 and its total refining capacity to 210,000 barrels per day. 

The major event affecting Saudi Arabia and other gulf states 
in the early 1990s was clearly the Persian Gulf War. The effect 
of that war on the kingdom has yet to be assessed. Financially, the 
cost of the war for the area as a whole has been estimated by the 
Arab Monetary Fund at US$676 billion for 1990 and 1991. This 
figure does not, however, take account of such factors as the eco- 
logical impact of the war, the loss of jobs and income for thou- 
sands of foreign workers employed in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere 
in the gulf, and the slowdown effect on the growth of the economies 



xxvm 



of Saudi Arabia and the gulf states. In most instances, these econ- 
omies had been growing at a good rate before the war, which tended 
to deplete or eliminate any accumulated financial reserves. 

More difficult to measure, however, was the social impact of the 
war. Many foreign observers had speculated that the arrival in the 
kingdom of more than 600,000 foreign military personnel, including 
women in uniform, would bring about significant changes in Saudi 
society. However, military personnel tended to be assigned to re- 
mote border areas of the country and were little seen by the popu- 
lation as a whole. The net effect of their presence was therefore 
minimal in the opinion of a number of knowledgeable Saudis. 

As Saudi Arabia entered the final years of the twentieth cen- 
tury, there were signs, however, that the expression of public dis- 
sent, once unthinkable, was becoming more commonplace. Such 
dissent was usually couched within an Islamic framework, but 
nonetheless it represented a force with which the Al Saud had to 
reckon. King Fahd, now seventy- two, had succeeded thus far in 
balancing the demands of modernists and traditionalists domesti- 
cally and in pursuing a policy of moderation internationally. Some 
observers wondered, however, how much longer Fahd would be 
able to rule and how adaptable the more conservative Crown Prince 
Abd Allah would be as Fahd's successor. 



August 23, 1993 Helen Chapin Metz 



XXIX 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud, founder of Saudi Arabia 



ABD AL AZIZ ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud rose to prominence 
in the Arabian Peninsula in the early twentieth century. He be- 
longed to the Saud family (the Al Saud — see Glossary), who had 
controlled parts of Arabia during most of the nineteenth century. 
By the late nineteenth century, however, the rival Al Rashid fam- 
ily had forced the Al Saud into exile in Kuwait. Thus, it was from 
Kuwait that Abd al Aziz began the campaign to restore his family 
to political power. First, he recaptured Najd, a mostly desert region 
in the approximate center of the peninsula and the traditional 
homeland of the Al Saud. During the mid- 1920s, Abd al Aziz's 
armies captured the Islamic shrine cities of Mecca and Medina. 
In 1932, he declared that the area under his control would be known 
as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 

Abd al Aziz's new realm was a very poor one. It was a desert king- 
dom with few known natural resources and a largely uneducated 
population. There were few cities and virtually no industry. Although 
the shrines at Mecca and Medina earned income from the Muslim 
pilgrims who visited them every year, this revenue was insufficient 
to lift the rest of the kingdom out of its near- subsistence level. 

All this changed, however, when United States geologists dis- 
covered oil in the kingdom during the 1930s. Saudi Arabia's ex- 
ploitation of its oil resources transformed the country into a nation 
synonymous with great wealth. Wealth brought with it enormous 
material and social change. 

Perhaps because of the great upheaval since the 1932 oil discov- 
ery, history and origins were very important to Saudi Arabia. 
Although the country owed its prominence to modern economic 
realities, Saudis tended to view life in more traditional terms. The 
state in 1992 remained organized largely along tribal lines. Islam 
continued to be a vital element in Saudi statecraft. 

The tendency to draw inspiration from the past was an essential 
part of the Saudi state. The historical parallels between the King- 
dom of Saudi Arabia and its Arab and Islamic past were striking. 
In conquering Arabia, for instance, Abd al Aziz brought together 
the region's nomadic tribes in much the same way that his great- 
grandfather, Muhammad ibn Saud, had done more than a cen- 
tury earlier. 

The Setting of Saudi Arabia 

The title, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, uses the word kingdom, 
which is not an Islamic term. However, given the significance of 



3 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

religion in Saudi Arabia, it is clear that Saudis believe that ulti- 
mate authority rests with God (Allah). The Saudi ruler is Allah's 
secular representative and bases political legitimacy on his religious 
credentials (see The King, ch. 4). 

The term Saudi refers to the Al Saud family, the royal house of 
Saudi Arabia, whose eponym is Saud ibn Muhammad ibn Muqrin. 
Saud himself was not a significant figure, but his son, Muham- 
mad ibn Saud (literally, Muhammad, the son of Saud), conquered 
most of the Arabian Peninsula in the early eighteenth century. In 
the almost two centuries since then, Muhammad ibn Saud's fam- 
ily has grown tremendously, and in 1992 the ruling house of Saudi 
Arabia had more than 4,000 male members. 

The term Arabia — or the Arabian Peninsula — refers to a geo- 
graphic region whose name is related to the language of the majority 
of its indigenous inhabitants. Before the era of the Muslim con- 
quests in the mid-seventh century, some Arabic-speaking peoples 
also lived in Palestine, Syria, and Iraq, and Christian Arab buffer 
states were established north of the peninsula between the Sassanid 
and Byzantine empires. As a result of the Muslim conquests, 
however, people of the peninsula spread out over the wider region 
that today is known as the "Arab world," and the Arabic language 
became the region's dominant language. 

The desert is the most prominent feature of the Arabian Penin- 
sula. Although vast, arid tracts dominate Saudi Arabia, the coun- 
try also includes long stretches of arid coastline along the Persian 
Gulf and the Red Sea and several major oases in the Eastern 
Province (see fig. 1). Accordingly, the Saudi environment is not 
uniform, and the differences between coastal and desert life have 
played their part in Arabian history. People living on the water 
have had more contact with other groups and thus have developed 
more cosmopolitan outlooks than those living in the interior. 

Saudi Arabia is the largest country on the Arabian Peninsula. 
It shares the Persian Gulf and Red Sea coasts with such countries 
as the Persian Gulf states and Jordan; hence there are cultural and 
historical overlaps with its neighbors. Many of these countries rely 
on the authority of a single family — whether the ruler calls himself 
a king, as in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, or an amir, as in the gulf 
states. Tribal loyalties also play an important role in these coun- 
tries, and large portions of their populations have only recently 
stopped living as nomads. 

Several important factors, however, distinguish Saudi Arabia 
from its neighbors. Unlike other states in the area, Saudi Arabia 
has never been under the direct control of a European power. 
Moreover, the Wahhabi movement that began in Saudi Arabia 



4 



Historical Setting 



has had a greater impact on Saudi history than on any other coun- 
try. Although the religious fervor of Wahhabism affected popula- 
tions of such neighboring states as present-day Qatar, only in Saudi 
Arabia was it an essential element in the formation of the modern 
state. 

The Pre-lslamic Period 

The bodies of water on either side of the Arabian Peninsula 
provided relatively easy access to the neighboring river-valley civili- 
zations of the Nile and the Tigris-Euphrates. Once contact was 
made, trading could begin, and because these civilizations were 
quite rich, many goods passed between them. 

The coastal people of Arabia were well-positioned to profit from 
this trade. Much of the trade centered around present-day Bahrain 
and Oman, but those tribes living in the southwestern part of the 
peninsula, in present-day Yemen and southern Saudi Arabia, also 
profited from such trade. The climate and topography of this area 
also permitted greater agricultural development than that on the 
coast of the Persian Gulf. 

Generous rainfall in Yemen enabled the people to feed them- 
selves, while the exports of frankincense and myrrh brought wealth 
to the area. As a result, civilization developed to a relatively high 
level in southern Arabia by about 1000 B.C. The peoples of the 
area lived in small kingdoms or city states, of which the best known 
is probably Saba, which was called Sheba in the Old Testament. 
The prosperity of Yemen encouraged the Romans to refer to it as 
Arabia Felix (literally, "happy Arabia"). Outside of the coastal 
areas, however, and a few centers in the Hijaz associated with the 
caravan trade, the harsh climate of the peninsula, combined with 
a desert and mountain terrain, limited agriculture and rendered 
the interior regions difficult to access. The population most likely 
subsisted on a combination of oasis gardening and herding, with 
some portion of the population being nomadic or seminomadic. 

The material conditions under which the Arabs lived began to 
improve around 1000 B.C. About this time, a method for saddling 
camels had been developed to transport large loads. The camel was 
the only animal that could cross large tracts of barren land with 
any reliability. The Arabs could now benefit from some of the trade 
that had previously circumvented Arabia. 

The increased trans-Arabian trade produced two important 
results. One was the rise of cities that could service the trains of 
camels moving across the desert. The most prosperous of these — 
Petra in Jordan, associated with the Nabatean Kingdom, and 
Palmyra in Syria, for example — were relatively close to markets 



5 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

in the Mediterranean region, but small caravan cities developed 
within the Arabian Peninsula as well. One of the ancient cities that 
formed part of the Nabatean Kingdom from about 25 B.C. to the 
end of the first century A.D. was Madain Salin, the ruins of which 
still exist. The most important of these caravan cities was Mecca, 
which also owed its prosperity to certain shrines in the area that 
were visited by Arabs from all over the peninsula. 

Some Arabs, particularly in the Hijaz, held religious beliefs that 
recognized a number of gods as well as a number of rituals for wor- 
shiping them. The most important of these beliefs involved the sense 
that certain places and times of year were sacred and must be 
respected. At those times and in those places, warfare, in particu- 
lar, was forbidden, and various rituals were required. Foremost 
of these was the pilgrimage, and the best known pilgrimage site 
was Mecca. 

The second result of the Arabs' increased involvement in trade 
was the contact it gave them with the outside world. In the Near 
East, the Persians and the Romans were the great powers in the 
centuries before the advent of Islam, and the Arab tribes that bor- 
dered these territories were drawn into their political affairs. After 
A.D. 400, both empires paid Arab tribes not only to protect their 
southern borders but also to harass the borders of their adversaries. 

In the long term, however, it was the people that traveled with 
the camel caravans and their ideas that were most important. By 
A.D. 500, the traditional ritual of Arab worship was but one of 
a number of religious options. The Sabaeans of southern Arabia 
followed their own system of beliefs, and these had some adher- 
ents in the interior. Followers of pagan beliefs, as well as Hanifs, 
who were mentioned in the Quran and believed to be followers 
of an indigenous monotheistic religion, were widespread in the 
peninsula. In addition, the area had well-established communities 
of Christians and Jews. Along the gulf coast were Nestorians, while 
in Yemen Syrian Orthodox and smaller groups of Christians were 
to be found among beduin and in monasteries that dotted the north- 
ern Hijaz. In the sixth century, shortly before the birth of Mu- 
hammad, the city of Najran, in what is now southwestern Saudi 
Arabia, had a Christian church with a bishop, monks, priests, nuns, 
and laity, and was ruled by a Jewish king. Jews were an impor- 
tant part not only of the Yemeni population, but also of the oases 
communities in the region of Medina. 

The Early Islamic Period, 622-700 

The Saudis, and many other Arabs and Muslims as well, trace 
much of their heritage to the birth of the Prophet Muhammad in 



6 



Ancient Nabatean tomb, 
Madain Salih 
Courtesy 
Saudi Arabian 
Information Office 



A.D. 570. The time before Islam is generally referred to as "the 
time of ignorance" (of God). 

Muhammad was born in Mecca at a time when the city was es- 
tablishing itself as a trading center. For the residents of Mecca, 
tribal connections were still the most important part of the social 
structure. Muhammad was born into the Quraysh, which had be- 
come the leading tribe in the city because of its involvement with 
water rights for the pilgrimage. By the time of Muhammad, the 
Quraysh had become active traders as well, having established al- 
liances with tribes all over the peninsula. These alliances permit- 
ted the Quraysh to send their caravans to Yemen and Syria. 
Accordingly, the Quraysh represented in many ways the facilita- 
tors and power brokers for the new status quo in Arabian society. 

Tribes consisted of clans that had various branches and fami- 
lies, and Muhammad came from a respectable clan, the sons of 
Hashim, but from a weak family situation. Muhammad's father 
Abd Allah had died before his son was born, leaving the Prophet 
without a close protector. The Prophet was fortunate, however, 
that his uncle Abu Talib was one of the leaders of the Hashimite 
clan; his connection to Abu Talib gave Muhammad a certain 
amount of protection when he began to preach in 610 against the 
Meccan leadership. 

Everything we know about Muhammad's life comes from Mus- 
lim historiography. The Prophet worked for Abu Talib in the 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

caravan business, giving him the opportunity to travel beyond Ara- 
bia. Travel gave the Prophet contact with some of the Christian 
and Jewish communities that existed in Arabia; in this way he be- 
came familiar with the notion of scripture and the belief in one 
God. Despite this contact, tradition specifies that Muhammad never 
learned to read or write. As a child, however, he was sent to the 
desert for five years to learn the beduin ways that were slowly being 
forgotten in Mecca. 

Muhammad married a rich widow when he was twenty-five years 
old; although he managed her affairs, he would occasionally go 
off by himself into the mountains that surrounded Mecca. On one 
of these occasions, Muslim belief holds that the angel Gabriel ap- 
peared to Muhammad and told him to recite aloud. When Mu- 
hammad asked what he should say, the angel recited for him verses 
that would later constitute part of the Quran, which means liter- 
ally "the recitation." Muslims believe that Muhammad continued 
to receive revelations from God throughout his life, sometimes 
through the angel Gabriel and at other times in dreams and vi- 
sions directly from God. 

For a while, Muhammad told only his wife about his experiences, 
but in 613 he acknowledged them openly and began to promote 
a new social and spiritual order that would be based on them. Mu- 
hammad's message was disturbing to many of the Quraysh for 
several reasons. The Prophet attacked traditional Arab customs 
that permitted lax marriage arrangements and the killing of chil- 
dren. More significant, however, was the Prophet's claim that there 
was only one God because in condemning the worship of idols he 
threatened the pilgrimage traffic from which the Quraysh profited. 

By 618 Muhammad had gained enough followers to worry the 
city's leaders. The Quraysh hesitated to harm the Prophet because 
he was protected by his uncle, but they attacked those of his fol- 
lowers who did not have powerful family connections. To protect 
these supporters, Muhammad sent them to Ethiopia, where they 
were taken in by the Christian king who saw a connection between 
the Prophet's ideas and those of his own religion. Following his 
uncle's death in 619, however, Muhammad felt obliged to leave 
Mecca. In 622 he secretly left the city and traveled about 320 kilo- 
meters north to the town of Yathrib. In leaving Mecca, Muham- 
mad chose to abandon the city where he had grown up to pursue 
his mission in another place; thus, the event often has been used 
to illustrate a genuine commitment to duty and sacrifice. This 
emigration, or hijra (see Glossary), marks the beginning of the Is- 
lamic calendar. Muslims use a lunar calendar, which means that 
their twelve-month year is shorter than a solar one. 



8 



Historical Setting 



The Quraysh were unwilling to allow Muhammad to remain un- 
opposed in Yathrib, and various skirmishes and battles occurred, 
with each side trying to enlist the tribes of the peninsula in its cam- 
paigns. Muhammad eventually prevailed, and in 630 he returned 
to Mecca, where he was accepted without resistance. Subsequently 
he moved south to strongholds in At Taif and Khaybar, which sur- 
rendered to him after lengthy sieges. 

By his death in 632, Muhammad enjoyed the loyalty of almost 
all of Arabia. The peninsula's tribes had tied themselves to the 
Prophet with various treaties but had not necessarily become Mus- 
lim. The Prophet expected others, particularly pagans, to submit 
but allowed Christians and Jews to keep their faiths provided they 
paid a special tax as penalty for not submitting to Islam. 

After the Prophet's death, most Muslims acknowledged the 
authority of Abu Bakr (died in 634), an early convert and respected 
elder in the community. Abu Bakr maintained the loyalty of the 
Arab tribes by force; and in the battles that followed the Prophet's 
death, which came to be known as the apostasy wars, it became 
essentially impossible for an Arab tribesman to retain traditional 
religious practices. Arabs who had previously converted to Juda- 
ism or Christianity were allowed to keep their faith, but those who 
followed the old polytheistic practices were forced to become Mus- 
lims. In this way, Islam became the religion of most Arabs. 

The Prophet had no spiritual successor inasmuch as God's reve- 
lation (the Quran) was given only to Muhammad. There were, 
however, successors to the Prophet's temporal authority, and they 
were called caliphs (successors or vice regents). Caliphs ruled the 
Islamic world until 1258, when the last caliph and all his heirs were 
killed by the Mongols. For the first thirty years, caliphs managed 
the growing Islamic empire from Yathrib, which had been renamed 
Madinat an Nabi ("the city of the Prophet") or Al Madinah al 
Munawwarah ("the illuminated city"). These names are usually 
shortened simply to Medina — "the city." 

Within a short time, the caliphs had conquered a large empire. 
At the conclusion of the apostasy wars, the Arab tribes united be- 
hind Islam and channeled their energies against the Byzantine and 
Persian empires. Arab-led armies pushed quickly through both of 
these empires and established Arab control from present-day Spain 
to Pakistan. 

The achievements of Islam were great and various, but after 656 
these achievements ceased to be controlled from Arabia. After the 
third caliph, Uthman, was assassinated in 656, the Muslim world 
was split, and the fourth caliph, Ali (murdered in 660) spent much 
of his time in Iraq. After Ali, the Umayyads established a hereditary 



9 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

line of caliphs in Damascus. The Umayyads were overthrown in 
750 by the Abbasids, who ruled from Baghdad. By the latter part 
of the seventh century, the political importance of Arabia in the 
Islamic world had declined. 

The Middle Ages, 700-1500 

Until about 900, the centers of Islamic power remained in the 
Fertile Crescent, a semicircle of fertile land stretching from the 
southeastern Mediterranean coast around the Syrian Desert north 
of the Arabian Peninsula to the Persian Gulf and close to the Ara- 
bian heartland. After the ninth century, however, the most sig- 
nificant political centers moved farther and farther away — to Egypt 
and India, as well as to what is now Turkey and the Central Asian 
republics. Intellectual vitality eventually followed political power, 
and, as a result, Islamic civilization was no longer centered in Mecca 
and Medina in the Hijaz. 

Mecca remained the spiritual focus of Islam because it was the 
destination for the pilgrimage that all Muslims were required, if 
feasible, to make once in their lives. The city, however, lacked po- 
litical or administrative importance even in the early Islamic pe- 
riod. This role devolved on Medina instead, which had been the 
main base for the Prophet's efforts to gain control of the shrines 
in Mecca and to bring together the tribes of the peninsula. After 
the Prophet's death, Medina continued to be an administrative 
center and developed into something of an intellectual and liter- 
ary one as well. In the seventh and eighth centuries, for instance, 
Medina became an important center for the legal discussions that 
would lead to the codification of Islamic law. Orthodox (Sunni — 
see Glossary) Islam recognizes four systems, or schools, of law. One 
of these, the school of Malik ibn Anas, which originated with the 
scholars of Medina in the late eighth century, is observed today 
in much of Africa and Indonesia. The three other Sunni law schools 
(Hanafi, Shafii, and Hanbali) developed at about the same time, 
but largely in Iraq. 

Arabia was also the site for some of the conflicts on which the 
sectarian divisions of Islam are based (see Religion, ch. 2). A major 
Islamic sect, the Shia (from Shiat Ali, or "party of Ali" — see Glos- 
sary), is still represented in Saudi Arabia but forms a larger per- 
centage of the populations in Iraq and Iran. 

One Shia denomination, known as the Kharijite movement, 
began in events surrounding the assassination of Uthman, the third 
caliph, and the transfer of authority to Ali, the fourth caliph. Those 
people who believed Ali should have been the legitimate succes- 
sor to the Prophet refused to accept the authority of Uthman. 



10 



Al Munis village, near Az Zahran al Janub, showing the hills of 
southwestern Saudi Arabia in the background 
Courtesy Aramco World 



Muawiyah in Syria challenged Ali's election as caliph, leading to 
a war between the two and their supporters. Muawiyah and Ali 
eventually agreed to an arbitrator, and the fighting stopped. Part 
of Ali's army, however, objected to the compromise, claiming Mua- 
wiyah's family were insincere Muslims. So strong was their pro- 
test against compromise that they left Ali's camp (the term khariji 
literally means "the ones who leave") and fought a battle with their 
former colleagues the next year. 

The most prominent quality of the Kharijite movement was op- 
position to the caliph's representatives and particularly to Mua- 
wiyah, who became caliph after Ali. Although the Kharijites were 
known to some Muslims as bandits and assassins, they developed 
certain ideals of justice and piety. The Prophet Muhammad had 
been sent to bring righteousness to the world and to teach the Arabs 
to pray and to distribute their wealth and power fairly. According 
to the Kharijites, whoever was lax in following the Prophet's direc- 
tives should be opposed, ostracized, or killed. 

The Kharijite movement continued to be significant on the Per- 
sian Gulf coast from the ninth century through the eleventh cen- 
tury and survived in the twentieth century in the more moderate 
form of Ibadi Islam. The uncompromising fanaticism of the original 



11 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Kharijites resembled the fervor that enabled Arab armies to con- 
quer so much territory in the seventh century. This same spirit 
helped the Al Saud succeed at the end of the eighteenth century 
and again at the beginning of the twentieth. 

The mainstream Shia sect originated in circumstances similar 
to those of the Kharijite movement. The Shia believed that Ali 
should have succeeded the Prophet as leader of the Muslim com- 
munity. They were frustrated three times, however, when the larger 
Muslim community selected first Abu Bakr, next Umar (died in 
644), and then Uthman as caliph. Ali finally became caliph in 656. 

The dispute between Ali and Muawiyah was never resolved. 
Muawiyah returned to Syria while Ali remained in Iraq, where 
he was assassinated by a Kharijite follower in 660. Muawiyah as- 
sumed the caliphate, and Ali's supporters transferred their loyalty 
to his two sons, Hasan and Husayn. When Muawiyah 's son, Yazid, 
succeeded his father, Husayn refused to recognize his authority 
and set out for Iraq to raise support. He was intercepted by a force 
loyal to Yazid. When Husayn refused to surrender, his entire party, 
including women and children, was killed at Karbala in southeastern 
Iraq. 

The killing of Husayn provided the central ethos for the emer- 
gence of the Shia as a distinct sect. Eventually, the Shia would split 
into several separate denominations based on disputes over who 
of Ali's direct male descendants should be the true spiritual leader. 
The majority came to recognize a line of twelve leaders, each known 
as imam (see Glossary), beginning with Ali and ending with Mu- 
hammad al Muntazar (Muhammad, the awaited one). These Shia, 
who are often referred to as "Twelvers," claimed that the Twelfth 
Imam did not die but disappeared in 874. They believe that he 
will return as the "rightly guided leader," or mahdi, and usher 
in a new, more perfect order. 

Twelver Shia reverence for the imams has encouraged distinc- 
tive rituals. The most important is Ashura, the commemoration 
of the death of Husayn. Other practices include pilgrimages to 
shrines of Ali and his relatives. According to strict Wahhabi Sunni 
interpretations of Islam, these practices resemble the pagan ritu- 
als that the Prophet attacked. Therefore, observance of Ashura and 
pilgrimages to shrines have constituted flash points for sectarian 
problems between the Saudi Wahhabis and the Shia minority in 
the Eastern Province. 

The Shia minority in Saudi Arabia, like the Shia in southern 
Iraq, traces its origin to the days of Ali. A second Shia group, the 
Ismailis, or the Seveners, follow a line of imams that originally 
challenged the Seventh Imam and supported a younger brother, 



12 



Historical Setting 



Ismail. The Ismaili line of leaders has been continuous down to 
the present day. The current imam, Sadr ad Din Agha Khan, who 
is active in international humanitarian efforts, is a direct descen- 
dant of Ali. 

Although present-day Saudi Arabia has no indigenous Ismaili 
communities, an important Ismaili center existed between the ninth 
and eleventh centuries in Al Hufuf, in eastern Arabia. The Ismai- 
lis of Al Hufuf were strong enough in 930 to sack the major cities 
of Iraq. They also attacked Mecca and removed the sacred stone 
of the Kaaba, the central shrine of the Islamic pilgrimage. The pil- 
grimage was suspended for several years and resumed only after 
the stone was replaced, following the caliph's agreement to pay 
the Ismailis a ransom. 

Under normal circumstances, Muslims visited Mecca every year 
to perform the pilgrimage, and they expected the caliph to keep 
the pilgrimage routes safe and to maintain control over Mecca and 
Medina as well as the Red Sea ports providing access to them. When 
the caliph was strong, he controlled the Hijaz, but after the ninth 
century the caliph's power weakened and the Hijaz became a tar- 
get for any ruler who sought to establish his authority in the Is- 
lamic world. In 1000, for instance, an Ismaili dynasty controlled 
the Hijaz from Cairo. 

External control of the Hijaz gave the region extensive contact 
with other parts of the Muslim world. In this regard, the Hijaz 
differed greatly from the region immediately to the east, Najd. 

Najd was relatively isolated. It was more arid and barren than 
the Hijaz and was surrounded on three sides by deserts and sepa- 
rated from the Hijaz by mountains. All overland routes to the Hijaz 
passed through Najd but it was easier to go around Najd by sea. 
As the caliphs in Baghdad became less powerful, the road between 
Baghdad and Mecca that led across Najd declined in importance. 
After the thirteenth century, pilgrimage traffic was more likely to 
move up the Red Sea toward Egypt and so bypass Najd. 

So there were two faces of Arabia. To the west was the Hijaz, 
which derived a cosmopolitan quality from the foreign traffic that 
moved continually through it. In the east was Najd, which remained 
relatively isolated. During the eighteenth century, Wahhabi ideas, 
vital to the rise of the Al Saud, originated in Najd. 

The Al Saud and Wahhabi Islam, 1500-1818 

The Al Saud originated in Ad Diriyah, in the center of Najd, 
close to the modern capital of Riyadh. In about 1500, ancestors 
of Saud ibn Muhammad took over some date groves, one of the 
few forms of agriculture the region could support, and settled there. 



13 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Over time the area developed into a small town, and the clan that 
would become the Al Saud came to be recognized as its leaders. 

The rise of Al Saud is closely linked with Muhammad ibn Abd 
al Wahhab (1703-87), a Muslim scholar whose ideas form the basis 
of the Wahhabi movement. He grew up in Uyaynah, an oasis in 
southern Najd, where with his grandfather he studied Hanbali Is- 
lamic law, one of the strictest Muslim legal schools. While still a 
young man, he left Uyaynah to study with other teachers, the usual 
way to pursue higher education in the Islamic world. He studied 
in Medina and then went to Iraq and to Iran. 

To understand the significance of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wah- 
hab's ideas, they must be considered in the context of Islamic prac- 
tice. There is a difference between the established rituals clearly 
defined in religious texts that all Muslims perform and popular 
Islam. The latter refers to local practice that is not universal. 

The Shia practice of visiting shrines is an example of a popular 
practice. The Shia continued to revere the imams even after their 
death and so visited their graves to ask favors of the imams buried 
there. Over time, Shia scholars rationalized the practice and it be- 
came established. 

Some of the Arabian tribes came to attribute the same sort of 
power that the Shia recognized in the tomb of an imam to natural 
objects such as trees and rocks. Such beliefs were particularly dis- 
turbing to Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab. In the late 1730s, he 
returned to the Najdi town of Huraymila and began to write and 
preach against both Shia and local popular practices. He focused 
on the Muslim principle that there is only one God and that God 
does not share his power with anyone — not imams, and certainly 
not trees or rocks. From this unitarian principle, his students began 
to refer to themselves as muwahhidun (unitarians). Their detractors 
referred to them as "Wahhabis" — or "followers of Muhammad 
ibn Abd al Wahhab," which had a pejorative connotation. 

The idea of a unitary god was not new. Muhammad ibn Abd 
al Wahhab, however, attached political importance to it. He di- 
rected his attack against the Shia. He also sought out local lead- 
ers, trying to convince them that his teaching was an Islamic issue. 
He expanded his message to include strict adherence to the princi- 
ples of Islamic law. He referred to himself as a "reformer" and 
looked for a political figure who might give his ideas a wider au- 
dience. 

Lacking political support in Huraymila, Muhammad ibn Abd al 
Wahhab returned to Uyaynah where he won over some local leaders. 
Uyaynah, however, was close to Al Hufuf, one of the Twelver Shia 
centers in eastern Arabia, and its leaders were understandably 



14 



Historical Setting 



alarmed at the anti-Shia tone of the Wahhabi message. Partly as 
a result of their influence, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab was 
obliged to leave Uyaynah and headed for Ad Diriyah. He had ear- 
lier made contact with Muhammad ibn Saud, the leader in Ad 
Diriyah at the time, and two of Muhammad's brothers had ac- 
companied him when he destroyed tomb shrines around Uyaynah. 

Accordingly, when Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab arrived in 
Ad Diriyah, the Al Saud was ready to support him. In 1744 Mu- 
hammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab swore a 
traditional Muslim oath in which they promised to work together 
to establish a state ruled according to Islamic principles. Until that 
time, the Al Saud had been accepted as conventional tribal lead- 
ers whose rule was based on longstanding but vaguely defined 
authority. 

Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab offered the Al Saud a clearly 
defined religious mission to which to contribute their leadership 
and upon which they might base their political authority. This sense 
of religious purpose remained evident in the political ideology of 
Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. 

Muhammad ibn Saud began by leading armies into Najdi towns 
and villages to eradicate various popular and Shia practices. The 
movement helped to rally the towns and tribes of Najd to the Al 
Saud-Wahhabi standard. By 1765 Muhammad ibn Saud's forces 
had established Wahhabism — and with it the Al Saud political 
authority — over most of Najd. 

After Muhammad ibn Saud died in 1765, his son, Abd al Aziz, 
continued the Wahhabi advance. In 1802 the Al Saud-Wahhabi 
armies attacked and sacked Karbala, including the Shia shrine that 
commemorates the death of Husayn. In 1803 they moved to take 
control of Sunni towns in the Hijaz. Although the Wahhabis spared 
Mecca and Medina the destruction they visited upon Karbala, they 
destroyed monuments and grave markers that were being used for 
prayer to Muslim saints and for votive rituals, which the Wahha- 
bis considered acts of polytheism (see Wahhabi Theology, ch. 2). 
In destroying the objects that were the focus of these rituals, the 
Wahhabis sought to imitate Muhammad's destruction of pagan 
idols when he reentered Mecca in 630. 

While the Al Saud remained in Najd, the world paid them scant 
attention. Capturing the Hijaz, however, brought the Al Saud em- 
pire into conflict with the rest of the Islamic world. The popular 
and Shia practices to which the Wahhabis objected were impor- 
tant to other Muslims, the majority of whom were alarmed that 
shrines were destroyed and access to the holy cities restricted. 



15 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Moreover, rule over the Hijaz was an important symbol. The 
Ottoman Turks, the most important political force in the Islamic 
world at the time, refused to concede rule over the Hijaz to local 
leaders. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Ottomans 
were not in a position to recover the Hijaz, because their forces 
were weak and overextended. Accordingly, the Ottomans delegated 
the recapture of the Hijaz to their most ambitious client, Muham- 
mad Ali, the semi-independent commander of their garrison in 
Egypt. Muhammad Ali, in turn, handed the job to his son Tur- 
sun, who led a force to the Hijaz in 1816; Muhammad Ali later 
joined his son to command the force in person. 

Meanwhile, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab had died in 1792, 
and Abd al Aziz died shortly before the capture of Mecca. The 
movement had continued, however, to recognize the leadership of 
the Al Saud and so followed Abd al Aziz's son, Saud, until 1814; 
after Saud died in 1814, his son, Abd Allah, ruled. Accordingly, 
it was Abd Allah ibn Saud ibn Abd al Aziz who faced the invading 
Egyptian army. 

Tursun's forces took Mecca and Medina almost immediately. 
Abd Allah chose this time to retreat to the family's strongholds in 
Najd. Muhammad Ali decided to pursue him there, sending out 
another army under the command of his other son, Ibrahim. The 
Wahhabis made their stand at the traditional Al Saud capital of 
Ad Diriyah, where they managed to hold out for two years against 
superior Egyptian forces and weaponry. In the end, however, the 
Wahhabis proved no match for the Egyptian forces, and Ad 
Diriyah— and Abd Allah with it— fell in 1818. 

Nineteenth-Century Arabia 

The modern history of Arabia is often broken into three periods 
that follow the fortunes of the Al Saud. The first begins with the 
alliance between Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd 
al Wahhab and ends with the capture of Abd Allah. The second 
period extends from this point to the rise of the second Abd al Aziz 
ibn Saud, the founder of the modern state; the third consists of 
the establishment and present history of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia. 

In the Egyptians' attempt to establish control over the penin- 
sula, Muhammad Ali removed members of the Al Saud from the 
area. Following orders from the Ottoman sultan, he sent Abd Allah 
to Istanbul — where he was publicly beheaded — and forced other 
members of the family to leave the country. A few prominent mem- 
bers of the Al Saud found their way to Egypt. 



16 



Historical Setting 



The Egyptians turned next to the symbol of the Al Saud rule, 
the city of Ad Diriyah. They razed its walls and buildings and de- 
stroyed its palm groves so that the area could not support any 
agricultural settlement for some time. The Egyptians then sent 
troops to strategic parts of the peninsula to tighten their grip on 
it. They garrisoned Al Qatif, a port on the Persian Gulf that sup- 
plied some of the important centers in eastern Arabia and main- 
tained various forces along the Red Sea coast in the west (see fig. 2). 

In the Hijaz, Muhammad Ali restored the authority of the ashraf 
(sing., sharif — see Glossary), who had ruled the area from Mecca 
since the tenth century. However, Turki ibn Abd Allah, the uncle 
of one of the penultimate rulers (Saud), upset Egyptian efforts to 
exercise authority in the area. Turki had fought at Ad Diriyah but 
managed to escape the Egyptians when the town fell in 1818. He 
hid for two years among loyal forces to the south and, after a few 
unsuccessful attempts, recaptured Ad Diriyah in 1821. From the 
ruins of Ad Diriyah, Turki proceeded to Riyadh, another Najdi 
city, which eventually became the new Al Saud base. Forces under 
Turki's control reclaimed the rest of Najd in 1824. 

Turki 's relatively swift retaking of Najd showed the extent to 
which the Al Saud-Wahhabi authority had been established in the 
area over the previous fifty years. The successes of the Wahhabi 
forces had done much to promote tribal loyalty to the Al Saud. 
But the Wahhabi principles of the Al Saud rule were equally com- 
pelling. After Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab's death in 1792, 
the Al Saud leader assumed the title of imam. Thus, Al Saud lead- 
ers were recognized not just as shaykhs or leaders, but as Wahhabi 
imams, political and religious figures whose rule had an element 
of religious authority. 

Turki and his successors ruled from Riyadh over a wide area. 
They controlled the region to the north and south of Najd and ex- 
erted considerable influence along the western coast of the Persian 
Gulf. This area was no state but a large sphere of influence that 
the Al Saud held together with a combination of treaties and dele- 
gated authority. In the Jabal Shammar to the north, for instance, 
the Al Saud supported the rule of Abd Allah ibn Rashid with whom 
Turki maintained a close alliance. Later, Turki's son Faisal ce- 
mented this alliance by marrying his son, Talal, to Abd Allah's 
daughter, Nura. Although this family-to-family connection worked 
well, the Al Saud preferred to rely in the east on appointed leaders 
to rule on their behalf. In other areas, they were content to estab- 
lish treaties under the terms of which tribes agreed to defend the 
family's interests or to refrain from attacking the Al Saud when 
the opportunity arose. 



17 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 




Figure 2. Nineteenth- Century Arabia 



Within their sphere of influence, the Al Saud could levy troops 
for military campaigns from the towns and tribes under their con- 
trol. Although these campaigns were mostly police actions against 
recalcitrant tribes, the rulers described them as holy wars (jihad), 
which they conducted according to religious principles. The trib- 
ute that the Al Saud demanded from those under their control also 
was based on Islamic principles. Towns, for instance, paid taxes 
at a rate established by Muslim law, and the troops that accompa- 
nied the Al Saud on raiding expeditions returned one-fifth of their 
booty to the Al Saud treasury according to sharia (Muslim law) 
requirements. 

The collection of tribute was another indication of the extensive 
influence the Al Saud derived because of their Wahhabi connections. 



18 



Historical Setting 



Wahhabi religious ideas had spread through the central part of the 
Arabian Peninsula; as a result, the Al Saud influenced decisions 
even in areas not under their control, such as succession battles 
and questions of tribute. Their influence in the Hijaz, however, 
remained restricted. Not only were the Egyptians and Ottomans 
careful that the region not slip away again, but Wahhabi ideas had 
not found a receptive audience in western Arabia. Accordingly, 
the family was unable to gain a foothold in the Hijaz during the 
nineteenth century. 

The Al Saud maintained authority in Arabia by controlling sev- 
eral factors. First, they could resist, or at least accommodate, Egyp- 
tian interference. After 1824 when the Egyptians no longer could 
maintain outright military control over Arabia, they turned to po- 
litical intrigues. Turki, for instance, was assassinated in 1834 by 
a member of the Al Saud who recently had returned from Cairo. 
When Turki' s son, Faisal, succeeded his father, the Egyptians sup- 
ported a rival member of the family, Khalid ibn Saud, who with 
Egyptian assistance controlled Najd for the next four years. 

Muhammad Ali and the Egyptians were severely weakened after 
the British and French defeated their fleet off the coast of Greece 
in 1827. This action prevented the Egyptians from exerting much 
influence in Arabia, but it left the Al Saud with the problem of 
the Ottomans, whose ultimate authority Turki eventually ac- 
knowledged. Because the challenge to the sultan had helped end 
the first Al Saud empire in 1818, later rulers chose to accommo- 
date the Ottomans as much as they could. The Al Saud eventually 
became of considerable financial importance to the Ottomans be- 
cause they collected tribute from the rich trading state of Oman 
and forwarded much of this to the ashraf in Mecca, who relayed 
it to the sultan. In return, the Ottomans recognized the Al Saud 
authority and left them alone for the most part. 

The Ottomans, however, sometimes tried to expand their in- 
fluence by supporting renegade members of the Al Saud. When 
two of Faisal's sons, Abd Allah and Saud, vied to take over the 
empire from their father, Abd Allah enlisted the aid of the Otto- 
man governor in Iraq, who used the opportunity to take Al Qatif 
and Al Hufuf in eastern Arabia. The Ottomans eventually were 
driven out, but until the time of Abd al Aziz they continued to 
look for a relationship with the Al Saud that they could exploit. 

One of the reasons the Ottomans were unsuccessful was the grow- 
ing British interest in Arabia. The British government in India con- 
sidered the Persian Gulf to be its western flank and thus increasingly 
became concerned about the trade with the Arab tribes on the 
eastern coast. The British were also anxious about potentially hostile 



19 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Ottoman influence in an area so close to India and the planned 
Suez Canal. As a result, the British came into increasing contact 
with the Al Saud. As Wahhabi leaders, the Al Saud could exert 
some control over some of the tribes on the gulf coast, and they 
were simultaneously involved with the Ottomans. During the period 
from the 1830s to the 1880s, the Al Saud leaders began to play 
off the Ottomans and British against each other. 

Whereas the Al Saud were largely successful in handling these 
two powers in the Persian Gulf, they did not do so well in manag- 
ing their family affairs. The killing of Turki in 1834 touched off 
a long period of fighting. Turki's son, Faisal, held power until he 
was expelled from Riyadh by Khalid and his Egyptian supporters. 
Then, Abd Allah ibn Thunayyan (from yet another branch of the 
Al Saud) seized Riyadh. He could maintain power only briefly in 
the early 1840s, however, because Faisal, who had been taken to 
Cairo and then escaped, retook the city in 1845. 

Faisal ruled until 1865, lending some stability to Arabia. Upon 
his death, however, fighting started again, and his three sons — 
Abd Allah, Abd ar Rahman, and Saud — as well as some of Saud's 
sons each held Riyadh on separate occasions (see fig. 3). The po- 
litical structure of Arabia was such that each leader had to win the 
support of various tribes and towns to conduct a campaign. In this 
way, alliances were constantly formed and reformed, and the more 
often this occurred, the more unstable the situation became. 

This instability accelerated the decline of the Al Saud after the 
death of Faisal. While the Al Saud were bickering among them- 
selves, however, the family of Muhammad ibn Rashid, who con- 
trolled the area around the Jabal Shammar, had been gaining 
strength and expanding its influence in northern Najd. In 1891 
Muhammad ibn Rashid, the grandson of the leader with whom 
Turki had first made an alliance, was in a position to enhance his 
own power. He removed the sons of Saud ibn Faisal from Riyadh 
and returned the city to the nominal control of their uncle, Abd 
ar Rahman. Muhammad put effective control of the city, however, 
into the hands of his own garrison commander, Salim ibn Subhan. 
When Abd ar Rahman attempted to exert real authority, he was 
driven out of Riyadh. Thus, the Al Saud, along with the young 
Abd al Aziz, were obliged to take refuge with the amir of Kuwait. 

The Rise of Abd al Aziz, 1890-1926 

The founder of the modern state of Saudi Arabia lived much 
of his early life in exile. In the end, however, he not only recov- 
ered the territory of the first Al Saud empire, but made a state out 
of it. Abd al Aziz did this by maneuvering among a number of 



20 



Historical Setting 



forces. The first was the religious fervor that Wahhabi Islam con- 
tinued to inspire. His Wahhabi army, the Ikhwan (brotherhood — 
see Glossary), for instance, represented a powerful tool, but one 
that proved so difficult to control that the ruler ultimately had to 
destroy it. At the same time, Abd al Aziz had to anticipate the man- 
ner in which events in Arabia would be viewed abroad and allow 
foreign powers, particularly the British, to have their way. 

Abd al Aziz established the Saudi state in three stages, namely, 
by retaking Najd in 1905, defeating the Al Rashid at Hail in 1921 , 
and conquering the Hijaz in 1924. In the first phase, Abd al Aziz 
acted as tribal leaders had acted for centuries: while still in Kuwait, 
and only in his twenties, Abd al Aziz rallied a small force from 
the surrounding tribes and began to raid areas under Al Rashid 
control north of Riyadh. Then in early 1902, he led a small party 
in a surprise attack on the Al Rashid garrison in Riyadh. 

The successful attack gave Abd al Aziz a foothold in Najd. One 
of his first tasks was to establish himself in Riyadh as the Al Saud 
leader and the Wahhabi imam. Abd al Aziz obtained the support 
of the religious establishment in Riyadh, and this relatively swift 
recognition revealed the political force of Wahhabi authority. 
Leadership in this tradition did not necessarily follow age, but it 
respected lineage and, particularly, action. Despite his relative 
youth, by taking Riyadh Abd al Aziz had showed he possessed the 
qualities the tribes valued in a leader. 

From his seat in Riyadh, Abd al Aziz continued to make agree- 
ments with some tribes and to do battle with others. He eventually 
strengthened his position so that the Al Rashid were unable to evict 
him. By the middle of the first decade of the twentieth century, 
the Ottoman governor in Iraq recognized Abd al Aziz as an Otto- 
man client in Najd. The Al Saud ruler accepted Ottoman suzer- 
ainty because it improved his political position. Nevertheless he 
made concurrent overtures to the British to rid Arabia of Otto- 
man influence. In 1913, and without British assistance, Abd al 
Aziz's armies drove the Ottomans out of Al Hufuf in eastern Ara- 
bia and thereby strengthened his position in Najd as well. 

About this time, the Ikhwan movement began to emerge among 
the beduin, spreading Wahhabi Islam among the nomads. Stress- 
ing the same strict adherence to religious law that Muhammad ibn 
Abd al Wahhab had preached, Ikhwan beduin gradually abandoned 
their traditional way of life in the desert and moved to a form of 
agricultural settlement called hujar (see Glossary). The word was 
related to the term hijra that refers to the Prophet's emigration from 
Mecca to Medina in 622, conveying the sense that one who settles 
in a hujar moves from a place of unbelief to a place of belief. By 



21 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



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22 



Historical Setting 



moving to the hujra, the Ikhwan intended to take up a new way 
of life and dedicate themselves to enforcing a rigid Islamic ortho- 
doxy. Once in the hujra, the Ikhwan became extremely militant 
in enforcing upon themselves what they believed to be correct sunna 
(custom) of the Prophet, enjoining public prayer, mosque atten- 
dance, and gender segregation and condemning music, smoking, 
alcohol, and technology unknown at the time of the Prophet. They 
attacked people who refused to conform to Wahhabi interpreta- 
tions of correct Islamic practice and tried to convert Muslims by 
force to their version of Wahhabism. 

The Ikhwan looked eagerly for the opportunity to fight non- 
Wahhabi Muslims — and non-Muslims as well — and they took Abd 
al Aziz as their leader in this. By 1915 there were more than 200 
hujra in and around Najd and at least 60,000 Ikhwan waiting for 
a chance to fight. This force provided Abd al Aziz with a powerful 
weapon, but his situation demanded that he use it carefully. In 
1915 Abd al Aziz had various goals: he wanted to take Hail from 
the Al Rashid, to extend his control into the northern deserts in 
present-day Syria and Jordan, and to take over the Hijaz and the 
Persian Gulf coast. The British, however, had become more and 
more involved in Arabia because of World War I, and Abd al Aziz 
had to adjust his ambitions to British interests. 

The British prevented the Al Saud from taking over much of 
the gulf coast where they had established protectorates with sev- 
eral ruling dynasties. They also opposed Abd al Aziz's efforts to 
extend his influence beyond the Transjordanian, Syrian, and Iraqi 
deserts because of their own imperial interests. To the west, the 
British were allied with the ashraf who ruled the Hijaz from their 
base in Mecca. The British actually encouraged the Sharif of Mecca 
to revolt against the Ottomans and so open a second front against 
them in World War I. 

In this situation, Abd al Aziz had no choice but to focus his at- 
tentions on Hail. This action caused problems with the Ikhwan 
because, unlike Mecca and Medina, Hail had no religious sig- 
nificance and the Wahhabis had no particular quarrel with the Al 
Rashid who controlled it. The ashraf in Mecca, however, were 
another story. The Wahhabis had long borne a grudge against the 
ashraf because of their traditional opposition to Wahhabism. The 
ruler, Sharif Hussein, had made the situation worse by forbidding 
the Ikhwan to make the pilgrimage and then seeking non-Muslim, 
British help against the Muslim Ottomans. 

In the end, Abd al Aziz was largely successful in balancing the 
Ikhwan 's interests with his own limitations. In 1919 the Ikhwan 
completely destroyed an army that Hussein had sent against them 



23 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

near the town of Turabah, which lay between the Hijaz and Najd. 
The Ikhwan so completely destroyed the troops of the Sharif that 
no forces were left to defend the Hijaz, and the entire area cowered 
under the threat of a Wahhabi attack. In spite of this, Abd al Aziz 
restrained the Ikhwan and managed to direct them toward Hail, 
which they took easily in 1921. The Ikhwan went beyond Hail, 
however, and pushed into central Transjordan where they 
challenged Hussein's son, Abd Allah, whose rule the British were 
trying to establish after the war. At this point, Abd al Aziz again 
had to rein in his troops to avoid further problems with the British. 

In the matter of the Hijaz, Abd al Aziz was rewarded for his 
patience. By 1924 Hussein had grown no stronger militarily and 
had been weakened politically. When the Ottoman sultan, who had 
held the title of caliph, was deposed at the end of World War I, 
Sharif Hussein took the title for himself. He had hoped that the 
new honor would gain him greater Muslim support, but the op- 
posite happened. Many Muslims were offended that Hussein should 
handle Muslim tradition in such cavalier fashion and began to ob- 
ject strongly to his rule. To make matters worse for Hussein, the 
British were no longer willing to prop him up after the war. Abd 
al Aziz's efforts to control the Ikhwan in Transjordan as well as 
his accommodation of British interests in the gulf had proved to 
them that he could act responsibly. 

The Al Saud conquest of the Hijaz had been possible since the 
battle at Turabah in 1919. Abd al Aziz had been waiting for the 
right moment, and in 1924 he found it. The British did not en- 
courage him to move into Mecca and Medina, but they also gave 
no indication that they would oppose him. So the Wahhabi armies 
took over the area with little opposition. 

Nation Building: The Rule of Abd al Aziz, 1926-53 

The capture of the Hijaz complicated the basis of Abd al Aziz's 
authority. The Al Saud ruler was fundamentally a traditional Arab 
clan leader who held the loyalty of various tribes because of his 
spectacular successes. But Abd al Aziz was also a Wahhabi imam 
who held the intense loyalty of the Ikhwan. When he became the 
ruler of Mecca and Medina as well, Abd al Aziz took on the respon- 
sibilities of Khadim al Haramayn (custodian of the two holy 
mosques) and so assumed an important position in the wider Mus- 
lim world. Further, by maintaining his authority under pressure 
from the Western powers, Abd al Aziz had become the only truly 
independent Arab leader after World War I. Thus, he had a role 
to play in wider Arab politics as well. 



24 



Door of Al Mismak Palace, 
Riyadh, site of Abd al Aziz's 
attack in 1902 that began 
his recovery of the kingdom 
Courtesy Saudi Arabian 
Information Office 




In establishing his state, Abd al Aziz had to consider the vari- 
ous constituencies that he served. He made some effort to gain world 
Muslim approval before he moved into the Hijaz. Once the Hijaz 
was under his control, he submitted to the world Muslim commu- 
nity, even if only rhetorically, the question of how the area should 
be ruled. When he received no response, he held an informal 
referendum in which the notables of the Hijaz chose him as their 
king. In the Hijaz, Abd al Aziz restrained the more fanatical of 
his Wahhabi followers and eventually won the support of the local 
religious authorities, or ulama. 

Other Muslim countries were not at the time in a position to 
challenge Abd al Aziz. Most of the states lived under foreign rule 
or mandate, and two of the countries that did not, Persia and Tur- 
key, were in the midst of secular reforms. 

Abd al Aziz had problems at home, however. The first and most 
serious of these was the Ikhwan. The Ikhwan had no tolerance for 
the concessions to life in the twentieth century that Abd al Aziz 
was forced to make. They objected to machines, particularly those 
used for communication, such as the telegraph, as well as to the 
increasing presence of non-Muslim foreigners in the country. They 
also continued to object to some of the practices of non-Wahhabi 
Muslims. 

Most important, the Ikhwan remained eager to force their mes- 
sage on everyone. This attitude led them to attack non-Wahhabi 



25 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Muslims, and sometimes Wahhabi Muslims as well, within Saudi 
Arabia and to push beyond its borders into Iraq. Whereas the first 
sort of attack challenged Abd al Aziz's authority, the second caused 
him problems with the British, who would not tolerate the viola- 
tion of borders that they had set up after World War I . It was largely 
because of this second concern that Abd al Aziz found himself ob- 
liged to take on the Ikhwan militarily. When the Wahhabi forces 
continued to ignore his authority, he waged a pitched battle and 
defeated them in 1929. 

The way that Abd al Aziz put down the Ikhwan demonstrated 
his ability to assemble a domestic constituency. Throughout their 
history, the Al Saud had no standing army; when the family had 
a military objective, it had simply assembled coalitions of tribes 
and towns, or such groups as the Ikhwan. In facing the Ikhwan, 
Abd al Aziz built support in the same way. He went out into the 
country and made his case in large and small local meetings. He 
talked not only to the people who would be fighting with him, but 
also to the religious authorities, seeking their advice and approval. 
If the ruler wished to battle the Ikhwan, could this be sanctioned 
by Islam? Or might the Ikhwan' s demand to continue their jihad 
have greater justification? 

In the late 1920s, the majority sided with Abd al Aziz, setting 
the foundation of the modern state. The ruler built on this foun- 
dation by taking into account the interests of various groups. He 
continued to consult the ulama and, if he disagreed with them, to 
work to change their opinion. One of the best examples of Abd 
al Aziz's method was his struggle to set up radio communications. 
Like the Ikhwan, the ulama first opposed radio as a suspect modern 
innovation for which there was no basis in the time of the Prophet. 
Only when Abd al Aziz demonstrated that the radio could be used 
to broadcast the Quran did the ulama give it their approval. 

Abd al Aziz was careful not to make more enemies than 
necessary — and he tried to make those enemies he had into friends. 
This aim was demonstrated in his handling of his main rivals of 
the 1914-24 period, the Al Rashid of Hail and the Sharif of Mecca. 
After conquering Hail, Abd al Aziz reestablished the marriage links 
that his ancestor, Turki, had first forged between the two families 
by marrying three of the Al Rashid widows into his family. He 
made a similar effort to gain the favor of the Hashimites after tak- 
ing the Hijaz. Rather than expelling the family as a future threat, 
Abd al Aziz gave some of its members large tracts of land, enabling 
them to stay in the area and prosper. 

Abd al Aziz also assured himself the continued loyalty of those 
groups who had been allied with him by granting them what favors 



26 



Mountain outcropping in the southwest 
Beduin with their flocks and traditional tents 
Courtesy Aramco World 



27 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

he could, with difficulty, however, because the new Saudi king- 
dom had little money in its first twenty years. Najd had never been 
prosperous, and during the previous century its leaders had be- 
come almost dependent on the British to help them through recur- 
ring periods of famine. The British had been helpful throughout 
World War I, but when the political situation in Arabia stabilized, 
they became less inclined to support Abd al Aziz. 

The conquest of the Hijaz and the pilgrimage revenues that went 
with it considerably improved Abd al Aziz's fortune. With the 
worldwide depression in the 1930s, however, pilgrimage traffic 
dropped, and Saudi income from the pilgrimage was reduced by 
more than half. Accordingly, there was little that Abd al Aziz could 
do except to hand out what money he had in the traditional tribal 
manner. As many as 2,000 people would eat daily at Abd al Aziz's 
table, but this largess was the extent of the services that his govern- 
ment could provide. 

The event that was to change Saudi Arabia dramatically was 
the discovery of massive oil reserves in the kingdom. Oil was first 
found on the Iranian side of the gulf before World War I and then 
in Bahrain shorty afterward. Geologists suspected that they would 
find oil in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia as well; so in the 
early 1930s, British and United States companies competed for the 
rights to explore for oil. Standard Oil Company of California (Socal) 
was the firm that won and struck small pockets of oil fairly quickly. 
By the end of the decade, Socal discovered enormous deposits that 
were close to the surface and thus inexpensive to extract (see Brief 
History, ch. 3). 

The Reigns of Saud and Faisal, 1953-75 

Upon Abd al Aziz's death in 1953 he was succeeded by his son, 
Saud. Saud had been designated crown prince some years before 
in a political act that went back to the days of Muhammad ibn 
Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab. The new King Saud 
did not prove to be a leader equal to the challenges of the times. 
He was a spendthrift even before he became king, and this ten- 
dency became a more crucial issue when he controlled the king- 
dom's purse strings. Saud paid huge sums to maintain tribal 
acquiescence to his rule in return for recruits for an immense palace 
guard, the White Army, so-called because they wore traditional 
Arab dress rather than military uniforms. Revenues could not match 
Saud's expenditures for the tribes, subsidies to various foreign 
groups, and his personal follies. By 1958 the riyal (for value of the 
riyal — see Glossary) had to be devalued nearly 80 percent, despite 
annual oil revenues in excess of US$300 million. 



28 



Historical Setting 



Dissatisfaction grew over wasteful expenditures, the lack of de- 
velopment of public projects and education institutions, and the 
low wages of the growing labor force. Privileged classes had been 
unknown in the early days of Abd al Aziz's reign; his first palace 
was made of the same sun-dried mud bricks that the peasants used, 
shaykhs and beduin herdsmen called each other by their first names, 
and the clothing of rich and poor was quite similar. 

Dissatisfaction came from many sources, chief of which were a 
few of the more liberal princes and the sons of the rising middle 
class educated abroad. In an effort to discourage the formation of 
critical attitudes, college students abroad were forbidden to major 
in law, political science, or related areas. Further evidence of dis- 
content was reflected in 1956 when Arabian American Oil Com- 
pany (Aramco) Saudi workers called a second strike, the first having 
occurred in 1953. Saud issued a royal decree in June 1956 forbid- 
ding further strikes under penalty of dismissal. 

In foreign relations, Saud followed the inclinations of his father; 
he promoted Arab unity and, in cooperation with Gamal Abdul 
Nasser of Egypt, demanded the liberation of Palestine. Saudi Ara- 
bia's ties with Egypt had been strengthened by a mutual defense 
pact in October 1955. Together Nasser and Saud assisted in financ- 
ing an effort to discourage Jordan from joining the Western- 
sponsored Baghdad Pact. When French, British, and Israeli forces 
invaded Egypt in 1956 as a result of Nasser's nationalization of 
the Suez Canal, Saud granted the equivalent of US$10 million to 
Egypt, severed diplomatic relations with Britain and France, and 
placed an embargo on oil shipments to both countries. 

United States-Saudi relations also declined during the early years 
of Saud's reign. Nationalists criticized the leasing of Dhahran's 
air base to the United States, calling it a concession to Western 
imperialism. In 1954 the United States Point Four economic aid 
mission was terminated. 

Saudi policy toward the United States became more favorable 
following United States condemnation of the British, French, and 
Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956. During Saud's successful 1957 visit 
to the United States, in a conference with President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, Saud supported the Eisenhower Doctrine and agreed 
to a five-year renewal of the lease of the air base at Dhahran. 

But as Western relations improved, those with Egypt worsened. 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia had been drawn together because of their 
mutual interest in opposing foreign intervention in the Arab world. 
Beyond that point, all similarity of objectives vanished. Nasser had 
deposed a king in Egypt and was encouraging revolutionary 



29 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

attitudes in other Arab countries. His notions of Arab unity were 
abhorrent to Saud and to many Saudis who wished to preserve an 
independent kingdom. Furthermore, the Egyptians trafficked with 
the Soviet Union, from whom the Saudis had declined an arms 
offer and with whom they had suspended diplomatic recognition 
because of their opposition to atheism. The presence of large num- 
bers of Egyptian military attaches and teachers in Saudi Arabia 
caused concern among the Saudis that, at the very least, unaccept- 
able views would circulate. Saudi officials were surprised when Syria 
and Egypt merged in 1958 to form the United Arab Republic. Yet 
the shock generated by news of the union paled before the subse- 
quent disclosures of an alleged conspiracy by Saud to subvert the 
venture and to assassinate Nasser. 

The embarrassed senior members of the royal family had also 
become increasingly unhappy over Saud's tendency to appoint his 
inexperienced young sons to major government positions rather 
than older, more seasoned family members. They feared that such 
appointments indicated a plan to transfer the succession to his off- 
spring as opposed to the traditional practice of selecting the most 
senior and experienced family member as leader. These fears, com- 
bined with their concern over Saud's profligate spending and the 
alleged assassination plot, increased family dissatisfaction to the 
point that senior members of Al Saud pressured Saud to relinquish 
power to Faisal. 

On March 24, 1958, Saud issued a royal decree giving Faisal 
executive powers in foreign and internal affairs, including fiscal 
planning. As a result of Faisal's initiation of an austerity program 
in 1959 that included a reduction of subsidies to the royal family, 
the budget was balanced, currency stabilized, and embarrassing 
national debts paid. 

The reductions in the royal household budget incensed Saud and 
his circle, and a dispute arising out of Saud's desire to give full 
control of a Hijaz oil refinery to one of his sons made Faisal's po- 
sition increasingly precarious. In January 1961, Faisal and his 
Council of Ministers tendered their resignations. 

Saud assumed the post of prime minister and made another 
brother, the progressive Talal, minister of finance and national 
economy. A new cabinet was formed composed of many Western- 
educated commoners. Talal, concluding that Saud had mis- 
represented his intentions to engage his support, departed for Cairo, 
taking several air force officers and their airplanes with him. Civil 
war broke out in Yemen in September 1962, and Egyptian forces 
arrived to buttress the revolutionaries against the Saudis, who sup- 
ported the overthrown royalist government. 



30 



Historical Setting 



Faisal was reappointed as deputy prime minister and minister 
of foreign affairs in March 1962, and exercised executive power 
on behalf of Saud, who was in the United States for medical treat- 
ment. In October 1962, the ulama and many princes urged Faisal 
to accept the post of monarch, but he declined, citing a promise 
to his father to support Saud. Instead, Faisal again became prime 
minister, named Khalid deputy prime minister, and formed a 
government. He took command of the armed forces and quickly 
restored their loyalty and morale. 

The following month, Faisal announced a ten-point plan for re- 
form. Projected changes in the government included promises to 
create a consultative council, establish local government, and form 
an independent judiciary with a supreme judicial council composed 
of secular and religious members. He pledged to strengthen Islam 
and to reform the Committees for the Propagation of Virtue and 
Prevention of Vice (also known as the Committees for Public Moral- 
ity, or mutawwiin) . Progress was to be ensured by the regulation of 
economic and commercial activities, and there was to be a sustained 
effort to develop the country's resources. Social reforms would in- 
clude provisions for social security, unemployment compensation, 
educational scholarships, and the abolition of slavery. Consultations 
between Faisal and President John F. Kennedy led to promises of 
United States support of Faisal's plans for reform and of Saudi Ara- 
bia's territorial integrity. Diplomatic relations were reestablished with 
Britain and France, and debts to them were repaid. 

Faisal's projects and the budgetary allowance necessary to mod- 
ernize the armed forces for their engagement in Yemen meant that 
the king's personal income had to be cut. In March 1964, a royal 
decree endorsed by the royal family and the ulama reduced Saud's 
powers and his personal budget. The response from Saud, who 
had been on an extended and expensive tour of Europe with a large 
entourage, was outrage. Saud tried to garner support for a return 
to power, but the royal family and ulama held firm. On Novem- 
ber 2, 1964, the ulama issued a final fatwa, or religious decree, on 
the matter. Saud was deposed, and Faisal was declared king. This 
decision terminated almost a decade of external and internal pres- 
sure to depose Saud and to assert the power and integrity of con- 
servative forces within the Al Saud. 

During his reign, Saud had largely cut himself off from the 
citizenry, relying heavily on his advisers, many of whom were 
primarily concerned with acquiring personal wealth and power. 
Faisal, in contrast, despite working long hours on affairs of state, 
made himself available to the public daily in the traditional majlis, 
followed by a meal open to anyone. During the times he had acted 



31 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



as prime minister for Saud, Faisal had strengthened the power of 
the Council of Ministers and in 1954 had been primarily responsi- 
ble for the creation of the ministries of commerce and industry and 
of health (see The Council of Ministers, ch. 4). 

As king (1964-75), Faisal set himself the task of modernizing 
the kingdom. He directed his first two official acts toward safeguard- 
ing the nation from potential internal and external threats that could 
thwart development. In the first month of Faisal's reign, the Al 
Saud designated Khalid, a half brother of Faisal, crown prince, 
thus avoiding the kind of family power politics over succession that 
had nearly destroyed Saudi hegemony in the past. Faisal charged 
Sultan, another half brother serving as minister of defense and avi- 
ation, with modernizing the army and establishing an air defense 
system to protect the nation and its petroleum reserves from poten- 
tial external and internal threats. 

The king substantially increased funds to the King Abd al Aziz 
University in Jiddah and opened the University of Petroleum and 
Minerals in Dhahran. The emphasis on education resulted from 
Faisal's feeling that foreign influence was unavoidable as long as 
the population remained undereducated and unable to assume the 
country's many demanding positions. Faisal reorganized the king- 
dom's planning agency as the Central Planning Organization to 
develop priorities for economic development. As a consequence, 
oil revenues were invested to stimulate growth. 

Troubled by the spread of republicanism that challenged the 
legitimacy of the Al Saud, Faisal called an Islamic summit confer- 
ence in 1965 to reaffirm Islamic principles against the rising tide 
of modern ideologies. Faisal was dedicated to Islamic ideals that 
he had learned in the house of his maternal grandfather, a direct 
descendant of Abd al Wahhab, the eighteenth-century initiator of 
the revival of religious orthodoxy in Arabia (see The Al Saud and 
Wahhabi Islam, 1500-1818, this ch.). Faisal was raised in a Spar- 
tan atmosphere, unlike most of his half brothers, and was en- 
couraged by his mother to develop values consonant with tribal 
leadership. Faisal's religious idealism did not diminish his secular 
effectiveness. For him, political leadership was a religious act that 
demanded thoughtfulness, dignity, and integrity. Respect for Faisal 
increased in the Arab world based on the remarkable changes within 
Saudi Arabia, his reputation as a stalwart enemy of Zionism, and 
his rapidly increasing financial power. 

Faisal proceeded cautiously but emphatically to introduce 
Western technology. He was continually forced to deal with the 
insistent demands of his Westernized associates to move faster and 
the equally vociferous urgings of the ulama to move not at all. He 



32 



Historical Setting 



chose the middle ground, not merely in a spirit of compromise to 
assuage the two forces, but because he earnestly believed that the 
correct religious orientation would mitigate the adverse effects of 
modernization. For example, in 1965 the first Saudi television 
broadcasts offended some Saudis. One of Faisal's nephews went 
so far as to lead an assault on one of the new studios and was later 
killed in a shoot-out with the police. Such a family tragedy did not, 
however, cause Faisal to withdraw his support for the television 
project. 

Faisal's reign initiated a massive education program. Expendi- 
tures for education increased to an annual level of approximately 
10 percent of the budget. Vocational training centers and insti- 
tutes of higher education were built in addition to the more than 
125 elementary and secondary schools built annually. Women's 
demands, increasingly vocalized, led to the establishment of elemen- 
tary schools for girls. These schools were placed under religious 
control to pacify those who were opposed to education for women. 
Health centers also multiplied (see Education; Health, ch. 2). 

Regional affairs within the peninsula, with the exception of 
Yemen, primarily concerned boundary disputes. In August 1965, 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan reached a final determination of their 
boundaries. In 1965 Saudi Arabia also agreed on border delinea- 
tions with Qatar. The Continental Shelf Agreement with Iran in 
October 1968 established the separate rights of Iran and Saudi 
Arabia in the Persian Gulf, and an agreement was reached to dis- 
courage foreign intervention there. The formation of the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1971 did not receive official recognition 
until the settlement of the long-standing Al Buraymi Oasis dispute 
in 1975. 

Saudi Arabia's largest problem within the peninsula remained 
the settlement of the Yemen crisis. Egyptian aircraft bombed royalist 
installations and towns in southern Saudi Arabia in November 1 962 . 
Saudi Arabia responded by closing its two Egyptian banks, an ac- 
tion countered by Egypt's sequestration of all Saudi Arabian 
property holdings in Egypt. In August 1965, Faisal and Nasser 
agreed at Jiddah to an immediate cease-fire, the termination of 
Saudi aid to the royalists, and the withdrawal of Egyptian forces. 
In 1965 at Harad in Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Egypt sponsored 
a meeting of Yemeni representatives from the opposing sides. The 
conference became deadlocked, and hostilities resumed after the 
promised Egyptian troop withdrawals commenced. The royalists 
claimed extensive victories. The Egyptians, incensed at what they 
believed was renewed Saudi intervention, announced that they 
would not withdraw their remaining troops. 



33 




Sand dunes in the Rub al Khali, or Empty Quarter, 
with exploration party in the foreground 
Courtesy Aramco World 



35 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Saud, then living in Egypt, personally gave US$1 million to 
republicans of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR — North Yemen) 
and made broadcasts from its capital and from Cairo, stating his 
intention to return to rule "to save the people and land of Saudi 
Arabia." A series of terrorist bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia against 
residences of the royal family and United States and British per- 
sonnel led to the arrests of a group, including seventeen Yemenis, 
accused of the sabotage. They were found guilty and were pub- 
licly beheaded in accordance with the law. Egyptian and Saudi dis- 
agreements over Yemen were not resolved until the Khartoum 
Conference of August 1967. 

In the aftermath of the June 1967 War between Israel and vari- 
ous Arab states, the disputes between Arab governments took sec- 
ond place to what the Arabs called the "alien threat" of Israel. 
Faisal's influence at Arab conferences continued to increase, his 
position strengthened by the enormous revenues with which he 
could make good his commitments, and by his irreproachable repu- 
tation as a pious Muslim. Faisal's pan-Islamic pronouncements 
took concrete form during the June 1967 War, when an Islamic 
nation, Jordan, received a direct threat to its existence and that 
same "infidel power," Israel, seized and retained Jerusalem, the 
third holiest city of Islam. 

At the Khartoum Conference, Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia 
agreed to set up a fund equivalent to US$378 million to be dis- 
tributed among countries that had suffered from the June 1967 War. 
The Saudi contribution would be US$140 million. The monies were 
intended not only to ease this situation but also to buttress their 
political bargaining power. Egypt no longer could continue expen- 
sive commitments to the war in Yemen, and Nasser and Faisal 
agreed to a compromise proposed by Sudan for financial and eco- 
nomic withdrawals in Yemen. The conferees agreed neither to 
recognize nor to make peace with Israel and to continue to work 
for the rights of Palestinians. 

A fire in the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem on August 21, 1969, 
prompted the Islamic Summit Conference of September 1969 in 
Rabat, Morocco. Representatives agreed to intensify their efforts 
to ensure the prompt withdrawal of Israeli military forces in the 
occupied lands and to pursue an honorable peace. 

Having increased economic power, Saudi Arabia in July 1973 
threatened to reduce oil deliveries if the United States did not seek 
to equalize its treatment of Egypt and Israel. The threat was real- 
ized during the October 1973 War between Israel and Egypt and 
Syria, when the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries imposed a general rise in oil prices and an oil embargo on 



36 



Historical Setting 



major oil consumers that were either supporters of Israel or allies 
of its supporters. The embargo was a political protest aimed at ob- 
taining Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory and recog- 
nition of the rights of the Palestinian people. 

At an Arab conference held in Algiers in November 1973, Saudi 
Arabia agreed with all the participants except the representative 
of Jordan to recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) 
as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Jordan's 
King Hussein refused to participate but was encouraged by Faisal 
to attend the follow-up conference in October 1974 in Rabat. At 
this meeting, Hussein gave his reluctant agreement to the proposal 
that the PLO should be the negotiators with Israel over the estab- 
lishment of a Palestinian entity in the territory occupied by Israel. 
In return Saudi Arabia promised Hussein US$300 million a year 
for the next four years. 

As a result of the 1973 agreements that tripled the price of crude 
oil in response to the October 1973 War, Saudi Arabia acquired 
vastly increased revenues to devote to domestic programs. However, 
Faisal's failing health, overwork, and age prevented him from for- 
mulating a coherent development plan before he was assassinated 
on March 25, 1975. He was shot by his nephew, a disgruntled 
brother of the nephew killed in the 1965 television station incident. 

The Reign of Khalid, 1975-82 

Following the assassination, Crown Prince Khalid immediately 
succeeded to the throne and received the oaths, formal pledges of 
support from the family and tribal leaders, within the traditional 
three days. Fahd, the minister of interior, was named crown prince, 
as expected. 

Khalid 's preparation for ruling a modern state included accom- 
panying Faisal on foreign missions and representing Saudi Arabia 
at the United Nations. He was a quiet but influential figure within 
the royal family. He was known, for instance, to have rallied the 
family to support Faisal in the ouster of Saud in 1964. The calm 
strength and consistency that he displayed during this delicate and 
potentially dangerous crisis in many ways typified his reign. 
Although he ruled quietly, he ruled effectively and was consider- 
ably more than the figurehead many had expected him to be. 

Khalid 's leadership style was remarkably different from Faisal's. 
He was more liberal in terms of informing the press of the ration- 
ale behind foreign policy decisions. Although he largely used the 
same policy-making team as Faisal had, he allowed them greater 
latitude in decision making within their separate portfolios. In 
regional affairs, he permitted the governors considerably more 



37 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



autonomy and even authorized their use of discretionary funds. 
Above all. he valued consensus and the team approach to problem 
solving. 

The new king's first diplomatic coup was the conclusion in April 
1975 of a demarcation agreement concerning the Al Buraymi Oasis, 
where the frontiers of Abu Dhabi. Oman, and Saudi Arabia meet. 
Claims and counterclaims over this frontier area had exacerbated 
relations among the three states for years. The successful conclu- 
sion of negotiations under Khalid's aegis added to his stature as 
a statesman among knowledgeable observers of the peninsula po- 
litical scene. 

In April 1976. Khalid made state visits to all the gulf states in 
the hope of promoting closer relations with his peninsular neigh- 
bors. These early visits, in retrospect, probably laid the founda- 
tion for the later establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCCV Coinciding with Khalid's visits to neighboring states, Iran 
called for a formal, collective security arrangement of the shaykh- 
doms of the Persian Gulf. This proposal, although not summarily 
rejected, was received with great coolness by the Saudi government, 
as wary of Iran's hegemonistic pretensions as of Iraq's. 

Probably the most sensitive areas of Saudi Arabia's relations with 
its neighbors during Khalid's reign were its relations with the YAR 
and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY — South 
Yemen). Despite the establishment of relations with the YAR after 
the conclusion of its civil war in 1967 and massive Saudi aid. rela- 
tions remained strained and marked by mutual distrust. The YAR 
government objected to Saudi subsidies to Yemeni tribes critical 
of it and felt that Saudi Arabia considered North Yemen a con- 
venient buffer state to protect the kingdom against the PDRY. a 
major recipient of Soviet arms. 

In a reorganization of the Council of Ministers in late 1975, 
Khalid named Crown Prince Fahd deputy prime minister and desig- 
nated Abd Allah (another half brother and the commander of the 
Saudi Arabian National Guard) as second deputy prime minister 
(see The Royal Family, ch. 4: Saudi Arabian National Guard, 
ch. 5). 

Fahd. who had already participated in major decisions, became 
chief spokesman for the kingdom and a major architect of Saudi 
economic development, foreign affairs, and oil policy. In 1976 a 
major concern of the Saudi government was the civil war in Lebanon. 
.Although strongly committed to the official Saudi position that op- 
posed outside intervention or interference in Lebanese affairs, Fahd 
nevertheless was instrumental in setting up a League of Arab States 
(Arab League") peacekeeping; force. Despite this increasing reliance 



38 



Historical Setting 



on Fahd, the strains of office began to tell on Khalid, forcing him 
to return to the United States for successful open-heart surgery in 
Cleveland, Ohio. 

Much of the kingdom's attention in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
was focused on the construction of the Yanbu al Bahr and Al Jubayl 
industrial complexes, to diversify the kingdom's industrial base (see 
Non-Oil Industrial Sector, ch. 3). In addition to expanding indus- 
trial and petroleum facilities, one of Khalid's major domestic ac- 
complishments was his emphasis on agricultural development (see 
Modern Agriculture, ch. 3). 

In the field of foreign affairs, United States-Saudi relations con- 
tinued to be cordial under Khalid, although Saudi Arabia remained 
frustrated by perceived United States intransigence in the settle- 
ment of the Palestinian problem. In a January 1978 meeting with 
President Jimmy Carter in Riyadh, the king insisted that peace 
in the area could be achieved only by the complete Israeli with- 
drawal from occupied territories, as well as self-determination and 
resettlement rights for the Palestinians. 

Another topic reportedly discussed in Riyadh during this meet- 
ing was Soviet penetration and growing influence through arms 
sales and treaties of friendship with the two Yemens. Five months 
after the Riyadh meeting, Khalid asked Carter to sell advanced 
fighter planes to Saudi Arabia to assist in countering communist 
aggression in the area. The first delivery of the sixty F-15s under 
the agreement approved by Carter arrived in the kingdom in Janu- 
ary 1982. The sale and delivery of the F-15s, the subsequent United 
States release of sophisticated equipment to enhance the capabili- 
ties of the aircraft, and the negotiations resulting in the approval 
of the airborne warning and control system (AW ACS) aircraft owed 
much to Khalid's insistence on Saudi Arabia's being treated as a 
full partner in all United States-Saudi areas of joint concern. 

The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 caused major Saudi con- 
cern about its neighbors in the region. Moreover, as a result of 
the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel known as the Camp 
David Accords, on March 26, 1979, Khalid broke relations with 
Egypt and led in seeking Arab economic sanctions against Egypt. 

Some thought in 1979 that traditionalism was no longer a strong 
force in Saudi Arabia. This idea was disproved when 500 dissi- 
dents invaded and seized the Grand Mosque in Mecca on Novem- 
ber 20, 1979. The leader of the dissidents, Juhaiman al Utaiba, 
a Sunni, was from one of the foremost families of Najd. His grand- 
father had ridden with Abd al Aziz in the early decades of the cen- 
tury, and other family members were among the foremost of the 
Ikhwan. Juhaiman said that his justification was that the Al Saud 



39 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

had lost its legitimacy through corruption, ostentation, and mind- 
less imitation of the West — virtually an echo of his grandfather's 
charge in 1921 against Abd al Aziz. Juhaiman's accusations against 
the Saudi monarchy closely resembled Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah 
Musavi Khomeini's diatribes against the shah of Iran. 

The Saudi leadership was stunned and initially paralyzed by the 
takeover. The Grand Mosque surrounds the Kaaba, symbol of the 
oneness of God. The courtyard is one of the sites where the hajj, 
the fifth pillar of Islam, is enacted (see Pilgrimage, ch. 2). Because 
of the holiness of the place, no non-Muslims may enter the city 
of Mecca. Furthermore, all holy places come under a special in- 
junction in Islam. It is forbidden to shed blood there or to deface 
or to pollute them in any way. Despite careful planning on Juhai- 
man's part, a guard was shot dead by one of the nervous dissi- 
dents. Such a desecration is a major violation under Islamic law 
and merits crucifixion for the convicted offender. 

Juhaiman's party included women as well as men, other penin- 
sular Arabs, and a few Egyptians. A score of the dissidents were 
unemployed graduates of the kingdom's seminary in Medina. They 
had provisions for the siege they expected as well as extensive sup- 
plies of arms. 

The government's initial attempts to rout the dissidents were 
stymied. Before any military move could be authorized, the ulama 
had to issue a dispensation to allow the bearing of arms in a holy 
place. When the religious problems were solved by announcement 
of the ulama' s ruling, logistical problems bogged down the efforts 
of the military and the national guard for several days. Finally, 
two weeks later the military effort succeeded and the dissidents were 
dislodged. All the surviving males were eventually beheaded in the 
squares of four Saudi cities. 

Far from discounting the efforts of the rebels, the leaders exam- 
ined themselves and their policies more closely. Khalid, particu- 
larly, was sensitive to their complaints. Many of the dissidents had 
come from two of the tribes that traditionally have been recruited 
for the national guard. Khalid had spent much time with these 
people in the desert. 

Compounding the problems for the regime were Shia riots in 
Al Qatif, in the Eastern Province, two weeks after the siege of the 
Grand Mosque. Many of the rioters bore posters with Khomeini's 
picture. Although these were not the first Shia protests in the king- 
dom (others had occurred in 1970 and 1978 in response to dis- 
criminatory treatment of Shia by the government), the December 
rioters had become emboldened by Khomeini's triumphal return 
to Iran in early 1979. Up to 20,000 national guard troops were 



40 



Historical Setting 



immediately moved into the Eastern Province. Several demonstra- 
tors were killed and hundreds reportedly arrested. 

Almost visibly shaken by the takeover of the mosque and the 
Shia disturbances, the Saudi leadership announced in the after- 
math of these events that a consultative council (majlis ash shura) 
soon would be formed. The Shia disturbances in the Eastern 
Province encouraged the government to take a closer look at con- 
ditions there. Although it was clear that the Shia had been inspired 
by Khomeini, it was also obvious that repression and imprison- 
ment were stopgap solutions and as likely to promote greater 
resistance as to quell it. Further, the Shia lived in the area of the 
kingdom most vulnerable to sabotage, where numerous oil and gas 
pipelines crisscross the terrain. Aramco had refused to discriminate 
against the Shia in hiring practices and had a preponderance of 
Shia employees. This policy resulted from the location of Aramco 's 
activities and also because Aramco employment offered the Shia 
the best chance for mobility. 

Compared with other towns in the Eastern Province, the pre- 
dominantly Shia towns of Al Qatif and Al Hufuf were neglected 
areas. The Shia lacked decent schools, hospitals, roads, and sewer- 
age and had inadequate electrification and water supplies. Violent 
Shia demonstrations occurred once again in February 1980, and, 
although they were as harshly repressed as the previous ones, the 
deputy minister of interior, Amir Ahmad ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, 
was directed to draw up a comprehensive plan to improve the stan- 
dard of living in Shia areas. His recommendations, which were 
immediately accepted and implemented, included an electrifica- 
tion project, swamp drainage, the construction of schools and a 
hospital, street lighting, and loans for home construction. 

In early November 1980, a week before Ashura — the most im- 
portant Shia religious observance, which commemorates the death 
of Husayn — the government announced a new US$240 million 
project for Al Qatif. Also shortly before Ashura, Fahd ordered the 
release of 100 Shia arrested in the November 1979 and February 
1980 disturbances. Five days after Ashura, which was peaceful, 
Khalid toured the area — the first such visit by a Saudi monarch. 
Co-optation, which served the Saudi leadership so well with the 
general populace, also seemed the palliative for the Shia problem. 

After the troubles of 1979 and 1980, the Saudi leadership began 
to take a more assertive role in world leadership. Saudi Arabia ob- 
tained agreement on the kingdom as the site of the meeting of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference in January 1981 . Hosting 
the conference of thirty-eight Muslim heads of state was seen as 
a vehicle for refurbishing the Saudi image of "custodian of the two 



41 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

holy mosques." Also, the kingdom wished to present an alterna- 
tive to the Islamic radicalism of Libya's Muammar al Qadhafi and 
Iran's Khomeini, both of whom had caused Saudi Arabia concern 
in the previous two years. 

Shortly after the conference, the Saudi leadership announced the 
formation of the GCC project long favored by Khalid. Khalid and 
Fahd had been campaigning actively for such an organization for 
some time. The GCC included the six states of the peninsula that 
have similar political institutions, social conditions, and economic 
resources: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the 
United Arab Emirates. The aim of the GCC, as it was formally 
announced at its first summit in May 1981 , was to coordinate and 
unify economic, industrial, and defense policies. 

In the late 1970s, Saudi Arabia faced a host of regional problems. 
In addition to the Palestinian problem, early in Khalid' s reign the 
civil war in Lebanon began. In December 1979, the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan, and in September 1980 Iraq attacked Iran 
over suzerainty of the Shatt al Arab waterway. Saudi Arabia feared 
the conflict between Iran and Iraq might spread down the Persian 
Gulf. Furthermore, because Iraq and Iran were so engaged, a 
unique opportunity existed of forming an alliance that excluded 
them both. The two Yemens, who registered their outrage at ex- 
clusion from the GCC, continued to be among serious Saudi con- 
cerns. The Soviet Union appeared to be increasing its influence 
in both Yemeni nations. 

One month after the GCC second summit meeting in Riyadh, 
the Shia attempted a coup d'etat in Bahrain in December 1981. 
The insurgents, most of whom were captured, included Shia from 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, reminding the Saudis of one of their 
potential causes of discontent. 

In another regional development, the Saudis were angry at the 
Syrians for having signed a Treaty of Friendship and Coopera- 
tion with the Soviet Union. The Saudis, however, remained con- 
ciliatory in the hope of maintaining the facade of Arab unity and 
also so that they could function as mediators. In December 1980, 
when Jordanian and Syrian troops faced each other ready for con- 
frontation, Amir Abd Allah was sent to avert a crisis. Abd Allah, 
whose mother hailed from a Syrian tribe and who maintained ex- 
cellent personal relations there, was successful. 

Fahd was especially active in advancing Saudi foreign policy ob- 
jectives. He is credited with averting an escalation of tensions be- 
tween Algeria and Morocco in May 1981 . His major effort in 1980 
and 1981 was in devising some alternative to the divisive Camp 
David Accords, which had isolated Egypt. Before there could be 



42 



Historical Setting 



a Saudi-Egyptian rapprochement, a face-saving resolution to 
Egypt's agreement with Israel was necessary to preserve Saudi Ara- 
bia's legitimacy as an Arab mediator. 

In August 1981, prior to Egyptian president Anwar as Sadat's 
departure for the United States to discuss the resumption of the 
peace process, Fahd proposed his own peace plan to resolve the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The Fahd Plan, as it became known, stressed 
the necessity for a comprehensive settlement that included the cre- 
ation of a Palestinian state and Arab recognition of Israel's right 
to exist in exchange for Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip. Although the plan was endorsed by the PLO, dis- 
sident Palestinians, Libya, and Syria rejected it, leading to an early 
close of the Arab Summit in Fez, Morocco, in November 1981 (see 
Arab Nationalism, ch. 4). 

The Reign of Fahd, 1982- 

Fahd, already the major spokesman for the Saudi regime, be- 
came even more active as Khalid's health steadily deteriorated. This 
visibility and experience stood him in good stead when Khalid died 
after a short illness on June 14, 1982; Fahd immediately assumed 
power, and Abd Allah, head of the national guard, became crown 
prince. One of the first problems that the new king faced was a 
20 percent drop in oil revenues, as a result of a world oil surplus 
that developed by 1982 (see Economic Policy Making, ch. 3). 
Despite the fall in revenues, until the oil price crash of 1986 Saudi 
Arabia did not make significant changes in the oil policies it fol- 
lowed beginning in the oil boom years from 1974 onward. 

The reduction in Saudi Arabia's wealth has not decreased its 
influence in the Arab world. The kingdom, and Fahd in particu- 
lar, have played a mediating role in inter- Arab conflicts. Saudi Ara- 
bia continued, for instance, its efforts to stop the fighting in 
Lebanon. In 1989 King Fahd brought most of the Lebanese Na- 
tional Assembly, both Christian and Muslim deputies, to the Saudi 
resort city of At Taif. At the time, the assembly had been unable 
to meet in Lebanon because of military clashes and political vio- 
lence. Once in At Taif, however, the Lebanese deputies voted on 
a plan for reform and were eventually able to elect a new presi- 
dent. Fahd's actions did not solve the problems in Lebanon, but 
they helped to end a particular stage of the conflict. 

In November 1987, Saudi Arabia reestablished diplomatic re- 
lations with Egypt. King Fahd visited Egypt in March 1989 and 
received an enthusiastic welcome on the streets of Cairo. His visit 
signified the end of Egypt's temporary isolation within the Arab 
world. Although Egypt was the country of Nasser, one of the most 



43 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

charismatic figures of the modern Arab world, the visit of a Saudi 
king symbolized Egypt's return to the Arab family. 

* * * 

The best and most accessible book on Saudi Arabia before 1984 
is Robert Lacey's The Kingdom: Arabia and the House qfSaud. Lacey 
begins essentially with Abd al Aziz's rise to power, the establish- 
ment of the modern state, and the difficulties faced by Abd al Aziz's 
successors. A more analytical discussion of comparable material 
is found in Christine Moss Helms's The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia. 
Information on Abd al Aziz's relationship with the Ikhwan exists 
in John S. Habib's Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam. 

The leading book for the history of Al Saud before Abd al Aziz 
is R. Bayly Winder's Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century. For the 
period of Muhammad ibn Saud and Muhammad ibn Abd al Wah- 
hab, see George Rentz's article, "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia." 
Little has been written on Arabia in medieval times. Much infor- 
mation exists, however, on the early Islamic period; the principal 
Western author on the subject is W. Montgomery Watt. Anyone 
interested in a Muslim presentation of the subject should consider 
Mohamed Hassanein Haykal's The Life of Muhammad. For the pe- 
riod before Islam, see the first two chapters of Philip K. Hitti's 
History of the Arabs. (For further information and complete citations, 
see Bibliography.) 



44 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




The Royal Mosque, Jiddah 



SAUDI ARABIA IN THE 1990s was a society of contrasts. After 
three decades of intense modernization, the country's urban 
infrastructure was highly developed and technologically sophisti- 
cated. Excellent hospitals, clinics, schools, colleges, and universities 
offered free medical care and education to Saudi citizens. Shop- 
ping malls displayed Paris fashions; supermarkets sold vegetables 
flown in from the Netherlands; restaurants offered Tex-Mex, 
Chinese, or haute cuisine; and amusement centers with separate 
hours for male and female patrons dotted the urban landscape. 
Suburban neighborhoods with single-family houses and swimming 
pools hidden behind high walls ringed commercial districts, and 
satellite communications made a telephone call from Riyadh to New 
York as fast and as clear as a call to New York from Connecticut. 

Massive oil revenues had brought undreamed-of wealth to the 
kingdom. Affluence, however, proved a two-edged sword. The 
dilemma that Saudis faced in the 1990s was to preserve their cul- 
tural and religious heritage while realizing the advantages that such 
wealth might bring. The regime sought to acquire Western tech- 
nology while maintaining those values that were central to Saudi 
society. 

It was not an easy quest. The country has its roots in Wahhabism 
(see Glossary), an eighteenth-century reform movement that called 
for a return to the purity and simplicity of the early Islamic com- 
munity. It was the alliance between the Wahhabi religious reformers 
and the House of Saud (Al Saud) that provided the Arabs of the 
peninsula with a new and compelling focus for their loyalties and 
helped to forge the unification of the peninsula under the leader- 
ship of Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud. 

The kingdom was rooted in religion-based conservatism stem- 
ming from the Wahhabi reform movement. The strength of conser- 
vative opinion grew even as the pace of economic change increased. 
Religious conservatives and modernizers disagreed on what kinds 
of technology might be used appropriately and how best to use the 
kingdom's vast wealth. The dichotomy between the two was at the 
heart of much of the country's political affairs. There was, none- 
theless unanimous accord that Saudi Arabia's modernization — 
whatever form it might take — reflect its Islamic values. 

Massive urbanization and the altered economic situation have 
fueled both the forces of change and conservatism. Urbanization 
brought with it new social groups — students, technical experts, and 



47 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

a vast corps of foreign workers among them. The government has 
made every effort to insulate the population from the influence of 
the foreign community; the task grew more difficult as the num- 
ber of non-Saudis in the work force increased. Expansion of educa- 
tional and economic opportunities polarized those who had pursued 
secular studies and those who had pursued religious studies. 

Saudi Arabia stood with one foot firmly placed among the most 
highly developed nations of the world, yet the other foot lagged 
behind. Almost one-third of the population lived in rural areas very 
distant from developed urban centers, some living as nomadic and 
seminomadic herdsmen, and some as oasis agricultural workers. 
Other families were divided, caught between the devaluation of 
local products and the rising cost of living that accompanied de- 
velopment. Men went to distant towns to work as drivers, laborers, 
or soldiers in the Saudi Arabian National Guard, and women were 
left to tend family plots and livestock and raise children. Medical 
care and schooling were available to much of the population but 
were often located far from rural areas. For many rural people, 
lack of knowledge, a lack of incentive, illiteracy, physical distance, 
and bureaucratic obstacles limited access to the resources of Saudi 
Arabia's burgeoning society. 

Saudi Arabia's population also presented a picture of cultural 
contrasts. On the one hand, Saudi people felt a strong, almost tan- 
gible conviction in the Tightness of trying to live one's life accord- 
ing to God's laws as revealed through the Quran and the life of 
the Prophet Muhammad. On the other hand, the interpretation 
of what it meant to live according to God's laws had assumed differ- 
ent meanings to different groups of people: some wished to adjust 
traditional values to the circumstances of the present; others wished 
to adjust the circumstances of the present to traditional values. In 
no aspect of Saudi society was this tension more manifest than in 
the question of the role of women. The conservative view favored 
complete separation of women from men in public life, with the 
education of women devoted to domestic skills, whereas the lib- 
eral view sought to transform "separation values" into "modesty 
values," allowing the expansion of women's opportunities in work 
and education. 

Politically, the early 1990s saw unprecedented expressions of po- 
litical dissidence born of the economic imbalances and shifting so- 
cial boundaries produced by the development process. In petitions 
to the king for reform in the political system and political sermons 
in the mosques, Saudis have sought representation in government 
decision making. They have begun to ask who should control the 
fruits of oil production, who should decide the allocation of 



48 



The Society and Its Environment 



resources, and whose version of the just society should be rendered 
into law? But among opposition voices there was another contrast: 
some demanded representation to ensure that the governing sys- 
tem would enforce sharia (Islamic law), whereas others demanded 
representation to ensure protection for the individual from arbitrary 
religious or political judgments. 

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 has exacerbated these contrasts: 
as Saudi Arabia becomes more dependent on the United States 
militarily, the need to assert cultural independence from the West 
becomes proportionately greater. As Saudi Arabia abandons tradi- 
tional alliances in the Arab world in favor of closer ties with the 
West, the need to assert its leadership as a Muslim nation among 
the Muslim nations of the world becomes greater. In the early 1990s, 
tradition and Westernization coexisted in uneasy balance in Saudi 
Arabian society. 

Geography 

The kingdom occupies 80 percent of the Arabian Peninsula. Most 
of the country's boundaries with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
Oman, and the Republic of Yemen (formerly two separate coun- 
tries: the Yemen Arab Republic, or North Yemen, and the Peo- 
ple's Democratic Republic of Yemen, or South Yemen) are 
undefined, so the exact size of the country remains undetermined. 
The Saudi government estimate is 2,217,949 square kilometers. 
Other reputable estimates vary between 2, 149,690 square kilometers 
and 2,240,000 square kilometers. Less than 1 percent of the total 
area is suitable for cultivation, and in the early 1990s population 
distribution varied greatly among the towns of the eastern and 
western coastal areas, the densely populated interior oases, and the 
vast, almost empty deserts. 

External Boundaries 

Saudi Arabia is bounded by seven countries and three bodies 
of water. To the west, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea form 
a coastal border of almost 1,800 kilometers that extends south to 
Yemen, then follows a mountain ridge for approximately 320 kilo- 
meters to the vicinity of Najran. This section of the border with 
Yemen was demarcated in 1934 and is one of the few clearly de- 
fined borders with a neighboring country. The Saudi border run- 
ning southeast from Najran, however, is still undetermined (see 
fig. 1). The undemarcated border became an issue in the early 
1990s, when oil was discovered in the area and Saudi Arabia ob- 
jected to the commercial exploration by foreign companies on be- 
half of Yemen. In the summer of 1992, representatives of Saudi 



49 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Arabia and Yemen met in Geneva to discuss settlement of the 
border issue. 

To the north, Saudi Arabia is bounded by Jordan, Iraq, and 
Kuwait. The northern boundary extends almost 1,400 kilometers 
from the Gulf of Aqaba on the west to Ras al Khafji on the Per- 
sian Gulf. In 1965 Saudi Arabia and Jordan agreed to boundary 
demarcations involving an exchange of small areas of territory that 
gave Jordan some essential additional land near Aqaba, its only 
port. 

In 1922 Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud (r. 1902-53) 
and British officials representing Iraqi interests signed the Treaty 
of Mohammara, which established the boundary between Iraq and 
the future Saudi Arabia. Later that year, the Al Uqair Conven- 
tion signed by the two parties agreed to the creation of a diamond- 
shaped Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone of approximately 7,000 
square kilometers, adjacent to the western tip of Kuwait, within 
which neither Iraq nor Saudi Arabia would build permanent dwell- 
ings or installations. The agreement was designed to safeguard water 
rights in the zone for beduin of both countries. In May 1938, Iraq 
and Saudi Arabia signed an additional agreement regarding the 
administration of the zone. Forty-three years later, Saudi Arabia 
and Iraq signed an agreement that defined the border between the 
two countries and provided for the division of the neutral zone be- 
tween them. The agreement effectively dissolved the neutral zone. 

The boundary between Abd al Aziz's territories of Najd and the 
Eastern Province and the British protectorate of Kuwait was first 
regulated by the Al Uqair Convention in 1922. In an effort to avoid 
territorial disputes, another diamond-shaped Divided Zone of 5,790 
square kilometers directly south of Kuwait was established. In 1938 
oil was discovered in Kuwait's southern Burqan fields, and both 
countries contracted with foreign oil companies to perform explo- 
ration work in the Divided Zone. After years of discussions, Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait reached an agreement in 1965 that divided the 
zone geographically, with each country administering its half of 
the zone. The agreement guaranteed that the rights of both par- 
ties to the natural resources in the whole zone would continue to 
be respected (see Brief History, ch. 3) after each country had an- 
nexed its half of the zone in 1966. 

Saudi Arabia's eastern boundary follows the Persian Gulf from 
Ras al Khafji to Qatar, whose border with Saudi Arabia was never 
delineated following a 1965 agreement. The Saudi border with the 
state of Oman, on the southeastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula, 
runs through the Empty Quarter (Rub al Khali). The border demar- 
cation was defined by a 1 990 agreement between Saudi Arabia and 



50 



The Society and Its Environment 



Oman that included provisions for shared grazing rights and use 
of water resources. The border through Al Buraymi Oasis, located 
near the conjunction of the frontiers of Oman, Abu Dhabi (one 
of the emirates of the UAE), and Saudi Arabia has triggered ex- 
tensive dispute among the three states since the Treaty of Jiddah 
in 1927. In a 1975 agreement with Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi ac- 
cepted sovereignty over six villages in the Al Buraymi Oasis and 
the sharing of the rich Zararah oil field. In return, Saudi Arabia 
obtained an outlet to the Persian Gulf through Abu Dhabi. 

Saudi Arabia's maritime claims include a twelve-nautical-mile 
territorial limit along its coasts. The Saudis also claim many small 
islands as well as some seabeds and subsoils beyond the twelve- 
nautical-mile limit. 

Topography and Natural Regions 

The Arabian Peninsula is an ancient massif composed of stable 
crystalline rock whose geologic structure developed concurrently 
with the Alps. Geologic movements caused the entire mass to tilt 
eastward and the western and southern edges to tilt upward. In 
the valley created by the fault, called the Great Rift, the Red Sea 
was formed. The Great Rift runs from the Dead Sea along both 
sides of the Red Sea south through Ethiopia and the lake country 
of East Africa, gradually disappearing in the area of Mozambique, 
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Scientists analyzing photographs taken 
by United States astronauts on the joint United States-Soviet space 
mission in July 1975 detected a vast fan-shaped complex of cracks 
and fault lines extending north and east from the Golan Heights. 
These fault lines are believed to be the northern and final portion 
of the Great Rift and are presumed to be the result of the slow 
rotation of the Arabian Peninsula counterclockwise in a way that 
will, in approximately 10 million years, close off the Persian Gulf 
and make it a lake. 

On the peninsula, the eastern line of the Great Rift fault is visi- 
ble in the steep and, in places, high escarpment that parallels the 
Red Sea along the Gulf of Aqaba and the Gulf of Aden. The eastern 
slope of this escarpment is relatively gentle, dropping to the ex- 
posed shield of the ancient landmass that existed before the fault- 
ing occurred. A second lower escarpment, the Jabal Tuwayq, runs 
north to south through the area of Riyadh. 

The northern half of the region of the Red Sea escarpment is 
known as the Hijaz and the more rugged southern half as Asir. 
In the south, a coastal plain, the Tihamah, rises gradually from 
the sea to the mountains. Asir extends southward to the borders 
of mountainous Yemen. The central plateau, Najd, extends east 



51 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

to the Jabal Tuwayq and slightly beyond. A long, narrow strip of 
desert known as Ad Dahna separates Najd from eastern Arabia, 
which slopes eastward to the sandy coast along the Persian Gulf. 
North of Najd a larger desert, An Nafud, isolates the heart of the 
peninsula from the steppes of northern Arabia. South of Najd lies 
one of the largest sand deserts in the world, the Rub al Khali (see 
fig. 4). 

The Hijaz and Asir 

The western coastal escarpment can be considered two moun- 
tain ranges separated by a gap in the vicinity of Mecca. The north- 
ern range in the Hijaz seldom exceeds 2,100 meters, and the 
elevation gradually decreases toward the south to about 600 meters 
around Mecca. The rugged mountain wall drops abruptly to the 
sea with only a few intermittent coastal plains. There are virtually 
no natural harbors along the Red Sea. The western slopes have 
been stripped of soil by the erosion of infrequent but turbulent rain- 
falls that have fertilized the plains to the west. The eastern slopes 
are less steep and are marked by dry river beds (wadis) that trace 
the courses of ancient rivers and continue to lead the rare rainfalls 
down to the plains. Scattered oases, drawing water from springs 
and wells in the vicinity of the wadis, permit some settled agricul- 
ture. Of these oases, the largest and most important is Medina. 

South of Mecca, the mountains exceed 2,400 meters in several 
places with some peaks topping 3,000 meters. The rugged western 
face of the escarpment drops steeply to the coastal plain, the Ti- 
hamah lowlands, whose width averages only sixty-five kilometers. 
Along the seacoast is a salty tidal plain of limited agricultural value, 
backed by potentially rich alluvial plains. The relatively well- watered 
and fertile upper slopes and the mountains behind are extensively 
terraced to allow maximum land use. 

The eastern slope of the mountain range in Asir is gentle, meld- 
ing into a plateau region that drops gradually into the Rub al Khali. 
Although rainfall is infrequent in this area, a number of fertile 
wadis, of which the most important are the Wadi Bishah and the 
Wadi Tathlith, make oasis agriculture possible on a relatively large 
scale. A number of extensive lava beds (harrat) scar the surfaces 
of the plateaus east of the mountain ranges in the Hijaz and Asir 
and give evidence of fairly recent volcanic activity. The largest of 
these beds is Khaybar, north of Medina. 

Najd 

East of the Hijaz and Asir lies the great plateau area of Najd. 
This region is mainly rocky plateau interspersed by small, sandy 



52 



The Society and Its Environment 



deserts and isolated mountain clumps. The best known of the moun- 
tain groups is the Jabal Shammar, northwest of Riyadh and just 
south of the An Nafud. This area is the home of the pastoral Sham- 
mar tribes, which under the leadership of the Al Rashid were the 
most implacable foes of the Al Saud in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. Their capital was the large oasis of Hail, now 
a flourishing urban center. 

Across the peninsula as a whole, the plateau slopes toward the 
east from an elevation of 1,360 meters in the west to 750 meters 
at its easternmost limit. A number of wadis cross the region in an 
eastward direction from the Red Sea escarpment toward the Per- 
sian Gulf. There is little pattern to these remains of ancient 
riverbeds; the most important of them are Wadi ar Rummah, Wadi 
as Surr, and Wadi ad Dawasir. 

The heart of Najd is the area of the Jabal Tuwayq, an arc-shaped 
ridge with a steep west face that rises between 100 and 250 meters 
above the plateau. Many oases exist in this area, the most impor- 
tant of which are Buraydah, Unayzah, Riyadh, and Al Kharj. Out- 
side the oasis areas, Najd is sparsely populated. Large salt marshes 
(sabkah) are scattered throughout the area. 

Northern Arabia 

The area north of the An Nafud is geographically part of the 
Syrian Desert. It is an upland plateau scored by numerous wadis, 
most tending northeastward toward Iraq. This area, known as 
Badiyat ash Sham, and covered with grass and scrub vegetation, 
is extensively used for pasture by nomadic and seminomadic 
herders. The most significant feature of the area is the Wadi as 
Sirhan, a large basin as much as 300 meters below the surround- 
ing plateau, which is the vestige of an ancient inland sea. For thou- 
sands of years, some of the heavily traveled caravan routes between 
the Mediterranean and the central and southern peninsula have 
passed through the Wadi as Sirhan. The most important oases in 
the area are Al Jawf and Sakakah, just north of the An Nafud. 

Eastern Arabia 

East of the Ad Dahna lies the rocky As Summan Plateau, about 
120 kilometers wide and dropping in elevation from about 400 
meters in the west to about 240 meters in the east. The area is gener- 
ally barren, with a highly eroded surface of ancient river gorges 
and isolated buttes. 

Farther east the terrain changes abruptly to the flat lowlands of 
the coastal plain. This area, about sixty kilometers wide, is gener- 
ally featureless and covered with gravel or sand. In the north is 



53 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 






Boundary representation 
not necessarily authoritative 



Rro.5 ian Sea 





International boundary 




Administrative line 




Undefined boundary 




Boundary in dispute 




Armistice line 


HIJAZ 


Region 


® 


National capital 


• 


Populated place 


▲ 


Spot elevation in meters 





100 200 Miles 





100 200 Kilometers 



55 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

the Ad Dibdibah graveled plain and in the south the Al Jafurah 
sand desert, which reaches the gulf near Dhahran and merges with 
the Rub al Khali at its southern end. The coast itself is extremely 
irregular, merging sandy plains, marshes, and salt flats almost im- 
perceptibly with the sea. As a result, the land surface is unstable; 
in places water rises almost to the surface, and the sea is shallow, 
with shoals and reefs extending far offshore. Only the construc- 
tion of long moles at Ras Tanura has opened the Saudi coast on 
the gulf to seagoing tankers. 

Eastern Arabia is sometimes called Al Ahsa, or Al Hasa, after 
the great oasis, one of the more fertile areas of the country. Al Ahsa, 
the largest oasis in the country, actually comprises two neighbor- 
ing oases, including the town of Al Hufuf. 

The Great Deserts 

Three great deserts isolate Najd from north, east, and south as 
the Red Sea escarpment does from the west. In the north, the An 
Nafud — sometimes called the Great Nafud because An Nafud is 
the term for desert — covers about 55,000 square kilometers at an 
elevation of about 1,000 meters. Longitudinal dunes — scores of 
kilometers in length and as much as ninety meters high, and sepa- 
rated by valleys as much as sixteen kilometers wide — characterize 
the An Nafud. Iron oxide gives the sand a red tint, particularly 
when the sun is low. Within the area are several watering places, 
and winter rains bring up short-lived but succulent grasses that 
permit nomadic herding during the winter and spring. 

Stretching more than 125 kilometers south from the An Nafud 
in a narrow arc is the Ad Dahna, a narrow band of sand moun- 
tains also called the river of sand. Like the An Nafud, its sand tends 
to be reddish, particularly in the north, where it shares with the 
An Nafud the longitudinal structure of sand dunes. The Ad Dahna 
also furnishes the beduin with winter and spring pasture, although 
water is scarcer than in the An Nafud. 

The southern portion of the Ad Dahna curves westward follow- 
ing the arc of the Jabal Tuwayq. At its southern end, it merges with 
the Rub al Khali, one of the truly forbidding sand deserts in the 
world and, until the 1950s, one of the least explored. The topography 
of this huge area, covering more than 550,000 square kilometers, 
is varied. In the west, the elevation is about 600 meters, and the 
sand is fine and soft; in the east, the elevation drops to about 180 
meters, and much of the surface is covered by relatively stable sand 
sheets and salt flats. In places, particularly in the east, longitudinal 
sand dunes prevail; elsewhere sand mountains as much as 300 meters 
in height form complex patterns. Most of the area is totally waterless 
and uninhabited except for a few wandering beduin tribes. 



56 



The Society and Its Environment 

Water Resources 

In the absence of permanent rivers or bodies of water, rainfall, 
groundwater, desalinated seawater, and very scarce surface water 
must supply the country's needs. In eastern Arabia and in the Jabal 
Tuwayq, artesian wells and springs are plentiful. In Al Ahsa a num- 
ber of large, deep pools are constandy replenished by artesian springs 
as a result of underground water from the eastern watershed of the 
Jabal Tuwayq. Such springs and wells permit extensive irrigation 
in local oases. In the Hijaz and Asir, wells are abundant, and springs 
are common in the mountainous areas. In Najd and the great deserts, 
watering places are comparatively fewer and scattered over a wide 
area. Water must be hoisted or pumped to the surface, and even 
where water is plentiful, its quality may be poor. 

Modern technology has located and increased the availability of 
much of the underground water. Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi 
Aramco) technicians have determined that very deep aquifers lie 
in many areas of northern and eastern Arabia and that the Wasia, 
the largest aquifer in Saudi Arabia, contains more water than the 
Persian Gulf. The Saudi government, Saudi Aramco, and the United 
Nations (UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) have made 
separate and joint efforts to exploit underground water resources. 
In the past, improperly drilled wells have reduced or destroyed any 
good they might have served by leaching the lands they were drilled 
to irrigate. Successive agricultural projects, many of which were de- 
signed primarily to encourage beduin settlement, have increased 
water resource exploitation. In the early 1990s, large-scale agricultural 
projects have relied primarily on such underground aquifers, which 
provided more than 80 percent of the water for agricultural require- 
ments. In fiscal year (FY — see Glossary) 1987, about 90 percent of 
the total water demand in the kingdom was consumed by agriculture. 

Climate 

With the exception of the province of Asir with its towns of Jizan 
on the western coast and Najran, Saudi Arabia has a desert cli- 
mate characterized by extreme heat during the day, an abrupt drop 
in temperature at night, and slight, erratic rainfall. Because of the 
influence of a subtropical high-pressure system and the many fluc- 
tuations in elevation, there is considerable variation in temperature 
and humidity. The two main extremes in climate are felt between 
the coastal lands and the interior. 

Along the coastal regions of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, 
the desert temperature is moderated by the proximity of these large 
bodies of water. Temperatures seldom rise above 38°C, but the 
relative humidity is usually more than 85 percent and frequently 



57 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

100 percent for extended periods. This combination produces a 
hot mist during the day and a warm fog at night. Prevailing winds 
are from the north, and, when they blow, coastal areas become 
bearable in the summer and even pleasant in winter. A southerly 
wind is accompanied invariably by an increase in temperature and 
humidity and by a particular kind of storm known in the gulf area 
as a kauf. In late spring and early summer, a strong northwesterly 
wind, the shamal, blows; it is particularly severe in eastern Arabia 
and continues for almost three months. The shamal produces sand- 
storms and dust storms that can decrease visibility to a few meters. 

A uniform climate prevails in Najd, Al Qasim Province, and 
the great deserts. The average summer daytime temperature is 
45°C, but readings of up to 54°C are common. The heat becomes 
intense shortly after sunrise and lasts until sunset, followed by com- 
paratively cool nights. In the winter, the temperature seldom drops 
below 0°C, but the almost total absence of humidity and the high 
wind-chill factor make a bitterly cold atmosphere. In the spring 
and autumn, temperatures average 29°C. 

The region of Asir is subject to the southwest monsoon, usually 
occurring from May through October. An average of 300 millimeters 
of rainfall occurs during this period — 60 percent of the annual total. 
Additionally, in Asir and the southern Hijaz condensation caused 
by the higher mountain slopes contributes to the total rainfall. 

For the rest of the country, rainfall is low and erratic. The en- 
tire year's rainfall may consist of one or two torrential outbursts 
that flood the wadis and then rapidly disappear into the soil to be 
trapped above the layers of impervious rock. This is sufficient, 
however, to sustain forage growth. Although the average rainfall 
is 100 millimeters per year, whole regions may not experience rain- 
fall for several years. When such droughts occur, as they did in 
the north in 1957 and 1958, affected areas may become incapable 
of sustaining either livestock or agriculture. 

The Environment and the 1991 Persian Gulf War 

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 brought serious environmental 
damage to the region. The world's largest oil spill, estimated at as 
much as 8 million barrels, fouled gulf waters and the coastal areas 
of Kuwait, Iran, and much of Saudi Arabia's Persian Gulf shore- 
line. In some of the sections of the Saudi coast that sustained the 
worst damage, sediments were found to contain 7 percent oil. The 
shallow areas affected normally provide feeding grounds for birds 
and feeding and nursery areas for fish and shrimp. Because the plants 
and animals of the seafloor are the basis of the food chain, damage 



58 



The Society and Its Environment 



to the shoreline has consequences for the whole shallow-water 
ecosystem, including the multimillion-dollar Saudi fisheries industry. 

The spill had a severe impact on the coastal area surrounding 
Madinat al Jubayl as Sinaiyah, the major industrial and popula- 
tion center newly planned and built by the Saudi government. The 
spill threatened industrial facilities in Al Jubayl because of the sea- 
water cooling system for primary industries and threatened the 
supply of potable water produced by seawater-fed desalination 
plants. The Al Jubayl community harbor and Abu Ali Island, which 
juts into the gulf immediately north of Al Jubayl, experienced the 
greatest pollution, with the main effect of the spill concentrated 
in mangrove areas and shrimp grounds. Large numbers of ma- 
rine birds, such as cormorants, grebes, and auks, were killed when 
their plumage was coated with oil. In addition, beaches along the 
entire Al Jubayl coastline were covered with oil and tar balls. 

The exploding and burning of approximately 700 oil wells in 
Kuwait also created staggering levels of atmospheric pollution, 
spewed oily soot into the surrounding areas, and produced lakes 
of oil in the Kuwaiti desert equal in volume to twenty times the 
amount of oil that poured into the gulf, or about 1 50 million bar- 
rels. The soot from the Kuwaiti fires was found in the snows of 
the Himalayas and in rainfall over the southern members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (former Soviet Union), Iran, 
Oman, and Turkey. Residents of Riyadh reported that cars and 
outdoor furniture were covered daily with a coating of oily soot. 
The ultimate effects of the airborne pollution from the burning wells 
have yet to be determined, but samples of soil and vegetation in 
Ras al Khafji in northern Saudi Arabia revealed high levels of par- 
ticles of oily soot incorporated into the desert ecology. The UN 
Environmental Programme warned that eating livestock that grazed 
within an area of 7,000 square kilometers of the fires, or 1,100 
kilometers from the center of the fires, an area that included north- 
ern Saudi Arabia, posed a danger to human health. The overall 
effects of the oil spill and the oil fires on marine life, human health, 
water quality, and vegetation remained to be determined as of 1992. 
Moreover, to these two major sources of environmental damage 
must be added large quantities of refuse, toxic materials, and 
between 173 million and 207 million liters of untreated sewage in 
sand pits left behind by coalition forces. 

Population 

Saudis and Non-Saudis 

Estimates of the population holding Saudi citizenship have varied 
widely. Official figures published by the Saudi government indicated 



59 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 




1,500 1,000 500 500 1,000 1,500 
POPULATION !N THOUSANDS 



Source: Based on information from United Nations, The Sex and Age Distributions of Popula- 
tion, New York, 1990, 320. 

Figure 5. Population by Age and Sex, 1990 

a population of 14,870,000 in 1990 (see fig. 5). In the same year, 
however, estimates by one Western source inside the kingdom were 
as low as 6 million. United Nations estimates were slighdy less than 
the official Saudi figure. Based on the official Saudi figure, at the 
1990 rate of growth a population of 20 million was projected by 
the year 2000. The 1992 Saudi census indicated an indigenous 
population of 12.3 million people and a growth rate of 3.3 percent. 

In addition to the population holding Saudi citizenship, there 
were large numbers of foreign residents in the kingdom. In 1985 
the number of foreigners was estimated at 4,563,000, with a total 
foreign work force of 3,522,700. In 1990 the number of foreign- 
ers had risen to 5,300,000. In 1990 the greatest number of for- 
eign workers came from Arabic-speaking countries, chiefly Egypt, 



60 



The Society and Its Environment 



followed by Yemen, Jordan, Syria, Kuwait, and Palestinians, then 
Pakistan, India, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea). About 180,000 came from European coun- 
tries and 92,000 from North America. Between 1985 and 1990, 
the number of foreigners employed in the economy rose, in con- 
trast to the substantial decline expected and called for in the Fourth 
Development Plan (1985-90) (see Five-Year Plans, ch. 3). This 
increase was reflected in the number of residence permits issued 
to foreigners, which rose from 563,747 in 1985 to 705,679 in 1990. 
A goal of Saudi planners continued to be a reduction in the num- 
ber of foreign workers, and the Fifth Development Plan (1990-95) 
projected a 1.2 percent annual decline over five years, or a drop 
of almost 250,000 foreign workers. The 1992 census gave the num- 
ber of resident foreigners as 4.6 million. 

Whether such a decline could occur, or had already begun to 
occur in 1992, was questionable. From an economic point of view, 
there were difficulties in increasing the number of Saudi citizens 
in the work force. One difficulty was that potential Saudi workers 
for low-skilled and other jobs were becoming less competitive with 
foreigners in the private sector labor market. Wages of non-Saudi 
workers had been adjusted downward since the early 1980s, and, 
with a ready supply of non-Saudis willing to work in low-skilled 
occupations, the wage gap between Saudis and non-Saudi workers 
was widening. In addition, as the government recognized, Saudi 
secondary school and university graduates were not always as quali- 
fied as foreign workers for employment in the private sector. 
Although the Riyadh-based Institute of Public Administration 
offered training programs to increase the competitiveness of Saudi 
nationals, the programs had difficulty attracting participants. 

Social constraints on the employment of women (7 percent of 
the work force in 1990) also hampered indigenization of the work 
force. Government and private groups actively sought ways to ex- 
pand the areas in which women might work. The issue became 
more pressing as the number of female university graduates con- 
tinued to increase at a faster rate than the number of male graduates. 

Although such economic and social pressures have militated 
against increasing the number of Saudi nationals in the work force, 
the desired decline in foreign labor may have occurred as a result 
of new residency requirements imposed in the summer of 1990 to 
encourage the departure of Yemenis, the second largest segment 
of the foreign labor population. As a punitive response to the 
government of Yemen's sympathy with Iraq, the Saudi govern- 
ment issued a decree requiring Yemenis, who were previously ex- 
empt from regulations governing foreigners' doing business in the 



61 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

kingdom, to obtain residence permits. Subsequently, about 1 mil- 
lion Yemenis left the country. Only three weeks after the decree 
was issued, the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce announced that 
there were almost 250,000 jobs, especially in the area of small re- 
tail businesses, available for young Saudis as a result of the regu- 
lation of foreign residence visas. It was unclear in 1992 whether 
the types of employment and businesses vacated by Yemenis would 
prove attractive to Saudi job seekers, or whether these jobs would 
be recirculated into the foreign labor market. 

Diversity and Social Stratification 

The Saudi population is characterized by a high degree of cul- 
tural homogeneity and by an equally high degree of social stratifi- 
cation. The territory that in 1992 constituted the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia consisted of four distinct regions and diverse populations. 
Each region has sustained some measure of nomadic and semi- 
nomadic population: as recently as 1950, at least one-half the total 
population of the kingdom was estimated to be nomadic. Tribal 
identities were paramount among the nomadic population and 
among those in towns and villages who recognized a tribal affil- 
iation. The Eastern Province had a substantial Shia (see Glossary) 
population with cultural links to Iran, Bahrain, and other places 
in the gulf region, as well as an Indian, Yemeni, and black Afri- 
can component (see Shia, this ch.). Asir was more closely linked 
to Yemen than to Saudi Arabia both by population and geogra- 
phy. Najd was geographically divided into three regions, with town 
centers that functioned almost as independent city-states until the 
early twentieth century. Until the era of development began in the 
1960s, Najd remained relatively isolated, located as it was in the 
center of the peninsula in the midst of three deserts and a moun- 
tain chain, but its towns, too, had populations linked to the gulf, 
the Hijaz, and Africa. 

By contrast, the Hijaz, being home to the holy sites of Islam and 
host to pilgrimage traffic, was directly tied historically into the Otto- 
man bureaucratic system. The populations of Mecca, Medina, and 
Jiddah have been infused for centuries by descendants of foreign 
Muslims who had come for the pilgrimage and stayed. Mecca had 
substantial Indian and Indonesian communities, and Jiddah had 
descendants of Persians and Hadramis (from Hadramaut, or Aden), 
as well as Africans and people from other parts of the Arabic- 
speaking world. The cities of the Hijaz benefited by donations from 
pious Muslims throughout the world and became major centers 
of Islamic scholarship and learning. Jiddah was virtually without 
peer as the commercial center in the kingdom until the 1960s, and 



62 



The Society and Its Environment 



in all the Hijaz towns, mercantile families comprised a powerful 
elite. 

Social stratification was linked to this population diversity. Tribal 
affiliation constituted a major status category based on bloodline. 
At the top of the tribal status category were the qabila, families that 
could claim purity of descent from one of two eponymous Arab 
ancestors, Adnan or Qahtan, and could therefore claim to possess 
asl, the honor that stemmed from nobility of origin. To some ex- 
tent, tribal status could be correlated to occupation, yet manual 
labor in general, but particularly tanning hides and metal work, 
was considered demeaning for individuals of qabila status. Qabila 
families considered themselves distinct from and distinctly supe- 
rior to khadira, nontribal families, who could not claim qabila de- 
scent. Khadira include most tradesmen, artisans, merchants, and 
scholars, and constituted the bulk of the urban productive popula- 
tion of pre-oil Arabia. Marriage between individuals of qabila and 
khadira status was not normally considered. The claim to qabila status 
was maintained by patrilineal descent; therefore, qabila families were 
concerned to observe strict rules of endogamy (marriage back into 
the paternal line) so that status might be maintained and children, 
who were considered to belong to the family of the father, not the 
mother, would not suffer the taint of mixed blood. Within the qabila 
status group, however, there were status differentials, some groups 
being considered inferior precisely because they had once inter- 
married with khadira or an abd (slave) and were unable to claim 
purity of descent. The abd was at the bottom of the tribal-linked 
status hierarchy in the past. Black Africans were imported into the 
peninsula in large numbers to be sold as slaves until the late 
nineteenth century. Although slavery was not formally abolished 
until 1962, intermarriage between khadira and the black popula- 
tion has been extensive and has blurred social distinctions between 
the two. In contemporary Saudi Arabia, new status categories based 
on education and economic advantage began to undermine the im- 
portance of tribal affiliation to status and were having an homo- 
genizing effect on this barrier to social integration. 

An additional status category based on bloodline was that of 
ashraf, those who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad. 
The ashraf (sing., sharif — see Glossary) were significant in the Hijaz 
but far less so in Najd. 

These status categories based on blood have at times in the past 
and were in the 1990s being transcended by status groups based 
on religion, commerce, professions, and political power. Religious 
authority, for example, constituted an additional category of status. 
The ulama historically have represented a powerful intellectual 



63 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

elite of judges, scholars, imams, notaries, and preachers. Prestige 
still strongly adhered to religious scholarship and especially to the 
groups of scholars whose religious authority was recognized by the 
rulers and who were employed in the government bureaucracy (see 
Islamism in Saudi Arabia, this ch.; The Ulama, ch. 4). To some 
extent, as secular education became more valued and greater eco- 
nomic rewards accrued to those with technical and administrative 
skills, the status of the ulama declined. 

Merchants constituted an additional elite status category based 
on wealth. Many of the traditional merchant class, especially mer- 
chants from the Hijaz and the Eastern Province, lost influence as 
Saudi rulers ceased borrowing from them and began to compete 
with them, using oil resources to create a new merchant class favor- 
ing Najdis. The rulers also used preferential recruitment for ad- 
ministrative personnel from Najdi tribes, who in turn used their 
position to favor other Najdis and Najdi businesses. The result has 
been the creation of powerful administrative and commercial classes 
supplanting older elite groups based outside Najd. 

The interest and status of these groups may overlap others. In 
the Hijaz, members of an elite group known as the awaali (first 
families) claimed group solidarity based on past family connections; 
their association was actually distinguished by wealth and life-style, 
and the circle of families was constantly in flux. Families who be- 
longed to the group came from diverse backgrounds and included 
descendants of religious scholars, merchants, and pilgrimage guides. 

The Shia of the Eastern Province were near the low end of the 
social ladder in relation to the fruits of development and access to 
sources of power. According to literature produced outside Saudi 
Arabia, Shia opposition groups were active inside the kingdom and 
constituted the majority of the political prisoners in Saudi jails. Shia 
were generally disparaged in society by the Wahhabi (see Glos- 
sary) antipathy in which their rituals were held. The status of Shia, 
however, was in flux: they began to be drawn into positions of 
responsibility in government service and since the 1980s have 
received an increased share of government funding for development. 

Cultural Homogeneity and Values 

The population was characterized by a high degree of cultural 
homogeneity. This homogeneity was reflected in a common Arabic 
language and in adherence to Sunni (see Glossary) Wahhabi Islam, 
which has been fostered within the political culture promoted by 
the Saudi monarchy (see Wahhabi Theology, this ch.). Above all, 
the cultural homogeneity of the kingdom rested in the diffusion 
of values and attitudes exemplified in the family and in Arabian 



64 



The Society and Its Environment 



tribal society, in particular the values and attitudes regarding re- 
lations within the family and relations of the family with the rest 
of society. 

The family was the most important social institution in Saudi 
Arabia. For Saudis generally, the family was the primary basis of 
identity and status for the individual and the immediate focus of 
individual loyalty, just as it was among those who recognized a 
tribal affiliation. Families formed alignments with other families 
sharing common interests and life-styles, and individuals tended 
to socialize within the circle of these family alliances. Usually, a 
family business was open to participation by sons, uncles, and male 
cousins, and functioned as the social welfare safety net for all mem- 
bers of the extended family. 

The structure of the family in Saudi Arabia was generally com- 
patible with the structure of tribal lineage. Families were patrilineal, 
the boundaries of family membership being drawn around lines 
of descent through males. Relations with maternal relatives were 
important, but family identity was tied to the father, and children 
were considered to belong to him and not to the mother. At its 
narrowest, a family might therefore be defined as comprising a man, 
his children, and his children's children through patrilineal descent. 

Islamic laws of personal status remained in force in Saudi Ara- 
bia without modification, and the patrilineal character of the fam- 
ily was compatible with and supported by these Islamic family laws. 
Marriage was not a sacrament but a civil contract, which had to 
be signed by witnesses and which specified an amount of money 
(mehr) to be paid by the husband to the wife. It might further in- 
clude an agreement for an additional amount to be paid in the event 
of divorce. The amount of the mehr averaged between 25,000 and 
40,000 Saudi riyals (for value of the riyal — see Glossary) in the 
early 1990s, although some couples rejected the mehr altogether, 
stipulating only a token amount to satisfy the legal requirement 
necessary to validate the marriage contract. The contract might 
also add other stipulations, such as assuring the wife the right of 
divorce if the husband should take a second wife. Divorce could 
usually only be instigated by the husband, and because by law chil- 
dren belonged to the father, who could take custody of them after 
a certain age (the age varied with the Islamic legal school, but was 
usually seven for boys and puberty for girls), legally a wife and 
mother could be detached from her children at the wish of her 
husband. 

When women married, they might become incorporated into the 
household of the husband but not into his family. A woman did 
not take her husband's name but kept the name of her father 



65 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



because legally women were considered to belong to the family of 
their birth throughout their lives. Many in Saudi Arabia interpreted 
the retention of a woman's maiden name, as well as her retention 
of control over personal property as allowed under Islamic law, 
as an indication of women's essential independence from a hus- 
band's control under the Islamic system. Legally, a woman's closest 
male relative, such as a father or brother, was obligated to sup- 
port her if she were divorced or widowed. Divorce was common. 

According to Islamic law, men are permitted to marry as many 
as four wives. Among the adult generation of educated, Western- 
oriented elites, polygyny was not practiced. Polygyny was common, 
however, among some groups, such as the religiously conservative 
and the older generation of the royal family. In the cities, polygy- 
nous households were seen among recent migrants from rural areas. 
For a family of means, a polygynous housing arrangement usu- 
ally entailed a separate dwelling unit for each wife and her chil- 
dren. These units might be completely separate houses or houses 
within a walled family compound, in which case the compound 
might include a separate house that the men of the family shared 
and used for male gatherings, such as meals with guests or busi- 
ness meetings. 

Because the prerogatives of divorce, polygyny, and child cus- 
tody lay with the husband, women in Saudi Arabia appeared to 
be at a considerable disadvantage in marriage. However, these dis- 
advantages were partially offset by a number of factors. The first 
was that children were attached to mothers, and when children, 
especially sons, were grown, their ties to the mother secured her 
a place of permanence in the husband's family. Second, marriages 
were most often contracted by agreement between families, unit- 
ing cousins, or individuals from families seeking to expand their 
circle of alliances and enhance their prestige, so that a successful 
marriage was in the interest of, and the desire of, both husband 
and wife. In addition, Islamic inheritance laws guaranteed a share 
of inheritance to daughters and wives, so that many women in Saudi 
Arabia personally held considerable wealth. Because women by law 
were entitled to full use of their own money and property, they 
had economic independence to cushion the impact of divorce, should 
it occur. Most important, custody of children was in practice a mat- 
ter for family discussion, not an absolute regulated by religion. Fur- 
thermore, judges of the sharia courts, according to informal 
observations, responded with sympathy and reason when women 
attempted to initiate divorce proceedings or request the support 
of the court in family-related disputes. 



66 



The Society and Its Environment 



Families in Saudi Arabia, like families throughout the Middle 
East, tended to be patriarchal, the father in the family appearing 
as an authoritarian figure at the top of a hierarchy based on age 
and sex. Undergirding the patriarchal family were cultural and re- 
ligious values that permeated the society as a whole, and that found 
their clearest expression in tribal values and practices. Families 
shared a sense of corporate identity, and the esteem of the family 
was measured by the individual's capacity to live up to socially 
prescribed ideals of honor. 

The values and practices inherent in these ideals, as well as ad- 
herence to Islam, were at the heart of the cultural homogeneity 
among the diverse peoples — tribal and nontribal — of the kingdom. 
The society as a whole valued behavior displaying generosity, self- 
lessness, and hospitality; deference to those above in the hierar- 
chy of the family; freedom from dependence on others and mastery 
over one's emotions; and a willingness to support other family mem- 
bers and assume responsibility for their errors as well. An exam- 
ple of the sense of corporate responsibility binding Arabian families 
may be seen in an incident that occurred in the 1970s in a Hijazi 
village. Although this incident occurred among beduin who were 
recently settled, the group solidarity illustrated was applicable to 
the Arabian family in general as well as to those united by tribal 
affiliation. An automobile accident took the life of a young boy, 
and the driver of the car was obligated to pay compensation to the 
boy's father. The family of the driver, although indigent, was able 
to borrow the money from a local merchant and present it to the 
boy's father in a ceremony "to forgive." Afterward, delegated 
members of the tribe assumed the responsibility of collecting money 
toward repayment of the compensation from all the people in the 
tribe, who happened to include close relatives of the boy who was 
killed. In this way, all parties to the tragedy were satisfied that the 
best interests of the extended family/tribal group had been served 
in serving the interests of an individual member. 

Chastity and sexual modesty were also very highly valued. Ap- 
plied primarily to women, these values not only were tied to fam- 
ily honor but also were held to be a religious obligation. Specific 
Quranic verses enjoin modesty upon women and, to a lesser degree, 
upon men; and women are viewed as being responsible for sexual 
temptation (jitna). Although this attitude is ancient in the Middle 
East and found to some degree throughout the area in modern 
times, it has taken on religious significance in Islam through in- 
terpretations of Muslim theologians. 

The veiling and separation of women were considered mechan- 
isms to ensure sexual modesty and avoid fitna. In practice, the effect 



67 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

of veiling and separation also ensured the continuing dependence 
of women on men. Some families adopted more liberal standards 
than others in defining the extent of veiling and separation, but 
the underlying value of sexual modesty was almost universal. Be- 
cause the separation of women from unrelated men was accepted 
as a moral imperative, most activities of a woman outside her home 
required the mediation of a servant or a man; for example, if a 
woman should not be seen, how could she apply for a government 
housing loan in an office staffed by men? In fact, how could she 
get to the government office without a servant or a man to take 
her, because women were not allowed to drive. The continuing 
dependence of women on men, in effect, perpetuated the family 
as a patriarchal unit. Control of women ensured female chastity 
and thus family honor as well as the patrilineal character of the 
family. In Saudi society in general, the role of women was basic 
to maintaining the structure of the family and therefore of society. 

Structure of Tribal Groupings 

Almost all nomadic people are organized in tribal associations, 
the exceptions being the saluba, the tinkers and traders of the desert, 
and black beduin, descendants of former slaves. Not all tribal peo- 
ple, however, are beduin because urban and agricultural peoples 
may maintain tribal identities. 

Structurally, tribal groups are defined by common patrilineal 
descent that unites individuals in increasingly larger segments. The 
lineage is the unit that shares joint responsibility for avenging the 
wrongs its members may suffer and, conversely, paying compen- 
sation to anyone whom its members have aggrieved. Although tribes 
may differ in their status, all lineages of a given tribe are consid- 
ered equal. Water wells, aside from the newer deep wells drilled 
by the government, are held in common by lineages. Among 
nomads, lineage membership is the basis of summer camps; all 
animals, although owned by individual households, bear the lin- 
eage's brand. The lineage is the nexus between the individual and 
the tribe. To be ostracized by one's lineage leaves the individual 
little choice but to sever all tribal links; it is to lose the central ele- 
ment in one's social identity. 

Above the level of lineage, there are three to five larger segments 
that together make up the tribe. Donald Cole, an anthropologist 
who studied the Al (see Glossary) Murrah, a tribe of camel-herding 
nomads in eastern and southern Arabia, notes that four to six 
patrilineally related lineages are grouped together in a clan (seven 
clans comprise the Al Murrah tribe). However the subdivisions 
of a tribe are defined, they are formed by adding larger and larger 



68 



The Society and Its Environment 

groups of patrilineally related kin. The system permits lineages to 
locate themselves relative to all other groups on a "family tree." 

In practice, effective lineage and tribal membership reflect eco- 
logical and economic constraints. Among nomads, those who sum- 
mer together are considered to be a lineage's effective membership. 
On the individual level, adoption is, and long has been, a regular 
occurrence. A man from an impoverished lineage will sometimes 
join his wife's group. His children will be considered members of 
their mother's lineage, although this contravenes the rules of 
patrilineal descent. 

The process of adjusting one's view of genealogical relationships 
to conform to the existing situation applies upward to larger and 
larger sections of a tribe. Marriages and divorces increase the num- 
ber of possible kin to whom an individual can trace a link and, 
concomitantly, of the ways in which one can view potential alli- 
ances and genealogical relationships. The vicissitudes of time, the 
history of tribal migrations, the tendency of groups to segment into 
smaller units, the adoption of client tribes by those stronger, a 
smaller tribe's use of the name of one more illustrious — all tend 
to make tenuous the tie between actual descent and the publicly 
accepted view of genealogy. At every level of tribal organization, 
genealogical "fudging" brings existing sociopolitical relationships 
into conformity with the rules of patrilineal descent. The genea- 
logical map, therefore, is as much a description of extant social 
relations as a statement of actual lines of descent. 

Tribe and Monarchy 

The rise of the centralized state has undercut tribal autonomy, 
and sedentarization has undermined the economic benefits of tribal 
organization, but in the 1990s the tribe remained a central focus 
of identity for those claiming a tribal affiliation. Contemporary tribal 
leadership continued to play a pivotal role in relations between in- 
dividuals and the central government, particularly among those 
who were recently settled or still nomadic. 

The tribal leader, the shaykh (see Glossary), governs by con- 
sensus. Shaykhs acquire influence through their ability to mediate 
disputes and persuade their peers toward a given course of action. 
The qualities their position demands are a detailed grasp of tribal 
affairs, a reputation for giving good advice, and generosity. Shaykhs 
are essentially arbitrators; the process of resolving disputes reflects 
the tribe's egalitarian ethos. Shaykhs do not lead discussions but 
carefully ascertain everyone's opinion on a given question. Con- 
sensus is necessary before action is taken. To force a decision is 



69 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

to undermine one's influence; leaders are effective only as long as 
they conform to the tribe's expectations. 

Tribal leaders in the past brokered relationships among com- 
peting tribes and clans. Raiding was a mechanism of economic 
redistribution that conferred status on strong and successful raid- 
ing clans. Tribes or lineages could opt out of the round of raiding 
and counterraiding by seeking the protection of a stronger, more 
militarily oriented group. The protected paid their protector an 
agreed sum {khuwa), in return for which their lives and property 
were to be spared. The shaykh who accepted khuwa was obliged 
to safeguard those who paid it or compensate them for whatever 
damages they incurred. As with the booty of raiding, the shaykh 
who accepted the payment could only guarantee this influence by 
distributing it to his fellow tribesmen. These client-patron relation- 
ships based on payment of protection money were undermined by 
Abd al Aziz in the 1920s when he released weaker tribes from ob- 
ligations to stronger ones and made himself the sole source of wealth 
redistributed from the spoils of raiding, and then later from oil 
profits. 

The working relationship between the monarchy and tribal lead- 
ers is viewed in much the same framework as the traditional rela- 
tionship between the shaykh and tribal members. In fact, the same 
framework of the relationship between tribal shaykh and tribal 
members is the model for the ideal relationship between the monar- 
chy and all Saudi citizens. Just as the tribal shaykh was expected 
to mediate disputes and assure the welfare of his group by receiv- 
ing tribute and dispensing largess, governors in the provinces and 
the king himself continue the custom of holding an open audience 
(majlis — see Glossary) at which any tribesman or other male citizen 
could gain a hearing. The largess of the shaykh was dispensed not 
as direct handouts of food or clothing, as in the past, but through 
the institutions of the state bureaucracy in the form of free medi- 
cal care, welfare payments, grants for housing, lucrative contracts, 
and government jobs. 

The tribes of Arabia acknowledged the political authority of the 
Saudi monarchy as being above the tribal group. Loyalty to the 
state was not a matter of nationality or still less an abstract notion 
of citizenship; it was a matter of loyalty to the Al Saud (see Glos- 
sary) and to the royal family as the focus of the Islamic nation. 
In a study of the Al Murrah, Nicholas Hopkins notes that "The 
Al Murrah make a distinction between al-Dawlah (the state or 
bureaucracy) and al-Hukumah (the Saudi royal family or gover- 
nors); they are loyal to the latter and fearful of the former, but 
fear that the state is taking over the government. ' ' Most tribes were 



70 



The Society and Its Environment 



affiliated with the Al Saud through marriage ties as the product 
of Abd al Aziz's deliberate policy of cementing ties between him- 
self and the tribal groups. In the 1970s and 1980s, the political al- 
liance between tribe and state was reinforced by marrying tribal 
women to government officials and Saudi princes. According to 
a 1981 study carried out among the Al Saar beduin in southern 
Arabia, these marriages were encouraged by tribal leaders because 
they were seen as a means of ensuring continuing access to govern- 
ment leaders. 

Tribal solidarity has been institutionalized and tribal ties to both 
dawlah and hukumah have been cemented through the national guard. 
The amir of the Al Murrah tribal unit studied by Hopkins was 
the head of a national guard unit composed mainly of Al Murrah, 
and most Al Murrah families in the unit under study had at least 
one family member serving in the national guard. Through the 
national guard, former nomads received training and the poten- 
tial for high-level careers, as well as instruction in military sciences, 
and housing, health, and social services for dependents and families. 
The government also provided water taps and markets in cities, 
towns, and villages that were used in marketing livestock. Also 
provided were veterinary services, subsidized fodder, and build- 
ings for storage. 

Beduin Economy in Tradition and Change 

The word beduin is derived from the Arabic word bawaadin (sing. , 
baadiya), meaning nomads, and is usually associated with a camel- 
herding life in the desert. The word, therefore, describes an occu- 
pation and is not synonymous with the word tribe (qabila), despite 
the fact that the two are often used interchangeably. The word 
bawaadin, furthermore, not only refers to camel-herding but also 
is an elastic term that is understood in relation to hadar, or settled 
people. People from the city, for example, are likely to view vil- 
lagers as part of the bawaadin, but the villager considers only the 
nomadic people as bawaadin. Villagers and nomads, on the other 
hand, make a distinction between shepherds who tend sheep and 
goats, staying close by the village, and the beduin who raise camels. 
"While the physical boundary between the desert and the sown 
is strikingly sharp in the Middle East . . " notes Donald Cole, "the 
boundary between nomadic pastoralist and sedentary farmer is less 
precise." Beduin and farmers are united in a single social system. 
Each relies on the other for critical goods and services to sustain 
a way of life; they share substantial cultural unity. Tribal loyalties 
transcend differences in livelihood; many tribes have both seden- 
tary and nomadic branches. 



71 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

There is a nomadic- sedentary continuum: at one extreme are 
completely settled farmers and merchants; at the other are camel 
herders who produce primarily for their own consumption and have 
little recourse to wage labor. A host of finely graded distinctions 
exist between the two extremes. Wealthy beduin frequently estab- 
lished a branch of the family in an oasis with commercial and 
agricultural investments. Individual households moved along the 
continuum as their domestic situation changed. Part of the family 
might settle to attend school, while others maintained the family's 
flocks. 

Among nomads there is a dichotomy — as well as a status 
differential — between those who herd sheep and goats and those 
who herd camels. Because sheep and goats are more demanding 
in their need for water and thus more limited in their migrations, 
their herders migrate shorter distances and have greater contact 
with the oasis population. Camels, on the other hand, can endure 
much longer periods without water, and camel herders are thereby 
able to range much more widely than other pastoralists. Camel- 
herding tribes were usually the most powerful militarily and had 
more status than other herders. 

Alliances between beduin and townsmen have historically been 
a defining feature of the politics of the peninsula. Just as beduin 
could opt out of raiding a particular town, the town could pay an 
agreed khuwa, the payment being the exchange of a portion of their 
surplus production for a guarantee of peace. 

At the same time that town and village relied on nomad pro- 
tection, nomads themselves relied on the sedentary populace for 
sustenance and diverse services. Nomadism has never been a self- 
contained system. Even camel-herding beduin relied on the oasis 
population for a variety of needs. Their diet was supplemented with 
dates, grains, and, more recently, processed foods together with 
such essentials as tent fibers and tent pins. Further, the sedentary 
population provided medical care when home remedies failed, as 
well as education facilities and religious leadership. Farmers who 
owned animals entrusted them to nomads' care and the nomads 
in turn received the animals' milk; beduin left their date palms 
in the farmers' hands in return for a portion of the harvest. 

Development policies in Saudi Arabia have encouraged the seden- 
tarization of most nomadic groups in the kingdom. The percent- 
age of fully nomadic people is unknown, but it was certainly 
declining in the early 1990s. Those who continued to maintain their 
livestock faced economic difficulties in spite of government as- 
sistance. The rise in the cost of living in Saudi Arabia, coupled 
with the decline in the commercial value of camels and other 



72 




Beduin father and son 
Courtesy Saudi Aramco 
Beduin driving camels 
Courtesy Aramco World 

73 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

livestock, occasioned a need for greater cash income. Consequently, 
beduin men had begun migrating to the cities for wage work, often 
as drivers of cars, trucks, and tractors. They frequently left their 
families behind to tend the animals. 

A study among Al Saar beduin shows that urban migration of 
men resulted in increased work for women and, at the same time, 
denied them the economic benefits of government programs 
designed to improve the welfare of nomadic families. With the fam- 
ily together, women generally tended only the sheep and goats; 
men herded the camels. In addition to caring for animals, producing 
food, and caring for the household, nomadic women also engaged 
in crafts, primarily weaving household textiles, such as mats, tent 
cloth, tent dividers, and sacks to contain their belongings. 

The women in the study were left alone with children and had 
total responsibility for caring for all the animals, camels as well 
as sheep and goats, while their husbands remained in the towns 
as much as six months at a time. However, because they were not 
entitled to a separate citizenship card, being listed as dependents 
on their husbands' citizenship cards, they were unable to apply 
for livestock subsidies or for land or home loans issued through 
government-run service centers near their summer grazing areas. 
Similarly, women were denied use of the pickup truck, now ubiq- 
uitous among nomadic families and indispensable for transport- 
ing wood and water and for transportation between the encampment 
and the herds as well as to government service centers. Although 
the burden of labor was left to women, they could use trucks only 
in the desert where they could not be seen by government authori- 
ties because women were not allowed to drive. 

One result of the increased burden on women has been the so- 
cial reorganization of labor based on the combined efforts of women. 
Women with infants tended to carry out traditional female work 
of child care and food preparation, whereas older women, widows, 
and women without infants cared for the herds and also sold their 
animals at the service stations, another task traditionally the respon- 
sibility of men. 

Religion 

Early Development of Islam 

The vast majority of the people of Saudi Arabia are Sunni Mus- 
lims. Islam is the established religion, and as such its institutions 
receive government support. In the early seventh century, Mu- 
hammad, a merchant from the Hashimite branch of the ruling 
Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca, began to preach the 



74 



The Society and Its Environment 



first of a series of revelations that Muslims believe were granted 
him by God through the angel Gabriel. He stressed monotheism 
and denounced the polytheism of his fellow Meccans. 

Because Mecca's economy was based in part on a thriving pil- 
grimage business to the Kaaba, the sacred structure around a black 
meteorite, and the numerous pagan shrines located there, Muham- 
mad's vigorous and continuing censure eventually earned him the 
bitter enmity of the town's leaders. In 622 he was invited to the 
town of Yathrib, which came to be known as Medina (the city) 
because it was the center of his activities. The move, or hijra (see 
Glossary), known in the West as the hegira, marks the beginning 
of the Islamic era. The Muslim calendar, based on the lunar year, 
begins in 622. In Medina, Muhammad — by this time known as 
the Prophet — continued to preach, defeated his detractors in bat- 
tle, and consolidated both the temporal and spiritual leadership 
of all Arabia in his person before his death in 632. 

After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his 
words regarded as coming directly from God into the Quran, the 
holy scripture of Islam. Other sayings and teachings of his and his 
companions as recalled by those who had known Muhammad, be- 
came the hadith (see Glossary). The precedent of his personal deeds 
and utterances was set forth in the sunna. Together the Quran, 
the hadith, and the sunna form a comprehensive guide to the spiri- 
tual, ethical, and social life of an orthodox Sunni Muslim. 

During his life, Muhammad was both spiritual and temporal 
leader of the Muslim community; he established Islam as a total, 
all-encompassing way of life for individuals and society. Islam 
historically recognizes no distinction between religion and state, 
and no distinction between religious and secular life or religious 
and secular law. A comprehensive system of religious law (the 
sharia — see Glossary) developed during the first four centuries of 
Islam, primarily through the accretion of precedent and interpre- 
tation by various judges and scholars. During the tenth century, 
however, legal opinion began to harden into authoritative doctrine, 
and the figurative bob al ijtihad (gate of interpretation) gradually 
closed, thenceforth limiting flexibility in Sunni Islamic law. 

After Muhammad's death, the leaders of the Muslim commu- 
nity chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his 
earliest followers, as caliph, or successor. At the time, some per- 
sons favored Ali, the Prophet's cousin and husband of his daugh- 
ter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the so-called Shiat Ali or 
Party of Ali) eventually recognized the community's choice. The 
next two caliphs — Umar, who succeeded in 634, and Uthman, who 
took power in 644 — were acknowledged by the entire community. 



75 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in 656, Muawiyah, 
governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his murdered kinsman 
Uthman. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his capital to 
Mesopotamia, where a short time later he, too, was murdered. 

Ali's death ended the period in which the entire community of 
Islam recognized a single caliph. Upon Ali's death, Muawiyah 
proclaimed himself caliph from Damascus. The Shiat Ali, however, 
refused to recognize Muawiyah or his line, the Umayyad caliphs; 
in support of a caliphate based on descent from the Prophet, they 
withdrew and established a dissident sect known as the Shia. 

Originally political in nature, the differences between the Sunni 
and Shia interpretations gradually assumed theological and 
metaphysical overtones. Ali's two sons, Hasan and Husayn, be- 
came martyred heroes to the Shia and repositories of the claims 
of Ali's line to mystical preeminence among Muslims. The Sun- 
nis retained the doctrine of the selection of leaders by consensus, 
although Arabs and members of the Quraysh, Muhammad's tribe, 
predominated in the early years. 

Reputed descent from the Prophet continued to carry social and 
religious prestige throughout the Muslim world in the early 1990s. 
Meanwhile, disagreements among Shia over who of several 
pretenders had a truer claim to the mystical powers of Ali produced 
further schisms. Some Shia groups developed doctrines of divine 
leadership far removed from the strict monotheism of early Islam, 
including beliefs in hidden but divinely chosen leaders with spiritual 
powers that equaled or surpassed those of the Prophet himself. The 
main sect of Shia became known as Twelvers because they recog- 
nized Ali and eleven of his direct descendants (see The Middle Ages, 
700-1500, ch. 1). 

The early Islamic polity was intensely expansionist, fueled both 
by fervor for the new religion and by economic and social factors. 
Conquering armies and migrating tribes swept out of Arabia, 
spreading Islam. By the end of Islam's first century, Islamic ar- 
mies had reached far into North Africa and eastward and north- 
ward into Asia. 

Although Muhammad had enjoined the Muslim community to 
convert the infidel, he had also recognized the special status of the 
"people of the book," Jews and Christians, whose scriptures he 
considered revelations of God's word that contributed in some mea- 
sure to Islam. Inhabiting the Arabian Peninsula in Muhammad's 
time were Christians, Jews, and Hanifs, believers in an indigenous 
form of monotheism who are mentioned in the Quran. Medina 
had a substantial Jewish population, and villages of Jews dotted 
the Medina oases. Clusters of Christian monasteries were located 



76 



The Society and Its Environment 



in the northern Hijaz, and Christians were known to have visited 
seventh-century Mecca. Some Arabic-speaking tribal people were 
Christian, including some from the Najdi interior and the Ghas- 
sanids and Lakhmids on the Arabian borderlands with the Byzan- 
tine Empire. Najran, a city in the southwest of present-day Saudi 
Arabia, had a mixed population of Jews, Christians, and pagans, 
and had been ruled by a Jewish king only fifty years before Mu- 
hammad' s birth. In sixth-century Najran, Christianity was well 
established and had a clerical hierarchy of nuns, priests, bishops, 
and laity. Furthermore, there were Christian communities along 
the gulf, especially in Bahrain, Oman, and Aden (in present-day 
Yemen). 

Jews and Christians in Muslim territories could live according 
to their religious law, in their communities, and were exempted 
from military service if they accepted the position of dhimmis, or 
tolerated subject peoples. This status entailed recognition of Mus- 
lim authority, additional taxes, prohibition on proselytism among 
Muslims, and certain restrictions on political rights. 

Tenets of Islam 

The shahada (testimony) succinctly states the central belief of 
Islam: "There is no god but God (Allah), and Muhammad is his 
Prophet." This simple profession of faith is repeated on many ritual 
occasions, and its recital in full and unquestioning sincerity desig- 
nates one a Muslim. The God of Muhammad's preaching was not 
a new deity; Allah is the Arabic term for God, not a particular 
name. Muhammad denied the existence of the many minor gods 
and spirits worshiped before his prophecy, and he declared the 
omnipotence of the unique creator, God. Islam means submission 
to God, and one who submits is a Muslim. Being a Muslim also 
involves a commitment to realize the will of God on earth and to 
obey God's law. 

Muhammad is the "seal of the Prophets"; his revelation is said 
to complete for all time the series of biblical revelations received 
by Jews and Christians. Muslims believe God to have remained 
the same throughout time, but that men strayed from his true teach- 
ing until set right by Muhammad. Prophets and sages of the bibli- 
cal tradition, such as Abraham (Ibrahim), Moses (Musa), and Jesus 
(Isa), are recognized as inspired vehicles of God's will. Islam, 
however, reveres as sacred only the message, rejecting Christian- 
ity's deification of Christ. It accepts the concepts of guardian angels, 
the Day of Judgment, general resurrection, heaven and hell, and 
eternal life of the soul. 



77 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

The duties of the Muslim — corporate acts of worship — form the 
five pillars of Islamic faith. These are shahada, affirmation of the 
faith; salat, daily prayer; zakat, almsgiving; sawm, fasting during 
the month of Ramadan; and hajj, pilgrimage to Mecca. These acts 
of worship must be performed with a conscious intent, not out of 
habit. Shahada is uttered daily by practicing Muslims, affirming 
their membership in the faith and expressing an acceptance of the 
monotheism of Islam and the divinity of Muhammad's message. 

The believer is to pray in a prescribed manner after purification 
through ritual ablutions at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset, 
and nightfall. Prescribed bows and prostrations accompany the 
prayers, which the worshiper recites facing Mecca. Prayers imbue 
daily life with worship, and the day is structured around religious 
observance. Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at the 
mosque under a prayer leader. On Fridays, the practice is obliga- 
tory. Women may attend public worship at the mosque, where they 
are segregated from the men, but women most frequently pray at 
home. A special functionary, the muezzin, intones a call to prayer 
to the entire community at the appropriate hours; those out of ear- 
shot determine the proper time from the position of the sun. 

In the early days of Islam, the authorities imposed a tax on per- 
sonal property proportionate to one's wealth; this tax was distributed 
to the mosques and to the needy. In addition, free-will gifts were 
made. Although still a duty of the believer, almsgiving in the twen- 
tieth century has become a more private matter. Properties con- 
tributed by pious individuals to support religious activities are 
usually administered as a religious foundation, or waqf (see Glos- 
sary). 

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period 
of obligatory fasting that commemorates Muhammad's receipt of 
God's revelation, the Quran. Fasting is an act of self-discipline that 
leads to piety and expresses submission and commitment to God. 
Fasting underscores the equality of all Muslims, strengthening sen- 
timents of community. During Ramadan all but the sick, weak, 
pregnant or nursing women, soldiers on duty, travelers on neces- 
sary journeys, and young children are enjoined from eating, drink- 
ing, or smoking during the day. Official work hours often are 
shortened during this period, and some businesses close for all or 
part of the day. Because the lunar calendar is eleven days shorter 
than the solar calendar, Ramadan revolves through the seasons 
over the years. When Ramadan falls in the summertime, a fast 
imposes considerable hardship on those who must do physical work. 
Each day's fast ends with a signal that light is insufficient to 



78 



The Society and Its Environment 



distinguish a black thread from a white one. Id al Fitr, a three-day 
feast and holiday, ends the month of Ramadan and is the occasion 
of much visiting. 

Finally, Muslims at least once in their lifetime should, if possi- 
ble, make the hajj to the holy city of Mecca to participate in spe- 
cial rites held during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. The 
Prophet instituted this requirement, modifying pre-Islamic custom 
to emphasize sites associated with Allah and Abraham, father of 
the Arabs through his son Ismail (also known as Ishmael). The 
pilgrim, dressed in two white, seamless pieces of cloth (ihram) per- 
forms various traditional rites (see Pilgrimage, this ch.) These rites 
affirm the Muslim's obedience to God and express intent to 
renounce the past and begin a new righteous life in the path of 
God. The returning male pilgrim is entitled to the honorific "hajj" 
before his name and a woman the honorific "hajji." Id al Adha, 
the feast of sacrifice, marks the end of the hajj month. 

The permanent struggle for the triumph of the word of God on 
earth, jihad, represents an additional duty of all Muslims. This 
concept is often taken to mean holy war, but most Muslims see 
it as a struggle in the way of God. Besides regulating relations be- 
tween the individual and God, Islam regulates the relations of one 
individual to another. Aside from specific duties, Islam imposes 
a code of ethical conduct encouraging generosity, fairness, honesty, 
and respect. It also explicitly propounds guidance as to what con- 
stitutes proper family relations and it forbids adultery, gambling, 
usury, and the consumption of carrion, blood, pork, and alcohol. 

A Muslim stands in a personal relationship to God; there is 
neither intermediary nor clergy in orthodox Islam. Men who lead 
prayers, preach sermons, and interpret the law do so by virtue of 
their superior knowledge and scholarship rather than because of 
any special powers or prerogatives conferred by ordination. Any 
adult male versed in the prayer form is entitled to lead prayers — a 
role referred to as imam (see Glossary). 

During the formative period of Islamic law, four separate Sun- 
ni schools developed and survived. These schools differ in the ex- 
tent to which they admit usage of each of the four sources of law: 
the Quran, the sunna or custom of the Prophet, reasoning by anal- 
ogy, and the consensus of religious scholars. The Hanafi school, 
named after Imam Abu Hanifa, predominates in the territories 
formerly under the Ottoman Empire and in Muslim India and 
Pakistan; it relies heavily on consensus and analogical reasoning 
in addition to the Quran and sunna. The Maliki school, named 
after Malik ibn Anas, is dominant in upper Egypt and West Africa; 



79 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

developed in Medina, it emphasizes use of hadith that were cur- 
rent in the Prophet's city. The school of Muhammad ibn Idris ash 
Shafii, prevailing in Indonesia, stresses reasoning by analogy. 

The fourth legal school is that of Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 855), 
which is the school adhered to in Saudi Arabia. The Hanbali school 
has attracted the smallest following because it rejects the use of anal- 
ogy as well as the consensus of judicial opinion except as recorded 
by the jurists of the first three centuries of Islam. However, an im- 
portant principle in Hanbali thought is that things are assumed 
to be pure or allowable unless first proved otherwise. 

Wahhabi Theology 

The political and cultural environment of contemporary Saudi 
Arabia has been influenced by a religious movement that began 
in central Arabia in the mid-eighteenth century. This movement, 
commonly known as the Wahhabi movement, grew out of the 
scholarship and preaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, a 
scholar of Islamic jurisprudence who had studied in Mesopotamia 
and the Hijaz before returning to his native Najd to preach his 
message of Islamic reform. 

Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab was concerned with the way 
the people of Najd engaged in practices he considered polytheis- 
tic, such as praying to saints; making pilgrimages to tombs and 
special mosques; venerating trees, caves, and stones; and using vo- 
tive and sacrificial offerings. He was also concerned by what he 
viewed as a laxity in adhering to Islamic law and in performing 
religious devotions, such as indifference to the plight of widows 
and orphans, adultery, lack of attention to obligatory prayers, and 
failure to allocate shares of inheritance fairly to women. 

When Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab began to preach against 
these breaches of Islamic laws, he characterized customary prac- 
tices as jahiliyah, the same term used to describe the ignorance of 
Arabians before the Prophet. Initially, his preaching encountered 
opposition, but he eventually came under the protection of a local 
chieftain named Muhammad ibn Saud, with whom he formed an 
alliance. The endurance of the Wahhabi movement's influence may 
be attributed to the close association between the founder of the 
movement and the politically powerful Al Saud in southern Najd 
(see The Al Saud and Wahhabi Islam, 1500-1818, ch. 1). 

This association between the Al Saud and the Al ash Shaykh, 
as Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab and his descendants came to 
be known, effectively converted political loyalty into a religious ob- 
ligation. According to Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab 's teach- 
ings, a Muslim must present a bayah, or oath of allegiance, to a 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



Muslim ruler during his lifetime to ensure his redemption after 
death. The ruler, conversely, is owed unquestioned allegiance from 
his people so long as he leads the community according to the laws 
of God. The whole purpose of the Muslim community is to be- 
come the living embodiment of God's laws, and it is the responsi- 
bility of the legitimate ruler to ensure that people know God's laws 
and live in conformity to them. 

Muhammad ibn Saud turned his capital, Ad Diriyah, into a 
center for the study of religion under the guidance of Muhammad 
ibn Abd al Wahhab and sent missionaries to teach the reformed 
religion throughout the peninsula, the gulf, and into Syria and 
Mesopotamia. Together they began a jihad against the backslid- 
ing Muslims of the peninsula. Under the banner of religion and 
preaching the unity of God and obedience to the just Muslim ruler, 
the Al Saud by 1 803 had expanded their dominion across the penin- 
sula from Mecca to Bahrain, installing teachers, schools, and the 
apparatus of state power. So successful was the alliance between 
the Al ash Shaykh and the Al Saud that even after the Ottoman 
sultan had crushed Wahhabi political authority and had destroyed 
the Wahhabi capital of Ad Diriyah in 1818, the reformed religion 
remained firmly planted in the settled districts of southern Najd 
and of Jabal Shammar in the north. It would become the unifying 
ideology in the peninsula when the Al Saud rose to power again 
in the next century. 

Central to Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab 's message was the 
essential oneness of God {tawhid). The movement is therefore known 
by its adherents as ad dawa HI tawhid (the call to unity), and those 
who follow the call are known as ahl at tawhid (the people of unity) 
or muwahhidun (unitarians). The word Wahhabi was originally used 
derogatorily by opponents, but has today become commonplace 
and is even used by some Najdi scholars of the movement. 

Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab 's emphasis on the oneness of 
God was asserted in contradistinction to shirk, or polytheism, de- 
fined as the act of associating any person or object with powers 
that should be attributed only to God. He condemned specific acts 
that he viewed as leading to shirk, such as votive offerings, pray- 
ing at saints' tombs and at graves, and any prayer ritual in which 
the suppliant appeals to a third party for intercession with God. 
Particularly objectionable were certain religious festivals, includ- 
ing celebrations of the Prophet's birthday, Shia mourning ceremo- 
nies, and Sufi mysticism. Consequently, the Wahhabis forbid grave 
markers or tombs in burial sites and the building of any shrines 
that could become a locus of shirk. 



81 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

The extensive condemnation of shirk is seen in the movement's 
iconoclasm, which persisted into the twentieth century, most notably 
with the conquest of At Taif in the Hijaz. A century earlier, in 
1802, Wahhabi fighters raided and damaged one of the most sacred 
Shia shrines, the tomb of Husayn, the son of Imam Ali and grand- 
son of the Prophet, at Karbala in Iraq. In 1804 the Wahhabis de- 
stroyed tombs in the cemetery of the holy men in Medina, which 
was a locus for votive offerings and prayers to the saints. 

Following the legal school of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Wahhabi ulama 
accept the authority only of the Quran and sunna. The Wahhabi 
ulama reject reinterpretation of Quran and sunna in regard to issues 
clearly settled by the early jurists. By rejecting the validity of rein- 
terpretation, Wahhabi doctrine is at odds with the Muslim refor- 
mation movement of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
This movement seeks to reinterpret parts of the Quran and sunna 
to conform with standards set by the West, most notably standards 
relating to gender relations, family law, and participatory demo- 
cracy. However, ample scope for reinterpretation remains for Wah- 
habi jurists in areas not decided by the early jurists. King Fahd 
ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud has repeatedly called for scholars to en- 
gage in ijtihad to deal with new situations confronting the modern- 
izing kingdom. 

The Wahhabi movement in Najd was unique in two respects: 
first, the ulama of Najd interpreted the Quran and sunna very liter- 
ally and often with a view toward reinforcing parochial Najdi prac- 
tices; second, the political and religious leadership exercised its 
collective political will to enforce conformity in behavior. Muham- 
mad ibn Abd al Wahhab asserted that there were three objectives 
for Islamic government and society; these objectives have been 
reaffirmed over the succeeding two centuries in missionary litera- 
ture, sermons, fatwa (see Glossary) rulings, and in Wahhabi expli- 
cations of religious doctrine. According to Muhammad ibn Abd al 
Wahhab the objectives were "to believe in Allah, enjoin good be- 
havior, and forbid wrongdoing." 

Under Al Saud rule, governments, especially during the Wah- 
habi revival in the 1920s, have shown their capacity and readiness 
to enforce compliance with Islamic laws and interpretations of Is- 
lamic values on themselves and others. The literal interpretations 
of what constitutes right behavior according to the Quran and hadith 
have given the Wahhabis the sobriquet of "Muslim Calvinists." 
To the Wahhabis, for example, performance of prayer that is punc- 
tual, ritually correct, and communally performed not only is urged 
but also is publicly required of men. Consumption of wine is for- 
bidden to the believer because wine is literally forbidden in the 



82 



The Society and Its Environment 



Quran. Under the Wahhabis, however, the ban extended to all 
intoxicating drinks and other stimulants, including tobacco. Modest 
dress is prescribed for both men and women in accordance with 
the Quran, but the Wahhabis specify the type of clothing that should 
be worn, especially by women, and forbid the wearing of silk and 
gold, although the latter ban has been enforced only sporadically. 
Music and dancing have also been forbidden by the Wahhabis at 
times, as have loud laughter and demonstrative weeping, particu- 
larly at funerals. 

The Wahhabi emphasis on conformity makes of external appear- 
ance and behavior a visible expression of inward faith. Therefore, 
whether one conforms in dress, in prayer, or in a host of other ac- 
tivities becomes a public statement of whether one is a true Muslim. 
Because adherence to the true faith is demonstrable in tangible ways, 
the Muslim community can visibly judge the quality of a person's 
faith by observing that person's actions. In this sense, public opinion 
becomes a regulator of individual behavior. Therefore, within the 
Wahhabi community, which is striving to be the collective embodi- 
ment of God's laws, it is the responsibility of each Muslim to look 
after the behavior of his neighbor and to admonish him if he goes 
astray. 

To ensure that the community of the faithful will "enjoin what 
is right and forbid what is wrong," morals enforcers known as 
mutawwiin (literally, "those who volunteer or obey") have been 
integral to the Wahhabi movement since its inception. Mutawwiin 
have served as missionaries, as enforcers of public morals, and as 
"public ministers of the religion" who preach in the Friday mosque. 
Pursuing their duties in Jiddah in 1806, the mutawwiin were ob- 
served to be "constables for the punctuality of prayers . . . with 
an enormous staff in their hand, [who] were ordered to shout, to 
scold and to drag people by the shoulders to force them to take 
part in public prayers, five times a day." In addition to enforcing 
male attendance at public prayer, the mutawwiin also have been 
responsible for supervising the closing of shops at prayer time, for 
looking out for infractions of public morality such as playing music, 
smoking, drinking alcohol, having hair that is too long (men) or 
uncovered (women), and dressing immodestly. 

In the first quarter of the century, promoting Wahhabism was 
an asset to Abd al Aziz in forging cohesion among the tribal peo- 
ples and districts of the peninsula. By reviving the notion of a com- 
munity of believers, united by their submission to God, Wahhabism 
helped to forge a sense of common identity that was to supersede 
parochial loyalties. By abolishing the tribute paid by inferior tribes 
to militarily superior tribes, Abd al Aziz undercut traditional hi- 
erarchies of power and made devotion to Islam and to himself as 



83 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

the rightly guided Islamic ruler the glue that would hold his king- 
dom together. In the early 1990s, unity in Islam of the Muslim 
umma (community) under Al Saud leadership was the basis for the 
legitimacy of the Saudi state. 

The promotion of Islam as embracing every aspect of life ac- 
counted in large measure for the success of Wahhabi ideology in 
inspiring the zealotry of the Ikhwan movement. Beginning in 1912, 
agricultural communities called hujar (collective pi.) were settled 
by beduin who came to believe that in settling on the land they 
were fulfilling the prerequisite for leading Muslim lives; they were 
making a hijra, "the journey from the land of unbelief to the land 
of belief. " It is still unclear whether the Ikhwan settlements were 
initiated by Abd al Aziz or whether he co-opted the movement once 
it had begun, but the settlements became military cantonments in 
the service of Abd al Aziz's consolidation of power. Although the 
Ikhwan had very limited success in agriculture, they could rely on 
a variety of subsidies derived from raids under the aegis of Abd 
al Aziz and provisions disbursed directly from his storehouses in 
Riyadh. 

As newly converted Wahhabi Muslims, the Ikhwan were fanat- 
ical in imposing their zealotry for correct behavior on others. They 
enforced rigid separation of the sexes in their villages, for exam- 
ple, and strict attention to prayers, and used violence in attempt- 
ing to impose Wahhabi restrictions on others. Their fanaticism 
forged them into a formidable fighting force, and with Ikhwan as- 
sistance, Abd al Aziz extended the borders of his kingdom into the 
Eastern Province, Hail, and the Hijaz. Ultimately, the fanaticism 
of the Ikhwan undermined their usefulness, and they had to be 
reckoned with; the Ikhwan Rebellion (1928-30) marked their eclipse 
(see The Ikhwan Movement, ch. 5). 

In the 1990s, Saudi leadership did not emphasize its identity as 
inheritor of the Wahhabi legacy as such, nor did the descendants 
of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, the Al ash Shaykh, continue 
to hold the highest posts in the religious bureaucracy. Wahhabi 
influence in Saudi Arabia, however, remained tangible in the phys- 
ical conformity in dress, in public deportment, and in public prayer. 
Most significantly, the Wahhabi legacy was manifest in the social 
ethos that presumed government responsibility for the collective 
moral ordering of society, from the behavior of individuals, to in- 
stitutions, to businesses, to the government itself. 

Shia 

Shia are a minority in Saudi Arabia, probably constituting about 
5 percent of the total population, their number being estimated 



84 



The Society and Its Environment 



from a low of 200,000 to as many as 400,000. Shia are concen- 
trated primarily in the Eastern Province, where they constitute 
perhaps 33 percent of the population, being concentrated in the 
oases of Qatif and Al Ahsa. Saudi Shia belong to the sect of the 
Twelvers, the same sect to which the Shia of Iran and Bahrain be- 
long. The Twelvers believe that the leadership of the Muslim com- 
munity rightfully belongs to the descendants of Ali, the son-in-law 
of the Prophet, through Ali's son Husayn (see Early Development 
of Islam, this ch.). There were twelve such rightful rulers, known 
as Imams, the last of whom, according to the Twelvers, did not 
die but went into hiding in the ninth century, to return in the full- 
ness of time as the messiah (mahdi) to create the just and perfect 
Muslim society. 

From a theological perspective, relations between the Shia and 
the Wahhabi Sunnis are inherently strained because the Wahha- 
bis consider the rituals of the Shia to be the epitome of shirk (poly- 
theism; literally "association"), especially the Ashura mourning 
celebrations, the passion play reenacting Husayn' s death at Kar- 
bala, and popular votive rituals carried out at shrines and graves. 
In the late 1920s, the Ikhwan (Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman 
Al Saud's fighting force of converted Wahhabi beduin Muslims) 
were particularly hostile to the Shia and demanded that Abd al 
Aziz forcibly convert them. In response, Abd al Aziz sent Wah- 
habi missionaries to the Eastern Province, but he did not carry 
through with attempts at forced conversion. Government policy 
has been to allow Shia their own mosques and to exempt Shia from 
Hanbali inheritance practices. Nevertheless, Shia have been for- 
bidden all but the most modest displays on their principal festivals, 
which are often occasions of sectarian strife in the gulf region, with 
its mixed Sunni-Shia populations. 

Shia came to occupy the lowest rung of the socioeconomic lad- 
der in the newly formed Saudi state. They were excluded from the 
upper levels of the civil bureaucracy and rarely recruited by the 
military or the police; none was recruited by the national guard. 
The discovery of oil brought them employment, if not much of a 
share in the contracting and subcontracting wealth that the petro- 
leum industry generated. Shia have formed the bulk of the skilled 
and semiskilled workers employed by Saudi Aramco. Members of 
the older generation of Shia were sufficiently content with their 
lot as Aramco employees not to participate in the labor disturbances 
of the 1950s and 1960s. 

In 1979 Shia opposition to the royal family was encouraged by 
the example of Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini's 



85 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

revolutionary ideology from Iran and by the Sunni Islamist (some- 
times seen as fundamentalist) groups' attack on the Grand Mosque 
in Mecca in November. During the months that followed, conser- 
vative ulama and Ikhwan groups in the Eastern Province, as well 
as Shia, began to make their criticisms of government heard. On 
November 28, 1979, as the Mecca incident continued, the Shia 
of Qatif and two other towns in the Eastern Province tried to ob- 
serve Ashura publicly. When the national guard intervened, riot- 
ing ensued, resulting in a number of deaths. Two months later, 
another riot in Al Qatif by Shia was quelled by the national guard, 
but more deaths occurred. Among the criticisms expressed by Shia 
were the close ties of the Al Saud with and their dependency on 
the West, corruption, and deviance from the sharia. The criticisms 
were similar to those levied by Juhaiman al Utaiba in his pam- 
phlets circulated the year before his seizure of the Grand Mosque. 
Some Shia were specifically concerned with the economic dispari- 
ties between Sunnis and Shia, particularly because their popula- 
tion is concentrated in the Eastern Province, which is the source 
of the oil wealth controlled by the Sunni Al Saud of Najd. During 
the riots that occurred in the Eastern Province in 1979, demands 
were raised to halt oil supplies and to redistribute the oil wealth 
so that the Shia would receive a more equitable share. 

After order was restored, there was a massive influx of govern- 
ment assistance to the region. Included were many large projects 
to upgrade the region's infrastructure. In the late 1970s, the Al 
Jubayl project, slated to become one of the region's largest em- 
ployers, was headed by a Shia. In 1992, however, there were reports 
of repression of Shia political activity in the kingdom. An Amnesty 
International report published in 1990 stated that more than 700 
political prisoners had been detained without charge or trial since 
1983, and that most of the prisoners were Shia (see Prison Condi- 
tions, ch. 5). 

Islamism in Saudi Arabia 

The decade of the 1980s was characterized by the rise of ultracon- 
servative, politically activist Islamic movements in much of the Arab 
world. These Islamist movements, labeled fundamentalist in the West, 
sought the government institutionalization of Islamic laws and so- 
cial principles. Although Saudi Arabia already claimed to be an 
Islamic government whose constitution is the Quran, the kingdom 
has not been immune to this conservative trend. 

In Saudi Arabia, the 1960s, and especially the 1970s, had been 
years of explosive development, liberal experimentation, and open- 
ness to the West. A reversal of this trend came about abruptly in 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



1979, the year in which the Grand Mosque in Mecca came under 
attack by religiously motivated critics of the monarchy, and the 
Islamic Republic of Iran was established. Each of these events sig- 
naled that religious conservatism would have to be politically ad- 
dressed with greater vigor. Although the mosque siege was carried 
out by a small band of zealots and their actions of shooting in the 
mosque appalled most Muslims, their call for less ostentation on 
the part of the Saudi rulers and for a halt to the cultural inunda- 
tion of the kingdom by the West struck a deep chord of sympathy 
across the kingdom. At the same time, Ayatollah Khomeini's call 
to overthrow the Al Saud was a direct challenge to the legitimacy 
of the monarchy as custodian of the holy places, and a challenge 
to the stability of the kingdom with its Shia minority. 

In the years following these events, the rise of the ultraconser- 
vative periphery has caused the vast center of society to shift in 
a conservative direction, producing greater polarity between those 
who are Western-oriented and the rest of society. The 1991 Per- 
sian Gulf War marked another dramatic shift toward conservative 
sentiment, and this conservative trend continued to gain momen- 
tum in the early 1990s. 

The conservative revival has been manifest in literature, in in- 
dividual behavior, in government policies, in official and unoffi- 
cial relations with foreigners, in mosque sermons, and in protest 
demonstrations against the government. The revival was also ap- 
parent in increased religious programming on television and radio, 
and an increase in articles about religion in newspapers. 

On an individual level, some Saudi citizens, especially educated 
young women, were expressing the revivalist mood by supplement- 
ing the traditional Saudi Islamic hijab (literally curtain or veil), a 
black cloak, black face veil, and hair covering, with long black gloves 
to hide the hands. In some cases, women who formerly had not 
covered their faces began to use the nontransparent covering once 
worn mainly by women of traditional families. Some, especially 
younger, university-educated women, wore the hijab when travel- 
ing in Europe or the United States to demonstrate the sincerity 
of their belief in following the precepts of Islam. 

In the Hijaz, another expression of the Islamic revival was par- 
ticipation in the ritual celebration of popular Islamic holidays. Some 
elite Hijazi families, for example, have revived the mawlid, a gather- 
ing for communal prayer on the occasion of the Prophet's birth- 
day, or to celebrate a birth, mourn a death, bless a new house, 
or seek God's favor in fulfillment of some wish, such as cure of 
an illness or the birth of a child. Mawlid rituals, especially when 
performed by women, were suppressed by Abd al Aziz when he 



87 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

conquered the Hijaz because they incorporated intercession and 
the Wahhabis considered them the equivalent of polytheism. 

Reacting to the revivalist mood, the government has backed the 
mutawwiin in responding to calls for controls over behavior per- 
ceived as non-Islamic. In November 1990, a group of forty-seven 
women staged a demonstration to press their claim for the right 
to drive. The mutawwiin demanded that the women be punished. 
The government confiscated the women's passports, and those em- 
ployed as teachers were fired. The previously unofficial ban on 
women's driving quickly became official. As a further indication 
of the growing conservatism, considerable criticism of the wom- 
en's behavior in asking for the right to drive came from within the 
women's branch of the university in Riyadh. 

Religiously sanctioned behavior, once thought to be the respon- 
sibility of families, was being increasingly institutionalized and en- 
forced. Women, for example, were usually prevented from traveling 
abroad unless accompanied by a male chaperon (mahram), a marked 
shift from the policy of the late 1970s, when a letter granting per- 
mission to travel was considered sufficient. This rule has com- 
pounded the difficulties for women wishing to study abroad: a 1982 
edict remained in force that restricted scholarships for women to 
those whose father, husband, or brother was able to remain with 
them during the period of study. 

State funding has increased for the nationwide organization of 
mutawwiin that is incorporated into the civil service bureaucracy. 
Once responsible primarily for enforcing the attendance of men 
in the mosque at prayer time, the tasks of the mutawwiin since the 
1980s have come to include enforcing public abstinence from eat- 
ing, drinking, and smoking among both Muslims and non-Muslims 
in the daylight hours during Ramadan. The mutawwiin (also seen 
as Committees for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of 
Vice or Committees for Public Morality) are also responsible for 
seeing that shops are closed at prayer time and that modest dress 
is maintained in public. Foreign women were under increased pres- 
sure to wear clothing that covered the arms and legs, and men and 
women who were unrelated might be apprehended for traveling 
together in a car. In the early 1980s, an offending couple might 
have received an official reprimand, but in the early 1990s they 
might experience more serious consequences. In 1991, for exam- 
ple, a Saudi citizen who gave a foreign female coworker a ride home 
was sentenced to a public flogging and his coworker subsequently 
was deported. 

The rise in conservatism also can be seen in measures taken to 
obstruct non-Muslim religious services. Non-Muslim services have 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



long been discouraged, but never prohibited, in Arabia. Even at 
the height of the Wahhabi revival in the 1920s, Christian mission- 
ary doctors held prayer services in the palace of Abd al Aziz. In 
the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Christian religious services were held 
regularly in private houses and in housing compounds belonging 
to foreign companies, and these services were usually ignored by 
mutawwiin as long as they did not attract public attention or en- 
courage proselytism. With the end of the Persian Gulf War, how- 
ever, mutawwiin began to enforce a ban on non-Muslim worship 
and punished offenders. In 1991, for example, a large number of 
mutawwiin accompanied by uniformed police broke up a Christian 
service in Riyadh and arrested a number of participants, includ- 
ing children. 

The most significant indicator of the growing shift toward con- 
servatism was the willingness of the state to silence opposition 
groups. For example, in May 1991, more than 400 men from the 
religious establishment and universities, including Saudi Arabia's 
most prominent legal scholar, Shaykh Abd al Aziz ibn Baz, peti- 
tioned the king to create a consultative council, a request to which 
the king responded favorably in February 1992. In their petition, 
however, the signatories asked not only for more participation in 
decision making, but also for a revision of all laws, including com- 
mercial and administrative regulations, to conform with the sharia. 
They asked for the creation of Islamic banks and an end to interest 
payments in established banks, as well as the redistribution of 
wealth, protection for the rights of the individual, censure of the 
media so that they would serve Islam and morality, and the crea- 
tion of a strong army so that the kingdom would not be dependent 
on the West. The requests represented a combination of appar- 
ently liberal petitions (a consultative council, redistribution of 
wealth) with a conservative religious bent. 

In a follow-up to the petition, a number of the signatories wrote 
a letter stating that funds for religious institutions were being cut 
back, that the institutions were not being given the resources to 
create jobs, and that their fatwas were being ignored. The letter 
further claimed that those who signed the original petition had had 
their passports confiscated and were being harassed by security per- 
sonnel even though "they had committed no other crime than giving 
advice to the Guardian." This affair suggested that the govern- 
ment was sufficiently concerned about the increasingly conserva- 
tive mood to shift its strategy from merely co-opting the conservative 
agenda to suppressing its extreme voices. 

In another incident, a movement called Islamic Awakening, 
which had a growing following in religious colleges and universities, 



89 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

attempted to hold a public demonstration in early 1991, but par- 
ticipants were threatened with arrest if they did so. At the same 
time, the government arrested a well-known activist in the Islamic 
Awakening while he was preaching a sermon in a Riyadh mosque. 

Factors contributing to the increased attraction of Islamic con- 
servatism included the problem of impending loss of identity caused 
by overwhelming Westernization. As secular education, popula- 
tion mobility, the breakup of extended family households, and the 
employment of women chipped away at cherished institutions of 
family and society, religion was a refuge and a source of stability 
(see Cultural Homogeneity and Values, this ch.). 

Another factor was disaffection with the existing economic sys- 
tem in the face of rising unemployment. During the rapid expan- 
sion of the 1970s, employment in the public sector was virtually 
assured for Saudi citizens with technical skills and for those with 
a Western education. By the end of the decade, however, those 
positions, especially in education and in the ministries, came under 
pressure from increasing numbers of university graduates with ris- 
ing expectations that no longer could be fulfilled in public sector 
employment. In addition, in the 1990s a growing number of young 
men educated in Islamic colleges and universities were unemployed; 
their acquired knowledge and skills were becoming more irrele- 
vant to the demands of the economy and bureaucratic infrastruc- 
ture, even within the judiciary where traditionally Islamic 
scholarship was most highly valued. 

An additional factor lay in the monarchy's continuing need to 
maintain legitimacy as an "Islamic government." As long as the 
ruling family believes it must continue to prove itself a worthy inher- 
itor of the legacy on which the kingdom was founded, it will be 
obliged to foster religious education and the Islamic political cul- 
ture in which the kingdom's media are steeped. A lesser factor in 
the rise of conservatism may be widespread sympathy with the sense 
of being victimized by the West, as evidenced, for example, in the 
continuing displacement of Palestinians in the occupied territories 
and southern Lebanon. 

Islam remained the primary cohesive ideology in the kingdom, 
the source of legitimacy for the monarchy, and the pervasive sys- 
tem for moral guidance and spirituality. The nature of the Islamic 
society Saudi Arabia wished to have in the future, however, was 
one of the important and passionately debated issues in the king- 
dom in the early 1990s. The ultraconservative moral agenda ap- 
pealed on an emotional level to many Saudi citizens. But the desire 
to expand the jurisdiction of sharia law and to interfere with the 
banking system was also a source of concern for many people. 



90 



Hajj, or pilgrimage, terminal, 
at King Abd al Aziz 
International Airport, Jiddah 
Courtesy Aramco World 




Because nearly all Saudis have reaped material benefits from state- 
funded development, people were hesitant to jeopardize those 
benefits and the political stability that allowed development. Some 
have suggested that the new system of basic laws was a clear sig- 
nal that the monarchy was firmly committed to liberalization and 
no longer felt compelled to tolerate conservative excesses. Close 
assessment of the implications of the basic laws suggested, however, 
that the monarchy was making no substantive changes and, in ef- 
fect, was taking no chances to risk disturbing the balance among 
competing religious persuasions in the kingdom. 

Pilgrimage 

The hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, occurs annually between the 
eighth and thirteenth days of the last month of the Muslim year, 
Dhu al Hijjah. The hajj represents the culmination of the Mus- 
lim's spiritual life. For many, it is a lifelong ambition. From the 
time of embarking on the journey to make the hajj, pilgrims often 
experience a spirit of exaltation and excitement; the meeting of so 
many Muslims of all races, cultures, and stations in life in har- 
mony and equality moves many people deeply. Certain rites of pil- 
grimage may be performed any time, and although meritorious, 
these constitute a lesser pilgrimage, known as umra. 

Improved transportation and accommodations have increased 
dramatically the number of visitors who enter the kingdom for 



91 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

pilgrimage. In 1965 almost 300,000 Muslims came from abroad 
to perform the rites of pilgrimage, primarily from other Arab and 
Asian countries. By 1983 that number had climbed to more than 
1 million. In addition to those coming from abroad, each year 
600,000 to 700,000 people living in the kingdom join in the hajj 
rituals. In 1988 and 1989, a total of 1.5 million pilgrims attended 
the hajj, representing a drop of about 200,000 in the number of 
foreign pilgrims, probably the result of a temporary ban on Iranian 
pilgrims instituted after a violent confrontation with Saudi police. 
In the hajj season of 1992, the Saudi press claimed a record of 2 
million pilgrims. 

The Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs and Religious Trusts han- 
dles the immense logistical and administrative problems generated 
by such a huge international gathering. The government issues spe- 
cial pilgrimage visas that permit the pilgrim to visit Mecca and 
to make the customary excursion to Medina to visit the Prophet's 
tomb. Care is taken to assure that pilgrims do not remain in the 
kingdom after the hajj to search for work. 

An elaborate guild of specialists assists the hajjis. Guides (mutaw- 
wifs) who speak the pilgrim's language make the necessary arrange- 
ments in Mecca and instruct the pilgrim in the proper performance 
of rituals; assistants (wakils) provide subsidiary services. Separate 
groups of specialists take care of pilgrims in Medina and Jiddah. 
Water drawers (zamzamis) provide water drawn from the sacred well. 

In fulfilling the commandment to perform the hajj, the pilgrim 
not only obeys the Prophet's words but also literally follows in his 
footsteps. The sacred sites along the pilgrimage route were fre- 
quented by Muhammad and formed the backdrop to the most im- 
portant events of his life. It is believed, for example, that he received 
his first revelation at Jabal an Nur (Mountain of Light) near Mina. 

The haram, or holy area of Mecca, is a sanctuary in which vio- 
lence to people, animals, and even plants is not permitted. The 
word haram carries the dual meaning of forbidden and sacred. As 
a symbol of ritual purification, on approaching its boundaries the 
male pilgrim dons an ihram, two white seamless pieces of cloth. 
Women wear a white dress and head scarf and may choose to veil 
their faces, although it is not required. Once properly attired, pil- 
grims enter a state of purity in which they avoid bathing, cutting 
hair and nails, violence, arguing, and sexual relations. 

Approaching Mecca, pilgrims shout, "I am here, O Lord, I am 
here!" They enter the Grand Mosque surrounding the Kaaba, a 
cube-shaped sanctuary first built, according to Muslim tradition, 
by Abraham and his son Ismail. The Kaaba contains a black stone 
believed to have been given to Abraham by the angel Gabriel, 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



according to some sources, and by others, to have been simply part 
of the structure of the original Kaaba. In pre-Islamic times, the 
Kaaba was the object of pilgrimage, housing the idols of the pagan 
jahiliyah, the age of ignorance, and, according to Islamic tradition, 
was cleansed by Muhammad of idols and rededicated to the wor- 
ship of the one God. 

On the eighth day, the pilgrims go to Mina, a plain outside 
Mecca, spending the night in prayer and meditation. On the morn- 
ing of the ninth day, they proceed to the Plain of Arafat where 
they perform the central ritual of the hajj, the standing (wuquj). 
The congregation faces Mecca and prays from noon to sundown. 
Muhammad delivered his farewell sermon from a hill above the 
plain called the Mount of Mercy, or Mount Arafat, during his final 
pilgrimage. In performing wuquf, the pilgrim figuratively joins those 
the Prophet addressed. It is believed that the pilgrim leaves Arafat 
cleansed of sin. 

A cannon sounds at sunset, and all rush to Muzdalifah, where 
they toss pebbles at one of three stone pillars representing Satan. 
Satan, in Islamic tradition, tempted Abraham not to sacrifice Ismail 
as God commanded. Ismail stoned Satan in response to the temp- 
tation, an act that symbolizes for the Muslim Ismail's total sub- 
mission to the will of God, for he went as a willing victim to the 
sacrifice. In the stoning, pilgrims renounce evil and declare their 
willingness to sacrifice all they have to God. Following the ston- 
ing, each pilgrim buys a camel, sheep, or goat for sacrifice in imi- 
tation of Abraham, and the excess meat is distributed to the poor. 
The sacrifice is duplicated by Muslims the world over, who celebrate 
the day as Id al Adha, the major feast of the Muslim year. The 
sacrifice ends the hajj proper. The pilgrim may then bathe, shave, 
cut his hair, and resume normal clothing. 

Lastly, the pilgrims go to the Grand Mosque in Mecca. In the 
sanctuary, the pilgrims walk around the Kaaba seven times and 
point to the stone or kiss it as a symbol of the continuity of Islam 
over time and of the unity of believers. They then pray in the Place 
of Abraham, the spot within the mosque where the patriarch prayed. 
During this time, the pilgrims may also reenact the running be- 
tween the hills of Safa and Marwa and may drink from the sacred 
well of Zamzam, commemorating the frantic search by Hagar to 
find water for her son Ismail, and the opening of the well of Zam- 
zam by the angel Gabriel, which saved the future father of the 
Arabs. These rites constitute the umra. Some pilgrims conclude their 
pilgrimage with a visit to the Prophet's Mosque in Medina. 

The rite of pilgrimage not only has special significance in the 
life of Muslims but also has profound political significance for the 



93 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Saudi monarchy. The king has claimed for himself the tide Khadim 
al Haramayn, or "custodian of the two holy mosques," a title that 
complements the Saudi claim to legitimacy. To prove themselves 
worthy of the title, Saudi monarchs must show that they are capa- 
ble not only of defending the interests of Arabian Muslims but also 
of defending the holy sites of Islam for the benefit of Muslims the 
world over. The Saudis have therefore invested heavily over the 
years in facilitating the arrival, transportation, feeding, and ac- 
commodation of pilgrims arriving annually for the rites of the hajj. 
New airport buildings, road networks, water supplies, and public 
health facilities have been provided. Much publicity has accom- 
panied government contributions to the comfort of pilgrims. The 
government distributes bottled water, juices, and boxed lunches 
during the climbing of Mount Arafat; stations ambulances staffed 
with first-aid teams in strategic locations; shows health education 
videos on airplanes and ships bringing pilgrims; and relieves pil- 
grims of the task of having to slaughter their sacrificial animal. The 
Islamic Development Bank now sells vouchers for sacrificial ani- 
mals, which are chosen by the pilgrim and then slaughtered, 
processed, and frozen for distribution and sale in slaughterhouses 
in Mina. 

Since the late 1980s, the Saudis have been particularly energetic 
in catering to the needs of pilgrims. In 1988 a US$15 billion traffic 
improvement scheme for the holy sites was launched. The improve- 
ment initiative resulted partly from Iranian charges that the Saudi 
government was incompetent to guard the holy sites after a 1987 
clash between demonstrating Iranian pilgrims and Saudi police left 
400 people dead. A further disaster occurred in 1990, when 1,426 
pilgrims suffocated or were crushed to death in one of the new air- 
conditioned pedestrian tunnels built to shield pilgrims from the heat. 
The incident resulted from the panic that erupted in the over- 
crowded and inadequately ventilated tunnel, and further fueled Ira- 
nian claims that the Saudis did not deserve to be in sole charge 
of the holy places. In 1992, however, 114,000 Iranian pilgrims, 
close to the usual level, participated in the hajj. 

To symbolize their leadership of the worldwide community of 
Muslims as well as their guardianship of the holy sites, Saudi kings 
address the pilgrimage gathering annually. The Saudis also pro- 
vide financial assistance to aid selected groups of foreign Muslims 
to attend the hajj. In 1992, in keeping with its interests in proselytiz- 
ing among Muslims in the newly independent states of the former 
Soviet Union, the Saudi government sponsored the pilgrimage for 
hundreds of Muslims from Azerbaijan and Tadzikistan. 



94 



Muslim pilgrims praying on Mount Arafat 
Courtesy Aramco World 



95 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Education 

Education has been a primary goal of government in Najd since 
the late eighteenth century, when the Wahhabi movement en- 
couraged the spread of Islamic education for all Muslim believers. 
Because the purpose of Islamic education was to ensure that the 
believer would understand God's laws and live his or her life in 
accordance with them, classes for reading and memorizing the 
Quran along with selections from the hadith were sponsored in 
towns and villages throughout the peninsula. At the most elemen- 
tary level, education took place in the kuttab, a class of Quran reci- 
tation for children usually attached to a mosque, or as a private 
tutorial held in the home under the direction of a male or female 
professional Quran reader, which was usually the case for girls. 
In the late nineteenth century, nonreligious subjects were also taught 
under Ottoman rule in the Hijaz and Al Ahsa Province, where 
kuttab schools specializing in Quran memorization sometimes in- 
cluded arithmetic, foreign language, and Arabic reading in the cur- 
riculum. Because the purpose of basic religious learning was to know 
the contents of holy scripture, the ability to read Arabic text was 
not a priority, and illiteracy remained widespread in the penin- 
sula. In 1970, in comparison to all countries in the Middle East 
and North Africa, the literacy rate of 15 percent for men and 2 
percent for women in Saudi Arabia was lower only in Yemen. For 
this reason, the steep rise in literacy rates — by 1990 the literacy 
rate for men had risen to 73 percent and that for women to 48 
percent — must be seen as an achievement. 

Students who wished to pursue their studies beyond the elemen- 
tary level could attend an informal network of scholarly lectures 
(halaqat) offering instruction in Islamic jurisprudence, Arabic lan- 
guage, Quranic commentaries (tqfsir), hadith, literature, rhetoric, 
and sometimes arithmetic and history. The most prestigious ulama 
in Arabia received specialized training at Al Azhar mosque in Cairo, 
or in Iraq. In Saudi Arabia, higher studies in religious scholarship 
were formalized in 1945 with the establishment of the At Taif School 
of Theology (Dar al Tawhid). In the early 1990s, there were two 
university-level institutions for religious studies, the Islamic Univer- 
sity of Medina and the Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic Univer- 
sity in Riyadh. 

Since the 1920s, a small number of private institutions has offered 
limited secular education for boys, but it was not until 1951 that 
an extensive program of publicly funded secondary schools was in- 
itiated. In 1957 the first university not dedicated to religious 
subjects, Riyadh University, subsequently renamed King Saud 



96 



The Society and Its Environment 



University, was established. The Ministry of Education, which ad- 
ministered public educational institutions for boys and men, was 
set up in 1954. Publicly funded education for girls began in 1960 
under the inspiration of then Crown Prince Faisal and his wife Iffat. 

Initially, opening schools for girls met with strong opposition 
in some parts of the kingdom, where nonreligious education was 
viewed as useless, if not actually dangerous, for girls. This atti- 
tude was reflected in the ratio of school-age boys to girls in primary 
school enrollments: in 1960, 22 percent of boys and 2 percent of 
girls were enrolled. Within a few years, however, public percep- 
tions of the value of education for girls changed radically, and the 
general population became strongly supportive. In 1981 enrollments 
were 81 percent of boys and 43 percent of girls. In 1989 the num- 
ber of girls enrolled in the public school system was close to the 
number of boys: almost 1.2 million girls out of a total of 2.6 mil- 
lion students, or 44 percent. School attendance was not compul- 
sory for boys or girls (see table 2, Appendix.) 

By 1989 Saudi Arabia had an education system with more than 
14,000 education institutions, including seven universities and 
eleven teacher-training colleges, in addition to schools for voca- 
tional and technical training, special needs, and adult literacy. The 
system was expanding so rapidly that in 1988-89 alone, 950 new 
schools were opened to accommodate 400,000 new students. Gen- 
eral education consisted of kindergarten, six years of primary school, 
and three years each of intermediate and secondary (high) school. 
All instruction, books, and health services to students were provided 
free by the government, which allocated nearly 20 percent of its 
expenditures, or US$36.3 billion, to human resources under the 
Fourth Development Plan (1985-90). The Fifth Development Plan 
(1990-95) proposed a total expenditure of about US$37.6 billion. 

Administratively, two organizations oversaw most education in- 
stitutions in the kingdom. The Ministry of Education supervised 
the education of boys, special education programs for the handi- 
capped, adult education, and junior colleges for men. Girls' edu- 
cation was administered by the Directorate General of Girls' 
Education, an organization staffed by ulama, working in close 
cooperation with the Ministry of Education. The directorate general 
oversaw the general education of girls, kindergartens and nurser- 
ies for both boys and girls, and women's literacy programs, as well 
as colleges of education and junior colleges for girls. The Ministry 
of Higher Education was the authority overseeing the kingdom's 
colleges and universities. 

Public education, at both the university and secondary-school 
level, has never been fully separated from its Islamic roots. The 



97 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

education policy of Saudi Arabia included among its objectives the 
promotion of the "belief in the One God, Islam as the way of life, 
and Muhammad as God's Messenger." At the elementary- school 
level, an average of nine periods a week was devoted to religious 
subjects and eight per week at the intermediate-school level. This 
concentration on religious subjects was substantial when compared 
with the time devoted to other subjects: nine periods for Arabic 
language and twelve for geography, history, mathematics, science, 
art, and physical education combined at the elementary level; six 
for Arabic language and nineteen for all other subjects at the in- 
termediate level. At the secondary level, the required periods of 
religious study were reduced, although an option remained for a 
concentration in religious studies. 

For women, the goal of education as stated in official policy was 
ideologically tied to religion: "The purpose of educating a girl is 
to bring her up in a proper Islamic way so as to perform her duty 
in life, be an ideal and successful housewife and a good mother, 
ready to do things which suit her nature such as teaching, nursing 
and medical treatment." The policy also recognized "women's right 
to obtain suitable education on equal footing with men in light of 
Islamic laws." In practice, educational options for girls at the 
precollege level were almost identical to those for boys. One ex- 
ception was that, at all levels of precollege education, only boys 
took physical education, and only girls took home economics. 

Inequalities of opportunity existed in higher education that 
stemmed from the religious and social imperative of gender segre- 
gation. Gender segregation was required at all levels of public edu- 
cation, but was also demanded in public areas and businesses by 
religiously conservative groups as well as by social convention. 
Because the social perception was that men would put the knowledge 
and skills acquired to productive use, fewer resources were dedi- 
cated to women's higher education than to men's. This constraint 
was a source of concern to economic planners and policy makers 
because training and hiring women not only would help solve the 
difficulties of indigenizing the work force, but also would help to 
satisfy the rising expectations of the thousands of women graduat- 
ing from secondary schools, colleges, and universities. 

The concern was compounded by the fact that women as a group 
have excelled academically over males in secondary schools, and 
the number of female graduates has outstripped the number of 
males, even though the number of girls entering school was con- 
siderably lower than the number of boys. The number of female 
secondary level graduates has increased more than tenfold, from 
1,674 in 1975 to 18,211 in 1988. Calculated as a combination of 



98 




99 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



the hours invested in those who drop out or repeat classes and those 
who graduate, it took an average of eighteen pupil years to produce 
a male graduate of general education, as opposed to fifteen pupil 
years to produce a female graduate. Under conditions existing in 
the early 1990s, the problem can only become more acute because 
the Fifth Development Plan projected 45,000 female secondary 
school graduates in 1995 and only 38,000 male graduates. 

This increase in women graduates has not been met by a com- 
mensurate increase in higher education opportunities. Despite sub- 
stantial expansion of college and university programs for women, 
they remained insufficient to serve the graduates who sought ad- 
mission. The Fifth Development Plan cited higher education for 
women as a major issue to be addressed, and Saudi press reports 
in 1992 indicated that there was discussion of creating a women's 
university. 

A major objective for education in the Fourth Development Plan 
and the Fifth Development Plan has been to develop general edu- 
cation to deal with technological changes and rapid developments 
in social and economic fields. The ultimate goal was to replace a 
portion of Saudi Arabia's huge foreign labor force (79 percent of 
the total in 1989) with indigenous workers. In the late 1980s, a 
high rate of student dropouts and secondary school failures pre- 
cluded the realization of these goals. (In 1990 the ratios of the num- 
ber of students at the primary, intermediate, and secondary levels 
to the total number of students stood at 69.6, 20.5, and 9.9 per- 
cent, respectively.) The dropout problem was far more acute with 
boys than with girls. One means of addressing the dropout problem 
was a program initiated in 1985 called "developed secondary edu- 
cation," designed to prepare students for university study as well 
as for practical participation in the work force. In this program, 
the student was allowed to select two-thirds of his or her study plan 
from courses that had practical applications or genuine appeal to 
the student's own interests and abilities. After completing a required 
general program consisting of courses in religion, mathematics, 
science, social studies, English, Arabic, and computers, students 
elected a course of study in one of three concentrations: Islamic 
studies and literature, administrative science and humanities, or 
the natural sciences. 

Another goal in both the Fourth Development Plan and the Fifth 
Development Plan has been to indigenize the secondary teacher 
corps. At the end of the 1980s, about 40 percent were foreigners, 
mostly from other Arabic-speaking countries, and almost half of 
that percentage were Egyptian. In the early 1980s, there had been 
steep gains in the number of Saudis teaching at all levels, especially 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



at the elementary level. This gain resulted from the increase dur- 
ing the 1970s of institutes for training teachers and the greater 
material incentives for careers in education, stipulated in a royal 
decree of 1982. Nonetheless, training schools for teachers had trou- 
ble attracting candidates, especially males; male enrollment declined 
slightly, whereas female enrollment nearly tripled. In 1984 there 
were about 12,000 women enrolled in the seven female colleges 
of education located in Riyadh, Jiddah, Mecca, Medina, Buray- 
dah, Abha, and Tabuk. The challenge of attracting Saudis to the 
teaching profession was being met in the early 1990s by a plan to 
abolish the training institutes for secondary teachers and shift the 
enrollment to junior colleges. This move would allow graduates 
the opportunity to complete a university education for a bachelor's 
degree and thus draw more potential candidates to the teaching 
profession. 

Government funding for higher education has been particularly 
munificent. Between 1983 and 1989, the number of university stu- 
dents increased from approximately 58,000 to about 113,000, a 
95 percent increase. Equally dramatic was the increase in the num- 
ber of women students at the university level: from 20,300 to 47,000 
during the same period, or a 132 percent increase. In 1989 the num- 
ber of graduates from all of the kingdom's colleges and universi- 
ties was almost the same for men and women: about 7,000 each. 

The new campus of King Saud University in Riyadh, built in 
the early 1980s, was designed to accommodate 25,000 male stu- 
dents; the original university buildings in central Riyadh were con- 
verted into a campus for the women's branch of the university. 
King Saud University included colleges of administrative sciences, 
agriculture, arts, dentistry, education, engineering, medical sci- 
ences, medicine, pharmacy, and science. Of these, the only course 
of study that excluded women was engineering, on the premise that 
a profession in engineering would be impossible to pursue in the 
context of sex-segregation practices. In the early 1990s, the univer- 
sity offered postgraduate studies in sixty-one specializations, and 
doctorates in Arabic, geography, and history. In 1984 there were 
479 graduate students, including 151 women. 

The University of Petroleum and Minerals (King Fahd Univer- 
sity) in Dhahran, founded in 1963, offered undergraduate and 
graduate degree programs in engineering and science, with most 
programs of study offered in English. Also in Dhahran was King 
Faisal University, founded in 1976, with colleges of agricultural 
sciences and foods, architecture, education, medicine, and veteri- 
nary medicine. In 1984 some 40 percent of its 2,600 students were 
women. 



101 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



In progress in 1992 was the expansion of King Abd al Aziz 
University in Jiddah. Founded in 1968, the university in 1990 had 
about 15,000 undergraduate students, of whom about one-third 
were women. It consisted of nine colleges, including arts and 
sciences, environmental studies, marine sciences, medicine, and 
meteorology. The university's expansion plans, funded by an in- 
vestment of US$2 billion, called for the addition of colleges of 
education, environmental design, pharmacy, and planning and 
technology. The completed expansion should accommodate 25,500 
students, with a medical complex to include a hospital, a health 
services center, and a medical research facility. 

The establishment and growth of faculties of arts and sciences, 
medicine, and technology have been accompanied by the growth 
in religious institutes of higher learning. The Islamic University 
of Medina, founded in 1961, had an international student body 
and faculty that specialized in Islamic sciences. In 1985 the univer- 
sity had 2,798 students including several hundred graduate stu- 
dents. The Islamic University also had a college preparatory 
program that specialized in teaching the Arabic language and 
religion; in 1985 there were 1,835 students, all but 279 of them 
foreign. 

At least two of the universities founded for religious instruction 
have integrated secular subjects and practical training into their 
curriculum. The Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University, 
established in 1974, produced qualified Muslim scholars, teachers, 
judges, and preachers. The university specialized in such classical 
studies as Arabic language and Islamic jurisprudence. It also offered 
newer approaches to the study of Islam, with courses in state pol- 
icy in Islam, Islamic sects, and Islamic culture and economics. In 
addition, practical subjects such as administration, information and 
mass media, library sciences, psychology, and social service were 
offered. In 1986 enrollment numbered 12,000 students with an ad- 
ditional 1 ,000 in graduate programs. More than 1 ,500 of these stu- 
dents were women. Umm al Qura University, originally a college 
of sharia with an institute to teach Arabic to non- Arabs, had grown 
to include colleges of agricultural sciences, applied sciences, en- 
gineering, and social sciences. Of its 7,500 undergraduate students 
in 1984, 51 percent, or 3,800, were women. 

The expansion of the university system in Saudi Arabia has en- 
abled the kingdom to limit financial support for study abroad. Such 
restrictions had long been the desire of some conservatives, who 
feared the negative influences on Saudi youth from studying abroad. 
Since the mid- to late 1980s, the number of Saudi students going 
abroad to study has dropped sharply. In the 1991-92 school year, 



102 



Royal Technical Institute, 
Riyadh 




Courtesy Aramco and Its World 



only 5,000 students were reported studying abroad; there were 
slightly more than 4,000 the previous year, with half of those study- 
ing in the United States. These figures contrasted with the approx- 
imately 10,000 students studying abroad in 1984. As in the past, 
students going abroad to study received substantial financial as- 
sistance. Students selected to receive government funding to study 
abroad in 1992 received allowances for tuition, lodging, board, and 
transportation; those intending to study science or technology 
received an additional stipend. A male student also was encouraged 
through financial incentives to marry before leaving Saudi Arabia 
and to take his wife and children with him. The incentives, including 
an offer of tuition payment that allowed the wife to pursue a course 
of study as well, addressed concerns about moral temptations and 
cultural confusions that might arise from living alone abroad. As 
an additional buffer against such potential problems, an orienta- 
tion program in Islamic and foreign cultures was offered at Imam 
Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University for students about to go 
abroad. 

Women going abroad to study were a particular concern for the 
ulama in the Department of Religious Research, Missionary Ac- 
tivities, and Guidance. In 1982 government scholarships for women 
to study abroad were sharply curtailed. Enforcement of the mahram 
rule, whereby women were not allowed to travel without their closest 
male relative as a chaperon, discouraged prospective students from 



103 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

studying abroad. In 1990 there were almost three times as many 
men studying abroad on government scholarships as there were 
women, whereas in 1984 more than half were women. 

The expansion of formal religious education programs in a tech- 
nologically modernizing society has created some economic dis- 
locations and some degree of social polarization between those 
equipped primarily with a religious education and those prepared 
to work in the modern economic sector. Opportunities for govern- 
ment employment in religious affairs agencies and the judiciary 
have been shrinking as traditional areas of religious authority have 
given way to new demands of the modernizing and developing state. 
At the same time, unemployment was becoming a problem in the 
society at large. In the private sector, for example, where most of 
the employment growth was expected from 1990 to 1995, employ- 
ment was projected to increase by 213,500, but at the same time 
the Saudi indigenous labor force was expected to increase by 
433,900. Consequendy, the growing number of graduates in reli- 
gious studies — in 1985, 2,733 students in the Islamic University 
of Medina and more than 8,000 in Muhammad ibn Saud Univer- 
sity in Riyadh — was a potential source of disaffection from the state 
and its modernizing agenda. 

Health 

Saudi Arabia has committed vast resources (US$16.4 billion in 
the years 1985 to 1990) to improving medical care for its citizens, 
with the ultimate goal of providing free medical care for everyone 
in the kingdom. In 1990 the number of hospitals operated by the 
government and the private sector together stood at 258, with a 
capacity of 36,099 beds. Of these hospitals, 163 were run by the 
Ministry of Health and sixty-four by the private sector. In addi- 
tion, other government agencies, such as the national guard, the 
Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, 
operated hospitals and clinics for their staffs and families. There 
were also teaching hospitals attached to the medical faculties of 
universities in the kingdom (see table 3, Appendix). 

King Fahd Medical City outside Riyadh was a US$534 million 
project. It was to include five hospitals of different specializations, 
with a capacity of 1,400 beds in addition to outpatient clinics, and 
was expected to be completed in the early 1990s. To provide per- 
sonnel for the expanding medical facilities, which in 1992 were 
staffed largely by foreign physicians, nurses, technicians, and ad- 
ministrators, the government has encouraged medical education 
in the kingdom and has financed medical training abroad. Four 
of the kingdom's seven universities offered medical degrees and 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



operated well-equipped hospitals. Saudi universities also had col- 
leges of nursing, pharmacology, and other fields related to the deliv- 
ery of medical care. 

One objective of medical planning was to sponsor cutting-edge 
research in the kingdom. There were some reported successes. The 
King Saud University College of Pharmacology developed a drug 
effective in stabilizing blood sugar in diabetics, and heart surgeons 
at the Armed Forces Hospital Heart Center in Riyadh performed 
innovative open-heart surgery on an infant. At the College of 
Sciences of King Saud University, scientists have used radioactive 
isotopes to determine the effect of antibiotics on body functions. 
The King Khalid Eye Specialist Hospital, staffed by foreign doc- 
tors, was a world center for the treatment of eye disorders. 

Whereas advanced medical research and some of the most so- 
phisticated medical care available anywhere in the world were con- 
centrated in Riyadh and a few major cities, medical care at the 
most basic level was limited in the countryside. In the early 1990s, 
a key objective of the Ministry of Health was to facilitate the delivery 
of primary care to rural areas by establishing primary health-care 
centers that provided basic services and dispensed medicines. For 
every four or five primary centers, which numbered 1,668 in 1990, 
there was to be one diagnostic and maternity center (there were 
ninety-eight centers in 1990). The large specialist hospitals located 
in cities were intended as referral hospitals for sophisticated medi- 
cal treatment such as transplants, cancer treatment, surgery, and 
complicated diagnoses. 

For the primary centers to be effective, health education has had 
to become an essential part of the centers' mission. In some areas, 
basic hygiene was unknown, as was the principle of contagion. The 
rural population and others who had had little or no exposure to 
observable benefits of modern medicine tended to view preventive 
measures and medicines with caution. According to a common 
traditional view, illness was not related to human behavior, such 
as poor sanitation habits, but was caused by spiritual agents, such 
as the jinn, the evil eye, or the will of God. Prevention and treat- 
ment of disease, therefore, lay in appealing to the spiritual agent 
responsible, using means such as prayer to God, votive offerings, 
or amulets to ward off the evil eye. 

Before the introduction of modern medicine, local practitioners 
specialized in a variety of treatments, such as exorcism for mental 
illness, setting of broken bones, herbal remedies for many ailments, 
and cauterization. Cauterization involved heating a stick or nail 
until it was red-hot and then applying it to the area believed to 
be affected; this procedure was used to treat almost any affliction, 



105 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

from coughs to abscesses to convulsions. Recourse to local healers 
was declining as access to more effective health care and health 
education became available. 

Infant mortality rates for the kingdom remained high in the early 
1980s, with an estimated 118 deaths per 1 ,000 live births. By con- 
trast, based only on deliveries of infants in hospitals of the Minis- 
try of Health, the infant mortality rate (children stillborn or died 
during birth) was low, declining in 1990 to 21 per 1,000 in 1990 
from 25 per 1,000 in 1986. Death rates have declined as well, from 
20 per 1,000 in 1965, to 10.7 per 1,000 between 1975 and 1980, 
down to 7.6 per 1,000 between 1985 and 1990. 

In 1990 the World Health Organization certified that Saudi Ara- 
bia was free from the quarantine diseases of cholera, plague, and 
yellow fever. Compulsory immunization of infants and young chil- 
dren and the introduction in 1986 of an epidemic control system 
to facilitate communication on outbreaks of communicable diseases 
have contributed to the successful eradication of these diseases. 
Poliomyelitis, however, has persisted, and the Ministry of Health 
has set a target date of the year 2000 to eliminate the disease. 

Malaria remained a problem in the Tihamah southern coastal 
plain, especially in Jizan, Asir, and Al Qunfudhah, which was on 
the coast in northern Asir. In 1988 the disease affected 1.6 percent 
of the total population, down from the 4.2 percent recorded eight 
years earlier. This drop was attributed mainly to measures taken 
to eliminate breeding grounds for mosquitoes and spraying with 
insecticides. Bilharzia was a continuing problem in Jizan, Al Bahah, 
Asir, Najran, Medina, Al Jawf, Hail, and At Taif. The incidence 
of the disease was lowered from 8.4 percent in 1980 to 1 .9 percent 
in 1988, but efforts to eliminate infestations of the bilharzia para- 
site and to prevent re infestation were a continuing challenge. Cases 
of leishmaniasis have occurred in almost every province with the 
expansion of agricultural lands, which provide breeding grounds 
for disease-carrying flies. In 1988 the reported number of cases 
(under 15,000) was small, but the disease was being studied to pre- 
vent its spread. Trachoma was considered one of the main causes 
of blindness in the kingdom despite programs designed to combat 
the disease. 

Urbanization and Development 

The family and religious values have profound implications for 
future development and for policy planning. Family values, and 
the corresponding behaviors of individuals, have been institution- 
alized by the state in the process of centralizing control and allocat- 
ing resources. Many of the state-supported restrictions on women, 



106 



Public playground, Abha 
Courtesy Saudi Arabian Information Office 

for example, did not exist in the 1960s and 1970s. They were the 
product of attempts to reconcile family and religious values with 
opportunities and objectives that have grown out of the develop- 
ment process and of increased religious conservatism. Over the past 
two decades, one striking outgrowth of Saudi development has been 
rapid migration of the population to the cities. In the early 1970s, 
an estimated 26 percent of the population lived in urban centers. 
In 1990 that figure had risen to 73 percent. The capital, Riyadh, 
had about 666,000 inhabitants according to the 1974 census (the 
most recent official census). By 1984 the population, augmented 
by the removal of the diplomatic missions from Jiddah to Riyadh, 
was estimated at about 1.8 million. 

Urbanization, education, and modernization were having pro- 
found effects on society as a whole, but especially on the family. 
The urban environment fostered new institutions, such as wom- 
en's charitable societies, that facilitated associations and activities 
for women outside the family network. Urban migration and wealth 
were breaking up the extended family household, as young cou- 
ples left hometowns and established themselves in single-family 
homes. Education for women also was encouraging the rise of the 
nuclear family household: a study in Ad Dammam carried out in 
1980 showed that of a sample of 100 salaried women, 91 percent 



107 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

of whom had a high-school or university education, fully 90 per- 
cent lived in nuclear family households. By contrast, in a sample 
of rural women who were 91 percent illiterate, only half lived in 
a nuclear family unit. The same study showed that the more edu- 
cated, salaried women had an average of two children, as opposed 
to rural women with an average of 4.6 children. As the level of 
education rose, the age of first marriages rose as well: 79 percent 
of the salaried women were over the age of sixteen (and most over 
the age of nineteen) when first married, whereas 75 percent of rural 
women were married between the ages of ten and twelve. 

In spite of the limitations imposed by sex-segregation values, and 
in spite of the small proportion of women in the work force rela- 
tive to men (7 percent in 1990), the number of working women — 
and the kinds of places in which they worked — were growing. In 
the early 1990s, women were employed in banks, including banks 
exclusively for women, in utility and computer operations, in televi- 
sion and radio programming, and in some ministries. They worked 
as clerical assistants, journalists, teachers and administrators in girls' 
schools, university professors, and as social workers. In medicine, 
women served as doctors, pharmacists, and, more recently, as 
nurses. In 1992 there were almost 3,100 Saudi women trained and 
employed as nurses, or 10 percent of the total number of nurses 
employed in the kingdom. This number represented a dramatic 
change in the attitudes of some families, not only toward the profes- 
sion, but about the limits of sex segregation. In the 1970s, nursing 
was disparaged as a profession for women because of the presumed 
contact it entailed with male doctors and patients; nursing programs 
in Saudi Arabia thus could not recruit female Saudi students. 

By the 1990s, women had proved themselves competent to suc- 
ceed in employment that had been culturally perceived as men's 
work, and in the academic field they had shown that they could 
be more successful than men (see Education, this ch.). Women had 
also carved out for themselves positions of respect outside the fam- 
ily, whereas previously an aspect of respect for women came from 
being unknown outside the family. 

The practices of veiling and separation, and the values under- 
lying these practices, however, were not being dislodged. There 
was little expressed desire for such change because the practices 
were grounded in fundamental family values, religiously sanctioned 
and institutionalized by the government. The premise that wom- 
en, from a moral standpoint, should not associate with unrelated 
men was the basis for all Saudi regulations on the behavior of 
women, including the separation of boys and girls in the educa- 
tion system, the requirement that women have a male chaperon 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



to travel, that women hire a male manager as a requirement for 
obtaining a commercial license, that women not study abroad 
without a male chaperon, not check into a hotel alone, and not 
drive a car in the kingdom. 

There was a link between tribal-family values, religion, and state 
power that made intelligible the outcome of the women's driving 
demonstration of November 1990. If, in fact, society held as a basic 
moral premise that a woman should not be seen by any man out- 
side her own family, how could the same society allow her to drive 
a car, when anyone passing by could see her face? The position 
of the ulama as stated in afatwa by the head of the Department 
of Religious Research, Missionary Activities, and Guidance was 
that women should not be allowed to drive because Islam supported 
women's dignity. The fatwa did not say that Islam forbade wom- 
en's driving — Saudi Arabia was the only Muslim country that for- 
bade women to drive — but said that because Islam supported 
women's dignity, a Muslim government must protect women from 
the indignity of driving. The state could not easily abrogate such 
rulings of the ulama because these rulings responded to the family- 
tribal values and the interpretations of Islam that were at the heart 
of Saudi society. The general public response was supportive of 
the ulama and the actions of the state. Indeed, there was a broad 
consensus of support for such rulings precisely because they cor- 
responded to the values of modesty and sex segregation that were 
enmeshed in religion and in the honor of the family. 

Changes being wrought through urbanization and development 
were having disturbing consequences for the traditional notion of 
the family and its values. They brought closely held religious values 
into question. For men, the consequences were particularly un- 
settling because these changes brought their position of control and 
protection of the family into question. Education, urbanization, 
and modernization placed women in areas of public space where, 
culturally, they should not be, for public space was space reserved 
for men. The physical world around Saudis was changing. Social 
groupings were realigning, status categories were shifting, and eco- 
nomic dislocations were altering people's income expectations. In 
such a fluctuating world, for both men and women, clinging to 
traditional attitudes about women in the family was an expression 
of a desire for stability in the society at large. The development 
policies of the 1970s and 1980s had, in effect, planted the seeds 
of a cultural backlash, seeds that were coming into flower in the 
early years of the decade of the 1990s. 

* * * 



109 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

The classic work on Arabian beduin is H.R.P. Dickson's The 
Arab of the Desert. For information on beduin today, see especially 
William Lancaster's The Rwalla Bedouin Today and Donald Cole's 
numerous publications, including Nomads of the Nomads. Motoko 
Katakura in Bedouin Village writes about issues of beduin settlement. 
Some of the best anthropological studies available on Saudi Ara- 
bia, such as Arabian Oasis City: The Transformation of 'Unayzah, have 
been prepared by Soraya Altorki and Donald Cole. On gender is- 
sues, see the work of Aisha Mohamed Almana, Soraya Altorki, 
and Eleanor Doumato. Deborah Amos's book Lines in the Sand con- 
tains a chapter on gender issues during the Persian Gulf War. 

John Esposito's books on Islam, such as Islam: The Straight Path 
and The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality? are among the best and most 
readable. James P. Piscatori's work on Islamism, Islamic Fundamen- 
talisms and the Gulf Crisis, contains information pertinent to Saudi 
Arabia, as does "Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State For- 
mation in Saudi Arabia" by Joseph Kostiner. John S. Habib's Ibn 
Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam remains the best reference for the Ikhwan 
movement. Edward Mortimer in Faith and Power and George Rentz 
in "Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia" write on the Wahhabi move- 
ment. Christine Moss Helms' s The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia is not 
only valuable on the formation of the Saudi state, but also on geog- 
raphy, ecology, and human settlement. 

In Alan Richards's and John Waterbury's book, A Political Econ- 
omy of the Middle East, Saudi Arabia may be seen in relation to other 
Middle Eastern countries. J.S. Birks and C.A. Sinclair discuss is- 
sues of economy and development in Saudi Arabia into the '90s. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



110 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Offshore drilling platform 



THE DEVELOPMENT of the Saudi Arabian economy has gone 
hand in hand with the establishment and expansion of the Saudi 
state during the last fifty years. The process of building the state, 
fortified by oil revenues distributed through the modern institu- 
tions of bureaucracy, worked to unify this economically diverse 
country. So pervasive has been the influence of these relatively 
young institutions that few vestiges of the old economy survive un- 
changed. 

Before the discovery of oil in the Arabian Peninsula, it would 
have been difficult to speak of a unified entity such as the Saudi 
Arabian economy. Before the 1930s, the region that would later 
come under the control of the Saudi state was composed of several 
regions that lived off specific resources and differentiated human 
activities. The western province, the Hijaz, for example, depended 
chiefly on subsistence agriculture, some long-distance trade, and 
the provision of services to pilgrims traveling to the holy cities of 
Mecca and Medina. A plantation economy that grew dates and 
other cash crops dominated the Eastern Province (also known as 
Al Ahsa, Al Hasa, and Ash Sharqiyah). An extremely hostile en- 
vironment determined geographical separation of peoples. Because 
permanent habitation could exist only where there was water — at 
natural springs and wells — the long distances between water sources 
isolated clusters of people and hampered travel. The difficulty of 
travel also discouraged penetration from the outside, as did the lack 
of readily exploitable natural resources. 

The discovery of oil in the Eastern Province in 1938 came just 
six years after another major development: the establishment of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which unified a number of diverse 
areas of the peninsula under one ruler. Moreover, the rebuilding 
of Europe after World War II and its need for cheap, reliable sources 
of oil greatly enhanced the position of the newly established Saudi 
Arabian oil industry. The combination of these three events formed 
the basis of the current structure of the Saudi economy. 

The quantum jump in revenues that flowed into the treasury 
of Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud (ruled 1932-53) forti- 
fied his position and allowed the king to exert greater political and 
economic control over the territories he had conquered. At the apex 
of the economy was the state with all the mechanisms needed to 
ensure the rule of the Saud family (Al Saud). The state became 



113 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

the widespread agent of economic change, replacing the traditional 
economy with one that depended primarily on the state's outlays. 

The conjuncture of these events also thrust Saudi Arabia, by 
virtue of its location and its enormous oil assets, into the center 
of the West's strategic concerns. At first the issue was the recon- 
struction of Europe; later, however, the steady flow of oil from the 
kingdom would be regarded as essential for international economic 
stability. In this sense, Saudi oil production and investment poli- 
cies have assumed paramount importance to the industrialized world 
and, more recently, the developing world. This importance of oil 
to the West, particularly to the United States, could not have been 
more clearly underscored than it was by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 
in August 1990 and may have been a key reason for the massive 
military effort marshaled to expel Iraq from Kuwait. After the Per- 
sian Gulf War (1991), Saudi Arabia's standing in the world oil mar- 
ket increased because it was the only major oil-producing country 
that had significant excess capacity of crude oil production and 
thereby a strong influence on international oil supplies and prices. 

Maintaining this position in the international oil market has been 
the basis of Saudi economic policy in the early 1990s and was like- 
ly to remain so in the near future. Despite Saudi attempts to diver- 
sify the economy, developing a self-perpetuating nonoil sector has 
proved more difficult than earlier Saudi planners had envisioned. 
This is not to say that the government has not raised the average 
Saudi citizen's standard of living to one of the highest levels in the 
world and established for most of its inhabitants world-class infra- 
structural and social services. But sustaining real income growth 
still depended primarily on government spending, which was largely 
facilitated by oil revenues. Therefore, the government could not 
afford to neglect the oil sector, the primary engine of economic 
growth. 

Developing the oil sector was crucial to domestic political sta- 
bility, and it was the kingdom's importance as an oil producer that 
guaranteed its protection during the gulf crisis. During the early 
1990s, it was becoming clear that with the expected decline of oil 
production from the republics of the former Soviet Union, com- 
bined with the stagnating output in other debt-ridden and geo- 
logically constrained Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) and non-OPEC oil producers, Saudi Arabia 
had the chance to obtain a disproportionate share of any net incre- 
ment of crude oil demand over the coming years. 

Saudi Arabia had set out to meet this challenge with a major 
capacity-expansion plan for its oil industry. First, the Saudi Ara- 
bian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco, the national oil company) 



114 



The Economy 



accelerated plans to push sustainable domestic crude oil produc- 
tion capacity by 1995 to between 10.5 million and 1 1 million bar- 
rels per day (bpd — see Glossary) from 8.4 million bpd in 1992, 
with an increased share of lighter grades of crude oil produced. 
Second, the Saudi Arabian Marketing and Refining Company 
(Samarec) planned to upgrade its refineries to meet the new en- 
vironmental standards in the West and growing domestic demand. 
Third, following its acquisition of downstream (see Glossary) as- 
sets in the United States and the Republic of Korea (South Korea), 
the kingdom planned to purchase refining capacity closer to key 
consuming markets. Although shrouded in secrecy that made de- 
tails obscure, this strategy seemed designed to obtain or increase 
Saudi Arabia's market share. 

During the 1970s and early 1980s, the sharp increase in oil prices 
relieved the chronic financial constraints that had plagued the Saudi 
state since its inception. Massive oil revenues, combined with de- 
lays in using the funds and the Saudi economy's limited absorp- 
tive capacity, created large financial surpluses in both the private 
and government sectors of the economy. The vast majority of these 
assets were invested in international financial institutions and in 
Western government securities. 

After 1982 government authorities were obliged to change their 
emphasis from managing surpluses to coping with growing budge- 
tary and balance-of-payments shortfalls. With the downturn in oil 
prices beginning in 1982, oil revenues to the kingdom began to 
recede. Given the huge investment expenditures to which it was 
already committed, the government was forced to finance large 
budget and current account deficits of the external balance of pay- 
ments through foreign asset drawdowns. At first, the small decline 
in oil prices was considered a necessary "cooling off" period and 
a chance to review the investment program begun fifteen years 
earlier. Facing an ever-worsening international oil supply glut, the 
burden of reducing oil output under OPEC's newly installed quota 
system fell largely on Saudi Arabia. The kingdom's oil revenues 
therefore took a double blow — reduced prices and reduced ex- 
ports — not to mention the devaluation of the United States dollar, 
the currency in which oil is sold on international markets. By late 
1985, responding to domestic concerns, Saudi Arabia sharply 
boosted oil output in an attempt to regain its market share and 
to impose production discipline on other OPEC members. This 
policy led directly to the oil price crash of 1986. 

The replacement in 1986 of well-known Minister of Petroleum 
and Mineral Resources Ahmad Zaki Yamani by Hisham Muhi 
ad Din Nazir, and King Fahd ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud's personal 



115 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

intervention in the kingdom's oil affairs, were followed by a more 
commercial approach to oil exports that was designed to maintain 
Saudi Arabia's world market share. Greater OPEC discipline and 
a revival in world demand, stimulated by lower oil prices and rapid 
economic growth in Asia, helped return some buoyancy to the oil 
markets after 1986. Nonetheless, oil revenues in the late 1980s re- 
mained at 25 percent to 30 percent of levels during the early 1980s 
and proved insufficient to cover government expenditures and offset 
imports, thus perpetuating budget and external payment deficits. 
The authorities further reduced foreign assets and attempted to 
stanch capital flight (aggravated by the short-lived Iranian mili- 
tary thrusts into Iraq in 1986 and 1987 and the "tanker war" of 
1987) and to induce the repatriation of private capital through the 
sale of government bonds. This strategy stemmed the hemorrhage. 
By early 1990, following the end of the Iran-Iraq War two years 
earlier, increased oil output and higher oil prices combined with 
improving private sector confidence to revive an economy that had 
contracted for several years in a row. 

In the two months following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 
all government efforts at restoring confidence in the economy since 
the 1986 price crash evaporated, precipitating another large out- 
flow of private capital and a virtual standstill in domestic invest- 
ment. But as oil prices and Saudi output soared to replace embargoed 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil, and with the arrival of the United Nations 
(UN) coalition forces, calm returned to the economy, helped no 
doubt by substantial expenditures related to the war effort. After 
the war, the repatriation of private funds and renewed economic 
confidence created what some journalists called a "miniboom." 
Despite budgetary problems at home and international economic 
problems, promising regional trade prospects emerged. Such 
prospects consisted of new markets in Iran, Central Asia, and South 
Asia, as well as the reconstruction of Kuwait, that opened new op- 
portunities for Saudi businessmen. 

The Persian Gulf War was disastrous for government finances, 
however. Higher oil revenues were insufficient to cover the esti- 
mated US$60 billion that the war cost the Saudi government. The 
authorities had to deplete the last of the financial reserves remain- 
ing from the oil-boom days of the early 1980s. In mid- 1992, official 
external assets stood at the minimum needed for ensuring confi- 
dence in the Saudi currency, the riyal, and for maintaining prudent 
reserves. Although budgetary 7 and external deficits had been sharply 
reduced, the government was forced to borrow on the interna- 
tional market and to reduce subventions to government enterprises, 



116 



The Economy 



such as Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (Sabic) and Saudi 
Aramco, forcing such firms to seek capital overseas. 

The status of government accounts in the aftermath of the Per- 
sian Gulf War clouded the prospects for smooth financing of the 
three major expenditure categories on the ruling family's priority 
list for the 1990s: the oil-sector capacity-expansion plan, major in- 
creases in defense and arms purchases, and the maintenance of pub- 
lic investments to sustain the domestic standard of living. The 
options faced by the government to alleviate its financial constraints 
were limited, especially on the oil revenue front, and debt financ- 
ing would be clearly unsustainable over the medium term. Dur- 
ing the 1990s, therefore, the government will probably strive for 
financial maneuverability by reducing the dependence of the pri- 
vate sector on government funds and by attempting to diversify 
budget revenue sources. 

Economic Policy and the Structure of the Economy 

Fundamental Factors That Transformed the Economy 

For thousands of years, the economy of the Arabian Peninsula 
was determined by autonomous clusters of people living near wells 
and oases. Most of the population was engaged in agriculture, in- 
cluding nomads who raised livestock by moving their animals to 
the limited forage produced by infrequent rains. However, the in- 
ability of pastoral nomads to provide for their communities solely 
on the basis of pastoral activities forced them to create multiple 
resource systems. Such systems took the form of protection ser- 
vices for merchant caravans and pilgrims, control over small oases, 
and, to a lesser extent, direct cultivation. In the settled areas, lo- 
cal craftsmen produced a few items needed by those living near 
or visiting the scattered sources of water. Production was limited 
to serve very small markets and existed essentially on a subsistence 
level. Trade was limited primarily to camel caravans and the an- 
nual influx of pilgrims visiting the holy places in the Hijaz. In the 
principal cities, such as Jiddah and Mecca, several large merchant 
families settled permanently and prospered, especially after the late 
nineteenth-century development of the Hejaz Railway. The growth 
in international trade associated with European colonial expansion 
also benefited these merchants and attracted numerous families from 
as far away as the Eastern Province of Arabia, Persia, the Levant, 
and Turkey. 

The most profound agent of change for the economy of Saudi 
Arabia was the discovery of huge reserves of oil by a United States 
company in 1938. Initially, the newly established oil industry had 



117 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



only an indirect impact on this primitive economy. The establish- 
ment of the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco, predeces- 
sor of Saudi Aramco) and the oil towns around the oil fields 
triggered major changes in the economy of the kingdom, especially 
in the Eastern Province. Development of the oil fields required an- 
cillary construction of modern ports, roads, housing, power plants, 
and water systems. Saudi workers had to be trained in new skills. 
In addition, the concentration of oil field employees and the range 
of services the oil company and employees needed opened new 
economic opportunities on a scale previously unseen by local mer- 
chants, contractors, and others. Aramco provided technical, finan- 
cial, and logistical support to local entrepreneurs to shed the many 
support activities it had initially assumed. The discovery of oil ended 
the kingdom's isolation and introduced new ways to organize the 
production and distribution of goods and services. 

Although the oil industry's creation produced a profound im- 
pression on the kingdom's economy, economic structural change 
was well under way before oil was discovered. Abd al Aziz Al Saud's 
quest to consolidate his family's control over the territories by es- 
tablishing a modern state had begun to transform the traditional 
economy. One of the pivotal policies pursued by the king was seden- 
tarization of the beduin, largely for political and security reasons. 
As part of the creation of the Ikhwan (see Glossary) movement, 
Abd al Aziz encouraged the establishment of a series of agricul- 
tural communities {hujar — see Glossary), designed to relieve the 
beduin groups comprising this unified military force of providing 
for their livelihoods (see Nation Building: The Rule of Abd al Aziz, 
1926-53, ch. 1). The hujar never succeeded in becoming self- 
sufficient, however, requiring the government to supplement basic 
necessities. Once the Ikhwan movement was disbanded, some 
tribesmen returned to their original occupations, but a significant 
number joined the White Army (so-called because members wore 
beduin attire not military uniform), which later became the Saudi 
Arabian National Guard, or moved to the cities to seek employ- 
ment (see The Ikhwan Movement, ch. 5). Moreover, in 1925 the 
government abolished the exclusive rights of tribes to their dira 
(tribal grazing land) and further accelerated the transformation. 
The final blow to the traditional tribal economy was dealt many 
years later. A law adopted in 1968 distributed swaths of land in 
various parts of the country to individuals, thereby breaking the 
centuries-old communal control over land. Inevitably, this distri- 
bution of lands led to land ownership patterns that mainly benefited 
tribal leaders and, finally, to the growth in land sales to nontribal 
members. 



118 



The Economy 



Economic Policy Making 

The economic philosophy of the Saudi Arabian royal family has 
not changed since the reign of Abd al Aziz, but the economic role 
of the government has grown tremendously. The stated goal of 
Saudi rulers has been to improve the economic conditions of the 
country's citizens while retaining the society's Islamic values. 
Imbedded in this social contract, however, is the issue of political 
control. The Al Saud recognized that the key to political power 
in the kingdom lay in replacing the old economy with lucrative new 
economic opportunities for the country's citizenry. 

In the early stages of the kingdom, the only nontraditional eco- 
nomic opportunities for Saudi citizens were linked to employment 
in the military, distribution of land, and some modest contracts 
and commissions. Abd al Aziz had limited means. His revenue 
was adequate to allow only minimal government functions, not to 
undertake economic and social projects. Development of the coun- 
try's oil resources resulted in some wage payments to Saudis and 
local purchases of goods and services by foreign oil companies, but 
the impact on the Saudi economy was initially minor. The main 
beneficiary of oil exports was the ruling family and its tribal allies. 
Until the 1970s, oil income increased slowly, and the government 
usually operated under financial constraint. The government's eco- 
nomic decisions were largely those of determining priorities among 
alternative uses of limited resources. Government structure and 
subsidiary economic organizations also evolved slowly. In 1952 the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) was created to serve 
as the central bank, and in 1962 the General Petroleum and Mineral 
Organization (Petromin) was formed. 

Economic Policy During the Oil Boom, 1974-85 

In the early 1970s, the economic situation changed dramatically. 
Oil exports expanded substantially, royalty payments and taxes on 
foreign oil companies increased sharply, and oil-exporting govern- 
ments, including the kingdom, began setting and raising oil ex- 
port prices. Saudi Arabia's revenues per barrel of oil (averaged 
from total production and oil revenues) quadrupled from US$0.22 
in 1948 to US$0.89 in 1970. By 1973, the price had reached US$1.56 
and soared to US$10 and higher in 1974 following the Arab oil em- 
bargo introduced to pressure Western supporters of Israel during 
the October 1973 War. In 1982 the average export price per bar- 
rel of oil reached well above US$30. Between 1973 and 1980, 
government oil revenues jumped from US$4.3 billion to US$101.8 
billion. At last the higher oil revenues gave Saudi officials the means 
to make major structural changes in the economy. 



119 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



The society encompassed factions eager to promote the modern- 
ization program, as well as some elements within the royal family 
and the religious community who feared the social consequences 
of rapid economic transformation. Others, mainly from the tech- 
nocratic elite, were concerned about the economic consequences 
of such a rapid expansion in expenditures. One choice facing 
policymakers in the early 1970s was whether to restrict oil produc- 
tion to a level that was adequate to finance limited economic and 
social development or to allow production at a level that would meet 
world demand for crude oil. Choosing a relatively high produc- 
tion level would force a decision on whether to use resulting revenues 
for rapid domestic economic and social development or long-term 
investments abroad. There were other policy choices. Those peo- 
ple who wanted to keep oil in the ground, except for that needed 
for limited development, argued strongly that this policy would best 
preserve the country's resources for future generations. 

The choices appear to have been made by 1974 at the latest, 
although the decision-making process was not always clear or dis- 
cernible. One issue was clear, however: domestic economic policy 
did not drive oil production and export policies. The Al Saud 
pledged to keep oil flowing at moderate prices, commensurate with 
world needs, arguing that the kingdom was as dependent on the 
stability and prosperity of consuming nations as those nations were 
on Saudi oil. Moreover, if Saudi Arabia wanted to ensure that oil 
would remain the energy source of choice, moderate prices were 
essential. In addition to framing the issue in purely economic terms, 
the decision had a geopolitical dimension: since World War II the 
kingdom had linked itself with the West and was eager to honor 
its pledge as a loyal ally on the international and regional level. 
This position was also reflected in its relations with Aramco. Saudi 
officials argued that the kingdom had avoided nationalization, opt- 
ing instead for a gradual takeover of foreign oil companies operat- 
ing within Saudi borders. Despite these attempts to moderate oil 
prices, the supply-and-demand fundamentals of the international 
oil market combined with the changes in ownership of downstream 
assets to raise international oil prices, creating enormous pressures 
on the domestic front to invest rising oil revenues in developing 
the country's economic and social infrastructure. 

By the mid-1970s, the government had decided to use most of 
the growing oil revenues for a massive development effort. An im- 
portant part of that effort was to industrialize, largely by investing 
in processing plants that used the country's hydrocarbon resources. 
This policy meant at least a decade of very large investments to 
build the plants and the necessary infrastructure. It meant financing 



120 



The Economy 



and building the gas-gathering system, the pipelines for gas and 
crude oil to bring the raw material to the two chosen main indus- 
trial sites — Al Jubayl (or Jubail) and Yanbu al Bahr (known as 
Yanbu) — and building the industrial sites themselves. The develop- 
ment effort also included many other projects, such as the huge 
and costly airports at Riyadh and Jiddah, hospitals, schools, in- 
dustrial plants, roads, and ports. By the mid-1980s, the massive 
expenditures totaled US$500 billion. 

The decision to increase the country's oil and gas resource de- 
velopment through downstream investments in refineries and 
petrochemical plants was logical considering the country's resource 
endowment. Three factors motivated such a strategy. First, down- 
stream investments were capital-intensive, which fitted Saudi Ara- 
bia's small population and large oil revenues. Second, more 
value-added income would be extracted and retained, thereby max- 
imizing Saudi revenues through the export of more refined petro- 
leum products instead of crude oil. Moreover, the natural gas that 
had been largely wasted before the 1980s would be processed and 
used. 

Third, some Saudi planners saw industrialization as another op- 
portunity to widen the sphere of economic activity for foreign and 
domestic private firms. Participation of foreign private sector firms 
was crucial from the outset. Saudi Arabia invited several interna- 
tional oil companies to invest in joint ventures in the new export 
refineries built in the kingdom during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Furthermore, participation by international petrochemical com- 
panies was necessary to obtain the technology needed. There was 
also the issue of access to the markets of the West: Saudi planners 
anticipated regulatory and trade problems by exporting petrochem- 
icals to markets that already had made substantial investments in 
the petrochemical industry. Saudi planners therefore hoped that, 
with the help of foreign multinationals, they could fit Saudi 
petrochemical output into international distribution networks. 

On the domestic front, the state would build the basic indus- 
tries, the crucial first step in the chain of industrial processing. 
Through loans and other incentives, the state would foster the 
growth of specific private sector industries that would be at the lower 
end of the industrial process. Over a period, the planners anticipated 
that the state-owned conglomerates might be partially privatized. 

A large part of the funds spent on development programs were 
intended to promote private sector investment and to support fu- 
ture consumption. Starting in the mid-1970s, the government 
decided that an adequate infrastructure was essential to the king- 
dom's future development. Providing this infrastructure included 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

revamping and building electricity, water, sewerage, desalination, 
and telecommunication systems. Moreover, it entailed creating air- 
ports and ports and laying a vast network of roads. In terms of 
generating and distributing electric power, the government as- 
sisted private companies building and operating its electricity net- 
work through concessionary capital loans and continuing operating 
subsidies. Apart from upgrading distribution facilities for water, 
the government built several desalination plants and drilled wells, 
built dams, and installed pumps. Telecommunications were quickly 
brought to international standards, allowing Saudi Arabia to han- 
dle all its communication needs in local and international telephone, 
telegraph, maritime, and television distribution services, via cable, 
satellite, and terrestrial transmission systems. Under King Faisal 
ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud (1964-75), there was a massive increase 
in government spending on education to an annual level of about 
10 percent of the budget. 

Saudi planners also saw the need for a subsidy program to sup- 
plement direct government outlays. The major reason was income 
distribution. Although direct grants to average citizens would have 
been most efficient, the logistics involved would have been difficult. 
Conversely, waiting for the oil expenditures to reach this economic 
and social objective might have created additional social tensions. 
Therefore, the government adopted a widespread subsidy program 
for utilities, fuels, agriculture, social services (both private and pub- 
lic), the industrial sector, and several other areas. Beyond income 
distribution, the rationale of the subsidy program was the need to 
promote nonoil development through cheap loans, technical as- 
sistance, industrial and agricultural incentives, and preferential buy- 
ing of domestic products by the government. The subsidy program 
was also designed to improve education and health services. 

The massive development effort entailed many risks. The size 
of the effort and the technology involved required the participa- 
tion of a huge number of foreign workers for a long period, with 
the potential of disrupting the society. The pace of modernization 
was also economically disruptive. Some observers questioned 
whether Saudi refineries and petrochemical plants would be effi- 
ciently managed and prove competitive within a reasonable time. 
By the early 1980s, the country encountered economic and social 
tensions — such as the inflation of the mid-1970s, the takeover of 
the Grand Mosque in Mecca in November 1979, and disturbances 
in the Eastern Province in 1979-80 — that dissipated only late in 
the 1980s. 

Another risk of the massive development effort was the loss of 
control over expenditures or inadequate justification of investments. 



122 



The Economy 



The sudden easing of financial constraints in the mid-1970s per- 
mitted consideration of projects deemed too lavish or too large 
earlier. The forced development of the capital at Riyadh was a sen- 
timental and political decision that required large expenditures to 
bring such necessities as water, electricity, communications, and 
housing inland to a capital far from the economic centers of the 
country. The huge airports at Riyadh and Jiddah (built at a reported 
cost of US$3.2 billion and more than US$5 billion, respectively) 
were architectural monuments, but whether they were a wise use 
of the patrimony of future generations was unclear. 

The rapid rise of public purchases and contracts after 1974 caused 
foreign businessmen to flock to the kingdom. Because Saudi agents 
were usually essential, foreign businessmen frequently paid them 
large fees, to be recovered in the contract they were seeking. The 
Saudi business sector viewed these practices from a perspective 
different from that of some outside observers: agent fees and influ- 
ence peddling were called corruption by visiting journalists but were 
judged less harshly domestically, although there was some unease. 
Some Saudis criticized agent fees frequently granted to the wealthy, 
especially people related to the royal family. The perceived costs, 
combined with growing criticism at home, eventually prompted 
the government to restrict the use of agents and fees on some defense 
contracts and to take other measures to control costs. 

Looking back at this huge effort in the early 1990s after several 
years of stagnant public investment, the picture was mixed. On 
the one hand, the infrastructure had stood the test of time and 
provided the citizenry with world-class facilities. On the other hand, 
maintaining these investments, some of which lacked a direct finan- 
cial payback, despite their more general economic uses, has been 
costly. More problematic may be the public perception that authori- 
ties, having fostered such dependency on government largess, found 
it extremely difficult to reduce services. 

Several other infrastructure problems became apparent. First, 
the vast majority of expenditures were concentrated in a few cities, 
predisposing these metropolitan areas to more rapid economic 
growth. Second, infrastructural support systems were programmed 
at an early stage of the country's development, rendering some 
obsolete in the early 1990s. Third, some of the facilities seemed 
to have been built as an end in themselves, leading to unnecessary 
waste and continuing maintenance costs. 

The most entrenched problem from the period of rapid develop- 
ment of the mid-1970s to the early 1980s stemmed from the govern- 
ment's willingness to subsidize production, consumption, and 
investment. The objectives for subsidies were threefold: encouraging 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

nonoil economic activity, meeting social goals, and distributing in- 
come. The subsidy program may have created greater problems 
than were earlier anticipated. Saudi planners never thought that 
oil revenues would constrain expenditures to the extent that they 
did in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Efficiency requires that sub- 
sidies be applied directly at the source. Most Saudi production sub- 
sidies have been indirect subsidies, which have reduced the cost 
to consumers of electricity and other industrial inputs, leading to 
unnecessary waste. The industrial sector has thereby become a rela- 
tively inefficient producer and has made little effort to wean itself 
from government assistance. 

Nowhere was this problem more prevalent than in the agricul- 
tural sector where national security was the original objective in 
raising output. Saudi Arabia became self-sufficient in several major 
food grains but the cost to the budget and the ecology could not 
be justified. First, international experience has shown that if a food 
embargo were to be imposed, such an embargo has generally failed 
unless accompanied by a major military campaign. Second, sav- 
ings on food purchased from overseas could easily have been in- 
vested in inventory to safeguard against an external threat. Third, 
no social benefit emanated from such a program. Agricultural em- 
ployment continued to decline, and large conglomerates, rather 
than peasant farmers, profited from most subsidies. Fourth, sub- 
sidies could have been related to more appropriate production 
methods that promoted water conservation. 

Economic Policy after the 1986 Oil-Price Crash 

The general thrust of Saudi economic policy underwent a fun- 
damental change after the oil price crash of 1986. The serious deple- 
tion of foreign assets, combined with the extensive decline in oil 
revenues, necessitated a revised economic policy. The deprecia- 
tion of the United States dollar on international financial markets 
also hurt Saudi purchasing power abroad. The kingdom's exter- 
nal terms of trade deteriorated rapidly because oil exports were 
largely denominated in United States dollars, and the bulk of Saudi 
imports came from countries whose currencies were appreciating 
relative to the United States dollar. 

Reappraisal of the development program became necessary. The 
most urgent task was shoring up government finances, yet domes- 
tic constraints allowed only a few options, especially in terms of 
raising nonoil revenues. Imposing an income tax, for example, was 
out of the question partly because of its political dangers in a country 
where it was an unknown procedure likely to raise questions of in- 
come distribution and taxation without representation. Also an 



124 



The Economy 



income tax appeared impractical because the bureaucratic difficul- 
ties involved in collection would be more expensive than the in- 
take would justify. King Fahd's short-lived idea of taxing foreign 
workers' income was retracted after a public outcry. The govern- 
ment froze some current account spending and cut capital spend- 
ing, partly by delaying projects and also by canceling some 
programs. The private sector was informed that subsidies of vast 
capital expenditures had ended for the present, and, whereas cer- 
tain major projects would be completed, the government's emphasis 
would shift to improving the efficiency and maintenance of its public 
assets. In addition, major defense contracts would include a pro- 
vision whereby foreign equipment and service contractors would 
be required to allocate 35 percent of the cost of their projects or 
services for industrial investments in Saudi Arabia. 

Economic Policy in the 1990s 

The government's attempts to deal with the chronic budget 
deficits, largely through expenditure retrenchment, depletion of 
foreign assets, and the sale of development bonds, generally helped 
stabilize its financial situation by the late 1980s (see table 4, Ap- 
pendix). It became clear by 1989 that the economy had weathered 
some of the other problems, such as the spate of bankruptcies of 
private companies, the growth of bad banking debts, and the mas- 
sive outflow of private capital to overseas financial centers that fol- 
lowed the oil-price crash of 1986. During 1989 and 1990, economic 
planners had renewed optimism. New plans were made to put the 
oil and nonoil sectors of the economy on a surer footing. The per- 
ceived recovery in international oil consumption and prices provided 
regional policymakers the opportunity to resume spending to pro- 
mote economic growth. As a result, two major initiatives became 
the basis of Saudi economic policy. 

First, Saudi Arabia unveiled plans to raise crude oil production 
capacity to between 10.5 million and 11 million bpd by 1995. With 
the restructuring of the General Petroleum and Mineral Organi- 
zation (Petromin), the creation of Samarec, which was given con- 
trol over most of the kingdom's oil refineries, and the announcement 
of a major plan to upgrade domestic and export refineries, a com- 
prehensive picture emerged of the government's effort to promote 
oil investments. Another indication of Riyadh's intentions came 
in 1989 when Saudi Aramco purchased 50 percent of Star En- 
terprises in the United States, a joint venture with Texaco that 
signaled Saudi Arabia's pursuit of geographically diversified down- 
stream projects. 



125 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Second, the government was not eager to continue its expan- 
sionist fiscal policies. Despite moderately higher oil prices, mili- 
tary outlays, oil-capacity expansion plans, and current expenditures 
accounted for the bulk of total spending and did not permit a fis- 
cal boost. However, because the nonoil private sector remained 
largely dependent on government spending, the sharp cutbacks in 
capital outlays hindered economic diversification. In light of this 
failure, the government adopted two policies to reorient and re- 
vive the private sector. 

Financial sector reform was the government's main option. Since 
1988 SAMA had made great strides in bolstering commercial bank 
balance sheets through mergers, debt write-offs, and injection of 
funds to prevent failures. Subsequently, banking regulations and 
supervision were tightened and compliance with international cap- 
ital adequacy requirements enforced. The authorities also en- 
couraged banks to take a more active role in financing private sector 
investments. The idea of opening a Riyadh stock exchange received 
renewed interest: the government sanctioned the establishment of 
the exchange in early 1990 and hinted it could be an appropriate 
venue for selling government assets. 

Protectionism as a policy also gained some popularity during 
this period. Partly motivated by the impasse in Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) negotiations with the European Economic Com- 
munity (EEC), but mainly to protect domestic private investment, 
Saudi Arabia began enforcing some restrictive tariff and nontariff 
barriers that had been instituted in the mid-1980s. Under the guise 
of conforming to GCC-wide levels, Saudi Arabia raised its tariff 
rates to 20 percent on most items, with certain industrial items gain- 
ing protection at higher rates. The government also began enforc- 
ing nontariff regulations such as preference for nationally produced 
commodities and the continued application of preference for local 
contractors, as well as quality standards that favored local production. 
In addition, the kingdom assiduously protected domestic banks from 
foreign competition by barring the sale of any foreign financial 
products and services. 

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait halted the miniboom that these 
policies had fostered. In the immediate wake of the invasion, the 
government faced two tasks. First, it had to deal with the massive 
outflow of assets from the domestic banking sector by liquidating 
the commercial banks (which lost more than 12 percent of their 
deposits within the first month of the crisis), encouraging a repatri- 
ation of private assets, and restoring the confidence of foreign cred- 
itors, who had canceled lines of credit as a precautionary measure. 
The monetary authorities reversed most of the hemorrhage caused 



126 



The Economy 



by the loss of confidence in the Saudi riyal. Second, the govern- 
ment was obliged to raise oil output to levels unseen since the early 
1980s. Saudi Aramco had to respond to a serious crisis without 
an adequate assessment of its overall production capacity. It quickly 
became apparent that Saudi Arabia had sufficient capacity to replace 
the bulk of the 4.5 million to 5 million bpd of Iraqi and Kuwaiti 
oil embargoed by the UN. Output rose rapidly to 8.5 million bpd, 
which restored some calm to the international oil market; however, 
by the end of 1990, oil prices were nearly double those in June 1990. 

Supporting the United States-led multinational forces, however, 
placed an enormous burden on the government's budget. Because 
the deficits for 1990 and 1991 reached record levels, the fiscal 
authorities were forced again to engage in further external asset 
drawdowns, increased volumes of development bond sales, and a 
novel feature: external borrowing from commercial banks and ex- 
port credit agencies. Saudi Arabia was a prominent member of the 
World Bank (see Glossary) but because of the nation's high per 
capita income, it was not entitled to borrow from that organiza- 
tion. Most of the major projects envisaged before August 1990 were 
preserved, however. But external borrowing had gained credence 
as the means to fund not only budgetary shortfalls but also the cap- 
ital programs of major public enterprises. Notably, Saudi Aramco 
did not scale back its crude-oil capacity expansion plan. Rather, 
it appeared that new ways of financing were being sought from 
foreign commercial banks, multinational companies, and the 
domestic private sector. Sabic also moved to raise capital overseas, 
while Saudi Consolidated Electric Company (Sceco), the electri- 
city conglomerate, requested foreign suppliers to help finance its 
expansion program. 

The fiscal crisis did not cause economic problems for the pri- 
vate sector because the government's reduction of its budgeted ex- 
penditures was slight. Moreover, domestic government spending 
in support of the war effort surged, and many Saudi companies 
benefited from war-related contracts. Also, as a result of Opera- 
tion Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, the more than 
600,000 troops of the multinational forces increased domestic spend- 
ing on consumer goods. This spending offset the effects of the fall 
in the number of foreign workers after the government expelled 
more than 1 million Yemenis, Palestinians, Sudanese, and Iraqis 
following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The miniboom, which was 
interrupted by the Iraqi invasion, was revived by this increase in 
government spending, and then received further stimulus by three 
other factors. First, the protection of the kingdom by United States 
forces and the perception that this would continue enhanced private 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

sector confidence in the government. The private sector again 
repatriated capital, and the stock market boomed, with share is- 
sues rising to unprecedented levels. Second, changing regional pol- 
itics encouraged many firms, which had set up manufacturing and 
processing plants for the domestic market, to seek sales in Iran, 
Turkey, and Central Asia. Third, the government cut domestic 
fees and utility charges almost in half. This increased subsidy was 
targeted to lower- and middle-income Saudis but had the net ef- 
fect of raising domestic disposable income. As a result, it was seen 
by some people as a serious attempt by the monarchy to head off 
growing domestic demands for political participation. 

Five-Year Plans 

The kingdom first established a planning agency in 1958 in 
response to suggestions of International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary) advisers. Planning was limited in the 1960s partly 
because of Saudi financial constraints. The government concen- 
trated its limited funds on developing human resources, the trans- 
portation system, and other infrastructure aspects. In 1965 planning 
was formalized in the Central Planning Organization, and in the 
1975 government reorganization it became the Ministry of Plan- 
ning. The Ministry of Finance and National Economy controlled 
funding, however, and appeared to exert considerable influence 
over plan implementation. 

The First Development Plan (1970-75) was drafted in the late 
1960s and became effective on September 2, 1970, at the start of 
the fiscal year (FY — see Glossary). Drafted during a period of fis- 
cal constraint, gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) was 
to increase by 9.8 percent per year (in constant prices) and show 
the greatest increase in the nonoil sectors. Planned budget alloca- 
tions for the five years were US$9.2 billion, 45 percent of which 
was to be spent on capital projects. Planned expenditures were con- 
centrated on defense, education, transportation, and utilities. The 
unanticipated great expansion of crude oil production, accompa- 
nied by large increases in revenues per barrel, contributed to an 
exceptionally high rate of economic growth, far beyond the plan- 
ners' expectations. Nonoil real GDP increased by 11.6 percent per 
year. As oil revenues grew, budget allocations increased, totaling 
about US$27 billion for the five years; actual budget expenditures 
amounted to US$21 billion. 

The Second Development Plan (1975-80) became effective on 
July 9, 1975, at the start of the fiscal year. The plan contained 
numerous social goals similar to those of the first plan, but it also 



128 



The Economy 



set forth goals that reflected decreased fiscal constraints. Social goals 
included the introduction of free medical service, free education 
and vocational training, interest-free loans and subsidies for the 
purchase of homes, subsidized prices for essential commodities, 
interest-free credit for people with limited incomes, and extended 
social security benefits and support for the needy. The plan also 
outlined several economic goals and programs. GDP was to grow 
at an average rate of 10 percent a year. The nonoil sector's real 
planned rate of increase was 13.3 percent per year; the oil sector's 
projected rate of growth was 9.7 percent, although actual growth 
would depend on world markets. 

The government's planned expenditures totaled almost US$142 
billion, plus additional private investment. As the size of oil revenues 
became clearer during the plan's preparation, the final investment 
figure was more than double the initial sum. The planners ac- 
knowledged that spending of this magnitude would create various 
problems, and they anticipated shortfalls in actual spending. The 
largest share of planned government expenditure, 23 percent, was 
allocated for continuing development of ports, roads, and other 
infrastructure. Expansion of industry, agriculture, and utilities 
received 19 percent of expenditures, and defense and human 
resource development — essentially education — each received 16 
percent. 

The planners were correct in anticipating problems. An increas- 
ing flood of imports after 1972 proved too great for the transpor- 
tation system to handle. Ports, where ships waited for four to five 
months to unload, were bottlenecks, but storage and distribution 
from the ports were also inadequate. Government spending con- 
tributed to the problems. By 1976 the clogged ports, an acute hous- 
ing shortage, skyrocketing construction costs, and a growing 
manpower shortage caused prices to accelerate at what some ob- 
servers estimated at about 50 percent a year, although the official 
cost-of-living index did not reflect these rates. 

By 1977 second plan projects and ad hoc measures, such as the 
government's spending less than planned, had relieved many 
problem areas. Construction of additional ports, which contrib- 
uted to almost a fivefold increase in the number of ship berths, 
and paved roads, which increased by 63 percent to more than 22,000 
kilometers as well as other substantial additions to the transporta- 
tion and communications system occurred during the second plan 
period. More than 200,000 housing units were built over the five 
years. 

Actual government expenditures during the second plan reached 
US$200 billion, about 40 percent above the planned figure and 



129 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

almost ten times the level of the first plan. As the transportation 
bottlenecks were removed, annual budget expenditures increased. 
Expenditures for salaries and other operating costs increased more 
rapidly than expected, whereas capital investments rose more slowly 
than budgeted. Over the course of the plan, between 20 percent 
and 33 percent of national income was devoted to investment. The 
private sector accounted for 27 percent of fixed capital formation; 
government ministries and agencies outside of the oil and gas sec- 
tor invested 61 percent, and the public oil sector accounted for 12 
percent. The bulk of fixed capital formation was in construction. 

Despite the massive increase in government expenditures, overall 
real GDP growth at 9.2 percent average per annum was below the 
planned 10 percent rate. This lower growth resulted from a slower- 
than-anticipated growth in petroleum production, a function of in- 
ternational market conditions and political factors. Nonoil GDP 
grew at an average annual rate of 14.8 percent per year compared 
with a planned rate of 13.3 percent. The producing components 
grew at 16.6 percent per year on average (the plan rate was 13 
percent), with most components outpacing their targets. The fol- 
lowing components all exceeded their targets: agriculture, manufac- 
turing, utilities, and services (including trade, transport, and 
finance). Construction paralleled the planned growth rate, and min- 
ing other than oil and public sector projects did not meet targets. 

The Third Development Plan (1980-85) took effect May 15, 
1980. The third plan featured a modest rise in government expen- 
ditures reflecting stabilization of oil revenues and a desire to avoid 
inflation and disruptions to society from an unduly rapid pace of 
development. The planners expected construction activity to 
decline, but unfinished projects were to be completed and indus- 
try developed. Lower construction levels were expected to require 
only a small increase in the number of foreign workers. However, 
requirements for highly skilled workers and technicians, Saudi and 
foreign, to operate and maintain plants and equipment were ex- 
pected to require shifts in the composition of the work force. 

Total planned government civilian development expenditures 
during the third plan amounted to US$213 billion, plus an addi- 
tional US$25 billion for administrative and subsidy costs. Third 
plan expenditures were categorized differently, making compari- 
sons with the second plan difficult. Civilian development expen- 
ditures planned for 1980-85 were US$79 billion for the economy, 
primarily industry (37 percent of the total in the third plan; 25 per- 
cent in the second plan), US$76 billion for infrastructure (36 per- 
cent in the third plan; 50 percent in the second plan), US$39 billion 
for human resource development (19 percent in the third plan; 16 



130 



The Economy 



percent in the second plan), and US$18 billion for social develop- 
ment (close to 9 percent in both plans). 

The third plan coincided with the sharp downturn in Saudi oil 
production. The oil sector's output fell on average 14.2 percent 
per annum. As a result, during the five years of the plan the aver- 
age annual real GDP growth rate declined 1.5 percent compared 
with a planned annual increase of 1.3 percent. The principal fac- 
tors behind the continued positive rates of growth in the nonoil 
sector (6.4 percent on average per annum) were the relatively few 
cutbacks in government expenditures and the continuation of major 
infrastructure and industrial projects despite declining oil revenues. 
The nonoil manufacturing sector and utilities expanded at 12.4 per- 
cent and 18.6 percent, respectively, but at annual growth rates well 
below their targets. The construction sector contracted but only 
at half the rate planned. The agricultural sector grew rapidly, surg- 
ing to 8.1 percent per annum. The service sector maintained its 
momentum during the third plan, with trade and government ser- 
vices leading the way. The transportation and finance subsectors, 
however, fell well below their targets. 

The Fourth Development Plan (1985-90) budgeted total govern- 
ment outlays at SRI trillion (for value of the riyal — see Glossary) 
or almost US$267 billion, of which about US$150 billion was bud- 
geted for civilian development spending. Most cuts were to come 
from reduced expenditures on infrastructure and a shift to develop- 
ing economic and human resources. Concern for preserving the 
government's new investments was reflected in increased budgeted 
spending on operations and maintenance. The plan also empha- 
sized stimulating private sector investment and increasing economic 
integration with members of the GCC (see Collective Security under 
the Gulf Cooperation Council, ch. 5). 

During the period of the fourth plan, oil revenues plummeted 
following the oil-price crash of 1986. Overall real rates of GDP 
growth averaged a positive 1.4 percent per annum, far below the 
4 percent programmed. The revival in crude oil output from the 
low levels of 1986, however, boosted oil sector growth rates to 3.6 
percent per annum. The sharp decline in external income caused 
lower rates of output expansion in the producing sectors. Construc- 
tion and other mining sector growth rates fell by 8.5 and 1 .9 per- 
cent, respectively. Other manufacturing continued to grow modestly 
at 1.1 percent per annum, but well below the 15.5 percent target. 
Trade, transport, and finance reflected the financial setbacks in 
the government's program with annual average production declines. 
Two surprises helped to offset the depressed growth rates: agricul- 
ture, which had shown steadily higher rates of output growth in 



131 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

the second and third plan, rose by 13.4 percent per annum on aver- 
age during the fourth plan, nearly double its planned rate, and 
the utilities sector's ability to surpass its planned target of 5 per- 
cent per annum. 

Constrained resources shaped the Fifth Development Plan 
(1990-95), with committed funds for the civilian program falling 
by nearly 30 percent to approximately US$105.4 billion for the 
period. The bulk of the cuts were in government investment in 
economic enterprises, transportation, and communications. Human 
resources development, health and social services, and municipal- 
ity and housing all maintained their fourth-plan levels. Overall, 
the fifth plan called for consolidating the gains in infrastructure 
and social services of the previous twenty years and emphasized 
further economic diversification. The principal means for achiev- 
ing this goal was expanding the productive base of the economy 
by encouraging private sector investment in agriculture and light 
manufacturing. The private sector was allowed to purchase shares 
in the larger industrial complexes and utilities. For example, Sabic 
may be further privatized as well as some downstream refining as- 
sets. In addition, there was greater emphasis on financial sector 
reform and development through the establishment of joint stock 
companies and the role of the stock market in trading shares and 
other financial instruments. Another objective of the plan was 
greater government efficiency in social and economic services. 

Fifth-plan targets envisaged a 3.2 percent per annum growth rate. 
Oil sector output was expected to increase 2.2 percent per annum, 
while nonoil sector growth-rate targets were 3.6 percent. Agricul- 
ture, other manufacturing, utilities, and finance were to pace the 
economy while other sectors would show only modest growth rates 
of 2 percent to 4 percent per annum. 

Changing Structure of the Economy 

Measuring the changing structure of the economy was difficult 
because of the lack of consistent data on the GDP structure (see 
table 5, Appendix). After the 1986 price crash and the shift from 
the use of the hijra (see Glossary) calendar as the basis for govern- 
ment fiscal year accounting, national accounts data were revised 
and were generally not comparable to pre- 1984 data. Moreover, 
the base year used was extremely important: if the base year were 
1980, when oil prices were at peak levels, the nonoil sector in 1986 
accounted for 50 percent of real GDP; if the 1970 base year were 
used, nonoil GDP was closer to 75 percent of total output. 

Since 1984 the relative share of nonoil GDP has fallen from 75.8 
percent of overall real GDP (in 1970 prices) to 67.4 percent in 1990 



132 



The Economy 



(the latest year for which data were available in 1992). This fall 
in nonoil GDP share resulted from the steady growth in crude oil 
production, increases in gas output, and higher refinery through- 
put, which rose prior to the sharp increase in oil output in late 1990. 
In the nonoil sector, the agricultural sector has grown most dur- 
ing this period. Accounting for 7.5 percent of nonoil output in 1984, 
this sector had risen to more than 14.7 percent in 1990. The utili- 
ties sector has also gained, growing from 2.5 percent of nonoil 
production in 1984 to 4.6 percent in 1990. In contrast, manufac- 
turing has remained relatively stable, rising from 8.1 percent of 
nonoil GDP in 1984 to 9.0 percent in 1990. In contrast, construc- 
tion fell from 14.3 percent of nonoil GDP in 1984 to 9.2 percent 
in 1990. Services, comprising trade, transport, and social services, 
fell from more than 66.8 percent to 62.4 percent in the same period. 

Labor 

The Saudi labor force has undergone tremendous change in the 
latter half of the twentieth century as a consequence of the demise 
of traditional means of livelihood linked to pastoral nomadism as 
a way of life for most of the people and the rise of a modern 
economy. A large number of Saudis moved from these older oc- 
cupations into government service. Many foreign workers were also 
brought into the kingdom by the private sector. With the domes- 
tic labor force growing at an average of 5 percent annually between 
1975 and 1985, despite an annual population growth among the 
highest in the world at 3.5 percent, foreign labor was still neces- 
sary. Estimates varied, but a reliable Western source indicated that 
total employment grew from more than 1.7 million in 1975 to 2.2 
million in 1980. The domestic work force numbered 1 million people 
(58 percent of total employment) in 1975. By 1980 employment 
of foreigners had risen from 723,000 in 1975 to more than 1 mil- 
lion (or 46 percent of total employment). 

Ministry of Planning estimates, providing a breakdown of the 
sectoral distribution of employment, showed a slightly different 
picture. According to these figures, the total work force was 2.9 
million in FY 1979, of which 1.3 million workers were in produc- 
ing sectors and 1 .6 million were in the services sectors. Labor was 
concentrated in four main sectors: in FY 1979 agriculture accounted 
for 15.8 percent of the total work force, construction 20.4 percent, 
trade 10.6 percent, and community and social services, including 
government service, 34. 1 percent. By FY 1989 the total labor force 
had risen to close to 5.8 million, with 2.1 million in production 
sectors and 3.7 million in service sectors. Agriculture's share had 
fallen to 9.9 percent, construction was down to 16.4 percent, 



133 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

whereas trade's share of the labor force rose to 15.6 percent and 
community and social services were up to 42.4 percent. These 
figures indicated the extent to which the government had a direct 
hand in the livelihood of the average Saudi. 

Oil and Gas Industry 

Saudi Arabia is the world's most important oil producer. Given 
its relatively high production levels, accounting for nearly 13 per- 
cent of world output and 35 percent of total OPEC output in 1991 , 
and, more significantly, its small domestic needs, the kingdom's 
dominance of international crude oil markets is unchallenged. 
Although reluctant to play the role, Saudi Arabia has become the 
"swing producer," balancing international oil demand and supply. 
Therefore, within limits, Saudi oil production policies can have 
a profound impact on international prices. Since the early 1970s, 
the kingdom has occasionally used this dominance to influence oil 
prices, usually to further its objectives of sustaining long-term oil 
consumption and ensuring economic stability in the industrialized 
world. 

The oil sector is the key domestic production sector; oil revenues 
constituted 73 percent of total budgetary revenues in 1991. Pre- 
cise statistics for expenditures on sector development were not avail- 
able, but some estimates placed the annual figure at US$5 billion 
to US$7 billion, or less than 10 percent of total budgetary expen- 
ditures. Export oil revenues accruing to Saudi Aramco, a large por- 
tion of which is allocated to the budget, accounted for 90 percent 
of total exports in 1991. Only in the number of jobs was the oil 
sector relatively unimportant to the economy; the capital-intensive 
nature of the oil industry required few workers — less than 2 per- 
cent of the labor force in the early 1990s. 

Brief History 

Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud, the first king of Saudi 
Arabia, had not gained control of the western part of the country 
when he granted the first oil concession in 1923. A British invest- 
ment group, the Eastern and General Syndicate, was the recipient. 
The syndicate gambled on the possibility that it could sell the con- 
cession, but British petroleum companies showed no interest. The 
concession lapsed and was declared void in 1928. 

Discovery of oil in several places around the Persian Gulf sug- 
gested that the peninsula contained petroleum deposits. Several 
major oil companies, however, were blocked from obtaining con- 
cessions there by what was known as the Red Line Agreement, 
which prohibited companies with part ownership of a company 



134 




135 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

operating in Iraq from acting independently in a proscribed area 
that covered much of the Middle East. Standard Oil Company of 
California (Socal — later Chevron), which was not affected by the 
Red Line Agreement, gained a concession and found oil in Bahrain 
in 1932. Socal then sought a concession in Saudi Arabia that became 
effective in July 1933. Socal assigned its concession to its wholly 
owned operating subsidiary, California Arabian Standard Oil Com- 
pany (CASOC). In 1936 Socal sold a part interest in CASOC to 
Texaco to gain marketing facilities for the crude discovered in its 
worldwide holdings. The name of the operating company in Saudi 
Arabia was changed to Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) 
in January 1944. Two partners, Standard Oil Company of New 
Jersey (later renamed Exxon) and Socony-Vacuum (now Mobil 
Oil Company), were added in 1946 to gain investment capital and 
marketing outlets for the large reserves being discovered in Saudi 
Arabia. These four companies were the sole owners of Aramco until 
the early 1970s. 

The original concession called for an annual rental fee of 5,000 
British pounds (£) in gold or its equivalent until oil was discov- 
ered, a loan of £250,000 in gold to the Saudi government, a royalty 
payment of four shillings gold per net ton of crude production after 
the discovery of oil, and the free supply to the government of specific 
quantities of products from the refinery Aramco was to build after 
oil was discovered. (In 1933 the British pound was worth US$4.87; 
there were twenty shillings to the British pound.) The company 
received exclusive rights to explore for, produce, and export oil, 
free of all Saudi taxes and duties, from most of the eastern part 
of Saudi Arabia for sixty years. The terms granted by the govern- 
ment were liberal, reflecting the king's need for funds, his low es- 
timate of future oil production, and his weak bargaining position. 

The original concession agreement was modified many times. 
The first modification was made in 1939 after the discovery of oil 
in 1938. This change added to Aramco 's concession area and ex- 
tended the period to 1999 in return for payments substantially 
higher than those specified in the first agreement and for larger 
quantities of free gasoline and kerosene to be supplied by Aramco 
to the Saudi government. In 1950 a fifty-fifty profit-sharing agree- 
ment was signed, whereby a tax (called an income tax, but actually 
a tax on each barrel of oil produced) was levied by the govern- 
ment. This tax considerably increased government revenues. Fur- 
ther revisions increased the government's share — slowly until the 
1970s and rapidly thereafter. At the beginning of 1982, Aramco' s 
concession area amounted to about 220,000 square kilometers 



136 



The Economy 



(189,000 onshore and 31,000 offshore), having relinquished more 
than 80 percent of the original area of almost 1.3 million square 
kilometers. 

Once the existence of oil in quantity was ascertained, the ad- 
vantages of a pipeline to the Mediterranean Sea seemed obvious; 
it would save about 3,200 kilometers of sea travel and the transit 
fees of the Suez Canal. The Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company 
(Tapline), a wholly owned Aramco subsidiary, was formed in 1945, 
and the pipeline was completed in 1950. Many innovations were 
required to keep costs down and to make operations competitive 
with tankers. Tapline linked the Lebanese port of Az Zahrani, close 
to Sidon, to Al Qaysumah in Saudi Arabia (a distance of more 
than 1,200 kilometers), where it connected with a pipeline collect- 
ing oil from Aramco fields. Initial capacity was 320,000 bpd, but 
capacity was expanded, and the pipeline eventually handled 480,000 
bpd in the mid-1970s. Tax problems with Saudi authorities and 
transit fees due Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon plagued Tapline for 
many years. The line was damaged and out of operation several 
times in the 1970s. And as operating costs of Tapline increased, 
supertankers were reducing seaborne expenses. By 1975 Tapline 
was no longer used to export Saudi crude via Sidon. In 1982 the 
line was again damaged. In late 1983, Tapline filed formal notice 
to cease operations in Syria and Lebanon, although small amounts 
of crude would reportedly continue, albeit temporarily, to supply 
a refinery in Jordan. 

From the very start, Aramco had to concern itself with more 
than just oil. Its company presidents were virtually United States 
ambassadors in Saudi Arabia and played a significant role in shap- 
ing United States-Saudi relations in the early days of the oil com- 
pany. Moreover, the undeveloped infrastructure and facilities 
demanded that Aramco construct virtually everything it needed. 
A port to bring in equipment had to be built; water had to be found 
and delivered to work areas; and housing, hospitals, and offices 
had to be constructed to launch development. Few Saudis were 
familiar with machinery, local construction firms hardly existed, 
and the unavailability of most materials locally necessitated long 
supply lines. 

Aramco adopted the long-range policy of training Saudis to take 
over as many tasks as possible. However, major management po- 
sitions (culled from the ranks of the parent companies) were not 
intended to be relinquished and were not relinquished until Aramco 
could not resist government pressure to do so in the 1970s and 
1980s. A wide variety of training programs, including sixty annu- 
al scholarships to foreign universities, and social service programs 



137 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

were established by Aramco. Saudis, for example, were trained 
as doctors, supply experts, machinists, ship pilots, truck drivers, 
oil drillers, and cooks. Many of these Saudis later fanned out into 
the local economy to establish businesses and entered the growing 
bureaucracy in Jiddah and Riyadh. Others remained with Aramco 
and advanced in responsibility. Aramco was also one of the first 
foreign companies in Saudi Arabia to employ labor from a variety 
of countries other than the United States. By 1980 about 22,000 
of the 38,000 Aramco employees (excluding some 20,000 workers 
employed by Aramco contractors), were Saudis. More than 45 per- 
cent of management and supervisory positions were occupied by 
Saudis. In 1982 Ali Naimi, who had started with Aramco at age 
eleven and had risen through the ranks, became first executive vice 
president in charge of operations; two years later, Naimi became 
the first Saudi president of Aramco. The United States presence 
declined over the years. By 1980 there were only 3,400 United States 
citizens with Aramco. The remaining work force consisted of na- 
tionals from about forty-four countries. In 1989 the total number 
of company employees was 43,248. Of these, 31,712 were Saudis 
whereas the United States work force had shrunk to 2,482, and 
other foreign workers were slightly more than 9,000. 

To divest itself of supply and service sidelines, Aramco had al- 
ways subcontracted work to local entrepreneurs and at times pro- 
vided technical, financial, and material assistance. At the request 
of King Abd al Aziz, Aramco teams helped find water and develop 
agricultural projects. The Saudi government paid the company to 
build a modern port at Ad Dammam and to supervise the con- 
struction of a railroad linking the port to Riyadh. 

In the 1970s, Aramco' s activities expanded greatly. Part of the 
expansion was associated with the facilities needed for the more 
than threefold increase of crude oil production during the period. 
Well drilling, pipeline installation, and construction of gas-oil sepa- 
ration plants, storage tanks, and tanker-loading terminals acceler- 
ated tremendously. As the world's largest oil company, Aramco 
frequently had to design and build installations larger than those 
used elsewhere. During the 1970s, Aramco was also entrusted with 
developing a gas-gathering system (currently referred to as the 
master gas system), which reportedly cost between US$10 billion 
and US$15 billion for the first phase alone and was completed in 
1982. The company was also charged with producing the Eastern 
Province's electricity supply through managing the regional elec- 
tric power company. 

In 1968 Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Ahmad 
Zaki Yamani first publicly broached the idea of Saudi participation 



138 



The Economy 



in Aramco. In December 1972, long negotiations were completed 
for the Saudi government to buy 25 percent ownership of Aramco, 
effective in 1973. Negotiations during 1973 resulted in Saudi par- 
ticipation increasing to 60 percent, effective the beginning of 1974. 
In 1976 arrangements for total ownership of Aramco were reached, 
and in 1980 payments to the four Aramco parent companies were 
completed. By 1988 Aramco was converted to a totally Saudi-owned 
company called Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco). By 
the 1990s, Saudi Aramco had responsibility for all domestic ex- 
ploration and development — its mandate was expanded to include 
all Saudi Arabia — engaging in downstream joint ventures over- 
seas, purchasing on-land storage facilities closer to key consuming 
markets for its crude oil, and expanding its tanker subsidiary, Vela 
Marine International. 

The General Petroleum and Mineral Organization (Petromin) 
was established in 1962 as a public corporation wholly owned by 
the Saudi government to develop industries based on petroleum, 
natural gas, and minerals by itself or in conjunction with other in- 
vestors, foreign or domestic. Although its activities predominantly 
centered on the country's hydrocarbon resources, Petromin also 
explored for and developed other mineral resources. 

Petromin 's original charter suggested that it would eventually 
become the country's national oil company. After the mid-1960s, 
only Petromin received concessions for exploration and develop- 
ment. Petromin, however, assigned its rights, but not its conces- 
sions, to companies formed with foreign oil companies. A joint 
venture was formed with an Italian state company to explore part 
of the Rub al Khali, or Empty Quarter, but activity ceased in 1973 
after the company failed to discover oil. In 1967 Petromin joined 
a number of foreign oil companies in an equally unsuccessful ex- 
ploration of areas of the Red Sea claimed by the kingdom. 

In the 1960s, Petromin became responsible for domestic distri- 
bution of petroleum products, partly by purchasing Aramco 's local 
marketing facilities. It became part owner with private Saudi in- 
vestors in domestic refineries in Jiddah and Riyadh. It also began 
marketing crude oil abroad and became involved in tanker transport. 
By 1975 some of Petromin 's activities were curtailed as part of a 
ministerial reorganization. Among the reasons for limiting its scope 
were its unsuccessful attempts at further oil exploration, the incompe- 
tence of its operations, and the diffusion of its activities. A clearer 
distinction between its activities and those of Aramco also oc- 
casioned the restriction. Some businesses in which Petromin held 
part ownership, such as a fertilizer plant and a steel mill, as well 
as responsibility for the many large petrochemical plants that were 



139 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



in the study stage, were transferred to the new Ministry of Indus- 
try and Electricity. 

Although its responsibilities shrank somewhat after 1975, Petro- 
min's activities increased. It supervised the construction and be- 
came responsible for operation of the crude oil pipeline from the 
Eastern Province oil fields to the new industrial city of Yanbu on 
the Red Sea coast. In joint- venture partnerships with foreign oil 
companies, it rapidly expanded refining facilities for domestic use 
and export. Petromin had responsibility for the supply, storage, 
and distribution of domestic petroleum products, for which the de- 
mand was growing rapidly. Petromin marketed some crude oil and 
petroleum products abroad and exported natural gas liquids. It also 
continued exploration and drilling activities well into the 1980s. 

By the late 1980s, however, the government had decided to cre- 
ate a company to take over Petromin 's activities. The Saudi Ara- 
bian Marketing and Refining Company (Samarec) was created in 
1988 to produce and market refined products in the kingdom and 
abroad. It assumed control of the joint ventures with foreign oil 
companies. Moreover, the government ordered Samarec to imple- 
ment the major upgrading of domestic refineries, believed to cost 
well over US$5 billion during the first half of the 1990s. 

Among the pivotal concessions Saudi Arabia awarded were those 
made to two small independent oil companies to explore for oil in 
the Divided Zone (see Glossary). In 1949 the Getty Oil Company 
(formerly Pacific Western Oil Corporation) was granted the right 
to explore in the Saudi share of the Divided Zone. Aramco had 
relinquished this area in 1948 partly because the ruler of Kuwait 
had won very favorable terms for a concession in his share of the 
Divided Zone, and Aramco did not want to match those terms (see 
External Boundaries, ch. 2). 

Production from this concession (since the 1970s partly owned 
by Saudi Arabia) averaged 60,000 bpd during the 1980s. During 
the Persian Gulf War, production came to a halt because Getty's 
facilities were heavily damaged by the Iraqi occupying forces. The 
oil fields were mined while wells and gathering centers were seri- 
ously damaged or destroyed, as were the refinery and ten of four- 
teen crude oil storage tanks. 

The second pivotal concession was granted in December 1957 
by Saudi Arabia to the Arabian Oil Company (AOC), owned by 
Japanese business interests, giving exploration rights to the Divided 
Zone offshore area for two years, subject to extension. If oil were 
discovered in commercial quantities, an exploitation lease was to 
be granted for forty years. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
each became 10 percent owners of AOC. By the mid-1970s, Saudi 



140 



The Economy 



Arabia had increased its stake to 60 percent, and in the early 1990s 
still controlled the company. 

During the 1980s, average production was 125,000 bpd. After 
Iraqi attacks on storage facilities and the removal of personnel dur- 
ing the Persian Gulf War, output was shut down; production 
returned to peak levels by early 1992. 

Oil Industry in the 1990s 

Structure and Organization 

After two decades of organizational change, the reshaping of the 
oil industry in Saudi Arabia neared completion by the late 1980s. 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the industry was transformed 
from one controlled by foreign oil companies (the Aramco parent 
companies) to one owned and operated by the government. Deci- 
sions made directly by the ruling family increasingly became a fea- 
ture of the industry in the late 1970s. Saudi Arabia's participation 
in the Arab oil embargo in 1973 and foreign policy goals were fea- 
tures of this transition. In 1992 the government had title to all miner- 
al resources in the country (except in the former Divided Zone, 
where both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had interests in the natural 
resources of the whole zone). Through the Supreme Oil Council, 
headed by the king, and the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources the government initiated, funded, and implemented all 
investment decisions. It also controlled daily operations related to 
production and pricing. 

On a functional level, the industry also underwent significant 
transformation. By the late 1980s, the major companies established 
by or taken over from foreign owners by the government were re- 
quired to produce a particular product. For the most part, only 
one company controlled a certain industrial subsector, although 
there was some overlap. In the upstream part of the oil industry, 
all exploration, development, and production decisions within Saudi 
Arabia were controlled by Saudi Aramco. It managed the oil fields, 
pipelines, crude oil export facilities, and the master gas system 
throughout the country. Through its subsidiary Vela Marine In- 
ternational, Saudi Aramco controlled Saudi Arabia's tanker fleet. 
Because downstream investments overseas were an integral part 
of Saudi Arabia's crude oil marketing strategy, these have come 
under the control of Saudi Aramco. These downstream investments 
were joint-venture operations with foreign oil refiners. Saudi 
Aramco also operated the kingdom's largest oil refinery. In 1992 
the refinery's output largely conformed to Samarec's specifications. 
Saudi Aramco was managed by a board of directors headed by the 



141 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

minister of petroleum and mineral resources and a senior manage- 
ment staff headed by a president, with the Supreme Oil Council 
having oversight. Most operational decisions were made by the 
professional staff except oil output decisions, instructions for which 
came from the king through the minister. 

The downstream subsector of the oil industry was dominated 
by Samarec. Operated as a wholly government-owned refining and 
marketing company, Samarec took over Petromin 's operation in 
1988. Petromin still existed on paper, legally holding title with three 
foreign oil companies to the export refinery joint ventures at Al 
Jubayl on the gulf, and Yanbu and Rabigh on the Red Sea. In 
addition to managing these refineries, Samarec operated three 
wholly owned domestic refineries at Riyadh, Jiddah, and Yanbu. 
Samarec controlled the distribution of refined products within Saudi 
Arabia and managed the bulk plants, loading terminals, tanker fleet, 
and product pipelines. All export sales of refined products were 
also managed by the downstream company. During the Persian 
Gulf War, to augment domestic supplies of jet fuel and other 
products, Samarec bid for products in the Singapore market. The 
Petromin board of directors, headed by the minister of petroleum 
and mineral resources, set Samarec policy but operations were 
managed by a senior staff. 

After the reorganization of Petromin, the government transferred 
the production and distribution of lubricating oils to two joint ven- 
tures with Mobil. Two new companies were established: Petromin 
Lubricating Oil Company (Petrolube) and Petromin Lubricating 
Oil Refining Company (Luberef). Luberef operated the kingdom's 
single base oil refinery (base oil is a byproduct of the refining 
process), while Petrolube ran three small lubricating oil blending 
plants. Three other smaller private sector plants also operated 
lubricating oil blending facilities. 

Crude Oil Production and Pricing Policy 

The kingdom's oil policy was based on three factors: maintain- 
ing moderate international oil prices to ensure the long-term use 
of crude oil as a major energy source; developing sufficient excess 
capacity to stabilize oil markets in the short run and maintain the 
importance of the kingdom and its permanence to the West as a 
crucial source of oil in the long term; obtaining minimum oil 
revenues to further the development of the economy and prevent 
fundamental changes in the domestic political system. 

Short-term oil policy in the early 1990s has been shaped by two 
major sequences of events. The first was Saudi Arabia's refusal 



142 



Al Marjan gas-oil separation plant 
Ras Tanura Sea Islands Number 3 and Number 4, with tankers 

Courtesy Aramco World 



143 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

to play the role of "swing producer" in the mid-1980s, its subse- 
quent bid to maintain its market share, and abandonment of the 
fixed oil price system after the 1986 price crash. The second was 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the kingdom's replacement of most of 
the oil lost from these two OPEC members, and its ascendance 
as unchallenged leader within OPEC after August 1990. Both peri- 
ods have shaped an oil policy that called for OPEC decisions to 
promote moderate and stable oil prices but not compromise the 
kingdom's demand for its market share. Before the Persian Gulf 
War, Saudi Arabia demanded about 25 percent of the OPEC 
production ceiling; after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait the share rose 
to 35 percent. 

Saudi Arabia's behavior in the oil market since 1986 demon- 
strated its attempts to ensure both goals. In the early 1980s, oil 
prices rose rapidly because of the breakdown of the old vertically 
integrated system of multinational oil companies, following nation- 
alizations by producer governments during the 1970s. Other causes 
of the price rises were the disruption of Iranian exports during and 
after the Iranian Islamic Revolution in 1979, and the destruction 
of the Iranian and Iraqi oil sectors during the Iran-Iraq War of 
1980-88, which exacerbated an already low level of spare produc- 
tion capacity. High oil prices in the early 1980s stimulated the rapid 
growth of non-OPEC oil supplies in the developing world, in 
Siberia, the North Sea, and Alaska. 

As a result, oil prices began to drop in late 1982, forcing OPEC 
to institute a voluntary output reduction system by assigning in- 
dividual quotas. The new system failed to stem the price slide, 
however. By 1985 spot oil (see Glossary) prices had fallen to about 
US$25 per barrel from an average of US$32 per barrel in the early 
1980s. 

Saudi Arabia's adherence to an official price system, which most 
OPEC members were abandoning, rendered the kingdom the swing 
producer. As a result, Saudi Arabia was forced to curtail output 
to ever lower levels. Other members "cheated" on their quotas 
by offering competitive prices, effectively pushing the entire bur- 
den of adjustment onto Saudi Arabia. In 1979-80, Saudi Arabia 
had peaked at a production of more than 10 million bpd; by 1986, 
that amount had reached a low point of 3 million bpd. 

In early 1986, Saudi Arabia discontinued selling its oil at offi- 
cial prices and switched to a market-based pricing system called 
netback pricing — that guaranteed purchasers a certain refining mar- 
gin. In doing so, Saudi Arabia recaptured a significant market share 
from the rest of OPEC. The sharp rise in crude oil supplies precipi- 
tated the crash of spot prices from an average of US$28 per barrel 



144 



The Economy 



in 1985 to US$14 per barrel in 1986. The Saudis had used their 
"oil weapon" — significant excess capacity combined with adequate 
foreign financial reserves cushioning the blow of lower oil reve- 
nues — to establish some discipline in OPEC. 

It did not take long before OPEC agreed to a new set of quotas 
tied to a price target of US$18 per barrel. By late 1986 and early 
1987, prices rose to US$15 or US$16 per barrel for the OPEC 
basket (from well below US$10 per barrel in early 1986). To avoid 
a swing producer role, the Saudis imposed an important condi- 
tion on other OPEC members: a guaranteed quota of approximately 
25 percent of the total output ceiling, correlated to a US$18 per 
barrel price objective. 

The latter became the center of controversy within the organi- 
zation for much of the period before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
A revival in oil demand growth rates in the industrialized world 
between 1988 and 1990, partly aided by several years of low oil 
prices and double-digit annual consumption growth in the newly 
industrializing countries of East Asia, gave OPEC the chance to 
induce price increases above US$18 per barrel. Some members 
called for expanding OPEC's overall output ceiling by a smaller 
factor than the growth in anticipated demand, which would in ef- 
fect push oil prices up, possibly back to their early 1980s level. 

Whereas Saudi Arabia has always endeavored to maintain 
moderate oil prices, regional political and economic concerns have 
also motivated the kingdom not to depress prices too far, the 1986 
Saudi-induced price crash notwithstanding. In 1988 and 1989, King 
Fahd publicly guaranteed that Saudi Arabia would work to achieve 
oil price stability at US$18 per barrel. There was one overwhelm- 
ing reason for this policy: with the Iran-Iraq War cease-fire in 1988, 
the kingdom wanted to maintain oil prices at levels that would force 
Saddam Husayn to be concerned with rebuilding Iraq rather than 
threatening his neighbors. This objective was formally registered 
in the 1989 Nonaggression Pact that Riyadh signed with Baghdad. 

The biggest battles in OPEC prior to 1990, however, were be- 
tween Saudi Arabia and two of its gulf neighbors: Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). Both refused to restrict production 
to their quota levels, and by early 1990 their serious overproduc- 
tion contributed to mounting international crude oil inventories. 
By the second quarter of 1990, the oil traders in New York were 
pushing oil prices down. 

Saddam Husayn' s envoy, Saadun Hamadi, toured the gulf in 
June 1990 and halted the slide in prices as Iraq unveiled its own 
"oil weapon": the threat to invade Kuwait. Buttressing this threat 
by mobilizing 30,000 troops on the Kuwaiti border, Baghdad 



145 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

dictated an agreement at the OPEC ministerial meeting the fol- 
lowing month. Although respecting Saudi Arabia's 25 percent mar- 
ket share, and allowing the UAE to raise its quota to 1.5 million 
barrels per day, OPEC set an overall ceiling of almost 22.5 mil- 
lion bpd and a compromise price of US$21 per barrel. 

Saudi Arabia played a largely passive role at the July 1990 OPEC 
meeting in Geneva and conceded to Iraq's bid for dominance. 
Kuwait was clearly cowed: even before the meeting it reduced its 
oil output and appointed a new oil minister, Rashid Salim al Amiri, 
an unknown chemistry professor, to replace Ali Khalifa, the ar- 
chitect of Kuwait's downstream projects and its aggressive oil 
policies. 

When it invaded Kuwait, Iraq provoked massive intervention 
by the United States into the gulf and ultimately lost its power within 
OPEC. Behind direct United States protection, Saudi oil produc- 
tion rose to 8.5 million bpd or 35 percent of OPEC's total output. 

Operation Desert Storm allowed Riyadh to regain its status within 
OPEC . At each successive OPEC meeting until the gathering of 
ministers in February 1992, Saudi Arabia dictated the final agree- 
ments with virtually no opposition. The eleven active members were 
producing at capacity while prices remained relatively high. Be- 
tween March and July 1991 , both Iran and Saudi Arabia expertly 
sequenced the unloading of large stocks of oil in "floating storage" 
that had been built up as insurance during Operation Desert Shield. 
This action prevented an anticipated crash in oil prices during the 
spring and summer months of 1991. Part of the harmony within 
OPEC resulted from the opportunity Iran saw in being more 
cooperative with Saudi Arabia. For the West to see Iran as a "re- 
sponsible" member of OPEC could help Iran attract investment 
for its oil and other industrial sectors. 

Observers of OPEC , however, awaited the revival of the old dove- 
hawk battles. The February 12, 1992 OPEC meeting was held to 
discuss reinstatement of the July 1990 agreement, temporarily sus- 
pended after August 2, 1990. The hawks wanted to preserve the 
quota system and the reference price, which had been ignored in 
order to replace lost Iraqi and Kuwaiti output, raising oil prices 
to about US$21 per barrel for the OPEC basket. The expected 
return of Kuwait and Iraq to the oil market required a return to 
the preinvasion rules in order to prevent prices from falling sharply. 

Saudi Arabia's aim at the February 1992 OPEC meeting was 
to eradicate the last vestiges of the 1990 agreement and its quota 
shares, especially the kingdom's share of about 25 percent. At the 
February 1992 meeting, OPEC members refused to blink at Saudi 



146 



The Economy 



pressure. Iran particularly was willing to risk the improved relations 
it had forged with Saudi Arabia and absorb the oil price cut. 

Saudi Arabia's income requirement in the wake of the Persian 
Gulf War would, Tehran suspected, keep the Saudis from forcing 
other OPEC members into accepting its objectives as it did in 1986. 
Technically, the final agreement reached was essentially what the 
Saudis wanted in the short run: a total production ceiling of almost 
23 million bpd, a temporary quota of 35 percent of the ceiling, and 
the maintenance of price stability. They did not achieve their long- 
term objective: unanimous OPEC recognition of a 35 percent mar- 
ket share of all future OPEC output ceilings. 

Longer-term Saudi policy imperatives for the 1990s were shaped 
by structural factors within OPEC and within the international oil 
market. Highest on the priority list was the decision to push domes- 
tic oil capacity to more than 10.5 million bpd sustainable capacity 
with a further 1.5 million to 2 million bpd surge capacity in times 
of emergency. Three factors prompted these expansion plans. 
Growth in world demand for oil over the preceding several years, 
combined with the Persian Gulf War, had pushed the kingdom 
and other OPEC countries to their production capacities. Expect- 
ing that demand would continue to grow and that most other ex- 
porters were constrained by diminishing oil reserves or financing 
problems, a rapid rise in capacity could capture any increase in 
demand that might occur. Second, in light of the post- 1986 intra- 
OPEC market-share competition, oil capacity expansions have had 
a direct impact on the ability of individual members to jockey for 
quota increases. Third, the ability to raise output at will, in the 
event of an unforeseen price decline, helped stabilize total oil 
revenues, which constituted the bulk of domestic budgetary income. 

Saudi Arabia's interest in moving downstream was also a pri- 
ority of its oil policy. The drive to obtain overseas refining and 
storage facilities was designed to further two objectives related to 
security of supply. First, the kingdom wanted to obtain captive buy- 
ers of its crude, assuring stable prices and terms. Saudi Arabia 
would thus be more receptive to market conditions in consuming 
countries and avoid being closed out of certain countries. Gaining 
further profits from refining the crude was an associated reason 
for the move downstream overseas. Second, the kingdom sought 
to provide consuming countries with "reciprocal security mea- 
sures," under which it would undertake to guarantee supply — 
through capacity additions or stocking arrangements abroad — in 
return for consumer countries' decisions to avoid taxes and im- 
port restrictions on oil. Few consuming countries, however, have 
responded favorably to such arrangements. 



147 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Crude Oil Reserves and Production Capacity 

Saudi Arabia has been described as the world "mother lode" 
of oil and gas reserves. Estimates for 1990 placed total oil reserves 
of the kingdom at 261 billion barrels. Saudi Aramco controlled all 
the reserves within the country's borders with the exception of 
reserves in the Divided Zone, which were controlled by Getty Oil 
Company and the Arabian Oil Company. Total oil reserves have 
risen steadily since oil was discovered in 1938. During the 1970s 
and 1980s, estimates of total oil reserves grew by nearly 91 per- 
cent from 137 billion barrels in 1972 (see table 6, Appendix). The 
comprehensive reassessment of existing reserves boosted Saudi Ara- 
bia's share of world reserves to 25.8 percent. At 1992 production 
levels, these oil reserves would allow oil production for almost 
eighty-four years. 

Until the mid-1980s, all the oil that had been discovered had been 
found in the Eastern Province. Aramco had found forty-seven oil 
fields, including some during the 1970s in the Rub al Khali. The 
world's largest oil field, Al Ghawar, located in the Al Ahsa re- 
gion of the Eastern Province, is 250 kilometers long and 35 kilo- 
meters wide at its greatest extent. The field is so vast that names 
have been given to separate subsections such as Ain Dar, Shadqam, 
Al Hawiyah, Al Uthmaniyah, and Harad. Discovered in 1948, the 
field began output in 1951. By 1990 Al Ghawar had 219 flowing 
wells. Saudi Arabia also possessed the world's largest offshore field, 
As Saffaniyah, located in the gulf near Kuwait and the Divided Zone. 
As Saffaniyah was discovered in 1951, began output in 1957, and 
by 1990 had 223 flowing wells. Of the four fields discovered before 
Al Ghawar — Ad Dammam, Abu Hadriyah, Abqaiq (also seen as 
Buqayq), and Al Qatif — only Abqaiq and Al Qatif were still produc- 
ing in 1990. Abqaiq had forty-seven flowing wells. The major 
producing fields discovered after Al Ghawar, mainly in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, are offshore and include Manifah, Abu Safah, Al 
Barri, Az Zuluf, Al Marjan, and Al Khafji in the Divided Zone 
(see fig. 6). Saudi Arabia had a total of 789 flowing wells during 
1990, up from 555 producing wells in 1983. 

The quality of crude oil flowing from these wells is based on den- 
sity (measured by gravity standards established by the American 
Petroleum Institute — API) and the amount of sulfur and wax it con- 
tains. Light crude oil is generally more desirable and commands 
a higher price because it yields more high-value products such as 
gasoline and jet fuel. Several Saudi fields, including those in the 
Divided Zone, contain heavier grades by international standards. 
Al Ghawar field produces crude ranging from API gravity 33 degrees 



148 



The Economy 



to 40 degrees, which is considered light crude oil in the kingdom 
but is generally heavier than most international light crude oils. 
As Saffaniyah produces heavy crude oil with API gravity ranging 
from 27 degrees to 32 degrees. 

The historical production pattern until the early 1980s contained 
greater proportions of light and very light crude oils. By the mid- 
1980s, government policy sought to adjust output between heavy 
and light crude oils to reflect actual users of each, so that the king- 
dom would not exhaust its supply of light crude oils. Estimates for 
1991 showed that this balance was not achieved, however; Extra 
Light (from Al Barri field) and Arab Light (crudes from Abqaiq, 
Al Ghawar, Abu Hadriyah, Al Qatif, and others) recorded produc- 
tion levels close to 70 percent of total output of 8.2 million bpd, 
whereas Arab Medium (from Az Zuluf, Al Marjan, Al Kharsaniyah, 
and other fields) and Arab Heavy (from As Saffaniyah, Manifah, 
and other fields) production levels approached 11 percent and 19 
percent, respectively. In the early 1990s, the consensus was that 
after capacity was expanded, the split between light and heavy 
grades would shift to 10 percent more heavy crude oils, despite 
recent discoveries of very light grades south of Riyadh. During the 
1980s, technological developments in refining narrowed the differen- 
tials between light and heavy crudes. Therefore, the traditional price 
disadvantage that the Saudis faced was steadily being erased be- 
cause of the more sophisticated refineries being brought on line. 

Saudi crude oils also contain high sulfur levels. Crude from Al 
Ghawar has sulfur content ranging from about 1 .9 percent to close 
to 2.2 percent by weight, which is generally considered high. As 
Saffaniyah crude's sulfur content is even higher at above 2.9 per- 
cent by weight. Sulfur compounds are undesirable, often con- 
taminating crude oils and corroding processing facilities. 

Gas Reserves and Production Capacity 

In the Saudi fields, dissolved gas is associated under pressure 
with the crude oil in the reservoir. When the reservoir is penetrated 
by a production well, the pressure causes the crude oil mixed with 
the associated gas to rise freely to the surface. In Al Ghawar field, 
for example, 15 cubic meters of gas are extracted for every barrel 
of oil, while As Saffaniyah field produces 26 cubic meters of gas 
for every crude oil barrel. In numerous gas-oil separation plants 
(GOSPs), the associated gas is separated from the crude oil. In ad- 
dition, a number of fields containing only natural gas have been 
discovered. In the late 1970s, the government estimated total gas 
reserves, including associated gas, at 2.4 trillion cubic meters, or 
about 3 percent of known world gas deposits. By 1991 gas reserves 



149 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 




Figure 6. Major Oil Fields, 1992 



150 



The Economy 



in Saudi Aramco's fields were estimated at about 5.1 trillion cubic 
meters, while gas reserves in the Divided Zone were estimated at 
170 billion cubic meters. The ratio of reserves to current produc- 
tion has remained relatively steady at 100 to 115 years since the 
mid-1980s. 

Crude Oil Production and Exports 

During the 1980s, crude oil production fell from a peak of 9.9 
million bpd in 1980, as Saudi Arabia boosted output to offset short- 
falls in supply resulting from the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, 
to 3.3 million bpd in 1985. Thereafter, and until the Iraqi inva- 
sion of Kuwait, a combination of moves by the kingdom and de- 
velopments in international oil markets allowed for a steady increase 
in supply. Production rose to 4.9 million bpd in 1986 and reached 
in excess of 5.8 million bpd on the eve of the Iraqi invasion. To 
replace most of the 4.5 million bpd of embargoed Kuwaiti and Iraqi 
oil, Saudi Arabia raised output to 8.5 million bpd within three 
months. After the Persian Gulf War, market conditions and main- 
tenance projects required modest declines in output to below 8 mil- 
lion bpd, but the kingdom's output in 1991 and 1992 averaged 8.4 
million bpd. Divided Zone output, which was included in this 
figure, fell to zero immediately after the Persian Gulf War as a 
result of the war damage, but the Arabian Oil Company facilities 
resumed pumping at levels close to 350,000 bpd within a few 
months. Half of this output was attributed to Saudi Arabia. Getty 
Oil facilities in the Divided Zone did not resume pumping oil after 
the Persian Gulf War. 

The bulk of Saudi Arabia's crude oil production was exported. 
In 1980, for example, crude oil exports totaled about 9.2 million 
bpd or 93 percent of production. By 1985, with lower production, 
exports fell to below 2.2 million bpd (see table 7, Appendix). Over 
the latter half of the 1980s, exports have risen steadily to average 
3.3 million bpd in 1989, 4.8 million bpd in 1990, and 6.8 million 
bpd in 1991 and 1992. Direction of exports has also varied during 
the 1980s. In the early 1980s, the United States and Canada ac- 
counted for 15 percent of Saudi exports; by 1985 they accounted 
for only 6 percent. Lower oil prices and more aggressive pricing 
structures enabled Saudi Arabia to place greater quantities of oil 
in North America by the early 1990s when this market constituted 
almost one-third of Saudi crude oil sales overseas (see table 8, Ap- 
pendix). By contrast, Western Europe's importance to Saudi Arabia 
as an importer of crude fell during the 1980s from 41 percent in 
1981 to about 18 percent by 1990. Saudi Arabia has maintained 



151 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

its market presence in Asia, although the high levels of dependence 
of the mid-1980s have been reduced. Asia received 37 percent of 
Saudi crude oil exports in 1981, expanded its share to 68 percent 
by mid-decade, but with the kingdom's attempts to capture a greater 
share of the United States market, Asia imported a somewhat 
reduced 47 percent of Saudi crude oil exports by the early 1990s. 

Petroleum Refining Capacity, Production, Consumption, 
and Exports 

Total refining capacity in the kingdom grew from fewer than 
700,000 bpd in 1980 to roughly 1.9 million bpd in 1990. The sig- 
nificant capacity expansions during the 1980s were associated with 
the construction of three refineries: the Petromin/Mobil plant at 
Yanbu, which added 250,000 bpd; the 250,000-bpd Petromin/Shell 
plant at Al Jubayl; and the 325,000-bpd refinery at Rabigh. An 
80,000-bpd increase to Saudi Arabia's largest refinery at Ras 
Tanura (530,000-bpd capacity after the increase), completed by 
1987, also contributed to the overall increase. Damage to Saudi 
Arabia's refineries during the Persian Gulf War reduced capacity 
at Saudi Aramco's Ras Tanura refinery and at the AOC and Getty 
refineries in the Divided Zone. Total refining capacity during 1991 
averaged 1.6 million bpd, but repairs during 1992 helped restore 
overall refinery capacity to 1.8 million bpd. 

Domestic refined output grew steadily with the capacity expan- 
sions during the 1980s and early 1990s. Total production of re- 
fined petroleum averaged 1.2 million bpd in 1985, growing to more 
than 1.7 million bpd by 1990, representing an average capacity 
use of 84 percent in 1985 and 93 percent in 1990. The bulk of re- 
fined product output was naphtha and diesel oil; however, output 
of gasoline and lighter product grades grew more rapidly during 
the 1980s. This trend indicated both the construction of more 
sophisticated refineries and the upgrade of existing plants. Nonethe- 
less, Saudi Arabia's refining capacity was of fairly low quality. 

Domestic consumption of refined products grew rapidly in the 
first half of the 1980s. With economic retrenchment, however, con- 
sumption growth slowed markedly in the latter half of the 1980s. 
From 460,000 bpd in 1980, domestic consumption rose to 630,000 
bpd by 1985 and stagnated at that level until military consump- 
tion during the Persian Gulf War boosted domestic demand to 
840,000 bpd during 1991. A fall in consumption to 700,000 bpd 
was anticipated in 1992. Saudi Arabia became a major exporter 
of refined products after 1985. From a modest level of exports of 
290,000 bpd in 1985, refined product sales reached 734,000 bpd 
in 1990 before falling to 610,000 bpd as a result of output retained 



152 



The Economy 



domestically to fuel the foreign forces in the kingdom. A large 
proportion of exports have been directed to Asian markets, of which 
Japan alone accounted for one-third of Samarec's overseas sales. 

Master Gas System 

The structure of the master gas system — a system of gas-gathering 
facilities and pipelines that collect associated gas as a by-product 
of oil and nonassociated gas — reflected both its original design and 
changes made during the latter half of the 1980s. At first it was 
anticipated that the master gas system would distribute and process 
gas produced in association with crude oil. However, declining 
crude oil output in the mid-1980s forced Saudi Aramco to supple- 
ment the system's gas feed by developing the kingdom's non- 
associated gas resources. The current structure of the master gas 
system consists of sixty GOSPs in Khurays, As Saffaniyah, Al 
Ghawar, and Az Zuluf fields; three gas-processing plants located 
at Al Barri, Shadqam, and Al Uthmaniyah; the east- west natural 
gas liquids (NGL) pipeline that feeds NGL from Shadqam to 
Yanbu; and two gas fraction plants at Yanbu and Al Juaymah. 
Saudi Aramco also added about 57 million cubic meters per day 
of nonassociated gas-gathering capacity to the master gas system. 
Furthermore, it installed facilities capable of producing up to almost 
13 million cubic meters per day from the Abqaiq gas cap to meet 
peak demand, and 1.7 million cubic meters per day from the Qatif 
storage reservoir for emergency use. The system had the capacity 
to gather about 170 million cubic meters per day of unprocessed gas. 

In 1992 the master gas system could produce about 600,000 bpd 
of NGL when operating at full capacity, which included 315,000 
bpd of propane, 165,000 bpd of butane, and 120,000 bpd of natural 
gas. Saudi Arabia's refineries contributed another 40,000 bpd of 
liquid petroleum gas (LPG — propane and butane). The kingdom 
was the world's largest LPG exporter with a 30 percent market 
share of world seaborne trade in LPG. 

Despite the impressive capabilities of the system, it had several 
shortcomings. The system lacked sufficient associated gas-gathering 
facilities; as a result, substantial amounts of gas were flared or used 
in reinjection. Furthermore, there were insufficient processing plants 
once the gas was collected. Therefore, only about 113 million cubic 
meters per day of a total of nearly 170 million cubic meters per 
day of raw gas was processed. Finally, the government's domestic 
pricing policy, whereby gas was available to customers at US$0.50 
per million British thermal units, yielded insufficient revenues to 
finance further gas-processing facilities. 



153 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Upstream Development Plans 

In the early 1990s, Saudi Arabia was engaged in five major pro- 
grams to raise production capacity of crude oil to IP million bpd 
by the mid-1990s. The overall plan was originally scheduled for 
completion in 1998, but accelerated activity in the wake of the gulf 
crisis and the allocation of additional funds has moved the pro- 
jected completion date to 1994. The cost of this program has jumped 
from US$13 billion to between US$17 billion to US$20 billion. 
The needs associated with the gulf crisis largely entailed activat- 
ing existing capacity, which lay unused after output fell in the 
mid-1980s. This requirement involved recommissioning nearly 150 
wells and 12 GOSPs. By the end of 1990, that effort yielded total 
sustainable capacity of 8.8 million bpd. In addition to the war ef- 
fort, Saudi Aramco has been involved in bringing on-line a num- 
ber of GOSPs in existing and known areas such as As Saffaniyah, 
Al Uthmaniyah, and Abqaiq, all in the Eastern Province. Finally, 
Saudi Aramco began development of its new light crude oil finds 
in the central region, with the expectation that it could produce 
150,000 bpd of Arab Super Light from Al Hawtah field, south of 
Riyadh. Following Saudi Aramco' s mandate to conduct such ac- 
tivities in the entire country, it has begun exploration in nontradi- 
tional areas such as the central region and along the Red Sea coast. 
Prior to the gulf crisis, AOC and Getty Oil had plans to step up 
their exploration and development activity. These have been re- 
vised in light of the damage to existing facilities sustained during 
the war. 

Downstream Development Plans 

In addition to repairing damaged oil-refining facilities, mainly 
Saudi Aramco 's Ras Tanura refinery, the government has ordered 
Samarec to undertake a US$5 billion program to upgrade refineries. 
This five-year program will endeavor to transform its relatively basic 
domestic refining system into a sophisticated system designed to 
produce a cleaner, lighter series of products featuring higher oc- 
tane, lead-free gasoline. Although aimed primarily at meeting a 
growing internal demand, this development could position Saudi 
Arabia as a major exporter of gasoline by the end of the 1990s. 
Moreover, Samarec' s refineries are being revamped to process more 
Arab Heavy crude oils, leaving a larger proportion of Arab Light 
for export. Concentrating on the Riyadh, Yanbu, and Jiddah 
refineries fully owned by Samarec, the first phase of the project 
will cost US$1.7 billion. Later phases may include upgrading the 
operation of the kingdom's most problem-prone refinery at Rabigh. 



154 



The Economy 



Two projects at the Petromin/Mobil plant to produce methyl 
tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), an additive for unleaded gasoline, 
and an isomerization unit are also part of the downstream capacity- 
upgrading plans. 

Downstream plans overseas call for acquiring 2 million to 2.5 
million bpd of refining and marketing capacity abroad. Combined 
with current domestic refining capacity, such an expansion would 
allow the kingdom to refine roughly half of its crude oil output. 
In 1992 Saudi Aramco owned 50 percent of Star Enterprises, a 
joint venture with Texaco, in the United States. Star Enterprises 
operations included three refineries with combined refining capacity 
of 615,000 bpd. The company planned to upgrade one of the 
refineries at Port Arthur, Texas. It also had acquired significant 
distribution facilities, including 450 gas stations in Florida. In Asia 
Saudi Aramco had taken a 33 percent share in Ssangyong Oil Refin- 
ing Company refinery in Onsan, South Korea, giving the oil ex- 
porter approximately 175,000 bpd in refining capacity for its 
exclusive use. Further downstream plans called for expansion in 
Europe and Japan. 

Hydrocarbon-Sector Transport and Storage Facilities 

Pipelines usually provided the easiest and most efficient means 
of transporting oil and gas products. Expansion of the pipeline sys- 
tem was the major prerequisite for increased crude oil production 
and exports, for use of associated and nonassociated gas, and for 
increased refining and distribution of products. Saudi Arabia had 
four major pipelines serving the crucial transport needs of the coun- 
try's hydrocarbon sector. In the 1980s and early 1990s, pipeline 
construction and expansion have been motivated by security con- 
cerns stemming from the two major wars fought in the gulf rather 
than for economic reasons. Therefore, development efforts have 
concentrated on moving crude oil, products, and export terminals 
to the western part of the country. 

Two of the major crude oil pipelines crossing Saudi Arabia have 
been shut down. The Trans- Arabian Pipeline (Tapline), built in 
the 1950s to export oil to the Lebanese port of Az Zahrani on the 
Mediterranean Sea, ceased operations after the onset of the Leba- 
nese civil war in the 1970s. Whereas small quantities of oil con- 
tinued to be shipped to the Az Zarqa refinery in Jordan, this 
operation was also terminated in September 1990 as a result of Jor- 
dan's stance in the Persian Gulf War and its inability to meet Saudi 
Arabia's payment terms. The second pipeline that has been closed 
runs from the southern Iraqi border town of Az Zubayr to Saudi 
export terminals on the Red Sea. The Iraqis built the pipeline in 



155 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

two sections: the first, IPSA 1, was originally a spur to Petroline, 
Saudi Arabia's main oil transport artery, which allowed access to 
Petroline for further transport of Iraqi crude oil to Yanbu; the sec- 
ond, IPSA 2, built to parallel Petroline, ended at the export ter- 
minal at Ras al Muajjis near Yanbu. This pipeline, with capacity 
to transport more than 1.6 million bpd, opened in January 1990, 
but closed in August 1990 after the UN ordered an embargo on 
Iraqi exports. Moreover, the pipeline's two pump stations in 
southern Iraq suffered heavy damage during the Persian Gulf War. 

Petroline runs from Abqaiq to Yanbu. Built in 1981 with the 
capacity to move more than 1.8 million bpd of crude oil, Petroline 
was expanded to handle 3.2 million bpd in 1987. The expansion 
consisted of laying a new pipeline parallel to the original. Further 
development plans call for additional capacity to raise overall 
throughput to 4.5 million bpd. This project will give Saudi Aramco 
greater flexibility to move different grades of crude oil to its western 
export terminals. Security concerns have largely motivated this ex- 
pansion because the kingdom's foreign customers have shown less 
enthusiasm for lifting crude oil from the Red Sea port as a result 
of the higher cost of cargoes. Consequently, the actual carriage from 
Petroline has averaged only 1.5 million bpd. Saudi Arabia's other 
major pipeline is the east- west NGL pipeline. This pipeline runs 
from Shadqam to Yanbu, again parallel to Petroline, and can trans- 
port 270,000 bpd of NGL. Given the problems associated with the 
gas-gathering system, original plans to expand the pipeline to 
490,000 bpd were shelved. Finally, a smaller pipeline, built in the 
1940s, runs from Saudi Aramco' s facilities in the Eastern Province 
to the refinery on Bahrain, transporting approximately 200,000 
bpd of crude oil. 

In the early 1990s, the kingdom had three main export termi- 
nals for crude oil with a number of smaller facilities closer to produc- 
tion units. The export terminals at Ras Tanura on the Persian Gulf 
were the largest in the world. Designed to export crude oil and 
LPG, the facilities included two piers and one sea island with a 
total of eighteen berths, which can accommodate ships of up to 
550,000 deadweight tons (dwt). The facilities also included a tank 
farm with total storage capacity of 33 million barrels. Also on the 
Persian Gulf, thirty-three kilometers north of Ras Tanura, is the 
port of Al Juaymah. Tankers of up to 700,000 dwt could be ac- 
commodated at its six single-point moorings. Up to 4 million bpd 
of crude oil could be exported from Al Juaymah. Two additional 
berths were designed to export 200,000 cubic meters of LPG. Tank 
farm storage facilities had a capacity of 17.5 million barrels. The 
third Persian Gulf export terminal at Az Zuluf, located sixty-four 



156 



The Economy 



kilometers offshore, served the Az Zuluf and Al Marjan fields with 
one single-point mooring. 

Before the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, AOC and 
Getty Oil operated two other Persian Gulf ports in the Divided 
Zone. AOC had four berths with varying capabilities located almost 
five and eleven kilometers offshore at Al Khafji. Offshore facilities 
at Mina Saud, managed by Getty Oil, serviced ships at shallower 
berths. 

In 1981 Saudi Arabia opened the Red Sea port of Yanbu. Con- 
sisting of three offshore crude-oil berths, the port could handle 
tankers up to 550,000 dwt. In the early 1990s, total crude oil load- 
ing capacity stood at 2.6 million bpd with storage facilities hold- 
ing as much as 6 million barrels. LPG export facilities included 
two berths that served ships with 200,000-cubic-meter capacity. 
By the end of 1 992 , expansion plans called for adding a fourth crude- 
oil berth that would increase the port's overall loading capacity to 
3.9 million bpd. Connected to the IPSA 2 pipeline was the Red 
Sea port of Ras al Muajjis, south of Yanbu. Farther south at 
Rabigh, Saudi Arabia was completing a small port to serve the 
refinery. Nine berths capable of handling ships up to 312,000 dwt 
were under construction in 1992. 

Both Saudi Aramco and Samarec maintained a fleet of tankers 
to export crude oil and products. In 1992 Saudi Arabia controlled 
forty-three vessels with a combined displacement of 7 million dwt. 
Vela Marine International, Saudi Aramco's shipping subsidiary, 
had twenty-eight ships in its fleet, of which it owned six and char- 
tered the rest. Samarec' s fleet consisted of fifteen ships, including 
four small crude-oil tankers and eleven clean-product tankers. Ex- 
pansion plans in the early 1990s called for Vela Marine Interna- 
tional to acquire twenty-one additional vessels at a projected cost 
of US$2 billion. In addition to the six very large crude carriers 
(VLCCs), each with a capacity of 280,000 dwt under construction 
in the early 1990s, Vela planned to add nine VLCCs and eight 
ultra-large crude carriers (ULCCs), each with a capacity of 350,000 
dwt. The expansion of the fleet resulted from Saudi Aramco's desire 
to move as much as 70 percent of its crude exports on its own 
tankers, thereby reducing transport costs. Moreover, it sought mar- 
keting flexibility and floating storage facilities so as to improve the 
market balance of supply and demand. 

Non-Oil Industrial Sector 

During the 1980s, the government established, virtually from 
scratch, a modern industrial sector. The industrialization pro- 
cess had two goals: first, the use of the kingdom's enormous gas 



157 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

production as industrial inputs to produce chemicals and petrochem- 
icals for export and, second, the construction of energy-intensive 
industries, some for import- substitution purposes and others to meet 
infrastructural needs. The government also established state-of-the- 
art industrial cities and facilities to support its industrial program, 
including those at Al Jubayl and Yanbu. 

By the early 1990s, the vast majority of these plants had been 
completed, and few major expansions were planned. Infrastruc- 
ture requirements had largely stabilized and were adequate to meet 
the needs of the population and industry for much of the 1990s. 
Therefore, the government concentrated on maintenance and on 
improving productivity and efficiency. Moreover, with the onset of 
serious budgetary constraints, the government's role in advanc- 
ing the domestic industrialization process grew more indirect. The 
government was forcing a number of state-owned industrial insti- 
tutions to seek financing for their new capacity-expansion programs 
from nontraditional sources such as domestic and foreign com- 
mercial banks, stock markets, and private investors. In an ongoing 
attempt to encourage more private sector investment in manufac- 
turing, particularly in light industries, local business received in- 
centives in the form of production and consumption subsidies. 

Utilities 

Most of Saudi Arabia's electric power-generating capacity was 
built during the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless, after the establish- 
ment of the first municipal power plant in 1950, the development 
of the industry occurred largely in the private sector. By 1980 about 
ninety-five private companies supplied electric service, leading to 
a totally decentralized system. Voltages and cycles differed between 
towns and even within towns, preventing consumers from stan- 
dardizing equipment and appliances. Consumers suffered from 
chronic power failures, voltage fluctuations, and poor repair service. 
Hospitals and large plants often had their own generators. Plan- 
ners estimated that only 54 percent of the potential demand for 
electricity had been met in 1978. 

In the early 1970s, the government embarked on a twofold plan 
to organize the sector and to stimulate further investment. The sys- 
tem relied on private sector participation with strong government 
oversight and planning. Early attempts to standardize the system 
called for all new generators to be 60 Hertz with distribution vol- 
tages of 127 and 220 volts. In 1976 the first of a series of regional 
companies, Saudi Consolidated Electric Company (Sceco), was 
formed for the eastern region (Sceco-East). Ownership of the re- 
gional companies, which amalgamated their facilities under Sceco, 



158 



The Economy 



remained locally held. The government had some equity partici- 
pation, but the regional companies retained administrative 
autonomy. The government requested Aramco to manage Sceco- 
East because of its large share of generating facilities and its manage- 
ment expertise. Regional companies for the central and southern 
parts of the country were formed in 1979; Sceco-West was estab- 
lished in 1981 . The goal was to link the generators in a region and 
to improve planning and service. Eventually the regional com- 
panies would be tied together to form a nationwide grid. The 
government-owned General Electricity Corporation, which served 
rural areas, participated in the regional companies in areas where 
it was active. 

In addition, the government provided the private sector direct 
financial assistance for building and operating generating plants 
and distribution facilities under the Electric Utility Lending Pro- 
gram, administered by the Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
(SIDF). The government provided consumption subsidies by paying 
producers to sell their power below cost. The government also gave 
the producer an implicit fuel subsidy on gas. Direct subsidies to 
the sector peaked at SR2.75 billion in fiscal year 1984-85 but fell 
in 1989 to SR210 million. Following a 1992 government decree, 
subsidies were expected to rise again because electricity charges 
to users were halved. 

After the early 1960s, generating capacity expanded rapidly. By 
1979 generating capacity amounted to 4,214 megawatts. By 1990 
this capacity had quadrupled to 16,549 megawatts. Between 1975 
and 1979, consumption of electricity increased 37 percent yearly 
while the number of consumers rose 16 percent yearly. During the 
1980s, the consumption growth rate slowed to 23.8 percent annu- 
ally, with the number of consumers rising annually by 17 percent. 
From 872,054 subscribers in 1980 — representing 4 million people — 
subscribers reached 2.4 million in 1990. Industry usage averaged 
28.3 percent of electricity consumed, although in the Eastern 
Province, given the location of country's major industrial complex- 
es, industry demand accounted for more than 60 percent of elec- 
tric consumption. Industrial users in the other regions consumed 
less than 5 percent of total electricity generated. 

Water consumption also rose rapidly during the 1970s and 1980s, 
both by traditional sectors and by newly established urban and in- 
dustrial users. In the early 1980s, a national water plan was for- 
mulated when particularly serious problems were encountered. Lack 
of sewage treatment was contaminating groundwater from wells 
in the Eastern Province, and overpumping from wells in the cen- 
tral region near Riyadh drastically lowered the water table. 



159 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

However, few substantive changes in water supply have been in- 
stituted, leading to a continued depletion of water resources. Saudi 
Arabia's water was supplied from three different sources: surface 
water (about 10 percent), underground aquifers (more than 80 per- 
cent), and desalination plants (5 percent). The nonrenewable 
sources continued to provide the bulk of water to users and were 
being depleted at an alarming rate. Efforts to supplement the avail- 
able water supply have concentrated on building desalination plants. 
In 1980 fourteen plants were in operation with a combined capac- 
ity of 65 million cubic meters per year. Eight more plants were 
constructed during the decade, taking total capacity to more than 
600 million cubic meters per year. By the end of the 1980s, output 
from these plants was approximately 500 million cubic meters per 
year. 

Between 1980 and 1985, water consumption more than tripled, 
going from 190 million cubic meters to 574 million cubic meters. 
The consumption increase continued in the latter half of the de- 
cade, with water usage rising to 900 million cubic meters in 1990. 
Agriculture was the prime water user, accounting for 85 percent; 
its rate of consumption quadrupled from 1980 to 1985. Although 
data are lacking for the late 1980s and early 1990s, it appeared 
that usage continued to grow but at a slightly slower rate. The 
government's policy of providing water free to the sector, com- 
bined with new water-intensive methods of farming have been the 
main factors for this growth of water consumption. 

The idea of importing water into Saudi Arabia was first presented 
in the early 1970s when Denmark's Royal Greenland Company 
was commissioned to perform a study on the feasibility of towing 
icebergs. The conclusion reached was that no technical problems 
were insurmountable, but that the cost was prohibitive. In the late 
1980s, the Turkish government proposed a plan whereby two pipe- 
lines from Turkey would bring water (at a cost of about US$1 per 
cubic meter compared with US$5 to US$6 per cubic meter for 
producing desalinated water) to both the Eastern Province and the 
Hijaz. Security concerns have prevented the Saudis from moving 
further on these plans, however. 

Mining and Quarrying 

By the early 1980s, promising deposits of metallic minerals had 
been found, largely in the western part of the country, but com- 
mercial mining was limited. Several international companies and 
other organizations, including the United States Geological Sur- 
vey, were surveying and exploring for minerals. Commercial exploi- 
tation was being evaluated at some promising sites. The government 



160 



Water tower, Buraydah, A I Qasim 
Courtesy Saudi Arabian Information Office 
Water from desalination plants, such as that above, 
helps supplement limited groundwater. 

Courtesy Aramco World 



161 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

owned all subsoil resources and permitted joint ventures with Petro- 
min for exploration and mining activities. In fact, the government 
provided substantial assistance and incentives to foreign firms to 
develop mining. 

The first mining project was the Mahd adh Dhahab gold mine 
about 280 kilometers northeast of Jiddah. The gold mine started 
commercial production in 1988, with a total capacity of 400 tons 
of ore a day with a ratio of 26 grams of gold and 90 grams of silver 
per ton. Petromin reached an agreement with a Swedish company 
to exploit the gold deposits at Shukhaybirat, northeast of Medina. 
The mine began operations in 1991, planning to produce 1,500 
kilograms of gold annually together with silver. Furthermore, gold 
deposits were found at Hajar (north of Medina), Bir at Tawilah 
(southeast of At Taif), and Al Amar (southwest of Riyadh). Also 
in the early 1980s, iron ore deposits in Wadi Sawawin near the 
Gulf of Aqaba were under study to determine their economic poten- 
tial. Ore containing copper, lead, zinc, silver, and gold was located 
in the Al Masani area about 200 kilometers northeast of Jiddah 
and showed promise. A pilot project began in the early 1980s to 
determine the feasibility of processing metal-rich mud from the bot- 
tom of the Red Sea. Lead, zinc, copper, silver, platinum, and cad- 
mium appeared potentially exploitable. The country also has 
adequate nonmetallic minerals, such as clay, limestone, glass sand, 
and stone for the construction industry. These materials were ex- 
ploited by private firms. Large gypsum deposits had been located 
near Yanbu and phosphorite had been found in several locations 
in the 1980s. 

Manufacturing 

The government has played an instrumental role in developing 
the manufacturing sector. It had directly established in the basic 
industries sector industrial plants such as petrochemical, steel, and 
other large manufacturing enterprises. Also, it has developed 
manufacturing through direct loans, mainly by the SIDF and 
through industrial subsidies, offset programs, set-asides, preferential 
buying programs, and tariffs. In the 1980s, the bulk of private 
manufacturing investment was directed to plants that manufactured 
goods for the construction industry. With the decline of construc- 
tion in the mid-1980s, there has been a shift to other light manufac- 
turing including food processing, furniture making, and other 
consumer goods. This trend accelerated in the early 1990s. 

Partly because of private sector reluctance to invest in manufac- 
turing and partly because of growing oil revenues, the government 
was involved early in the 1960s in some basic industries. In the 



162 




Laboratory technician at work 
Courtesy Aramco World 

late 1960s, Petromin established a steel-rolling mill in Jiddah using 
imported billets, a urea fertilizer plant in Ad Dammam with 49 
percent private Saudi capital, and a sulfuric acid plant in the same 
location. In the early 1970s, as oil revenues grew, a coordinated 
plan emerged to collect and distribute gas that was flared to two 
yet-unbuilt industrial sites where it could be used in basic indus- 
tries. The two sites selected were Al Jubayl and Yanbu. 

In 1975 the Royal Commission for Al Jubayl and Yanbu was 
created. The commission was given authority to plan, construct, 
manage, and operate the infrastructure needed to support the basic 
industries the government intended to build and to satisfy the com- 
munity needs of the work force employed in these industries. The 
commission was also to promote investment in secondary and sup- 
porting industries, to develop effective city government, and to train 
Saudis to take over as many jobs as possible. The commission 
received an independent budget to facilitate its work. 

By 1990 there were sixteen primary industries, forty-six secon- 
dary enterprises, and approximately 100 support and light indus- 
trial units at Al Jubayl. Yanbu had attracted five primary industrial 
plants, twenty-five secondary plants, and seventy-five support and 
light units in 1990. Al Jubayl benefited from the massive petro- 
chemical projects of the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (Sabic), 



163 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



but both industrial sites saw substantial growth during the 1980s. 
Nonetheless, both locations suffered from overcapacity; for exam- 
ple, initial population projections called for 58,000 residents by 1985 
in Al Jubayl. but by 1987 total residents barely reached 40,000. 
Revised forecasts estimated that there was substantial room for 
growth during the 1990s, and that no major capacity expansion 
would be necessary until the year 2000. 

With the establishment of Sabic in 1976, the government under- 
took a major effort to create a domestic petrochemical industry that 
was designed to augment oil export earnings and to use abundantly 
available domestic resources, particularly associated gas supplies. 
The investments have been guided by a two-phase strategy. The 
first phase (1976-87) included a number of large capital-intensive 
and export-oriented petrochemical projects that have been com- 
pleted. Its aim was to produce bulk products such as ethylene, poly- 
ethylene, melamine. methanol, and downstream products including 
derivatives of ethylene. Moreover, during this period, Sabic under- 
took the construction of plants to produce fertilizers (urea, sulfuric 
acid, and melamine), metals (steel rods and bars), supporting in- 
dustrial products (nitrogen), and intermediate petrochemical 
products (vinyl chloride monomer, polyvinyl chloride, and MTBE). 
Sabic also acquired shares in two Saudi aluminum companies 
and expanded overseas by investing in a Bahraini petrochemical 
complex. 

During the first phase, financing by joint-venture partners and 
funding from the government's Public Investment Fund (PIF) 
provided the bulk of support for these projects. Domestic and 
regional private sector participation was also allowed after 30 per- 
cent of the equity capital of Sabic (approximately SR3 billion) was 
sold to residents of Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries. In 1987 
Sabic split each share into ten shares to mobilize investments from 
smaller investors. 

In 1992 Sabic owned, either outright or with a minimum 50 per- 
cent stake, fifteen major industrial enterprises. Total output ca- 
pacity was 13 million tons of various petrochemicals per year, up 
from 11.9 million tons per year in 1990 and 9.5 million tons per 
year in 1989. Although total sales have continued to rise, weaker 
international prices depressed profits during the late 1980s and early 
1990s. During 1991 Sabic registered net profits of US$613 mil- 
lion. About 95 percent of Sabic' s sales were exported; total exports 
approached US$4 billion per annum. Its success in rapidly increas- 
ing exports and capturing an international market share have made 
Sabic' s petrochemical exports subject to nondiscriminatory restraint 
in both Europe and Japan, its main export markets. Both the EC 



164 



The Economy 



and Japan have applied quantitative restrictions to Saudi exports. 
Moreover, urea exports from Saudi Arabia were subject to anti- 
dumping duties in the EEC, which no longer permitted preferen- 
tial treatment under its General System of Preferences. 

Future development plans, part of Sabic's second phase, were 
designed to maintain Saudi Arabia's 1992 international market 
share and raise domestic petrochemical capacity by 40 percent. By 
1993 Sabic hoped to increase total petrochemical capacity to 20 
million tons per year. Projects underway included the Eastern 
Petrochemical Company (Sharq), an equal-share joint venture with 
Japan's Mitsubishi Gas Company, which was planning a major 
increase in its capacity to produce ethylene glycol. The expansion 
program aimed to raise production to 660,000 tons per year from 
the 1991 level of 450,000 tons per year. Sharq also intended to in- 
crease its polyethylene production from 140,000 tons per year to 
270,000 tons per year. Ibn Zahr, the Saudi-European Petrochem- 
ical Company, a joint venture in which Sabic had a 70 percent 
share and Finland's Neste, Italy's Eco Fuel, and the Arabian 
Petroleum Investment Corporation (Apicorp — owned by the Or- 
ganization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries) each had 10 
percent, intended to raise the output of MTBE from 550,000 tons 
per year. The company's polypropylene plant was to be expanded 
as well. The National Methanol Company (Ibn Sina) planned to 
double methanol production from the 640,000 tons annually in 1991 
to 1.2 million tons. This plant was also expected to increase ca- 
pacity of MTBE to 500,000 tons per year and possibly to 700,000 
tons per year. The National Plastics Company (Ibn Hayyan), a 
joint venture with the South Korean Lucky Group (15 percent), 
planned to expand output of polyvinyl chloride from 200,000 tons 
to 300,000 tons per year. The National Industrial Gases Company 
was engaged in 1991 in doubling nitrogen production capacity from 
219,000 tons per year to 438,000 tons per year, whereas oxygen 
production capacity was to increase from 438,000 tons per year 
to 876,000 tons per year. The Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company 
completed a 500,000-tons-per-year anhydrous ammonia plant and 
a 600,000-tons-per-year granulated urea plant in 1992, and was 
expected to undertake further expansion throughout the 1990s. Be- 
cause the available gas-based feedstock (ethane and methane) would 
be insufficient to meet requirements of the second phase, Sabic has 
invested in two flexible feedstock crackers with a total combined 
capacity of about 1 million tons. The crackers help reduce depen- 
dence on ethane and methane and allow the use of naphtha, li- 
quefied petroleum gas, or propane as feedstock. 



165 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



In Sabic's second-phase financing plans, retained profits and 
limited borrowing from the PIF, SIDF, and domestic commer- 
cial banks were expected to provide partial funding. Nonetheless, 
Sabic hoped to raise almost 30 percent of the planned US$3.5 bil- 
lion to US$4 billion on the international market through syndi- 
cated borrowing. For example, Sharq's expansion plans called 
for approximately US$600 million in foreign borrowing, and Ibn 
Zahr was expected to raise US$500 million from foreign capital 
markets. 

The private sector's role in industrialization has been largely re- 
stricted to light and medium-sized manufacturing units. However, 
some larger merchant families had established larger-scale chem- 
ical, secondary-stage petrochemical, and car or truck assembly 
plants. By 1981 Saudi Arabia had approximately 1,200 industrial 
plants of all sizes. At the end of the 1980s, this figure had doubled 
to about 2,000 units and had risen to 2,100 by 1991. Most private 
manufacturing concerns in the 1980s produced construction materi- 
als, including cement, insulation materials, pipes, bricks, and wood 
products. Judging from data available from the Ministry of Industry 
and Electricity, there has been a marked shift from this sort of 
production to downstream chemicals, food processing, and metals, 
machinery, and equipment manufacturing. The annual number 
of new licenses issued to companies in the chemical, rubber, and 
plastics sector rose from seven per year in 1987 to fifteen in 1990. 
Although this number constituted at most 20 percent of all licenses 
granted, the size of the firms was growing, judging from their autho- 
rized capital, which grew from 42 percent of total new investment 
planned to 90 percent. Trailing well behind this sector was the food- 
processing sector, which saw a rise in number of licenses between 
1987 and 1990, but the volume of authorized capital declined, in- 
dicating smaller individual companies and more widespread par- 
ticipation. Metals and machinery manufacturing followed a pattern 
similar to chemical companies, with both the number of units and 
authorized capital growing during the four-year period. 

The patterns of Saudi private manufacturing investment have 
conformed to government investments. Incentives offered to pri- 
vate businesses included interest-free loans from SIDF of up to 50 
percent of the cost an industrial project, repayable within fifteen 
years. Exemptions from tariff duties on imported equipment, raw 
materials, spare parts, and other industrial inputs; land leases at 
significantly reduced prices; discriminatory buying practices by 
government agencies; and significant import protection were some 
of the other incentives provided. 



166 



The Economy 



Transportation and Telecommunications 
Transportation 

Saudi Arabia's extensive transportation system was almost com- 
pletely built in the four decades following 1950. In that year, the 
country had no railroads, about 200 kilometers of paved roads, 
and no adequate air facilities. Most localities could be reached only 
by gravel roads or tracks interspersed with a few airstrips for small 
airplanes. By 1991 the country boasted an excellent system of ex- 
pressways, paved roads, and airports that linked all the populated 
areas of the kingdom (see fig. 7). 

Highways constituted the backbone of the Saudi transportation 
system. In 1991 there were about 100,000 kilometers of roads, 
35,000 kilometers of which were paved. The country's chief route 
was the Trans-Arabian Highway, a multilane expressway that 
crossed the peninsula from Ad Dammam to Jiddah, passing through 
Riyadh and Mecca. Other expressways connected Jiddah with 
Medina, extended north from Ad Dammam toward the Kuwaiti 
border, and ringed the capital and Jiddah. Paved roads linked all 
other major urban areas. Paved roads crossed into all of Saudi Ara- 
bia's neighbors except Oman and a causeway connected with 
Bahrain. The Saudi Public Transportation Company, partly owned 
by the government, operated a fleet of more than 1 ,000 buses that 
provided regular service both between the country's cities and within 
them. 

Railroads were only a minor element in the country's transpor- 
tation system, and rail service was only reestablished in the early 
1950s after a four-decade hiatus. The Ottoman Turks built the first 
railroad on the peninsula, the Hejaz Railway linking Damascus 
with Medina. Parts of this railroad were destroyed in World War 
I, and the line was abandoned. In 1951 a 571 -kilometer, 
1.435-meter standard-gauge rail line was built linking Ad Dam- 
mam to Riyadh. A second, shorter line between Riyadh and Al 
Hufuf was built in the early 1980s. 

Because of the country's position as exporter of petroleum, ports 
played a major role in the transportation system. Jiddah was the 
kingdom's principal port, handling almost 60 percent of the goods 
moved by sea in 1988. Ad Dammam, serving the country's oil fields 
in the east, was the second-largest port for imports whereas Ras 
Tanura handled a major part of Saudi Arabia's petroleum exports. 
Al Jubayl on the Persian Gulf and Yanbu north of Jiddah, both 
of which were connected to large industrial complexes, were some- 
what smaller. Jizan near the Yemeni border in the south was a 
lesser port serving the Asir agricultural region. Numerous harbors 



167 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

on both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea served the fishing and 
coastal transportation sectors. 

Large distances between urban areas and difficult terrain have 
made air travel an essential complement to Saudi Arabia's road 
network. In 1991 there were sixty-nine airports with paved run- 
ways. The country's three largest airports, King Abd al Aziz In- 
ternational in Jiddah, King Khalid International in Riyadh, and 
Dhahran International (King Fahd International in Ad Dammam 
was under construction, scheduled for completion in 1994), had 
large modern terminals, runways capable of handling large air- 
planes, and regularly scheduled international flights. The country 
counted more than 19 million air passengers in 1985, many of them 
pilgrims en route to Mecca. Saudi Arabian Airlines, the national 
airline, offered domestic service to more than twenty cities and an 
international network to almost four dozen destinations in Africa, 
Europe, Asia, and North America. 

Telecommunications 

In 1991 Saudi Arabia had one of the most modern telecommu- 
nications systems in the world. An extensive system of microwave 
and coaxial cables crisscrossed the country and linked Saudi Ara- 
bia with Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab 
Emirates, and Yemen. Tropospheric-scatter radio linked the king- 
dom with Sudan and undersea coaxial cables extended from points 
on the west coast to Egypt and to Djibouti. Telephone service was 
entirely automatic, and international direct-distance dialing was 
available to all subscribers. In 1991 the country counted 1.6 mil- 
lion telephones or about eleven telephones per 100 inhabitants. 

Eight satellite ground stations provided worldwide transmission 
of telephone, telex, data, ship-to-shore, and broadcast signals. Five 
satellite ground stations operated with the International Telecom- 
munication Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) Atlantic Ocean and In- 
dian Ocean satellites. In addition, two satellite ground stations in 
the Arab Satellite Communications Organization (Arabsat) net- 
work could simultaneously handle 8,000 telephone calls and seven 
separate television channels to the twenty-two member countries 
of the Arabsat system. Another satellite ground station was linked 
to the International Marine Satellite system that provided com- 
munications to ships at sea. 

Broadcast facilities were scattered across the country and most 
locations could receive at least one radio station. More than 100 
transmitters provided television service to all urban areas. Saudi 
Arabia had an estimated 5 million radio receivers and 4.5 million 
television sets in 1991. 



168 




Figure 7. Transportation System, 
170 



The Economy 



Agriculture 

During the 1970s and 1980s, the government undertook a mas- 
sive restructuring of the agricultural sector. The stated objectives 
were food security through self-sufficiency and improvement of rural 
incomes. Although successful in raising domestic output of several 
important crops and foodstuffs through the introduction of modern 
agricultural techniques, the agricultural development program has 
not entirely met these objectives. In regard to self-sufficiency, the 
kingdom produced a sufficient surplus to export limited quanti- 
ties of food. However, if the entire production process were consid- 
ered, the import of fertilizers, equipment, and labor have made 
the kingdom even more dependent on foreign inputs to bring food 
to the average Saudi household. 

Two patterns of income distribution emerged: traditional agricul- 
tural regions did not benefit from the development program, and 
the government's financial support led to the establishment of large- 
scale agricultural production units. Some of these were managed 
and operated by foreign entities and owned by wealthy individu- 
als and large businesses. From an environmental viewpoint, the 
program had a less than satisfactory impact. Not only has it caused 
a serious drain on the kingdom's water resources, drawing mainly 
from nonrenewable aquifers, but it has also required the use of mas- 
sive amounts of chemical fertilizers to boost yields. In 1992 Saudi 
agricultural strategy was only sustainable as long as the govern- 
ment maintained a high level of direct and indirect subsidies, a 
drain on its budget and external accounts. 

Traditional Agriculture and Pastoral Nomadism 

In the past, the bulk of agricultural production was concentrated 
in a few limited areas. The produce was largely retained by these 
communities although some surplus was sold to the cities. Nomads 
played a crucial role in this regard, shipping foods and other goods 
between the widely dispersed agricultural areas. Livestock rear- 
ing was shared between the sedentary communities and nomads, 
who also used it to supplement their precarious livelihoods. 

Lack of water has always been the major constraint on agricul- 
ture and the determining factor on where cultivation occurred. The 
kingdom has no lakes or rivers. Rainfall is slight and irregular over 
most of the country. Only in the southwest, in the mountains of 
Asir, close to the Yemen border and accounting for 3 percent of 
the land area, was rainfall sufficient to support regular crops. This 
region and the southern Tihamah coastal plains sustained subsis- 
tence farming. Cropping in the rest of the country was scattered 



171 




170 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

and dependent on irrigation. Along the western coast and in the 
western highlands, groundwater from wells and springs provided 
adequate water for self-supporting farms and, to some extent, for 
commercial production. Moving east Najd and An Nafud, in the 
central and northern parts of the interior, had enough groundwater 
to allow limited farming. The Eastern Province supported the most 
extensive plantation economy. The major oasis centered around 
Al Qatif, which enjoyed high water tables, natural springs, and 
relatively good soils. 

Historically, the limited arable land and the near absence of grass- 
land forced those raising livestock into a nomadic pattern to take 
advantage of what forage was available. Only in summer, the year's 
driest time, did the nomad keep his animals around an oasis or 
well for water and forage. The beduin developed special skills that 
enabled them to know where rain had fallen and forage was avail- 
able to feed their animals and where they could find water en route 
to various forage areas. 

Traditionally, beduin were not self-sufficient but needed some 
food and materials from agricultural settlements. The near con- 
stant movement required to feed their animals limited other ac- 
tivities, such as weaving. The settled farmers and traders needed 
the nomads to tend their camels. Nomads would graze and breed 
animals belonging to sedentary farmers in return for portions of 
the farmers' produce. Beduin groups contracted to provide pro- 
tection to the agricultural and market areas they frequented in 
return for such provisions as dates, cloth, and equipment. Beduin 
further supplemented their income by taxing caravans for passage 
and protection through their territory. 

Beduin themselves needed protection. Operating in small in- 
dependent groups of a few households, they were vulnerable to raids 
by other nomads and therefore formed larger groups, such as tribes. 
The tribe was responsible for avenging attacks on any of its mem- 
bers. Tribes established territories that they defended vigorously. 
Within the tribal area, wells and springs were found and developed. 
Generally, the developers of a water source, such as a well, retained 
rights to it unless they abandoned it. This system created problems 
for nomads because many years might elapse between visits to a 
well they had dug. If people from another tribe just used the well, 
the first tribe could frequently establish that the well was in terri- 
tory where they had primary rights; but if another tribe improved 
the well, primary rights became difficult to establish. By the early 
twentieth century, control over land, water rights, and intertribal 
and intratribal relationships were highly developed and complex 
(see Beduin Economy in Tradition and Change, ch. 2). 



172 





The Hijaz/Wadi Hanifah junction is an 
example of the modern Saudi highway system. 
Courtesy Saudi Arabian Information Office 
Causeway to Bahrain under construction; it was completed in 1986. 

Courtesy Aramco World 



173 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Modern Agriculture 

Pastoral nomadism declined as a result of several political and 
economic forces. Sedenterization was a means of imposing politi- 
cal control over various tribal groupings in the Arabian Peninsula. 
New legal structures such as the 1968 Public Lands Distribution 
Ordinance created novel land relations and spurred the dissolu- 
tion of the beduin way of life. The establishment of an activist 
modern state provided incentives for large numbers of Saudi citizens 
to enter the regular, wage-based, or urban commercial employment. 
Moreover, modern technology and new transport networks under- 
mined the primitive services that the beduin offered the rest of the 
economy. 

Until the 1970s, sedentary agriculture saw few changes and 
declined in the face of foreign imports, urban drift, and lack of 
investment. The use of modern inputs remained relatively limited. 
Introduction of mechanical pumping in certain areas led to a modest 
level of commercial production, usually in locations close to urban 
centers. Nevertheless, regional distribution of agricultural activ- 
ity remained relatively unchanged, as did the average holding size 
and patterns of cultivation. 

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the government under- 
took a multifaceted program to modernize and commercialize 
agriculture. Indirect support involved substantial expenditures on 
infrastructure, which included electricity supply, irrigation, drain- 
age, secondary road systems, and other transportation facilities for 
distributing and marketing produce. Land distribution was also 
an integral part of the program. The 1968 Public Lands Distribu- 
tion Ordinance allocated 5 to 100 hectares of fallow land to individu- 
als at no cost, up to 400 hectares to companies and organizations, 
and a limit of 4,000 hectares for special projects. The beneficiaries 
were required to develop a minimum of 25 percent of the land within 
a set period of time (usually two to five years); thereafter, full owner- 
ship was transferred. In FY 1989, the total area distributed stood 
at more than 1.5 million hectares. Of this total area 7,273 special 
agricultural projects accounted for just under 860,000 hectares, or 
56.5 percent; 67,686 individuals received just under 400,000 hect- 
ares or 26.3 percent; 17 agricultural companies received slightly 
over 260,000 hectares, or 17.2 percent. Judging from these statis- 
tics, the average fallow land plot given to individuals was 5.9 hect- 
ares, 118 hectares to projects, and 15,375 hectares to companies, 
the latter being well over the limit of 400 hectares specified in the 
original plans. 

The government also mobilized substantial financial resources 
to support the raising of crops and livestock during the 1970s and 



174 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

1980s. The main institutions involved were the Ministry of Agricul- 
ture and Water, the Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank (SAAB) and 
the Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organization (GSFMO). SAAB 
provided interest-free loans to farmers; during FY 1989, for ex- 
ample, 26.6 percent of loans were for well drilling and casing, 23 
percent for agricultural projects, and the balance forihe purchase 
of farm machinery, pumps, and irrigation equipment. SAAB also 
provided subsidies for buying other capital inputs. 

GSFMO implemented the official procurement program, pur- 
chasing locally produced wheat and barley at guaranteed prices for 
domestic sales and exports. The procurement price was steadily 
reduced during the 1980s because of massive overproduction and 
for budgetary reasons, but it was substantially higher than inter- 
national prices. By the late 1980s, the procurement price for wheat, 
for example, was three times the international price. Although quan- 
tity restrictions were implemented to limit procurement, pressures 
from a growing farm lobby led to ceiling-price waivers. Moreover, 
the government encountered considerable fraud with imports being 
passed off as domestic production. To control this situation, the 
government has granted import monopolies for some agricultural 
products to the GSFMO, and procurement and import subsidies 
on certain crops have been shifted to encourage a more diversified 
production program. Finally, agricultural and water authorities 
provided massive subsidies in the form of low-cost desalinated water, 
and electric companies were required to supply power at reduced 
charges. 

The program prompted a huge response from the private sector, 
with average annual growth rates well above those programmed. 
These growth rates were underpinned by a rapid increase in land 
brought under cultivation and agricultural production (see table 9, 
Appendix). Private investments went mainly into expanding the 
area planted for wheat. Between 1983 and 1990, the average an- 
nual increase of new land brought under wheat cultivation rose 
by 14 percent. A 35 percent increase in yields per ton during this 
period further boosted wheat output; total production rose from 
1 .4 million tons per year in FY 1983 to 3.5 million tons in FY 1989. 
Other food grains also benefited from private investment. For ex- 
ample, output growth rates for sorghum and barley accelerated even 
faster than wheat during the 1980s, although the overall amount 
produced was much smaller. During the 1980s, farmers also ex- 
perimented with new varieties of vegetables and fruits but with only 
modest success. More traditional crops, like onions and dates, did 
not fare as well and their output declined or remained flat. 



176 



The Economy 



In the 1970s, increasing incomes in urban areas stimulated the 
demand for meat and dairy products, but by the early 1980s govern- 
ment programs were only partially successful in increasing domestic 
production. Beduin continued to raise a large number of sheep and 
goats. Payments for increased flocks, however, had not resulted 
in a proportionate increase of animals for slaughter. Some com- 
mercial feedlots for sheep and cattle had been established as well 
as a few modern ranches, but by the early 1980s much of the meat 
consumed was imported. Although the meat supply was still largely 
imported in the early 1990s, domestic production of meat had grown 
by 33 percent between 1984 and 1990, from 101,000 tons to 134,000 
tons. This increase, however, masked the dominant role of tradi- 
tional farms in supplying meat. Although new projects accounted 
for some of the rapid growth during the 1980s, a sharp decline of 
roughly 74 percent in beef stock production by specialized projects 
during 1989 resulted in only a 15 percent fall in meat output. This 
reversal also highlighted the problems in introducing modern com- 
mercial livestock-rearing techniques to the kingdom. 

Commercial poultry farms, however, greatly benefited from 
government incentives and grew rapidly during the 1980s. Chick- 
ens were usually raised in controlled climatic conditions. Despite 
the doubling of output, as a result of the rapid rise in chicken con- 
sumption, which had become a major staple of the Saudi diet, 
domestic production constituted less than half of total demand. Egg 
production also increased rapidly during the 1980s. The numbers 
of broiler chickens increased from 143 million in 1984 to 270 mil- 
lion in 1990, while production of eggs increased from 1,852 mil- 
lion in 1984 to 2,059 million in 1990. 

Fishing, however, was an underdeveloped aspect of the Saudi 
economy despite the abundance of fish and shellfish in coastal 
waters. The major reasons for the small size of this sector were 
the limited demand for fish and the comparative lack of fish mar- 
keting and processing facilities. Iraqi actions in releasing oil into 
the Persian Gulf during the Persian Gulf War caused appreciable 
damage to fish and wildlife in the gulf. Data concerning postwar 
catches were not available in late 1992, but in 1989 the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations estimated Saudi 
Arabia's total catch at more than 53,000 tons. 

Money and Banking 

Until the mid- twentieth century, Saudi Arabia had no formal 
money and banking system. To the degree that money was used, 
Saudis primarily used coins having a metallic content equal to their 



177 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

value (full-bodied coins) for storing value and limited exchange 
transactions in urban areas. For centuries foreign coins had served 
the local inhabitants' monetary needs. Development of banking 
was inhibited by the Quranic injunction against interest. A few 
banking functions existed, such as money changers (largely for pil- 
grims visiting Mecca), who had informal connections with inter- 
national currency markets. A foreign bank was established in Jiddah 
in 1926, but its importance was minor. Foreign and domestic banks 
were formed as oil revenues began to increase. Their business con- 
sisted mostly of making short-term loans to finance imports, com- 
mercial trading, and businesses catering to pilgrims. 

The government issued a silver riyal in 1927 to standardize the 
monetary units then in circulation. By 1950 the sharp increase in 
government expenditures, foreign oil company spending, and regu- 
lation of newly created private banking institutions necessitated 
more formal controls and policies. With United States technical 
assistance, in 1952 the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAM A) 
was created, designed to serve as the central bank within the con- 
fines of Islamic law. 

The financial system has developed several layers intended to 
serve a number of multifaceted economic, exchange, and regula- 
tory roles. At the apex was SAM A, which set the country's overall 
monetary policy. SAMA's functions also included stabilization of 
the value of the currency in an environment of openness with respect 
to exchange transactions and capital flows. The central bank used 
a number of monetary policy instruments for this purpose, including 
setting commercial-bank interest rates, which have been kept close 
to comparable dollar rates, the management of foreign assets, and 
the introduction of short- and medium-term government paper for 
budgetary and balance of payments purposes and to smooth fluc- 
tuations in domestic liquidity. SAM A also regulated commercial 
banks, exchange dealers, and money changers and has acted as 
the depository for all government funds; it paid out funds for pur- 
poses approved by the minister of finance and national economy. 

SAMA's charter stipulated that it would conform to Islamic law. 
It could not be a profit-making institution and could neither pay 
nor receive interest. There were additional prohibitions, includ- 
ing one against extending credit to the government. This latter pro- 
hibition was dropped in 1955, when the government needed funds 
and SAM A financed about one-half of the government's debt that 
accrued in the late 1950s. From 1962 to 1983, the budget surplus 
did not require such action and all the government's debt was 
repaid. In 1988 SAMA was once again required to bolster govern- 
ment reserves, which had been sharply reduced to finance fiscal 



178 




Modern cultivation techniques substantially increased 
crop production beginning in the 1980s. 

Courtesy Saudi Aramco 
Fish market, Jizan 
Courtesy Aramco World 



179 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

deficits, through the sale of Government Development Bonds. These 
bonds had varying short- and long-term maturities, with yields com- 
petitive with international interest rates. As a result of persistent 
government deficits, the stock of these bonds had grown to well 
over SRI 00 billion in 1991 . Most of these bonds were placed with 
autonomous government institutions; however, close to 25 percent 
were purchased by domestic commercial banks. 

In 1966 a major banking control law clarified and strengthened 
SAMA's role in regulating the banking system. Applications for 
bank licenses were submitted to SAM A, which submitted each ap- 
plication and its recommendations to the Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy. The Council of Ministers set conditions for 
granting licenses to foreign banks, however. The law also estab- 
lished requirements concerning reserves against deposits. Several 
restrictions continued to inhibit SAMA's implementation of mone- 
tary policy. It could neither extend credit to banks nor use a dis- 
count rate because these measures were forms of interest. SAM A 
had little flexibility in setting reserve and liquidity requirements 
for commercial banks. Its primary tool for expanding the credit 
base consisted in placing deposits in commercial banks. 

By the 1980s, new regulations were introduced, based on a sys- 
tem of service charges instead of interest to circumvent Islamic re- 
strictions. As of the early 1990s, banks were subject to reserve 
requirements. A statutory reserve requirement obliged each com- 
mercial bank to maintain a minimum of noninterest-bearing 
deposits with SAMA. Marginal reserve requirements applied to 
deposits exceeding a factor of the bank's paid-in capital and reserves. 
Moreover, banks had to hold additional liquid assets — such as cur- 
rency, deposits with SAMA beyond the reserve accounts, and 
Government Development Bonds — equal to part of their deposit 
liabilities. SAMA used two other instruments to manage commercial 
bank liquidity. The Bankers' Security Deposit Account (BSDA) 
was a short-term instrument with low yield, rediscountable with 
SAMA and transferable to other banks. In November 1991, SAMA 
issued the first treasury bills, which were short-term, usable for 
both liquidity management and government deficit financing, and 
designed gradually to replace the BSD As. 

Twelve private commercial banks operated in the kingdom, 
providing full- service banking to individuals, and to private and 
public enterprises. Eight of the banks were totally Saudi-owned. 
Four were joint ventures with foreign banks. In 1975 the govern- 
ment adopted a program of Saudi participation in ownership of 
foreign banks operating in the kingdom. In December 1982, the 
last of the foreign banks merged with a Saudi bank. The commercial 



180 



The Economy 



banks operated more than 1 ,000 branches throughout the country 
and a widespread network of automated teller machines. The range 
of bank activities grew markedly during the 1970s and 1980s. Be- 
yond providing credit and deposit facilities, they engaged in secu- 
rities trading, investment banking, foreign exchange services, 
government finance, and development of a secondary government 
bond-treasury bill market. 

For years money exchangers remained an anomaly in the Saudi 
banking system. They had operated for centuries in Arabia, par- 
ticularly for pilgrims to Mecca. Most were family businesses, some 
of which had grown very large since World War II, conducting 
most kinds of banking activities in many areas of the country. 
Although licensed, the money-exchange houses remained largely 
unregulated. Most money exchangers operated under sound busi- 
ness practices; however, a series of fraudulent and speculative prac- 
tices in the 1980s prompted SAMA to establish regulations for 
money-exchange houses. One of the larger such operations was con- 
verted to a commercial bank in 1987. 

Because commercial banks favored short-term lending to estab- 
lished firms and individuals, the government created special credit 
institutions to channel funds to other sectors and groups in the 
economy. The Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank was formed in 
1 963 to provide development financing and subsidies to the agricul- 
tural sector. The Saudi Credit Bank was formed in 1971 to pro- 
vide interest-free loans to low-income Saudis who could not obtain 
credit from commercial banks. The Public Investment Fund was 
created in 1973 to help finance large public ventures. The Saudi 
Industrial Development Fund was established in 1974 to provide 
interest-free, medium- and long-term financing of up to 50 per- 
cent of the cost of a private sector project. The Real Estate De- 
velopment Fund, also founded in 1974, was designed to encourage 
private sector residential and commercial building, partly through 
interest-free loans to low- and medium-income Saudis for up to 
70 percent of the cost of a home. 

The government budget provided almost all the funds for these 
specialized credit institutions and continued to increase their capi- 
tal requirements until the mid-1980s, when budgetary problems 
necessitated cutbacks. For the most part, these funds were self- 
fmancing during the latter half of the 1980s. A significant depar- 
ture from such self- financing was the government's substantial 
subvention to the Real Estate Development Fund in 1991 to allow 
a one-year moratorium on payments, which was a gift by King Fahd 
to his citizens. 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

The Saudi financial system also consisted of three autonomous 
government institutions, included because of their significant role 
in providing financing for budgetary shortfalls, deposits with 
SAM A, and foreign currency holdings. These included the Pen- 
sion Fund, the General Organization of Social Insurance, and the 
Saudi Fund for Development. 

For much of the 1980s, the stock exchange, created in 1983, was 
largely viewed by domestic investors as a vehicle for long-term in- 
vestments. Since the Persian Gulf War, this situation has changed 
markedly because the exchange has attracted investors seeking 
shorter-term investments. Share prices and trading volumes have 
grown sharply and by early 1992 had reached unprecedented lev- 
els, sparking fears of overvaluation. The official stock market index, 
which had remained relatively dormant in the late 1980s, and had 
dropped from 108.7 at the end of 1989 to 98.0 in late 1990, roughly 
doubled to 187.7 by the close of 1991. The value of shares traded 
grew from SRI 35 million at the end of 1990 to SRI. 8 billion by 
the first quarter of 1992. The number of shares traded doubled 
from 15 million for the whole of 1989, to 29.2 million in 1991. 

Three factors propelled this level of stock market activity. First, 
following the Persian Gulf War, confidence in the Saudi economy 
spurred by high oil prices and greater confidence in the regional 
geopolitical situation prompted domestic investors to repatriate for- 
eign funds. Second, low international interest rates, combined with 
similar returns of domestic savings rates, increased the attractive- 
ness of the stock exchange. Third, the number of companies trad- 
ing on the exchange increased markedly as they attempted to boost 
domestic investment following several years of depressed economic 
conditions. Moreover, the tight government budget prompted some 
public enterprises to obtain capital on the domestic financial mar- 
kets rather than from the state. 

The Saudi stock exchange was not open to foreign investment 
and only shares of Saudi companies could be traded. The excep- 
tion to the former rule was the right of citizens of GCC member 
states to purchase Sabic shares from 1984. In 1991 the Arab Na- 
tional Bank, partially funded by Jordanian capital, received per- 
mission to launch a stock fund, of which foreigners might purchase 
a portion. Despite growth in the stock market, the percentage of 
shares traded as a percentage of total market value of shares out- 
standing has been estimated as no more than 5 percent, very low 
by international standards. This lack of market depth resulted from 
the high proportion of shares owned by institutions rather than in- 
dividuals and the concentration of ownership in a few hands. 



182 



The Economy 



External Trade and Finance 
Foreign Trade 

Crude oil, refined products and natural gas liquids accounted 
for the bulk of Saudi exports. Nevertheless, the percentage of crude 
oil and petroleum product exports fell slightly during the 1980s as 
a result of the growth in petrochemical and other chemical exports. 
These products have come mainly from Sabic's companies. After 
declining to their lowest levels in the 1970s and 1980s, following 
the oil price crash of 1986, exports had steadily recovered by 1992, 
both as a result of improved oil prices and Saudi Arabia's inter- 
national market share of world oil supplies. Moreover, as Sabic 
created a new petrochemical capacity, nonoil exports rose as well. 
The direction of exports has been influenced by Saudi Arabia's 
oil customers. During the early 1980s, Asia and Western Europe 
were the major purchasers of Saudi oil. By the end of the decade, 
Europe had ceded its share to Asia and North America (see table 
10, Appendix). 

Saudi import levels have closely followed overseas oil earnings 
and government expenditures. SAM A, which published data on 
imports, did not include military imports in merchandise import 
figures. Some military imports were included in the current ac- 
count under government service imports (see Current Account, 
this ch.). Falling from a peak in the mid-1980s of US$40 billion 
to US$50 billion per annum, imports maintained levels of around 
US$20 billion during the late 1980s before starting to climb again 
in 1990 to 1992. Machinery, appliances, and electrical equipment 
constituted the largest import category, although in line with lower 
domestic investment these items fell in terms of total share. In 1984 
this category accounted for 24 percent of imports but by 1990 it 
had declined to 16 percent. Foodstuffs have been the second larg- 
est category: in 1984 these items made up 16 percent and fell only 
slightly to 14 percent in 1990. The decline in food imports resulted 
mainly from domestic import substitution of vegetable products. 
During the 1980s, chemical products, jewelry and metals, and other 
transport items exhibited the largest growth in imports. Chemical 
products, the third largest import category in 1990, constituted 
around 12 percent of imports. The principal source of imports was 
Western Europe, which maintained its share at 44 percent for much 
of the 1980s. The United States supplied 17 percent of the king- 
dom's imports, whereas Japan's share was 15 percent, having 
decreased from around 20 percent in the mid-1980s. Saudi Ara- 
bia bought only 3 to 4 percent of imported goods from the rest of 
the Middle East. 



183 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Current Account 

During the first half of the 1980s, Saudi Arabia had substantial 
trade surpluses, but these were reduced in the period of low oil 
prices after 1986. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and follow- 
ing the sharp increase in prices, the trade balance swelled to be- 
tween US$23 billion and US$24 billion. In contrast, the services 
sector of the current account registered large deficits. Service 
receipts, consisting of freight and insurance connected with mer- 
chandise exports and investment income, fell in accordance with 
decreases in the volume of oil exports and the depletion of foreign 
assets. Service payments have been a major burden on the cur- 
rent account. Whereas freight, insurance, and tourism receipts re- 
mained stagnant or fell during the 1980s, government military 
equipment purchases and public and private transfers (both aid 
flows and workers' remittances) did not contract sufficiently to erase 
the services and transfers deficit. Between 1984 and 1988, oil 
revenue declines forced the authorities to restrict government pur- 
chases of military equipment, which helped cover the deficit on 
services. However, after 1989, particularly after Operation Desert 
Shield, this category, in addition to the outflow of workers' remit- 
tances, aggravated the services' deficit to levels not seen since the 
early 1980s. The services and transfers deficit rose from US$11.9 
billion in 1988 to US$26.9 billion in 1990. As a result of these trade 
and services flows, the current account has remained persistently 
in deficit since 1986, although considerable progress was made up 
to 1988 in reducing the shortfall. Despite a sharply higher trade 
surplus in 1991, it was estimated that payments to foreign allies, 
greater arms purchases, and increases in remittances caused the 
current account deficit to balloon to US$24 billion in 1991 . By 1992, 
with the normalization of the military situation, the current ac- 
count deficit was estimated to return to levels more in line with 
the structural deficit of the economy. 

Capital Account 

During the early 1980s, current account surpluses led to a sharp 
increase in foreign asset holdings (see table 11, Appendix). As a 
result, the capital account was dominated by outflows from both 
official institutions and the private sector. With the current account 
registering sizable deficits after 1983, the capital account has seen 
a reversal of these trends. A reduction of foreign assets was fol- 
lowed by a significant inflow of banking sector capital for the pur- 
chase of Saudi development bonds. The private sector only began 
repatriating capital after the Persian Gulf War ended. For much 



184 



The Economy 



of the 1980s, private individuals and companies placed a substan- 
tial amount of funds overseas, a process that accelerated following 
the fall in oil prices in 1986 and as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. 
Increased confidence in the Saudi economy after the Persian Gulf 
War caused the return of these funds. The inflow of private capi- 
tal in 1991 allowed SAMA to stabilize official foreign exchange hold- 
ings and spurred economic activity in the nonoil sector. Official 
asset flows constituted the bulk of current account financing, a 
process that became unsustainable following the massive depletions 
to pay for the Persian Gulf War costs. As a result, the government 
has engaged in significant commercial borrowing on the interna- 
tional markets and instructed some of its public enterprises (nota- 
bly Saudi Aramco and Sabic) to do the same. With the expectation 
that Saudi Arabia will continue to run current account deficits dur- 
ing the foreseeable future, it is likely that the capital account will 
be dominated by debt flows and a good measure of private sector 
asset repatriation. 

Foreign Assets and Liabilities 

Publicly available information on Saudi Arabia's foreign assets 
was scant. Newspaper accounts placed foreign assets held by SAMA 
overseas at around US$100 billion during the early 1980s. These 
assets have been substantially depleted to finance current account 
deficits. A sizable portion has become nonperforming as Saudi Ara- 
bia has been unable to recover loans to several countries, notably 
Iraq. By the end of 1991, foreign assets of the government were 
estimated at US$30 billion if nonperforming assets were excluded. 
This amount was only sufficient for purposes of currency cover, 
a statutory requirement of SAMA. Saudi commercial banks held 
an additional US$30 billion to US$35 billion in foreign assets, some 
of which was depleted in the late 1980s to finance government bond 
purchases and to cover domestic liquidity. Estimates of private sec- 
tor assets were even more difficult to aggregate; however, based 
on Bank of International Settlements data and newspaper accounts, 
the figure could be as large as US$100 billion. 

Until 1991 Saudi Arabia's foreign liabilities were restricted to 
foreign lines of credit necessary to conduct international trade and 
financing operations held by domestic commercial banks. The nega- 
tive balance of payments caused the government to engage in a 
sizable borrowing program on international capital markets in 1991 . 
The borrowing program included a loan from Morgan Bank of 
approximately US$4.5 billion. Saudi Aramco was reported to have 
borrowed US$2 billion to finance parts of its oil sector develop- 
ment program, and several Sabic corporations borrowed for new 



185 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

industrial investments. Further borrowings were likely. At the end 
of 1991, total medium-long- term debt, consisting largely of govern- 
ment debt, was estimated at US$9 billion and was expected to grow 
to US$12 billion by the end of 1992. Short-term, trade-related debt 
was estimated at US$11 billion at the end of 1991. 

In summary, during the period of high oil prices beginning in 
the 1970s, the government transformed the kingdom into a modern 
economy with few vestiges of the pre-oil period remaining. Con- 
currently, the standard of living for the average Saudi grew mar- 
kedly, thanks to such factors as government-provided social services 
and a plethora of subsidies. Despite these achievements, what struck 
most observers was the fragile base that supported this standard 
of living. Government oil revenues, supplemented by private 
reserves accumulated during the oil boom years, accounted for 
much of the gross domestic product. Whereas diversification of the 
economy has been an objective for most of the five-year develop- 
ment plans since the 1970s, oil still dominated and was likely to 
continue to do so. Oil's predominance was apparent in 1992 as 
the government was allocating large sums to expand crude oil 
production capacity to still higher levels in anticipation of grow- 
ing international demand. 

The large oil sector did not mean that the kingdom had not in- 
vested heavily in industrialization: in 1992 it ranked among the 
major industrial economies in the Middle East. But most Saudi 
industries were petroleum-based, in the public sector, and heavily 
dependent on subventions from the government budget. The pri- 
vate sector has been reluctant to establish domestic processing 
plants, and those created have been heavily subsidized. Similarly, 
modern, water-intensive, and import-dependent agriculture has 
come at a huge cost to the government. 

Despite higher oil capacity and demand for Saudi Arabian crude 
oil and petroleum products, the kingdom will continue to face tight 
budgetary restrictions during the 1990s. The challenge facing the 
government in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War, with all its 
costs, was maintaining the high Saudi standard of living while con- 
tinuing to diversify the economy. With financial reserves at the 
bare minimum levels necessary to keep international confidence, 
this challenge became even more difficult. 

With the decline in oil prices in 1986, the number of books on 
Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf region markedly declined. There 
are, however, several excellent early monographs on the five-year 



186 



The Economy 



plans and early development programs but few recent books that 
deal with the problems of deficits and stabilizing the economy. Two 
of the most up-to-date books on the Saudi economy are Robert 
E. Looney's Economic Development in Saudi Arabia and H. Askari's 
and B. Dastmaltschi's Saudi Arabia's Economy: Oil and the Search for 
Economic Development. The latter is highly recommended because 
of its detailed analysis of the development plans and real costs as- 
sociated with them. Tim Niblock's State, Society, and Economy in Saudi 
Arabia provides an excellent background to the economic develop- 
ment effort and contains several insightful studies on the economic 
and social constraints facing the country. A particularly good book 
on the private sector is Michael Field's The Merchants . For ongoing 
coverage of the kingdom's economy, three sources are recom- 
mended: Middle East Economic Digest, Middle East Economic Survey, 
and Financial Times. A plethora of oil journals, especially Petroleum 
Intelligence Weekly, keep up with developments in the Saudi oil sec- 
tor. The United States Embassy in Riyadh also produces a com- 
prehensive annual summary of developments in the kingdom's oil 
sector. (For further information and complete citations, see Bib- 
liography.) 



187 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 




The Kaaba in the Grand Mosque, Mecca 



ABD AR RAHMAN AL SAUD, who had begun conquering ter- 
ritory in the Arabian Peninsula in 1902, proclaimed the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia in 1932. It was then, and remained sixty years 
later, the only nation to have been named after its ruling family. 
Fahd ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, who in 1992 had been ruling for 
ten years, was the fourth son of Abd al Aziz to become king since 
his father's death in 1953. Although the Al Saud kings ruled as 
absolute monarchs, their power was tempered by Islamic law 
(sharia) and by the custom of reaching consensus on political is- 
sues among the scores of direct adult male descendants of Abd al 
Aziz. 

Islam was a pervasive social and political force in Saudi Arabia. 
Because there was no separation of religion and state, the political 
role of religious scholars, or ulama, was second in importance to 
that of the ruling Al Saud family. The close association between 
the ulama, advocating the strict Islamic interpretations of Muham- 
mad ibn Abd al Wahhab, and the Al Saud originated in the eigh- 
teenth century and provided the dynasty with its primary source 
of legitimacy. The ulama acted as a conservative force in main- 
taining the traditional social and political values that characterized 
Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s. 

Although Saudi Arabia was established as a country based on 
a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, the discovery of vast 
petroleum deposits led to significant changes in the role of religion. 
Since the 1950s, when oil revenues became abundant, Saudi rul- 
ers have sought to reap the economic benefits derived from oil 
resources while trying to minimize the political and social impact 
of change. Nevertheless, the transformation of Saudi Arabia from 
a relatively isolated, predominantly rural country into a wealthy, 
urbanized nation hosting millions of foreign workers inevitably 
produced tensions. From a political perspective, the most signifi- 
cant development was the emergence of a group of middle-class 
professionals. This important and highly educated group of Saudis 
generally resented the lack of opportunities for citizen participa- 
tion in politics. Beginning in the 1960s, they tried to pressure the 
monarchy into creating an elective representative assembly. Saudi 
kings resisted demands for political liberalization by strengthen- 
ing regime ties with the ulama, who tended to distrust the notion 
of popular government because of the implicit assumption that man- 
made legislation could be equal to sacred law. 



191 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Islam also was a significant factor in Saudi Arabia's foreign re- 
lations. The very close relationship that developed between the king- 
dom and the non-Muslim United States after 1945, for example, 
was partly a result of Saudi antipathy to the former Soviet Union's 
espousal of atheism. Beginning in the late 1950s, Riyadh and 
Washington shared similar misgivings about the ties that secular, 
republican regimes in the region established with Moscow. Dur- 
ing the 1980s, the Saudis tried to counteract Soviet influence by 
providing military aid to Islamic groups that opposed secular 
governments in such countries as Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). In ad- 
dition, the kingdom gave generous economic assistance to the 
predominantly Muslim states of Africa and Asia in the expecta- 
tion that recipient countries would support its overall policy goals. 
Despite this largess, however, Jordan, Sudan, and the Republic 
of Yemen (a merger of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
and the Yemen Arab Republic, North Yemen), three of the coun- 
tries most dependent on Saudi foreign aid, failed to back the king- 
dom during its 1990-91 conflict with Iraq after the latter invaded 
Kuwait. 

Saudi efforts to use Islam as a vehicle for rallying diplomatic sup- 
port met with indifferent results because other Muslim countries 
generally did not base their foreign policies on religion. A notable 
exception was Iran, the kingdom's neighbor on the northern shore 
of the Persian Gulf. The shared Islamic heritage was not, however, 
a basis for Saudi-Iranian cooperation. On the contrary, the 1979 
Iranian Islamic Revolution had brought to power Muslim clergy 
who espoused a version of Islam that Saudi ulama considered he- 
retical. Moreover, Iranian officials throughout the 1980s denounced 
the Al Saud as corrupt and the institution of monarchy as un- 
Islamic. Consequently, the government of Saudi Arabia perceived 
Iran as a major threat to both domestic tranquility and regional 
security. Although Saudi Arabia remained officially neutral dur- 
ing the protracted Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), it supported the war 
aims of its former political rival, the secular government of Iraq, 
by providing Baghdad with loans and grants totaling several bil- 
lion dollars. 

Saudi financial assistance neither defeated Iran nor won Iraq's 
gratitude. In 1984 Iran initiated attacks on tankers carrying Saudi 
and Kuwaiti oil, justifying its actions on grounds that the mone- 
tary aid extended to Iraq had made both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait 
de facto Iraqi allies. As the war spread to the Persian Gulf, Riyadh 
began to perceive that the continuation of the conflict posed a major 
security threat. The government thus felt relieved in 1988 when 



192 



Government and Politics 



both belligerents, weary of fighting, agreed to accept a United 
Nations-mediated cease-fire. However, the cessation of Iran-Iraq 
hostilities provided the Saudis only a brief respite from concerns 
about regional security. Iraq soon turned on Kuwait, Saudi Ara- 
bia's close ally and neighbor. After Kuwait had resisted Iraqi de- 
mands for more than a year, Baghdad retaliated in August 1990 
by dispatching its army to occupy and annex the small, oil-rich 
state. King Fahd's government, shocked and frightened, called upon 
the United States for help. In an unprecedented development, thou- 
sands of United States troops, under authority of several United 
Nations resolutions, were deployed to the kingdom beginning in 
August 1990. The country's ulama tolerated their presence after 
receiving the king's assurances that the foreign military person- 
nel, among whom were several thousand women, would have 
minimal contact with Saudi civilians and be required to obey Saudi 
laws such as the ban on consumption of alcohol. 

By the beginning of 1991 , it had become obvious that the mas- 
sive United States military presence in Saudi Arabia would not 
persuade Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The Saudi government 
and its Arab allies consequently agreed to join the United States, 
which also had obtained support from its European allies, to force 
a withdrawal. Iraq's appeals for Arab and Islamic solidarity against 
the United States intervention failed to impress the Saudis, who 
noted that the sharing of similar religious traditions had not pre- 
vented Iraq from invading Kuwait nor threatening their country. 
During the forty-three-day Persian Gulf War, Iraqi missiles struck 
Riyadh and several other Saudi towns, and the Saudi armed forces 
participated with non-Muslims and non-Arabs in the fighting 
against Iraq. The war, which ended with Iraq's military defeat in 
February 1991, demonstrated to the Saudis the impracticality of 
trying to base foreign policy on their vision of Islam. Convinced 
that the kingdom's security interests required the long-term con- 
tainment of Iraq and convinced that Iran had the same objective, 
Riyadh put aside its reservations about Iran's adherence to Shia 
(see Glossary) Islam and began the process of normalizing rela- 
tions with Tehran. 

Structure of Government 

Saudi Arabia was an absolute monarchy in 1992. The king was 
not constrained by a written constitution, a legislative assembly, 
or elections. Since 1962, Saudi kings periodically promised to es- 
tablish a majlis ash shura, or consultative council, to advise them 
on governmental matters, but none of them undertook practical 
steps to establish such a body. In March 1992, King Fahd once 



193 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

again announced that a majlis ash shura would be appointed and 
specified its responsibilities. Fahd proposed a majlis of sixty-one 
members, all appointed by the king. The majlis would have lim- 
ited authority to question ministers and propose legislation. The 
majlis would not have actual legislative powers but rather would 
serve as an advisory body that could make recommendations to 
the king. 

As of the end of 1992, King Fahd had named only a single in- 
dividual to the majlis ash shura that he had proposed ten months 
earlier. In appointing the speaker, the king made no promises as 
to when Saudi citizens could expect the convening of the full majlis. 
The International Committee for Human Rights in the Gulf and 
the Arabian Peninsula issued a public statement advising Saudis 
that the government had promised consistently for thirty years to 
establish a consultative council but never had fulfilled these promises. 

Saudis considered the Quran, the holy book of Islam, their coun- 
try's constitution. The Quran is the primary source of the sharia. 
Because the sharia does not specifically address the conduct of most 
governmental matters, Saudi rulers, beginning with Abd al Aziz, 
have promulgated numerous regulations pertaining to the func- 
tions of government. In early 1992, King Fahd became the first 
Saudi monarch to compile these regulations into a single document 
called the main code (nizam). Promulgated as a royal decree, this 
document codified bureaucratic procedures and prohibited govern- 
ment agencies from arbitrarily arresting citizens or violating their 
privacy. Although the main code was not a formal constitution, 
it fulfilled some of the same purposes of such a document. However, 
the main code lacked any explicit clause guaranteeing the basic 
rights of citizens to freedom of belief, expression, assembly, or po- 
litical participation. 

The King 

As one of world's last absolute monarchs, the Saudi Arabian king 
exercised very broad powers. He was both head of state and head 
of government. Ultimate authority in virtually every aspect of 
government rested with the king. All legislation was enacted either 
by royal decree or by ministerial decree, which had to be sanc- 
tioned by the king. In his capacity as prime minister, the king ap- 
pointed all cabinet ministers, other senior government officials, and 
the governors of the provinces. In his capacity as commander in 
chief of the armed forces, the king appointed all military officers 
above the rank of lieutenant colonel. He also appointed all Saudi 
Arabia's ambassadors and other foreign envoys. All foreign 



194 



Government and Politics 



diplomats in the country were accredited to the king. In addition, 
the king acted as the final court of appeal and had the power of 
pardon. 

The legitimacy of the king's rule was based on the twin pillars 
of religion and the dynastic history of the Al Saud. The family's 
most important early ancestor, Muhammad ibn Saud (1710-65), 
had been a relatively minor local ruler in Najd before establishing 
a political and family alliance with the puritanical Muslim preacher 
and reformer Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab (1703-87) in 1744. 
Muhammad ibn Saud and his descendants — the Al Saud — ardently 
supported the preacher and his descendants — the Al ash Shaykh — 
and were determined to introduce a purified Islam, which oppo- 
nents called Wahhabism (see Glossary), throughout Arabia. Reli- 
gious fervor facilitated the conquest of Najd and at the height of 
their power in the early nineteenth century, the Al Saud had ex- 
tended their control over most of the Arabian Peninsula (see The 
Al Saud and Wahhabi Islam, 1500-1818, ch. 1). Subsequent con- 
flict with the Ottoman Empire and dynastic rivalries both dimin- 
ished and enhanced the political fortunes of the Al Saud throughout 
the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the Saudi alliance with the 
Al ash Shaykh endured. 

The founder of the modern state of Saudi Arabia, Abd al Aziz 
ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud (1876-1953), was a grandson of the 
last effective nineteenth-century Saudi ruler, Faisal ibn Turki 
(1810-66). Abd al Aziz restored the family from virtual political 
extinction by reintroducing the crusading zeal of Wahhabi Islam 
(see The Rise of Abd al Aziz, 1890-1926, ch. 1). By 1924, when 
the Ikhwan, a select force of beduin religious fighters created by 
Abd al Aziz, conquered the Hijaz, almost all the territory of the 
present-day Saudi state was under Abd al Aziz's authority. In 1932 
he proclaimed this territory the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and him- 
self its king. 

Abd al Aziz ruled until his death in 1953. Although he had named 
his eldest son, Saud ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud (1902-69), crown 
prince, he had not instituted an mechanism for orderly succession. 
Because Abd al Aziz was survived by more than thirty sons, the 
lack of a process for passing on the mantle of kingship constituted 
a source of potential political instability for the country. Problems 
emerged soon after King Saud began his reign. Like his father, 
Saud had more than thirty sons, and he was ambitious to place 
them in positions of power and influence. The new king's numer- 
ous brothers, who believed their nephews were too young and in- 
experienced to head ministries and major government departments, 
deeply resented their exclusion from power. The political and 



195 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

personal tensions among the Al Saud, combined with the ex- 
travagance and poor judgment of Saud, climaxed in a 1964 family 
coup. A number of brothers joined together to depose Saud and 
install as king the next eldest brother, Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al 
Saud (1904-75). The transfer of power was endorsed by Saudi Ara- 
bia's ulama, or religious authorities. 

King Faisal strengthened the powers of the monarchy during 
his eleven-year reign. Although he had acted as prime minister dur- 
ing most of Saud's rule, he issued a royal decree stipulating that 
the king would serve both as head of state and as head of govern- 
ment. Faisal also increased central control over the provinces by 
making local officials responsible to the king, creating a Ministry 
of Justice to regulate the autonomous religious courts, and estab- 
lishing a national development plan to coordinate construction 
projects and social services throughout the country. Faisal's con- 
cern for orderly government and durable institutions extended to 
the monarchy. In 1965 he persuaded his brothers to observe the 
principle of birth order among themselves to regulate the succes- 
sion, although the next eldest brother, Muhammad (born 1910), 
voluntarily stepped down in favor of Khalid (1912-82). 

Faisal's rule ended abruptly in 1975 when he was assassinated 
by one of his nephews. A meeting of senior Al Saud princes, the 
sons and surviving brothers of Abd al Aziz, acclaimed Crown Prince 
Khalid the new king. Because some of Khalid' s brothers, who would 
have been next in line of succession according to age, renounced 
their right to the throne, the king and the princes designated a youn- 
ger brother, Fahd (born 1921), crown prince. Fahd ascended to 
the throne in 1982 after Khalid suffered a fatal heart attack. In 
consultation with his brothers, Fahd named Abd Allah (born 1923) 
crown prince and Sultan (born 1927) third in line of succession. 
The relatively smooth transitions following the deaths of Faisal and 
Khalid thus seemed to have resolved the issue of succession among 
the sons of Abd al Aziz. In 1992, however, Fahd altered the proce- 
dure for designating future kings. In the same royal decree that 
announced the impending appointment of a majlis, Fahd declared 
that the king would henceforth name and could remove the crown 
prince. Furthermore, the crown prince would not automatically 
succeed on the death of the king, but serve as provisional ruler until 
he, or a descendant of Abd al Aziz deemed more suitable, was en- 
throned. 

Fahd's decree on succession established two precedents: a royal 
prerogative to choose and to withdraw approval for the crown 
prince; and an acknowledgement that the more than sixty grandsons 



196 



King Fahd ibn Abd al Aziz 
A I Saud, 
custodian of 
the two holy mosques 
Courtesy Aramco World 



Crown Prince 
Abd Allah ibn Abd al Aziz, 
first deputy prime 
minister and head of 
the Saudi Arabian 
National Guard 
Courtesy Aramco World 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

of Abd al Aziz were legitimate claimants to the throne. Previously, 
Saudi kings had not asserted the right to dismiss a designated crown 
prince. By proclaiming such a right, Fahd revived persistent rumors 
originating in the 1970s that he and his half brother Abd Allah 
disagreed on many political issues. To forestall speculation that 
his intent was to remove Abd Allah as crown prince and replace 
him with his full brother Sultan, Fahd reaffirmed Abd Allah's po- 
sition. However, in declaring that successor kings would be chos- 
en from the most suitable of Abd al Aziz's sons and grandsons, 
Fahd implied that Abd Allah or any future crown prince was not 
necessarily the presumed heir to the throne. The decision to in- 
clude the grandsons in the selection process and as potential can- 
didates for the throne symbolized the readiness of Fahd and his 
surviving brothers to pass substantive decision-making responsi- 
bilities to a younger generation of the Al Saud. However, this de- 
cision also introduced more uncertainty into the succession process. 
At least a dozen men of this Al Saud younger generation, includ- 
ing sons of Faisal, Fahd, Abd Allah, and Sultan, were actively in- 
volved in the Saudi government and presumably had a personal 
interest in the question of succession. 

The Royal Diwan 

The primary executive office of the king is the Royal Diwan. 
The king's principal advisers for domestic politics, religious affairs, 
and international relations have offices in the Royal Diwan. The 
king's private office also is in the Royal Diwan. The king conducts 
most routine government affairs from this office, including the draft- 
ing of regulations and royal decrees. In addition, the heads of several 
government departments have their offices in the diwan. These in- 
clude the chief of protocol; the Office of Beduin Affairs; the Depart- 
ment of Religious Research, Missionary Activities, and Guidance; 
and, as well, the mutawwiin or Committees for the Propagation of 
Virtue and Prevention of Vice (popularly known as the Commit- 
tees for Public Morality). The Department of Religious Research, 
Missionary Activities, and Guidance is headed by the most senior 
of the country's ulama. In 1992 this person was the religious scholar 
Shaykh Abd al Aziz ibn Baz, who spent much of his time in Medina, 
where he was in charge of the Prophet's Mosque. 

The king also held his regular majlis, or court, in the Royal 
Diwan. The purpose of the majlis was to provide Saudi citizens 
an opportunity to make personal appeals to the king for redress 
of grievances or assistance in private matters. Plaintiffs typically 
sought the king's intervention with the state's bureaucracy. Dur- 
ing the reigns of King Khalid and King Fahd, it was customary 



198 



Government and Politics 



for each person attending the majlis to explain his complaints and 
simultaneously present a written petition, which the monarch would 
later study and answer in a subsequent session. 

The Council of Ministers 

The Council of Ministers, created in 1953 by King Abd al Aziz 
shortly before his death, was the principal executive organ of the 
government. The Council of Ministers had authority to issue 
ministerial decrees, but it had no power separate from the king, 
who approved all its decisions. The office of prime minister had 
been abolished by royal decree in 1964, but the king, in his capac- 
ity as president of the Council of Ministers, served as the de facto 
prime minister. The crown prince was designated the first deputy 
prime minister, and the next prince in the line of succession was 
the second deputy prime minister. In 1992 the Council of Ministers 
consisted of the king, the crown prince, three royal advisers who 
held official positions as ministers of state without portfolio, five 
other ministers of state, and the heads of the twenty ministries, 
including Minister of Defense and Aviation Amir Sultan, who also 
served as second deputy prime minister. The ministries included 
agriculture and water; commerce; communications; defense and 
aviation; education; finance and national economy; foreign affairs; 
health; higher education; industry and electricity; information; in- 
terior; justice; labor and social affairs; municipal and rural affairs; 
petroleum and mineral resources; pilgrimage affairs and religious 
trusts; planning; post, telephone, and telegraph; and public works 
and housing. In addition to these ministries, the Saudi Arabian 
National Guard, which was headed by Crown Prince Abd Allah, 
was similar in status to a ministry. The governors of Medina, 
Mecca, Riyadh, and the Eastern Province, as well as the gover- 
nor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and the head 
of the General Petroleum and Mineral Organization (Petromin) 
also held ministerial rank (see fig. 8). 

The Ministry of Interior, which was responsible for domestic 
security, was second in overall political influence to the Ministry 
of Defense and Aviation. Since 1975 Amir Nayif ibn Abd al Aziz 
Al Saud (born 1933), who was a full brother of King Fahd, has 
been minister of interior. In 1992 Nayif ranked as the fourth most 
powerful person in the country after Fahd, Abd Allah, and Sul- 
tan. Nayif supervised the expansion of the ministry into an organi- 
zation that exercised considerable influence over the daily lives of 
Saudi citizens. 

As crown prince under King Khalid and as king in his own right 
since 1982, Fahd brought into the government many talented men 



199 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 





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200 



Government and Politics 



from families other than the ruling Al Saud. In 1992 about 75 per- 
cent of the Council of Ministers were of commoner backgrounds. 
Nevertheless, the key ministries of defense, foreign affairs, interior, 
and public works continued to be headed by Saudi princes. In ad- 
dition, several of the king's younger brothers and nephews were 
deputy ministers in these same ministries, in effect acquiring on- 
the-job training to help ensure Al Saud control for another gen- 
eration. 

The Civil Service and Independent Agencies 

The nine-member Civil Service Board, responsible to the Council 
of Ministers, exercised formal authority over the employees of all 
ministries, government organizations, and autonomous agencies. 
It presided over the Civil Service Bureau, which implemented the 
decisions and directives of the Civil Service Board that pertained 
to grade classification, pay rates, recruitment and personnel needs, 
and personnel evaluation. Beginning in the early 1970s, the num- 
ber of civil service employees in Saudi Arabia increased dramati- 
cally as the government expanded its social services. By 1992 an 
estimated 400,000 persons were government employees, includ- 
ing about 100,000 foreign nationals. 

During the 1970s, the number of autonomous agencies also ex- 
panded. Although most of these agencies were under the adminis- 
trative auspices of a particular ministry, each agency had its own 
budget and operated with considerable independence. Several agen- 
cies, including the General Audit Bureau, the Grievances Board, 
the Investigation and Control Board, and the Organization for Pub- 
lic Services and Discipline, were not attached to any particular 
ministry. The latter three agencies were responsible, respectively, 
for hearing complaints of misconduct by civil service employees, 
investigating complaints against government officials, and dispens- 
ing disciplinary action against civil servants judged guilty of mal- 
feasance in office. 

Civil servants were classified either as government officials 
(professionals who comprised three-quarters of total government 
employees in 1992) and lower-paid employees. All civil servants 
were ranked according to grade, and advancement depended on 
merit and seniority. Training was provided within each ministry 
and at the Institute of Public Administration, an autonomous 
government agency with its main training center in Riyadh, and 
at branches in Jiddah and Ad Dammam. 

The Legal System 

The Saudi Arabian legal system in 1992 was based on the sharia, 
or Islamic law. The sharia was applied throughout the kingdom 



201 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

in strict accordance with the interpretation of the Hanbali school 
of Sunni (see Glossary) Islam. Because pious Muslims believed that 
the sharia was sacred law, they accepted as judges, or qadis, only 
men who had spent a number of years studying the accepted sources 
of the sharia: the Quran and the authenticated traditions (hadith) 
of the Prophet Muhammad's rulings and practices. Historically, 
the decisions of qadis were subject to review by the ruler, whose 
primary role was to ensure that the Islamic community lived in 
conformity with the sharia. In effect, the judiciary was not an in- 
dependent institution but an extension of the political authority. 
This traditional relationship between qadis and the king still 
prevailed in Saudi Arabia. 

The Ministry of Justice, established by King Faisal in 1970, was 
responsible for administering the country's more than 300 sharia 
courts. The minister of justice, appointed by the king from among 
the country's most senior ulama, was the de facto chief justice. He 
was assisted by the Supreme Judicial Council, a body of eleven 
members chosen from the leading ulama. The Supreme Judicial 
Council supervised the work of the courts, reviewed all legal deci- 
sions referred to it by the minister of justice, expressed legal opin- 
ions on judicial questions, and approved all sentences of death, 
amputation (of fingers and hands as punishment for theft), and 
stoning (for adultery). Since 1983, the minister of justice has also 
served as chief of the Supreme Judicial Council, a position that 
further enhanced his status as chief justice. 

Sharia courts included courts of first instance and appeals courts. 
Minor civil and criminal cases were adjudicated in the summary 
courts of first instance. One kind of summary court dealt exclu- 
sively with beduin affairs. A single qadi presided over all summary 
court hearings. The general courts of first instance handled all cases 
beyond the jurisdiction of the summary courts. One judge usually 
presided over cases in the general courts, but three qadis sat in 
judgment for serious crimes such as murder, major theft, or sex- 
ual misconduct. 

Decisions of the summary and general courts could be appealed 
to the sharia appeals court. The appeals court, or court of cassa- 
tion, had three departments: penal suits, personal status suits, and 
all other types of suits. The appeals had two seats, one in Riyadh 
and one in Mecca. The chief justice and a panel of several qadis 
presided over all cases. The king was at the pinnacle of the judi- 
cial system, functioning as a final court of appeal and as a source 
of pardon. 

Saudi Arabia's judicial code stipulated that specialized courts 
may be established by royal decree to deal with infractions of 



202 



Government and Politics 



government regulations not covered by the sharia. Since the reign 
of Abd al Aziz, kings have created various secular tribunals out- 
side of the sharia court system to deal with violations of adminis- 
trative rules. The Grievances Board, for example, operated under 
the authority of the Bureau of the Presidency of the Council of 
Ministers. It reviewed complaints of improper behavior brought 
against both government officials and qadis. The Ministry of In- 
terior was in charge of the special police who enforced motor vehi- 
cle regulations. The Ministry of Commerce supervised arbitration 
and appeals boards established to settle commercial disputes, es- 
pecially those involving foreign businesses. Decrees pertaining to 
labor were enforced by special committees within the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs. 

Local Government 

Saudi Arabia consisted of fourteen provinces, or amirates (see 
fig. 1), each governed by an amir (governor) appointed by the king. 
In 1992 these amirates included Al Banah, Al Hudud ash 
Shamaliyah, Al Jawf, Al Madinah, Al Qasim, Al Qurayyat, Ar 
Riyadh, Ash Sharqiyah, Asir, Hail, Jizan, Makkah, Najran, and 
Tabuk. The larger, more populous amirates were subdivided into 
districts and subdistricts. 

In theory, the governors were responsible to the minister of in- 
terior. In practice, however, the governors usually reported directly 
to the king. In 1992 all amirate governors and most of their deputies 
were members of the Al Saud. King Fahd's brothers, sons, and 
nephews ruled the most politically important amirates; other kin 
ruled the smaller amirates. The governors maintained administra- 
tive offices in the principal cities of their respective amirates, 
although none of these cities was designated a capital. The gover- 
nors' principal responsibility was to oversee the work of both cen- 
tral government and municipal officials within the amirates. The 
governors also served as commanders of the local police and Saudi 
Arabian National Guard units and supervised the recruitment of 
local men for these security forces (see Saudi Arabian National 
Guard, ch. 5). In addition, each governor followed the example 
of the king and held a public majlis, often on a daily basis, at which 
he heard petitions from local residents. Typically, the petitions per- 
tained to local disputes, which the governor either arbitrated or 
referred to an appropriate court. Some governors considered the 
majlis an important link between the people and government and 
employed several special assistants who investigated local disputes 
and grievances. 



203 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

The governors were assisted by one, or sometimes two, deputies 
and, in some amirates, by one or more deputy assistant governors. 
In amirates that were subdivided into districts, the district officials 
were subordinate to the amirate governors. The mayors of each 
city, town, and village within an amirate were formally responsi- 
ble to the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, although in 
practice they also were subordinate to the governor. Since the 1960s, 
the Al Saud princes have discussed the merits of creating amirate 
councils, elected or appointed bodies of local men to advise and 
assist the governors. In early 1992, King Fahd announced that he 
would appoint councils in each amirate; these councils would as- 
sume limited local authority over some central government 
functions. 

Political Dynamics 

The Royal Family 

Although the Saudi king in 1992 was an absolute monarch in 
the sense that there were no formal, institutionalized checks on his 
authority, in practice his ability to rule effectively depended on his 
astuteness in creating and maintaining consensus within his very 
large, extended family. The king was the patriarch of the Al Saud, 
which, including all its collateral branches, numbered about 20,000 
people. These persons traced their patrilineal descent to Muham- 
mad ibn Saud, the eighteenth-century founder of the dynasty. The 
most important branch of the Al Saud family was known as Al 
Faisal. The Al Faisal branch consisted of the patrilineal descen- 
dants of Abd al Aziz's grandfather, Faisal ibn Turki. Only males 
of the Al Faisal branch of the family, estimated at more than 4,000 
in 1992, were considered royalty and were accorded the title of amir 
(prince). 

Even within the Al Faisal branch of the Al Saud family, the 
princes did not enjoy the same degree of influence. The several 
lineages within the Al Faisal branch derived from the numerous 
sons and grandsons of Faisal ibn Turki. His most important grand- 
son, Abd al Aziz, married several women, each of whom bore the 
king one or more sons. The sons of Abd al Aziz by the same mother 
(full brothers) inevitably felt more affinity for one another than for 
their half brothers, and thus political influence within this patrilineal 
family actually tended to be wielded on the basis of matrilineal de- 
scent. Since Fahd's ascent to the throne in 1982, the most influen- 
tial clan of the Al Faisal branch of the Al Saud family has been 
the Al Sudairi, known by the patronymic of Fahd's mother. Fahd 
had seven full brothers, including Minister of Defense Sultan, who 



204 




Old amirate building, Najran 
Courtesy Saudi Arabian Information Office 

was second in the line of succession, Minister of Interior Nayif, 
and Governor of Riyadh Salman. Sultan and Salman were consid- 
ered to be Fahd's closest political advisers. In 1983 Fahd appointed 
one of Sultan's sons, Bandar, to be the Saudi ambassador to the 
United States. Another of Sultan's sons, Khalid, was the de facto 
commander of Saudi armed forces during the Persian Gulf War. 
At least once a week, the king and his full brothers met for a fam- 
ily dinner at which they shared perspectives about national and 
international politics. In addition to his full brothers, seven of Fahd's 
half brothers were sons of other Al Sudairi women whom his father 
had married. As the sons of Fahd and his brothers matured and 
assumed government responsibilities during the 1980s, some Sau- 
dis began to refer to the clan as Al Fahd instead of Al Sudairi. 

The Al Thunayyan clan was closely allied to the Al Sudairi. King 
Faisal's favorite wife had been from the Al Thunayyan, a collat- 
eral branch of the Al Saud family that had intermarried with the 
Al ash Shaykh ulama family. During the Al Saud crisis that cul- 
minated in the 1964 deposition of King Saud, the Al Sudairi con- 
sistently supported Faisal. Because Faisal had no full brothers, he 
tended to favor those of his half brothers who had backed him during 
the prolonged political struggle with Saud. For example, Fahd, Sul- 
tan, and Nayif all received important ministerial positions from 



205 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Faisal when he was crown prince (1953-64) and for much of that 
period Saud's prime minister. Following Faisal's assassination in 
1975. Fahd. the eldest of the Al Sudairi brothers, was named sec- 
ond in the line of succession. Before becoming king in 1982. Fahd 
served as King Khalid's de facto prime minister and used his in- 
fluence to obtain ministerial-level appointments for Faisal's sons. 
One son. Saud ibn Faisal, was named minister of foreign affairs 
in 1975. 

The Al Jiluwi was a third influential clan of the .Al Saud family. 
The Al Jiluwi were descended from a brother of Faisal ibn Turki. 
the grandfather of Abd al Aziz. The mother of the late King Khalid 
and his only full brother. Muhammad (born 1910). had been an 
.Al Jiluwi. In the early 1960s. Khalid and Muhammad had shared 
the critical views of their half brothers Faisal and Fahd with respect 
to Saud's style of rule, and they were among the select group of 
princes and ulama who joined to depose Saud in 1964. The fol- 
lowing year Muhammad, who was older than Khalid and thus next 
in line of succession, renounced his right to the throne in favor 
of his brother. After Faisal's assassination. Muhammad was in- 
strumental in persuading two younger brothers, whose birth order 
preceded that of Fahd. to defer and accept Fahd as crown prince. 
After FLhalid's death in 1982. Muhammad remained one of the 
senior Saudi princes whom Fahd routinely consulted before mak- 
ing major political decisions. The sons of Khalid and Muhammad, 
however, have not demonstrated much interest in or aptitude for 
politics, and none of them held an important government position 
m 1992. 

Unlike the .Al Sudairi. .Al Thunavyan. and Al Jiluwi. the fourth 
influential Al Saud clan, the .Al Kabir. was not patrilineally de- 
scended from Abd al Aziz bur from his first cousin. Saud al Kabir. 
Thus, the Al Kabir princes were not in the line of succession. Then 
influence actually derived from their matrilineal descent: they were 
the sons and grandsons of Saud al Kabir 's wife Xura. the favorite 
sister of Abd al Aziz. The patriarch of the Al Kabir clan. Muham- 
mad ibn Saud (born 1909. not to be confused with Muhammad 
ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud i. was considered one of the senior Al Saud 
princes and was widely respected for his intimate knowledge of tribal 
genealogies and oral histories. Muhammad ibn Saud's eleven adult 
sons were active in business and politics. 

In addition to the clans, the Al Saud had numerous political fac- 
tions. The factions tended to be centered on a brother or coalition 
of brothers. For example. Fahd and his six full brothers have been 
known as the "Sudairi Seven" since the late 1970s. When Fahd 



206 



Government and Politics 



became king in 1982, the Sudairi Seven emerged as the most power- 
ful of the family factions. Five of Fahd's brothers held important 
government positions in 1992. Outside the royal family, the Sudairi 
Seven were regarded as the faction most favorably inclined toward 
economic development, political and social liberalization, and a 
close relationship with the United States. 

In 1992 the second most important family faction centered on 
Crown Prince Abd Allah, who headed the national guard. Abd 
Allah had no full brothers, but he cultivated close relationships with 
half brothers and nephews who also lacked family allies because 
they either had no full brothers or were isolated for some other 
reason. For example, in 1984 Abd Allah had appointed one of the 
sons of deposed King Saud as commander of the national guard 
in the Eastern Province. Prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the 
Abd Allah faction had a reputation as traditionalists who opposed 
many of the domestic and foreign polices favored by the Al Sudairi. 
In particular, the Abd Allah faction criticized the kingdom's mili- 
tary dependence on the United States. The Abd Allah faction also 
was a proponent of closer relations with Iran and Syria. During 
the Persian Gulf War, however, Abd Allah supported the decision 
to permit stationing of United States troops in the country. Since 
then, foreign policy has receded as a divisive issue within the House 
of Saud. 

The more than sixty grandsons of Abd al Aziz constituted a third 
discernible faction within the Al Saud. Among this generation, the 
sons of King Faisal and King Fahd have assumed the most impor- 
tant positions. The principal characteristic of the junior princes was 
their high level of education, often including graduate studies in 
the United States or Europe. In fact, during the 1980s, education, 
rather than seniority based on age, appeared to be the major source 
of influence for members of this generation. Fahd appointed many 
of them to responsible posts as ambassadors, provincial governors, 
and deputy ministers. Nevertheless, in terms of family politics, it 
was not clear whether the junior princes constituted a unified group, 
and if so, whether they were more favorably inclined toward the 
Al Sudairi faction or the Abd Allah faction. 

King Fahd usually consulted with several dozen senior princes 
of the four principal Al Saud clans before making major decisions. 
These influential princes, together with a score of leading ulama, 
comprised a group known as the ahl al hall wa al aqd (literally, "those 
who loose and bind"). The ahl al hall wa al aqd numbered 100 to 
150 men, but it was not a formal institution. The most important 
function of the group seemed to be to provide a broad elite con- 
sensus for government policy initiatives. Nevertheless, few analysts 



207 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

understood the precise nature of the relationship between the 
monarchy and the ahl al hall wa al aqd. In the past, the group had 
deposed one king (Saud in 1964) and had provided the public ac- 
clamation necessary to ensure the smooth accession to the throne 
of Faisal, Khalid, and Fahd. 

The Ulama 

The ulama, or Islamic religious leaders, served a unique role 
by providing religious legitimacy for Saudi rule. Except for Iran, 
where the ulama participated directly in government, Saudi Ara- 
bia was the only Muslim country in which the ulama constituted 
such an influential political force. The kingdom's ulama included 
religious scholars, qadis (judges), lawyers, seminary teachers, and 
the prayer leaders (imams) of the mosques. As a group, the ulama 
and their families included an estimated 7,000 to 10,000 persons. 
However, only the thirty to forty most senior scholars among them 
exercised substantive political influence. These prominent clergy 
constituted the members of the Council of Senior Ulama, an offi- 
cial body created by Faisal in 1971 to serve as a forum for regular 
consultation between the monarch and the religious establishment. 
Fahd continued the precedent set by Faisal and Khalid of meeting 
weekly with Council of Senior Ulama members who resided in 
Riyadh. 

The Council of Senior Ulama had a symbiotic relationship with 
the Saudi government. In return for official recognition of their 
special religious authority, the leading ulama provided tacit ap- 
proval and, when requested, public sanction for potentially con- 
troversial policies. Because Saudi kings esteemed their Islamic 
credentials as custodians of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, 
they considered ulama support critical. For example, in 1979 mem- 
bers of the Council of Senior Ulama signed the religious edict (fatwa) 
that sanctioned the use of force to subdue armed dissidents who 
had occupied the Grand Mosque in Mecca, Islam's holiest shrine. 
In 1990 the decision to invite thousands of United States military 
personnel to set up bases in the northeastern part of the country 
alarmed some devout Muslims who believed that the presence of 
so many non-Muslims on Saudi soil violated the sanctity of the 
holy land. Fahd defused such concerns by obtaining ulama approval 
for the United States military presence. 

Historically, the royal family maintained close ties with the 
ulama, especially with members of the Al ash Shaykh. The Al ash 
Shaykh included the several hundred direct male descendants of 
the eighteenth-century religious reformer Abd al Wahhab. The Al 
Saud dynastic founder, Muhammad ibn Saud, had married a 



208 



Government and Politics 



daughter of Abd al Wahhab, and subsequent intermarriage between 
the two families reinforced their political alliance. The mother of 
King Faisal, for example, was the daughter of an Al ash Shaykh 
qadi who was a direct descendant of Muhammad ibn Abd al Wah- 
hab. The preeminence of the Al ash Shaykh thus derived not only 
from its reputation for religious erudition but also from its posi- 
tion as part of the country's ruling elite. In 1992 most of the Al 
ash Shaykh men were not members of the clergy but held key po- 
sitions in government, education, the security services, the armed 
forces, and private business. Nevertheless, the Al ash Shaykh ulama 
dominated the kingdom's influential clerical institutions such as 
the Council of Senior Ulama, the Higher Council of Qadis, and 
the Administration of Scientific Study, Legal Opinions, Islamic 
Propagation, and Guidance. In addition, the most senior religious 
office, the grand mufti (chief judge), was traditionally filled by a 
member of Al ash Shaykh. 

Not all of the kingdom's ulama belonged to the Al ash Shaykh. 
Ulama from less prominent families tended to criticize, usually pri- 
vately, the senior clergy, especially after 1975. The increase in num- 
bers of students in seminaries led to a larger number of clergy willing 
to challenge the senior ulama' s role and to criticize their support 
of government policies. In December 1992, a group of ulama as- 
sociated with the conservative Salafi religious trend signed a pub- 
lic letter criticizing King Fahd personally for failing to understand 
that the clergy had a religious duty to advise all believers — including 
the royal family — of their obligation to abide by God's principles. 
This unprecedented action caused a major stir in Saudi Arabia. 
The king rebuked the ulama establishment and dismissed several 
senior clergy from their official positions. 

Other Groups 

The hereditary leaders of important beduin tribes and several mer- 
chant families have wielded political influence in the kingdom since 
its establishment. The principal tribes were the Anayzah, Bani 
Khalid, Harb, Al Murrah, Mutayr, Qahtan, Shammar, and Utaiba. 
In addition, there were at least fifteen minor tribes, including the 
predominantly urban Quraysh, the ancient Hijaz tribe to which 
the Prophet Muhammad belonged. The national guard, which has 
been headed by Crown Prince Abd Allah since 1963, recruited its 
personnel mostly from among the beduin tribes and its units were 
organized by tribal affiliation. Abd Allah's family ties to the tribes 
were also strong because his mother was the daughter of a shaykh 
of the Shammar, a Najdi tribe with clans in Iraq and Syria. 
Although the king and senior Al Saud princes did not usually consult 



209 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

with the tribal shaykhs before making decisions affecting national 
policy, the royal family routinely sought their advice on provin- 
cial matters. Consequently, tribal leaders still exercised significant 
influence in local politics. 

The traditional merchant families, whose wealth rivaled that of 
the Al Saud, included the Alireza, Ba Khashab, Bin Ladin, Al 
Qusaibi, Jamjum, Juffali, Kaki, Nasif, Olayan, Al Rajhi, and 
Sulayman. During the long reign of Abd al Aziz, the royal family 
depended on these commercial families for financial support. After 
oil revenues became a steady source of government income, the 
relationship between the Al Saud and the merchant families began 
to change. Significantly, the monarchy no longer needed mone- 
tary favors from the merchants. Nevertheless, the families that had 
complied with Abd al Aziz's repeated requests for loans were re- 
warded with preferential development contracts. In addition, the 
post- 1973 development boom led to the emergence of new entre- 
preneurial families such as Kamil, Khashoggi, Ojjeh, and Pharaon. 
The sons of Abd al Aziz continued to consult regularly with business 
leaders and appointed members of their families to government 
positions, including the Council of Ministers and the diplomatic 
corps. 

The social changes resulting from government-sponsored de- 
velopment projects helped to create a new class of Saudi profes- 
sionals and technocrats. These men comprised an urban-based, 
Western-educated elite that emerged from both the traditional mer- 
chant class and low-status families. The technocrats have had 
responsibility for implementing the country's economic develop- 
ment programs. Since the mid-1970s, a majority of the cabinet ap- 
pointees to the Council of Ministers have been members of this 
group. Saudi kings recruited technocrats to high government po- 
sitions on the basis of their demonstrated competency and loyalty 
to Al Saud dynastic rule. However, involvement with the exten- 
sive Al Saud carried political risks because implementation of eco- 
nomic policies inevitably interfered with the privileges or business 
interests of one or more princes. For example, Fahd summarily 
dismissed three of the country's most respected technocrats, former 
Minister of Health Ghazi al Qusaibi, former Minister of Oil Ahmad 
Zaki Yamani, and former Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency head 
Abd al Aziz Qurayshi after their advocacy of specific policies had 
alienated several Saudi princes. 

Other than the Council of Ministers, the new class of technocrats 
had no institutional base from which to express its views. Even 
within the Council of Ministers, the influence of this new class was 
circumscribed; they provided advice when the king solicited it, but 



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Government and Politics 



ultimate decision-making authority remained within the royal fam- 
ily. Because political parties and similar associations were not per- 
mitted, there were no legal means by which like-minded persons 
might organize. Nevertheless, evidence suggested that the Saudi 
professionals and technocrats were dissatisfied both with their ex- 
clusion from the political process and their expected conformity 
to rigid standards of social behavior. Periodically, individuals of 
this class petitioned the king, asking him to permit broader politi- 
cal participation. On the most recent occasion, at the end of 1990, 
several technocrats signed a petition asking for the creation of an 
elected majlis, a judiciary independent of the ulama, and a review 
of the restrictive codes that applied to women (see Cultural 
Homogeneity and Values, ch. 2). One of the boldest public pro- 
tests was staged by more than forty educated women who drove 
their cars through the streets of Riyadh in the fall of 1990 in viola- 
tion of an unofficial but strictly enforced ban on women driving 
automobiles. 

The ulama, tribal leaders, wealthy merchants, and technocrats 
constituted the four major groups that enjoyed varying degrees of 
access to political influence. The major group excluded was the 
Shia minority concentrated in and near the towns of Al Hufuf and 
Al Qatif in the Eastern Province (see Shia, ch. 2). Most of Saudi 
Arabia's estimated 200,000 to 400,000 Shia believed that the 
government, and especially the Sunni ulama, discriminated against 
them. Shia resentment exploded in a series of violent demonstra- 
tions in 1979 and 1980; at least twenty people were killed in these 
incidents. Since 1980 the government has tried to reconcile the dis- 
affected population through development projects in Shia commu- 
nities. However, in 1992 the Shia minority still had no means of 
participating in the political process, and most held low-status jobs. 
Saudi Shia, in fact, comprised virtually the only indigenous mem- 
bers of the country's working class. Foreign laborers, who had ob- 
tained temporary permits to reside in the kingdom, performed 
almost all manual labor (see Saudis and Non-Saudis, ch. 2). 

Media 

In 1992 a total of ten daily newspapers, all privately owned, were 
published in Saudi Arabia. Seven were printed in Arabic and three 
in English. The most widely read Arabic dailies were Ar Riyadh 
(circulation estimated at 140,000), published in Riyadh, and Al 
Jazirah (circulation 90,000), published in Jiddah. Smaller-circulation 
papers were published in both cities. The cities of Ad Dammam, 
Mecca, and Medina also had daily newspapers. All three English- 
language dailies were published in Jiddah. The largest of these was 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Arab News with an estimated circulation of 110,000. The smaller 
Saudi Gazette (circulation 17,400) and Saudi News (circulation 5,000) 
were specialized publications that emphasized economic news and 
press releases from the state-owned Saudi Press Agency. In addi- 
tion to the daily papers, there were fourteen weekly magazines, 
of which eight were published in Arabic and six in English, and 
twelve periodicals. 

Although there was no prepublication censorship of Saudi 
newspapers, editors understood that articles expressing opposition 
to the government or its policies were unacceptable, and they thus 
exercised self-censorship. The Ministry of Information effectively 
supervised all periodicals through the Press Law of 1964. This law 
required the formation of a fifteen-member committee to assume 
financial and editorial responsibility for each privately owned 
newspaper. The members of these committees had to be approved 
by the Ministry of Information. In contrast to the local press, the 
foreign press was heavily censored before being permitted into the 
kingdom. The objective of the censors was not only to remove po- 
litically sensitive materials but also to excise advertisements deemed 
offensive to public morality. 

Since 1990 several editors, reporters, and photojournalists have 
been suspended, dismissed, fired outright, or detained by Saudi 
security authorities for violating the unwritten press censorship code. 
In February 1992, the respected editor in chief of the English- 
language daily, Arab News, Khaled al Maeena, was fired for re- 
producing an Associated Press wire service report that featured an 
interview with the Egyptian cleric Shaykh Umar Abd ar Rahman, 
then residing in exile in New Jersey. In December 1992, the edi- 
tor in chief of the Arabic-language daily An Nadwah also was fired 
summarily after his paper featured an article about Islamic groups 
in the kingdom. 

As of 1991, the most recent year for which statistics were avail- 
able, there were an estimated 4.5 million television sets in Saudi 
Arabia and an estimated 5 million radio receivers. One hundred 
twelve television stations throughout the country broadcast both 
Arabic and English programs. There were forty-three AM radio 
stations and twenty-three FM stations. The Saudi Arabian Broad- 
casting Service transmitted programs overseas in Arabic, Farsi, 
French, Indonesian, Somali, Swahili, and Urdu. 

Foreign Policy 

Since at least the late 1950s, three consistent themes have domi- 
nated Saudi foreign policy: regional security, Arab nationalism, 
and Islam. These themes inevitably became closely intertwined 



212 



Government and Politics 



during the formulation of actual policies. For example, the pre- 
occupation with regional security issues, including concern for both 
regime stability and the safety of petroleum exports, resulted in 
the kingdom's establishing a close strategic alliance with the United 
States. Yet this relationship, which remained strong in 1992, often 
had complicated Saudi efforts to maintain solidarity with other Arab 
countries, primarily because many Arabs, especially during the 
1960s and 1970s, believed United States support for Israel was 
detrimental to their national interests. The close ties with the non- 
Muslim United States also contrasted with the strained relations 
that existed between Saudi Arabia and certain predominantly Mus- 
lim countries that challenged the kingdom's efforts to portray it- 
self as the principal champion of Islamic causes. 

Regional Security 

Saudi leaders historically regarded both aggression and exter- 
nally supported subversion as potential threats to their country's 
national security. Thus, their primary foreign policy objective was 
to maintain political stability in the broader Middle East area that 
surrounds the Arabian Peninsula. Their principal concerns tended 
to focus on their two more populous and more powerful neighbors, 
Iraq to the north and Iran across the Persian Gulf. Since 1970, 
Saudi Arabia has perceived each of these countries alternately as 
friend and foe, and the nature of its relations with Iran and Iraq 
at any given time has influenced the pattern of Saudi relations with 
other states. 

Relations with Iraq 

Saudi relations with Iraq have been the most problematic, vacil- 
lating from tension to de facto alliance to war. Throughout the 1960s 
and into the early 1970s, Riyadh had suspected Baghdad of sup- 
porting political movements hostile to Saudi interests, not only in 
the Arabian Peninsula but also in other Middle Eastern countries. 
Saudi-Iraqi ties consequently were strained; the kingdom tried to 
contain the spread of Iraqi radicalism by strengthening its rela- 
tions with states such as Iran, Kuwait, Syria, and the United States, 
all of which shared its distrust of Baghdad. Beginning about 1975, 
however, Iraq began to moderate its foreign policies, a change that 
significantly lessened tensions between Riyadh and Baghdad. Saudi 
Arabia's diplomatic relations with Iraq were relatively cordial by 
the time the Iranian Islamic Revolution erupted in 1979. 

The Saudis and Iraqis both felt threatened by the Iranian ad- 
vocacy of exporting Islamic revolution, and this shared fear fostered 
an unprecedented degree of cooperation between them. Although 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Riyadh declared its neutrality at the outset of the Iran-Iraq War 
in 1980, it helped Baghdad in nonmilitary ways. For example, dur- 
ing the conflict's eight years, Saudi Arabia provided Iraq with an 
estimated US$25 billion in low-interest loans and grants, reserved 
for Iraqi customers part of its production from oil fields in the Iraq- 
Saudi Arabian Neutral Zone, and assisted with the construction 
of an oil pipeline to transport Iraqi oil across its territory (see Ex- 
ternal Boundaries, ch. 2). 

Despite its considerable financial investment in creating a polit- 
ical alliance with Iraq, Saudi Arabia failed to acquire a long-term 
friend. On the contrary, in August 1990, only two years after Bagh- 
dad and Tehran had agreed to cease hostilities, Iraqi forces unex- 
pectedly invaded and occupied Kuwait. From a Saudi perspective, 
Iraq's action posed a more direct and serious threat to its imme- 
diate security than the possibility of Iranian-supported subver- 
sion. The Saudis were genuinely frightened and requested the 
United States to bring troops into the kingdom to help confront 
the menace. 

Riyadh's fears concerning Baghdad's ultimate intentions prompted 
Saudi Arabia to become involved directly in the war against Iraq 
during January and February 1991. Although the United States 
was the principal military power in the coalition of forces that op- 
posed Iraq, the kingdom's air bases served as main staging areas 
for aerial strikes against Iraqi targets, and personnel of the Saudi 
armed forces participated in both the bombing assaults and the 
ground offensive (see Persian Gulf War, 1991, ch. 5). Iraq re- 
sponded by firing several Scud-B missiles at Riyadh and other Saudi 
towns. This conflict marked the first time since its invasion of 
Yemen in 1934 that Saudi Arabia had fought against another Arab 
state. Saudi leaders were relieved when Iraq was defeated, but they 
also recognized that relations with Baghdad had been damaged as 
severely as Iraqi military equipment had been in the deserts of 
Kuwait and southern Iraq. Consequently, postwar Saudi policy 
focused on ways to contain potential Iraqi threats to the kingdom 
and the region. One element of Riyadh's containment policy in- 
cluded support for Iraqi opposition forces that advocated the over- 
throw of Saddam Husayn's government. In the past, backing for 
such groups had been discreet, but in early 1992 the Saudis in- 
vited several Iraqi opposition leaders to Riyadh to attend a well- 
publicized conference. To further demonstrate Saudi dissatisfaction 
with the regime in Baghdad, Crown Prince Abd Allah permitted 
the media to videotape his meeting with some of the opponents 
of Saddam Husayn. 



214 



View of Jiddah, formerly Saudi Arabia's diplomatic capital 
Courtesy Saudi Arabian Information Office 
A building flanking the central plaza of the Riyadh 

Diplomatic Quarter 
Courtesy Aramco World 



215 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Relations with Iran 

Saudi Arabia's postwar concerns about Iraq led to a rapproche- 
ment with Iran during 1991. Historically, relations with non-Arab 
Iran had been correct, although the Saudis tended to distrust Ira- 
nian intentions and to resent the perceived arrogance of the shah. 
Nevertheless, the two countries had cooperated on regional secu- 
rity issues despite their differences over specific policies such as oil 
production quotas. The Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 dis- 
rupted this shared interest in regional political stability. From a 
Saudi perspective, the rhetoric of some Iranian revolutionary lead- 
ers, who called for the overthrow of all monarchies as being un- 
Islamic, presented a serious subversive threat to the regimes in the 
area. Political disturbances in the kingdom during 1979 and 1980, 
including the violent occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca 
by Sunni religious extremists and riots among Saudi Shia in the 
Eastern Province, reinforced the perception that Iran was exploit- 
ing, even inciting, discontent as part of a concerted policy to ex- 
port its revolution. The Saudi government consequently was not 
displeased when Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980. Neverthe- 
less, Saudi Arabia remained officially neutral throughout the Iran- 
Iraq War, even though in practice its policies made it an effective 
Iraqi ally. 

The thorniest issue in Saudi-Iranian relations during the 1980s 
was not Riyadh's discreet support of Baghdad but the annual hajj, 
or pilgrimage to Mecca, that took place in the twelfth month of 
the Muslim lunar calendar (see Tenets of Sunni Islam; Pilgrimage, 
ch. 2). Contention over the participation in hajj rituals of Iranian 
pilgrims, who numbered about 150,000 in this period and com- 
prised the largest single national group among the approximately 
2 million Muslims who attended the yearly hajj rites, symbolized 
the increasing animosity between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Tehran 
insisted that its pilgrims had a religious right and obligation to en- 
gage in political demonstrations during the hajj. Riyadh, however, 
believed that the behavior of the Iranian pilgrims violated the 
spiritual significance of the hajj and sought to confine demonstra- 
tors to isolated areas where their chanting would cause the least 
interference with other pilgrims. Because the Saudis esteemed their 
role as protectors of the Muslim holy sites in the Hijaz, the Ira- 
nian conduct presented a major dilemma: to permit unhindered 
demonstrations would detract from the essential religious nature 
of the hajj ; to prevent the demonstrations by force would sully the 
government's international reputation as guardian of Islam's most 
sacred shrines. Tensions increased yearly without a satisfactory 



216 



Government and Politics 



resolution until the summer of 1987, when efforts by Saudi secu- 
rity forces to suppress an unauthorized demonstration in front of 
Mecca's Grand Mosque led to the deaths of more than 400 pil- 
grims, at least two-thirds of whom were Iranians. This tragedy 
stunned the Saudis and galvanized their resolve to ban all activi- 
ties not directly associated with the hajj rituals. In Tehran, angry 
mobs retaliated by ransacking the Saudi embassy; they detained 
and beat several diplomats, including one Saudi official who sub- 
sequently died from his injuries. These incidents severed the frayed 
threads that still connected Saudi Arabia and Iran; in early 1988, 
Riyadh cut its diplomatic relations with Tehran, in effect closing 
the primary channel by which Iranian pilgrims obtained Saudi visas 
required for the hajj. 

Although Iran began to indicate its interest in normalizing rela- 
tions with Saudi Arabia as early as 1989, officials in the kingdom 
remained suspicious of Tehran's motives and did not reciprocate 
its overtures for almost two years. The Persian Gulf War, however, 
significantly altered Saudi perceptions of Iran. The unexpected 
emergence of Iraq as a mortal enemy refocused Saudi security con- 
cerns and paved the way for a less hostile attitude toward Iran. 
For example, Riyadh welcomed Tehran's consistent demands for 
an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and interpreted Iran's strict ad- 
herence to neutrality during the conflict as a positive development. 
Despite their lingering doubts about Tehran's aims vis-a-vis the 
Shia population of southern Iraq, the Saudis recognized after the 
war that they and the Iranians shared an interest in containing Iraq 
and agreed to discuss the prospects of restoring diplomatic rela- 
tions. The issue that had proved so vexatious throughout the 1980s, 
the hajj, was resolved through a compromise that enabled Irani- 
ans to participate in the 1991 pilgrimage, the first appearance in 
four years of a hajj contingent sponsored by Tehran. In effect, once 
Saudi Arabia and Iran decided that cooperation served their re- 
gional interests, the hajj lost its symbolic significance as a focus 
of contention between two countries that defined themselves as Is- 
lamic. The reopening of embassies in Riyadh and Tehran accom- 
panied the resolution of the hajj and other outstanding issues. 

Relations with the GCC Countries 

In contrast to its relations with Iran or Iraq, Saudi Arabia's ties 
with the small Arab oil-producing states along its eastern flank have 
been historically close. In 1992 the kingdom was allied with its fel- 
low monarchies and shaykhdoms of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the Gulf Cooper- 
ation Council (GCC), a regional collective security and economic 



217 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

organization. Saudi Arabia had taken the lead in forming the GCC. 
The outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War in September 1980 had provided 
the impetus Riyadh needed to convince its neighbors to join in a 
defensive pact. During the initial phase of that conflict, Iraqi forces 
achieved major victories inside Iran. Despite their distrust of the 
revolutionary regime in Tehran, Iraq's early successes alarmed the 
Saudis because they feared a defeat of Iran would embolden Bagh- 
dad to adopt an aggressive posture against other countries, espe- 
cially in the Arabian Peninsula. Riyadh did not need to persuade 
the Kuwaiti and other gulf rulers about the security implications 
of a victorious Iraq; they all shared similar views of Iraqi ambi- 
tions, and they recognized the vulnerability of their small states. 
Representatives from Saudi Arabia and the five other countries 
began meeting in January 1981 to work out the details of an alli- 
ance, and the GCC was officially inaugurated four months later. 

Although the Iran-Iraq War continued to preoccupy the GCC 
until the belligerents agreed to a cease-fire in 1988, the focus of 
security concerns had shifted from Baghdad to Tehran by late 1981 , 
when it became obvious that Iraq would not be able to defeat Iran. 
Even before the Iran-Iraq War had begun, the Saudis and their 
allies believed Iranian agents fomented demonstrations and riots 
among the Shia population living in the countries on the Arab side 
of the Persian Gulf. Renewed alarm about Iran was aroused in 
December 1981, when Bahraini police announced the arrest of a 
clandestine group of Arab men associated with the illegal Islamic 
Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, based in Tehran. The Saudis 
and most other GCC rulers believed that the group, which had 
a large cache of arms allegedly provided by the Iranian embassy 
in Manama, planned to assassinate Bahraini officials and seize pub- 
lic buildings as part of a plot to overthrow the regime. This inci- 
dent convinced Saudi Arabia that Iran sponsored terrorist groups 
and inclined the kingdom to support the Iraqi war effort more 
openly. 

GCC concerns about Iranian involvement with regional terrorism 
remained high for almost three years following the Bahrain inci- 
dent. Between 1982 and 1985, a series of assassinations, detona- 
tions of explosives-laden automobiles, and airplane hijackings 
throughout the Middle East, as well as the outbreak of the tanker 
war in the Persian Gulf, all contributed to reinforcing the strong 
suspicions about Iran. From a GCC perspective, the most unsettling 
example of terrorism was the 1983 truck bombing of several sites 
in Kuwait, including the United States embassy. The Saudis and 
their allies generally disbelieved Iranian denials of complicity. 
Nevertheless, GCC security forces failed to obtain conclusive 



218 



Headquarters of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Riyadh 

Courtesy Aramco World 

evidence directly linking Iran to the various Arab Shia groups that 
carried out violent acts. The lack of tangible proof prompted Oman 
and the UAE to improve their bilateral relations with Iran and to 
mediate between Riyadh and Tehran. These efforts actually led 
to a limited rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran. For 
about a year, from 1985 to 1986, the two countries cooperated on 
several issues including oil policy. 

During 1986 the intensification of the tanker- war phase of the 
Iran-Iraq conflict and the revelations of covert United States arms 
shipments to Tehran combined to refocus GCC concerns on con- 
ventional security matters. Saudi Arabia differed with Kuwait 
regarding the most effective means of dealing with the new threat. 
In particular, the Saudis rejected the Kuwaiti view that the presence 
of foreign warships in the Persian Gulf would intimidate Iran into 
ceasing retaliatory attacks on GCC shipping. The Saudis believed 
that the presence of foreign naval vessels would merely provoke 
Iran into widening the conflict, and the ultimate consequences 
would be adverse for all the GCC states. Riyadh therefore sup- 
ported the renewal of United Nations (UN) efforts to negotiate a 
cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. After the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 598 (1988) calling for a cease-fire and mediated 
peace talks between the warring countries, Saudi Arabia joined its 



219 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

GCC allies in support of all diplomatic moves to bring sanctions 
against Iran if it refused to accept the resolution. All GCC coun- 
tries were relieved when Iran agreed in 1988 to abide by the terms 
of Resolution 598. 

The cessation of fighting between Iran and Iraq led to the reali- 
zation of the GCC's deepest fears: that a militarily strong Iraq would 
try to intimidate its neighbors. By the end of 1988, Iraq had be- 
gun to pressure Kuwait for the rights to use Kuwaiti islands that 
controlled access to Iraqi ports. Tension between Iraq and Kuwait 
escalated, culminating in August 1990 with Iraq's invasion, occu- 
pation, and annexation of the small country. The aggression re- 
vealed to a stunned GCC that the alliance had insufficient power 
to deter or repel an attack on one of its members. Saudi Arabia 
thus requested United States assistance, as well as assistance from 
its Arab allies. All other GCC members provided military contin- 
gents for the coalition that was formed to confront Iraq. Follow- 
ing the liberation of Kuwait, the GCC decided that it would be 
necessary to maintain security alliances with countries from out- 
side the Persian Gulf region. As of 1992, however, the GCC had 
not negotiated any arrangements for itself, although individual 
members had concluded bilateral defense pacts with other countries. 

Relations with Yemen 

Yemen was the only country in the Arabian Peninsula that was 
not a member of the GCC. Saudi Arabia had excluded Yemen (ac- 
tually two separate countries, the Yemen Arab Republic, YAR, 
or North Yemen and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, 
PDRY, or South Yemen from 1962 until unification in 1990) from 
GCC membership because of its republican form of government. 
Historically, Saudi relations with Yemen had been problematic. 
In 1934 Abd al Aziz had sent his army into Yemen in an unsuc- 
cessful effort to conquer the country. Although the hereditary Shia 
ruling family of Yemen, concentrated in the north, never lost its 
distrust of the Al Saud, it accepted military assistance from Riyadh 
after it was deposed in a republican coup in 1962. For the next 
five years, the Saudis supported the Yemeni royalists in their un- 
successful struggle to regain control from the republican regime 
backed by Egypt. In November 1962, Cairo tried to intimidate 
Riyadh into withdrawing its support by sending Egyptian aircraft 
over southern Saudi Arabia to bomb several towns, including Abha 
where a hospital was hit and thirty-six patients were killed (see The 
Reigns of Saud and Faisal, 1953-75, ch. 1). Following the June 
1967 Arab-Israeli War, Saudi Arabia and Egypt resolved their 
differences over the YAR; in practice this meant that Riyadh 



220 



Government and Politics 



accepted the republican government in Sanaa. Relations grad- 
ually normalized; by the late 1970s, Saudi Arabia was providing 
economic and military aid to the YAR. Nevertheless, the Saudis 
remained suspicious of their republican neighbor, and major out- 
standing issues such as the demarcation of borders were not ad- 
dressed. 

Saudi Arabia's attitude toward the PDRY influenced its overall 
Yemen policy. After Britain granted independence to its former 
colony of Aden and the adjoining protectorate of South Arabia in 
late 1967, a self-proclaimed Marxist government gained control 
of the entire area. Riyadh became preoccupied with containing the 
spread of Aden's Marxist ideas to the rest of the Arabian Penin- 
sula, especially in Oman, where a PDRY-backed insurgency move- 
ment fought against the Al Bu Said Omani dynastic government 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Until 1976, when diplomatic 
relations with the PDRY were finally established, Saudi Arabia 
actively supported efforts to overthrow the regime in Aden; Saudi 
hostility did not abate after 1976 but assumed more discreet forms, 
including covert aid to dissident factions within the ruling Yemeni 
Socialist Party (YSP). Opposition to the unification of the YAR 
and the PDRY also became a Saudi foreign policy objective, primar- 
ily because Riyadh feared the much disliked YSP would dominate 
a unified Yemen and thus acquire an even larger base from which 
to disseminate its radical ideas. When unification occurred in early 
1990, the Saudis increased clandestine funding to various Yemeni 
groups opposed to the YSP. 

Saudi Arabia's displeasure with Yemen's unification was mild 
compared with its reaction to Yemen's position in the Persian Gulf 
War. Yemen adopted a neutral stance, condemning the Iraqi in- 
vasion and annexation of Kuwait but refusing to support UN sanc- 
tions or the use of force. Yemen's policy incensed the Saudis, who 
terminated their economic assistance to the republic. In addition, 
Riyadh expelled about 1 million Yemeni workers who were resid- 
ing in the kingdom in 1990. Relations between Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen remained strained in 1992. 

Relations with Jordan 

The final country with which Saudi Arabia shared a land bor- 
der was Jordan, in the extreme northwest. Although the Hashi- 
mite dynasty that ruled Jordan also had ruled the Hijaz before being 
driven out by Abd al Aziz in 1924, past rivalries were buried after 
World War II, and relations between the two monarchies were rela- 
tively cordial, especially between 1955 and 1990. After the 1958 
overthrow of the Hashimite dynasty in Iraq, the Saudis assumed 



221 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

a protective attitude toward Jordan. Riyadh provided economic 
assistance for development projects, and, following the June 1967 
War, direct financial subventions for the budget. Saudi Arabia also 
mediated between Jordan and its various Arab adversaries, includ- 
ing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1970-71 and 
Syria in 1980. 

Jordan's refusal to support Saudi Arabia during its confronta- 
tion with Iraq in 1990 shocked and angered Riyadh. Many Saudis 
viewed Jordan's action as that of stabbing a friend in the back. 
The Saudi government reacted severely: all grants to Jordan were 
terminated; low-priced oil sales were cut off; and Jordanian im- 
ports were restricted. After Iraq had been defeated, Riyadh spurned 
Jordan's initiatives to reconcile differences. In 1992 relations be- 
tween the two former friends remained deeply strained. 

Relations with the United States 

Although Saudi Arabia and the United States obviously did not 
share any borders, the kingdom's relationship with Washington 
was the cornerstone of its foreign policy as well as its regional secu- 
rity policy. The special relationship with the United States actually 
dated to World War II. By the early 1940s, the extent of Saudi 
oil resources had become known, and the United States petroleum 
companies that held the concession to develop the oil fields were 
urging Washington to assume more responsibility for security and 
political stability in the region. Consequently, in 1943 the adminis- 
tration of Franklin D. Roosevelt declared that the defense of Saudi 
Arabia was a vital interest to the United States and dispatched the 
first United States military mission to the kingdom. In addition 
to providing training for the Saudi army, the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers constructed the airfield at Dhahran and other 
facilities. In early 1945, Abd al Aziz and Roosevelt cemented the 
nascent alliance in a meeting aboard a United States warship in 
the Suez Canal. Subsequently, Saud, Faisal, Khalid, and Fahd con- 
tinued their father's precedent of meeting with United States pres- 
idents. 

The United States-Saudi security relationship steadily expanded 
during the Cold War. This process was facilitated by the shared 
suspicions of Riyadh and Washington regarding the nature of the 
Soviet threat to the region and the necessity of containing Soviet 
influence. As early as 1947, the administration of Harry S. Truman 
formally assured Abd al Aziz that support for Saudi Arabia's ter- 
ritorial integrity and political independence was a primary objective 
of the United States. This commitment became the basis for the 
1951 mutual defense assistance agreement. Under this agreement, 



222 



Government and Politics 



the United States provided military equipment and training for 
the Saudi armed forces. An important provision of the bilateral 
pact authorized the United States to establish a permanent United 
States Military Training Mission in the kingdom. This mission 
still operated in Saudi Arabia in 1992. 

The United States-Saudi relationship endured despite strains 
caused by differences over Israel. Saudi Arabia had not become 
reconciled to the 1948 establishment of Israel in the former Arab- 
dominated territory of Palestine and refused to extend Israel diplo- 
matic recognition or to engage in any form of relations with Israel 
(see Cooperation with the United States, ch. 5). Despite this posi- 
tion, Riyadh acknowledged that its closest ally, the United States, 
had a special relationship with Israel. After the June 1967 War, 
however, Saudi Arabia became convinced that Israel opposed 
Riyadh's strong ties with Washington and wanted to weaken them. 
During the 1970s and 1980s, periodic controversies over United 
States arms sales to the kingdom tended to reinforce Saudi con- 
cerns about the extent of political influence that supporters of Is- 
rael wielded in Washington. In several instances congressional 
leaders opposed United States weapons sales on the grounds that 
the Saudis might use them against Israel. Despite assurances from 
Saudi officials that the weapons were necessary for their country's 
defense, Congress reduced or canceled many proposed arms sales. 
Although the debates over Saudi weapons purchases were between 
the United States legislature and the executive branch, these po- 
litical contests embittered Saudis and had an adverse impact on 
overall relations. From a Saudi perspective, the public policy dis- 
putes among United States leaders seemed to symbolize a weakening 
of the United States commitment to defend the kingdom's security. 

Saudi uneasiness about United States resolve was assuaged by 
the United States response to the crisis unleashed by Iraq's inva- 
sion and occupation of Kuwait. In this ultimate test of the United 
States-Saudi security relationship, Washington dispatched more 
than 400,000 troops to the kingdom to ward off potential aggression. 
This was not the first time that United States forces had been sta- 
tioned on Saudi soil. The huge Dhahran Air Base had been used 
by the United States Air Force from 1946 to 1962. In 1963, Presi- 
dent John F. Kennedy had ordered a squadron of fighters to Saudi 
Arabia to protect the kingdom from Egyptian air assaults. In 1980 
President Jimmy Carter loaned four sophisticated airborne warn- 
ing and control system (AWACS) aircraft and their crews to Saudi 
Arabia to monitor developments in the Iran-Iraq War. However, 
the presence of United States and other foreign forces prior to and 
during the Persian Gulf War was of an unprecedented magnitude. 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Despite the size of the United States and allied contingents, the 
military operations ran relatively smoothly. The absence of major 
logistical problems was due in part to the vast sums that Saudi Ara- 
bia had invested over the years to acquire weapons and equipment, 
construct modern military facilities, and train personnel. 

After the war, Saudi Arabia again faced the prospect of congres- 
sional opposition to its requests for weapons. Riyadh believed that 
it cooperation in the war against Iraq demonstrated the legitimacy 
of its defense requirements. Nevertheless, the United States in- 
formed Saudi officials that Saudi Arabia's request to purchase 
US$20 billion of United States military equipment probably would 
not win the required approval of Congress. Riyadh reluctantly 
agreed to an administration proposal to revise its request into two 
or three separate packages, which would be submitted in consecu- 
tive years. This process tended to erode the positive feelings created 
during the war and revive Saudi resentments about being treated 
as a less than equal ally. 

Arab Nationalism 

The politics of Arab nationalism have been as important a fac- 
tor in Saudi foreign policy as have issues of regional security. The 
kingdom's relations with other Arab states in the Middle East and 
North Africa have been directly influenced by Arab nationalist con- 
cerns. Since the early 1950s, three persistent themes have domi- 
nated Arab nationalism: Arab unity, the unresolved grievances of 
the Palestinians, and the conflict with Israel. Although Saudi Ara- 
bia had its unique perspectives on these themes, it strove to re- 
main within a broad inter- Arab consensus. At various times, 
however, Saudi views differed sharply from one or more of the 
powerful Arab states, and the kingdom consequently became en- 
meshed in the area's political tensions. 

Arab Unity 

The concept of a single Arab state stretching from the Atlantic 
Ocean to the Persian Gulf never had much appeal within Saudi 
Arabia. Most Saudis interpreted Arab unity to mean that the seven- 
teen principal Arab governments should strive for solidarity on 
major regional and international issues; respect the individual po- 
litical and social differences of each Arab country; and refrain from 
interference in one another's internal affairs. This view of Arab 
unity was conservative in comparison with the ideas advocated by 
Arab intellectuals and political leaders in Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and 
Syria, as well as within the Palestinian movement. The differing 
perspectives engendered frequent ideological contests, especially 



224 



Government and Politics 



with Egypt, the most populous Arab country, which was located 
across the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. The 
most severe strain in Saudi-Egyptian relations occurred between 
1957 and 1967 when Gamal Abdul Nasser was president of Egypt. 
Nasser was a charismatic leader whose Arab nationalist rhetoric 
included widely publicized denunciations of the Al Saud as cor- 
rupt rulers and subservient puppets of the United States. His 
government supported numerous revolutionary groups opposed to 
the Saudi regime and its regional allies. In addition, Riyadh be- 
lieved that Nasser was involved in major political upheavals such 
as the military overthrow of monarchies in Iraq (1958), Yemen 
(1962), and Libya (1969). 

The June 1967 War represented a defeat for radical Arab na- 
tionalists and contributed directly to a rapprochement between 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Initially, the normalization of relations 
proceeded gradually. After Anwar as Sadat became president of 
Egypt in 1970, however, close economic and political ties between 
the two countries developed rapidly. At Saudi urging, Sadat ex- 
pelled Soviet military advisers from Egypt, halted Cairo's assistance 
to revolutionary groups operating in the Arabian Peninsula, and 
patched up strained relations with Syria. During the October 1973 
War, Saudi Arabia supported Egypt by taking the unprecedented 
step of initiating an embargo on oil shipments to the United States 
and European countries that backed Israel. Subsequently, Riyadh 
encouraged Egyptian participation in United States-mediated 
negotiations aimed at obtaining phased Israeli withdrawals from 
Egyptian and Syrian territory occupied in 1967. 

Although the Saudis valued the close relations they had achieved 
with Egypt by 1978, they were not prepared for a separate Egyp- 
tian peace treaty with Israel. The Saudis genuinely believed that 
resolving the grievances of the Palestinians was an essential require- 
ment of a durable peace. Thus, they reacted negatively to news 
that Egypt and Israel, while attending a summit meeting at the 
United States presidential retreat of Camp David, Maryland, had 
reached agreement on terms for a comprehensive peace. Riyadh 
refused to support the Egyptian decision and joined with the other 
Arab states in condemning the initiative. After the Camp David 
Accords were signed in March 1979, Saudi Arabia broke diplo- 
matic relations with Egypt and cut off economic aid. Sadat re- 
sponded by broadcasting anti-Saudi speeches as vitriolic as any 
uttered by Nasser in the 1960s. 

The cumulative impact of major developments such as the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War 
in 1980, Sadat's assassination in 1981, the regional consequences 



225 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

of Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and persistent tensions with 
Libyan leader Muammar al Qadhafi encouraged Saudi leaders to 
reevaluate their policy of isolating Egypt. However, Riyadh was 
reluctant to undertake any bold initiatives toward normalizing re- 
lations with Cairo. Instead, it provided tacit approval for efforts 
by Iraq, Jordan, and Sudan to rehabilitate Egypt. Once an inter- 
Arab consensus had been achieved, including a decision to readmit 
Egypt to the League of Arab States, the Saudis felt comfortable 
that they could improve their ties to Egypt without encountering 
charges that they were betraying Arab nationalism. Saudi Arabia 
finally restored diplomatic relations with Egypt in November 1987. 
The cementing of the renewed ties took place during the Persian 
Gulf War, when Egypt sent a contingent of armed forces to Saudi 
Arabia to help defend the kingdom against an Iraqi attack. 

Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and the PDRY were the other coun- 
tries that the Saudis believed espoused a radical form of nationalism. 
These five states consistently criticized Saudi Arabia's ties to the 
United States during the 1970s and 1980s. Of all these countries, 
relations with Libya were the most strained. Libyan leader Qadhafi 
frequently denounced the Al Saud dynasty as corrupt and illegiti- 
mate and openly called for its overthrow. The Saudis were con- 
vinced that Qadhafi supported terrorist attacks on their diplomats 
and other Arab envoys and financed antigovernment groups in 
Egypt, Jordan, Sudan, and Tunisia. As part of the kingdom's 
propaganda campaign designed to counter Qadhafi' s verbal as- 
saults, in the mid-1980s King Fahd persuaded the Saudi ulama 
to declare Qadhafi a heretic. 

The Palestinians 

The Saudis believed that the failure to resolve the grievances of 
the Palestinians was the primary reason for political instability and 
conflict in the Middle East. The Saudi position in 1992 was gener- 
ally the same as the one set out by Fahd in an eight-point peace 
plan he proposed in August 1981 . The key points called for an Is- 
raeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Jorda- 
nian and Egyptian territories where the majority of the inhabitants 
were Palestinian that Israel occupied as a consequence of the June 
1967 War; the dismantling of exclusive Jewish settlements created 
by Israel in these territories since 1967; the eventual establishment 
of an independent Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem — part of the West Bank from 
1948 to 1967 — as its capital; and just compensation for Palestini- 
ans dispossessed of their lands and homes during the establishment 
of Israel in 1948. Fahd's proposals represented the mainstream 



226 



Government and Politics 



consensus that had evolved among most Arabs and Palestinians 
by the early 1980s. The Saudis were convinced that the Fahd Plan 
was a workable solution; they felt extremely disappointed that 
neither Israel nor the United States gave the plan serious con- 
sideration. 

During the 1980s, Saudi Arabia was the principal financial backer 
of the PLO. For Riyadh, this support was both a moral and a prag- 
matic imperative. Saudis sincerely believed that the Palestinians 
had suffered a grave injustice and that all Arabs had an obligation 
to provide assistance. On a more practical level, the Saudis ac- 
knowledged that conditions in the refugee camps helped to breed 
Palestinian radicalism; they thus perceived monetary aid to Pales- 
tinian leaders as a means of maintaining a moderate influence within 
the Palestinian movement. The PLO's public support for Saddam 
Husayn during the Persian Gulf War shocked the Saudis. The 
government retaliated by cutting off its aid to the PLO. As of early 
1992, the Saudis remained bitter about the failure of the Palestini- 
ans to support them during the war, and relations with the PLO 
had not been normalized. 

The Arab-Israeli Conflict 

The conflict between Israel and the Arab states is intimately con- 
nected with the Palestinians, although it has acquired distinct 
characteristics. Saudi Arabia, like all other Arab states except Egypt, 
has never recognized Israel. For Riyadh, such a step was unthink- 
able as long as the Palestinians continued to be denied their rights 
of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia accepted the 
reality of Israel's existence. In his 1981 peace plan, Fahd had called 
for the right of every state in the Middle East to live in peace. This 
was widely interpreted to mean that Saudi Arabia was ready to 
recognize Israel when all the points of the Fahd Plan pertaining 
to the Palestinians had been implemented. When the United States 
organized a conference to initiate Arab-Israeli peace talks in the 
fall of 1991, Saudi Arabia declined to participate, but it did en- 
courage Syria to take part. 

Islam 

Islam was a third factor that influenced Saudi foreign policy. 
Solidarity with Muslim countries in Asia and Africa was an im- 
portant objective. Since the 1970s, countries such as Bangladesh, 
Pakistan, and Somalia have received special consideration in terms 
of foreign aid because of religious affinity. Many Pakistani mili- 
tary personnel were on secondment to the Saudi armed forces during 
the 1980s. 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Islam was the principal motivation for Saudi Arabia's staunch 
anticommunist position throughout the Cold War era. Riyadh op- 
posed the atheism that was the official policy of all communist re- 
gimes. For example, it closed the Saudi legation in Moscow in 1938 
and declined to resume diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union. Fol- 
lowing the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, 
however, Riyadh established relations with most of the fifteen 
separate republics. As an ally of the United States, Saudi Arabia 
was a de facto political foe of the Soviet Union and expended large 
sums over the years in an effort to counteract Soviet influence in 
the Middle East. In one instance, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia ac- 
tually became involved in a proxy war with the Soviets. Through- 
out the 1980s, the Saudis supported the Pakistan-based Afghan 
resistance groups whose guerrillas routinely crossed into Afghanistan 
to fight against Soviet forces occupying parts of the country from 
December 1979 until February 1989 in an effort to protect the 
Marxist government in Kabul. 

From an Islamic perspective, it was permissible to maintain diplo- 
matic relations with non-Muslim states that were not hostile to 
Islam. Saudi relations with non-Arab and non-Muslim countries 
consisted primarily of commercial ties to the countries of Western 
Europe, Japan, and South Asia. All these countries were impor- 
tant customers for Saudi oil. In addition, Saudi Arabia imported 
a wide range of consumer goods from Japan, Germany, Britain, 
Italy, and France. Countries such as India, the Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) also supplied 
thousands of foreign laborers for the kingdom. 



Despite Saudi Arabia's significant strategic importance, few 
scholars have had an opportunity to undertake research in the 
country. Nevertheless, there are several studies that provide valu- 
able insights into the kingdom's political processes. Robert Lacey's 
The Kingdom: Arabia and the House of Saud is essential reading for 
an understanding of how the extensive Al Saud operates as a po- 
litical institution. Sandra Mackey's The Saudis: Inside the Desert 
Kingdom, although written in a less scholarly style, presents useful 
information about Saudi politics. La peninsule arabique d'aujourd'hui 
edited by Paul Bonnenfant contains several valuable articles deal- 
ing with aspects of Saudi society. Summer Scott Huyette's Politi- 
cal Adaptation in Saudi Arabia: A Study of the Council of Ministers is an 
informative study of the development of government institutions. 
(For further information and complete citations see Bibliography.) 



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Chapter 5. National Security 



Beduin warrior 



DURING ITS INFANCY in the 1930s, the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia needed little as far as national security was concerned. Secu- 
rity forces focused on protection of the king and the royal family, 
safety of the holy places, and nominal defense of its territory, much 
of which needed no protection other than that provided by its natural 
desolation. Sixty years later, however, as producer and largest ex- 
porter of oil and owner of about one-fourth of all proven reserves, 
the land of the Al Saud (the House of Saud) was in the world 
limelight. Its security was of major international concern, not only 
because the economies of many industrialized countries depended 
on Saudi oil, but also because of the kingdom's contribution to 
stability and political moderation in the Middle East. 

King Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud, restorer of the 
Al Saud and founder of the kingdom in 1932, had many sons, four 
of whom (all born to different mothers) have succeeded him to the 
throne. The defense and security organizations introduced under 
Abd al Aziz, and particularly promoted by King Faisal ibn Abd 
al Aziz Al Saud during his reign (ruled 1964-75), have grown and 
developed into three independent entities: the armed forces, the 
paramilitary forces of the national guard, and the police and secu- 
rity forces of the Ministry of Interior. In 1992 King Fahd ibn Abd 
al Aziz Al Saud, who had been on the throne for a decade, was 
at the apex of the security system, which was headed by three amirs 
(princes) of the royal family — all sons of Abd al Aziz. The regular 
armed forces — army, navy, air force, and air defense force — were 
under the Ministry of Defense and Aviation, headed by Amir Sultan 
ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud. The internal security functions, the police 
functions, and the paramilitary frontier guard elements were under 
Amir Nayif ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, the minister of interior. The 
Saudi Arabian National Guard, charged with the protection of vital 
installations, maintaining internal security, and supporting the 
Ministry of Defense as required, was headed by Amir Abd Allah 
ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, who was also crown prince. 

The manpower of the regular armed forces was estimated by the 
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies to be 
106,000 in 1992. The army was reported to have 73,000 person- 
nel; the navy, 11,000; the air force, 18,000; and the air defense 
forces, 4,000. The active-duty strength of the national guard was 
believed to be about 55,000; part-time tribal levies accounted for 
20,000 more personnel. 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Despite the tens of billions of dollars spent on modernizing its 
armed forces, the kingdom remained vulnerable. Although the com- 
munist threat in the region had dissipated, the country's oil wealth 
made it a potential target for radical states with more powerful mili- 
tary establishments. The nation's defense presented complex 
problems. Its territory was as large as the United States east of the 
Mississippi River, and the limited Saudi forces had to be concen- 
trated in widely scattered areas of greatest strategic sensitivity. Its 
stronger neighbors had greater experience in warfare and had larger 
numbers under arms. Although the country had never faced a direct 
threat of invasion, its situation changed dramatically in August 1990 
when Iraq occupied Kuwait and massed its troops on Saudi Arabia's 
northern border. The national guard was rushed to the border, 
but it was clear that Saudi forces alone would be unable to prevent 
Iraq from seizing the Saudi and Persian Gulf states' oil assets. King 
Fahd accordingly turned to the United States and others for help. 

A Saudi general, the son of the minister of defense and aviation, 
was named co-commander of Operation Desert Storm, the allied 
campaign that drove the Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in February 1991. 
The Saudi army had its first taste of combat operations, when it 
joined with United States forces and forces from a number of Western 
and other Arab states to liberate the city of Kuwait. The kingdom 
pledged more than US$16.8 billion to support the United States costs 
of deploying its forces and to provide financial assistance to other 
countries that had contributed forces to Desert Storm or were dis- 
advantaged by compliance with sanctions imposed against Iraq. The 
war exposed the country's need for improved deterrence, and King 
Fahd announced that a major expansion of the armed forces would 
be carried out during the remainder of the 1990s. His goals included 
a doubling of the army's size, the creation of a new reserve system, 
and the purchase of additional combat aircraft for the air force and 
warships for the navy. 

The army was the senior and largest of the services as well as 
the most influential in the military hierarchy and the government. 
The chief of staff of the armed forces has invariably been an army 
general. The air force was second in seniority, enjoying consider- 
able popularity among the younger members of the royal family 
and other elites who joined to train as pilots and held many of the 
commands. The air force was the first line of defense against sur- 
prise attack aimed at Persian Gulf oil installations. Its skilled pilots 
flew thousands of sorties in the Persian Gulf War and repelled 
Iranian intrusions during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War. In the judg- 
ment of the United States Department of Defense, the air force 
and the national guard, the two branches with the closest affiliation 



232 



National Security 



with the United States, were the most combat-ready and reliable 
of the Saudi armed services during the Persian Gulf crisis. 

The air defense force, separated from the army in the mid-1980s, 
operated fixed and mobile antiaircraft missile systems that guarded 
cities, oil facilities, and other strategic sites, chiefly along the Per- 
sian Gulf. These missile systems, along with the combat aircraft 
and ground radar stations, were linked to the Peace Shield air 
defense network, which depended heavily on surveillance by air- 
craft of the Saudi-operated and United States-supported airborne 
warning and control system (AWACS). 

The Saudi navy remained a coastal force operating from bases 
along the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Its potential had grown 
with the delivery of four French guided-missile frigates in the 
mid-1980s; three more such frigates were scheduled to be commis- 
sioned in the mid-1990s. The navy assisted in escort and minesweep- 
ing operations in the Persian Gulf during the tense "tanker war" 
period of the 1980s. 

A problem shared by all four armed services was the constant 
need for personnel qualified to operate and maintain a mixed in- 
ventory of advanced equipment and weapons. Because the pool 
of military recruits was limited, Saudi Arabia was forced to rely 
heavily on high technology. The country's policy of purchasing its 
weapons from diverse military suppliers contributed to the problem 
and introduced a hybrid character to the services that hampered 
their overall efficiency. 

The special military relationship between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia since the mid- 1940s has been built around United 
States policy to promote stability and peace in the Persian Gulf 
region. Although the two countries had no agreement on bases or 
facilities, Saudi Arabia has sought United States deployments of 
ships and fighter and surveillance aircraft in emergency situations. 
The huge scale of the Saudi base complexes and the interoperabil- 
ity of Saudi equipment have facilitated such deployments. 

Initially, United States assistance consisted of weapons and equip- 
ment and of advisers to develop the organization and to help train 
Saudi forces. Since the mid-1960s, and the rise in oil revenues, 
the Saudis have been able to pay for the needed arms, equipment, 
and instructors, as well as for the services of the United States Army 
Corps of Engineers, which was responsible for the construction of 
bases, military housing, and other facilities. Until 1990, less than 
20 percent of approximately US$60 billion in military sales was 
used for weapons; most expenditures were for infrastructure, main- 
tenance, spare parts, and training. The need for new weapons and 
replenishment of stocks used during the Persian Gulf War triggered 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

a surge of new military orders that were pending as of 1992. Faced 
with political obstacles in obtaining United States arms, the Saudis 
have maintained supply relationships with other countries, nota- 
bly Britain and France, which have had training missions in the 
kingdom for many years. The number of Western military per- 
sonnel stationed in Saudi .Arabia has deliberately been kept to a 
minimum, but large numbers of civilians — under contract to cor- 
porations — have worked in the kingdom in training, maintenance, 
and logistics functions. 

Historical Role of the Armed Forces 
Armed Struggle of the House of Saud 

The kingdom was founded in 1932, about thirty years after Abd 
al Aziz had begun the reconquest of the Arabian Peninsula for the 
House of Saud. During the eighteenth century, the Al Saud es- 
tablished hegemony over many of the tribes of the peninsula but 
lost it during the nineteenth century. The Islam of the forces led 
by Abd al Aziz was based on Wahhabism (see Glossary), the creed 
of the Al Saud since the eighteenth century. Inspired by the stern 
reformer, Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, the armies of the Al 
Saud gradually forced the other tribes of Najd to accept their 
dominance and slowly extended their rule to the shores of the Per- 
sian Gulf. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, they seized 
Mecca and Medina, destroying shrines and images they considered 
sacrilegious. Learning the fate of the two holy cities and of the 
Wahhabi practice of turning back Islamic pilgrims as idolaters, the 
Ottoman sultan-caliph in Constantinople sent his viceroy in Egypt, 
Muhammad Ali, to mount a campaign to destroy the .Al Saud. In 
1816 Mecca and Medina were recaptured and, after a bloody cam- 
paign, the Ottoman army conducted a savage invasion of the Al 
Saud homeland in Najd (see The Al Saud and Wahhabi Islam, 
1500-1818, ch. 1). 

During the course of the nineteenth century, the Al Saud gradu- 
ally resumed their dominance of the central Najd region only to 
be superseded in the 1890s by the Al Rashid, who originated in 
Hail, northwest of Riyadh. After the dramatic capture of Riyadh 
in a dawn raid in 1902. Abd al Aziz and his allies defeated the 
Rashidi forces in a series of battles, gradually winning control of 
the remaining settled areas of Najd. Although Ottoman forces 
equipped with artillery combined with the Rashidi armies, they 
could not prevent Abd al Aziz from consolidating his mastery over 
all central Arabia in the middle of the first decade of the twentieth 
century. 



234 



National Security 



Taking advantage of the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire and 
the weakening of Turkish garrisons on the peninsula, Abd al Aziz 
invaded the Eastern Province (also seen as Al Ahsa) in 1913 and 
then the entire gulf coast between Kuwait and Qatar after over- 
coming the Turkish garrison at Al Hufuf. Although it had remained 
part of the Ottoman Empire, most of the peninsula had been almost 
a world unto itself until the tribes were drawn into larger outside 
conflicts during World War I. Relying on the Ottomans to main- 
tain stability in the Middle East before the war, Britain had ear- 
lier disdained a pact with Abd al Aziz, but after Britain's declaration 
of war against the Ottoman Empire in October 1914, the British 
sought an alliance with the House of Saud. By a treaty signed in 
December 1914, the British recognized Saudi independence from 
the Ottoman Empire and provided Abd al Aziz with financial sub- 
sidies and small arms. As his part of the agreement, Abd al Aziz 
promised to keep 4,000 men in the field against the House of 
Rashid, which was associated with the Ottomans. Bolstered by 
Ikhwan (brotherhood — see Glossary) forces, Saudi control was ex- 
tended to the outskirts of Hail, the Rashidi capital, by 1917. 

The Ikhwan Movement 

Seeking to win over beduin tribal leaders and obtain their loyalty 
to him and his cause, Abd al Aziz established Ikhwan communi- 
ties in which the beduin tribesmen could settle and adopt a seden- 
tary way of life. The Ikhwan were supported by Abd al Aziz with 
land, seed, tools, and money, as well as arms and ammunition. 
A mosque was built in each community, and these mosques also 
served as military garrisons. By 1915 there were more than 200 
settlements and in excess of 60,000 men in readiness to heed Abd 
al Aziz's call for warriors in his continuing battles to unite the 
peninsula. 

The Ikhwan became dedicated, even fanatical followers of the 
young Al Saud leader. Acquiescence to discipline was not an Ikhwan 
virtue, but Abd al Aziz was an uncommon leader able to use the 
power of the brotherhood and its prowess in battle to his advan- 
tage. The greatest of the Ikhwan successes was the conquest of the 
Hijaz after World War I, but the bold exploits of the Ikhwan also 
marked the beginning of their end. When Sharif Hussein, the 
Hashimite ruler of the Hijaz, entered into military negotiations 
with the Al Rashid, Abd al Aziz's reaction was swift and harsh. 
He sent the Ikhwan against the Al Rashid stronghold at Hail, which 
was captured with littie difficulty in 1921. Emboldened by their 
success, the warriors disregarded orders and crossed the border into 
Transjordan. The raiding and plundering of their Hashimite ally 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

aroused the British, who counterattacked with devastating effect, 
using armored cars and aircraft. 

Other Ikhwan expeditions succeeded in overpowering Asir, an 
independent enclave in the southwest. In defiance of Abd al Aziz's 
authority, however, they continued to raid the British protectorates. 
Recognizing that the wild forays of the Ikhwan could only be a 
constant irritant and source of danger to his leadership, Abd al 
Aziz began to form a more conventional and more disciplined army. 
He entered Mecca and laid siege to Jiddah and Medina, which 
were occupied by the end of 1924. These successes led to the capit- 
ulation of the Hashimite kingdom of the Hijaz, leaving the Al Saud 
in control of the entire peninsula, except for Yemen in the south- 
west and the British gulf protectorates. 

Having acquired such a tremendous area, Abd al Aziz then faced 
the daunting task of governing it. First, however, he had to deal 
with the rebellious Ikhwan. The zealots of the brotherhood regarded 
the Western-influenced modernization pursued by Abd al Aziz as 
a betrayal of the fundamentals of Islam that had been their raison 
d'etre since the beginning of their association with the House of 
Saud. Renewed Ikhwan raids against defenseless groups in Iraq 
incensed the British, who were trying to stabilize the region, and 
finally compelled Abd al Aziz to force the submission of the Ikhwan. 
When the Ikhwan leadership revolted against Abd al Aziz, he took 
to the field to lead his army, which was now supported by four 
British aircraft (flown by British pilots) and a fleet of 200 military 
vehicles that symbolized the modernization that the Ikhwan ab- 
horred. After being crushed at the Battle of Sabalah, the Ikhwan 
were eliminated as an organized military force in early 1930. 

The suppression of the Ikhwan brought to an end the chronic 
warfare in the Arabian Peninsula except for a series of incidents 
between 1931 and 1934 along the poorly defined border with 
Yemen. Abd al Aziz placed his eldest son, Saud, at the head of 
an army that succeeded in occupying much Yemeni territory but 
could not defeat the Yemeni warriors so adept at defending their 
mountain passes. Pressure by European powers determined to 
maintain the status quo on the Arabian Peninsula finally brought 
peace, and much of the occupied territory was restored to Yemen. 

During the 1930s, Abd al Aziz, who had made himself king, al- 
lowed the remnants of the Ikhwan to regroup as a beduin militia. 
They became known as the White Army because they wore tradi- 
tional white robes rather than military uniforms. For Abd al Aziz, 
the White Army served as a counterbalance to the small regular 
army, thereby helping to ensure his control over internal security. 
In addition to the two armies, there was the Royal Guard, a lightly 



236 



National Security 



armed body of absolutely loyal officers and troops, whose mission 
consisted entirely of protecting the monarch and the growing royal 
family. 

World War II and Its Aftermath 

Prior to the outbreak of World War II, Saudi Arabia was on 
good terms with the Axis powers, concluding an arms agreement 
with Nazi Germany on the eve of the war. Abd al Aziz maintained 
formal neutrality during most of the war, gradually leaning toward 
the Allied side. In early 1945, he abandoned his neutral posture 
and made a nominal declaration of war against Germany. The out- 
break of the war and attendant shipping dangers had brought Saudi 
Arabian oil sales to a halt. As Allied needs for oil rose, the safeguard- 
ing of the Saudi oil reserves began to be regarded as of great stra- 
tegic importance. In 1943 President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared 
that the defense of Saudi Arabia was of vital interest to the United 
States, thus making the kingdom eligible for Lend-Lease assistance. 
By the end of World War II, British power and influence in Arab 
affairs had begun to wane, and during the late 1940s and early 
1950s the United States emerged as the dominant Western power 
on the Arabian Peninsula. 

Abd al Aziz was instrumental in forming the League of Arab 
States (Arab League) in 1945, and in 1948 he sent a token battal- 
ion of noncombatant troops to participate in the first Arab-Israeli 
war. Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, after leading the coup that 
deposed King Faruk in 1952, had become a spokesman for repub- 
licanism among the Arabs, vying for power and influence with the 
Arab monarchs. Nasser's broadcasts against the royal regimes and 
his calls for nationalist revolutions grew more inflammatory after 
Egypt's war over the Suez Canal with Israel, France, and Britain 
in 1956. Saud ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, who became king after 
Abd al Aziz's death in 1953, was associated with a clumsy plot to 
assassinate Nasser. This embarrassing episode, plus Saud's ex- 
travagance and lack of leadership qualities, compelled him to turn 
over executive power to his brother, Faisal, in 1958 (see The Reigns 
of Saud and Faisal, 1953-75, ch. 1). Faisal, who would become 
king six years later, dedicated himself to the development of a 
modern military force to protect the monarchy. 

Egyptian intervention in the civil war of neighboring Yemen in 
1962 provided ample proof of the need for reliable Saudi armed 
forces. An army coup against Imam Muhammad al Badr in Yemen 
triggered a civil war that was not resolved until 1967. The insur- 
gents were supported by Nasser, who committed a large expedi- 
tionary force of Egyptian troops to the conflict. Imam Badr fled 



237 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

north, rallying loyal tribes and seeking support from Saudi Arabia. 
Within a short time, the royalist supporters of Imam Badr were 
engaged in combat against the insurgents, who established the 
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR — North Yemen). Saudi troops were 
deployed to the border, and the royalist guerrillas were given sup- 
plies and safe havens. 

In November 1963, Egyptian aircraft overflew Saudi territory, 
dropping bombs on border villages. At the request of Saudi Arabia, 
the United States dispatched a squadron of F-100 jet fighters to 
the kingdom. Faced with this show of force and unity, the Egyp- 
tians backed off. Nevertheless, the presence of Egyptian military 
on the peninsula convinced Faisal of the need to upgrade the Saudi 
armed forces still further with United States and British assistance. 

During the June 1967 War against Israel, Faisal sent a Saudi 
brigade to Jordan to bolster King Hussein's war effort. The brigade 
was still in Jordan at the time of the October 1973 War launched 
by Egypt and Syria against Israel. When war broke out, Faisal dis- 
patched another brigade to Syria to lend support to the Syrian army. 
Neither of the Saudi brigades was involved in combat. 

Naval Warfare in the Persian Gulf, 1987 

The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88 brought enormous cost in lives 
and destruction to the two combatants. For a time, however, the 
war involved only the two belligerents and did not present a direct 
military threat to Saudi Arabia. The triumph of the radical Shia 
(see Glossary) movement in Iran and the Iranian Islamic Revolu- 
tion under Ayatollah Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini had raised 
alarm throughout the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf 
states led by Saudi Arabia supported the Iraqi war effort with money 
and supplies. By 1986 the focus of the war had shifted to the waters 
of the gulf, where Iran's naval superiority enabled it to block ship- 
ping intended for Iraq and the export of Iraqi oil. Iran's naval at- 
tacks against tankers and its minelaying reached a peak in 1987. 
Forty attacks were mounted against shipping to and from Saudi 
Arabia, although oil movements were not seriously affected. The 
four minesweepers of the Saudi navy contributed to the interna- 
tional effort to locate and clear Iranian mines from the gulf. In 
cooperation with the United States, the fleet of five Saudi AW ACS 
aircraft carried out surveillance of air traffic over the gulf. Two 
Iranian aircraft were shot down for violating Saudi air space. In 
October 1987, a fleet of missile-armed Iranian speedboats was ob- 
served moving toward As Saffaniyah, a major Saudi oil field, which 
had a processing complex at Ras al Khafji near the border with 
Kuwait. When Saudi ships and aircraft as well as ships of the United 



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States Navy moved quickly to intercept the force, the Iranian ships 
turned away. 

Persian Gulf War, 1991 

At the conclusion of its bloody eight-year war with Iran, Iraq 
was able to maintain a huge, battle-tested army and vast stock- 
piles of modern weapons. To intimidate Kuwait over the issue of 
access to the gulf and Kuwait's unwillingness to limit its oil produc- 
tion, President Saddam Husayn massed Iraqi troops on Kuwait's 
border. On August 2, 1990, to the surprise of the world, Iraq in- 
vaded and occupied Kuwait, and Husayn announced Kuwait's an- 
nexation as Iraq's nineteenth province. Iraqi combat forces 
continued to move southward to the Saudi border, and enormous 
amounts of supplies were transported to the frontline troops. In- 
telligence sources indicated that Husayn planned to seize the nearby 
Saudi oil fields and processing installations. The Saudi Arabian 
National Guard was mobilized and deployed along the border, with 
army units to follow. Convinced that an Iraqi attack on Saudi ter- 
ritory was imminent and recognizing that available Saudi forces 
were no match for the divisions Husayn had moved into Kuwait, 
King Fahd authorized the deployment of United States forces to 
defend his northern border against Iraqi aggression. 

In the ensuing months, an allied force of more than 600,000 
ground, sea, and air force personnel was assembled to defend Saudi 
Arabia and to drive the Iraqis out of Kuwait. Command of the 
allied forces was divided. The head of the United States Central 
Command, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, was in charge of 
United States, British, and French units; his Saudi counterpart, 
Lieutenant General Khalid ibn Sultan Al Saud, son of the minister 
of defense and aviation and nephew of the king, was in charge of 
units from twenty-four non-Western countries, including troops 
from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, and other states of the 
Persian Gulf. Saudi ground forces deployed for the allied under- 
taking (called Operation Desert Shield and renamed Operation 
Desert Storm when the war began in January 1991), consisted of 
one armored brigade, three mechanized brigades, and two national 
guard mechanized brigades. 

Saudi military resources were strained by the need to manage 
the allied military buildup and to ensure that the nations contribut- 
ing forces to the coalition were supplied with fuel, housing, power, 
and food. The Saudi air force flew 3,000 sorties, losing only one 
Tornado and two F-5E fighter aircraft to Iraqi fire. In one of the 
few engagements by any of the allied powers with the Iraqi air force, 



239 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

two Iraqi Mirage F-l aircraft trying to attack allied shipping were 
shot down by a Saudi pilot. Saudi fighter units were frustrated by 
the absence of Iraqi air targets; Iraqi aircraft either were destroyed 
on the ground or shifted away from the fighting. 

In their only ground attack on Saudi territory, the Iraqis cap- 
tured the evacuated border town of Ras al Khafji on January 30, 
1991. After two days of heavy fighting, three Saudi mechanized 
battalions, one tank battalion, and two national guard battalions, 
joined by a battalion from Qatar and supported by United States 
Marines and attack helicopters, succeeded in driving the Iraqis out 
of the town on February 2 . Eleven Iraqi tanks and fifty-one other 
armored vehicles were destroyed. The Saudis reported casualties 
of eighteen dead, thirty-two wounded, and eleven missing in what 
was described as the greatest land battle in which the country's 
forces had ever been engaged. Some allied observers said that the 
national guard units acted more decisively and were more aggres- 
sive in using firepower against entrenched Iraqi troops than were 
the regular Saudi forces. 

When the massive ground assault against the Iraqi positions 
began on February 24, 1991, the Saudi troops formed part of two 
Arab armies. The first, Joint Forces Command North, which also 
included Egyptian, Syrian, and Kuwaiti troops, was deployed on 
Kuwait's western border. Joint Forces Command East was deployed 
along the gulf, immediately south of Kuwait, and consisted of about 
five brigades from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, Morocco, and Senegal. The Saudi national guard 
formed part of a mobile reserve. 

The main attack was led by United States, British, and French 
forces in the west, directly facing Iraqi territory, and was aimed 
at cutting links between the Iraqi forces in Kuwait and their sources 
of supply in Iraq. The ground assault on Kuwait by the Arab forces 
of Joint Forces Command North was led by two Egyptian divi- 
sions on the left and on the right, and the ad hoc Khalid Division, 
consisting of Saudi and Kuwaiti troops, including the Saudi Twen- 
tieth Mechanized Brigade and the Fourth Armored Brigade. As 
the Khalid Division advanced eastward toward the city of Kuwait, 
passages through Iraqi minefields were cleared by allied bombing 
and engineer operations. On the third day, after light fighting and 
the surrender of thousands of Iraqi soldiers, the city of Kuwait was 
liberated. In the four days of fighting before the Iraqi army defend- 
ing Kuwait was destroyed, Saudi casualties were minimal. The 
Saudi navy was also involved, receiving credit for sinking an Iraqi 
minelayer with a Harpoon antiship missile. 



240 



Giant oil spill resulting from the Persian Gulf War, 1991 

Courtesy Aramco World 

Security Perceptions and Policies 
The Military Threat 

Until Iraq concentrated its forces on Saudi Arabia's northeastern 
border after the occupation of Kuwait in 1990, the kingdom had 
been exposed to few direct threats to its territory. The only overtly 
hostile actions were from Yemeni-based Egyptian air and naval 
units in 1963, YAR forces that attacked Saudi border posts in 1969 
and 1973, and Iranian attacks on shipping in the Persian Gulf in 
the 1980s. Nevertheless, the nation's wide geographic expanse and 
lengthy coastlines on both the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, combined 
with a small, scattered population, presented unusual problems of 
defense. With the world's largest reserves of oil and vulnerable oil 
processing facilities, the kingdom saw itself as a tempting target 
for aggressive forces. Moreover, it was militarily weak in a highly 
volatile region of the world, amid heavily armed and potentially 
hostile neighbors. 

Until the late 1980s, Saudi security concerns focused on the com- 
munist influence in nearby countries, notably in Ethiopia and the 
People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which gave the 
Soviet Union access to naval facilities in the Red Sea and on the 
Gulf of Aden. Saudi Arabia interpreted the Soviet invasion of 



241 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Afghanistan in December 1979 as a means of establishing a stag- 
ing area for future operations in the Persian Gulf. The revolution 
in Iran earlier that year produced a radical Shia-dominated regime 
in Tehran and introduced a far more immediate threat to gulf sta- 
bility. Iranian belligerence led Saudi Arabia to support Iraq dur- 
ing the Iran-Iraq War. The heating up of the tanker war in 1987 
escalated tensions. The Saudis, concerned about domestic attitudes 
and the reaction of Arab states, discouraged deeper United States 
involvement in the crisis. In April 1987, the United States agreed 
to Kuwait's request that Kuwaiti tankers sail under the United 
States flag with naval escorts. Saudi Arabia cooperated with this 
operation by assisting in mine clearance and air surveillance. 

The Saudi leadership considered Iran's condemnation of the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and its adherence to United Nations 
(UN) sanctions during the Persian Gulf War to be welcome signs 
of moderation. The overthrow of the Marxist regime in Addis 
Ababa in 1991 and the collapse of Soviet influence in the Middle 
East further reduced the threat of radical influences near the king- 
dom's borders. 

The Persian Gulf War of 1991 battered the offensive capability 
of Iraq's formidable military machine. An estimated forty divisions 
were lost or rendered ineffective. About two- thirds of Iraq's 4,500 
tanks were destroyed as well as more than 2,000 artillery pieces. 
Nevertheless, the Iraqi army's active manpower strength was an 
estimated 380,000 at the war's end, including three divisions of 
the Republican Guards, the troops considered most loyal to Presi- 
dent Saddam Husayn. Despite crippling blows to its fighting poten- 
tial, Iraq remained a potential adversary and a long-term security 
threat to Saudi Arabia's limited forces. 

Relations with Yemen have always been troubled in modern 
times. The border has been the scene of periodic tribal clashes and 
boundary disputes. The Riyadh government's bases in the southern 
desert enabled it to maintain ground and air units near the Yemeni 
frontier. Saudi Arabia had subsidized the YAR government and 
the northern Yemeni tribes and tried to isolate the Marxist govern- 
ment of the PDRY. 

The union of the two Yemens in May 1990 left Saudi Arabia 
uneasy that secular leftist elements of a more populous combined 
Yemen might prevail over the Islamic conservatism of the former 
YAR. Relations worsened when Yemen came out in support of 
Iraq, after the latter's invasion of Kuwait. Saudi Arabia retaliated 
by deporting about 1 million Yemeni workers whose repatriated 
earnings had formed a major part of Yemen's economy. 

Long stretches of uninhabited desert, known as the Empty Quar- 
ter, or Rub al Khali, formed disputed territory between Yemen 



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National Security 



and Saudi Arabia. To counter Yemeni smuggling and to main- 
tain better surveillance of the border area, Saudi Arabia announced 
in 1991 that it was seeking bids on an electronic security system 
to detect illegal crossings. In 1992 Saudi Arabia demanded that 
foreign oil companies discontinue test drilling in parts of the unde- 
fined territory that had long been under Yemeni control. The king- 
dom was thought to fear that a surge of oil revenues could be used 
to modernize the Yemeni armed forces. Saudi border patrols were 
increased and, according to the Yemenis, Saudi agents were ac- 
tive among residents of the disputed area for the purpose of under- 
mining Yemen's authority. 

The Saudis linked the influence of revolutionary Arab regimes 
to the continuation of the Arab-Israeli confrontation and the Israeli 
occupation of Arab territory on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Saudi Arabia viewed with concern the possibility of renewed Arab- 
Israeli hostilities, and the strong Israeli military establishment was 
seen as a potential threat to its security. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia 
considered a comprehensive settlement of the Palestinian question 
a primary objective of its policies. Saudi Arabia did not see war 
with Israel as an imminent threat, but it feared Israel's ability to 
mount strategic air strikes against sensitive Saudi targets at the out- 
set of any future Arab-Israeli conflict. The possibility of such 
preemptive strikes by Israel had impelled Saudi Arabia to commit 
a major part of its modern air defense to its northern border zones. 
The most likely Israeli targets in the kingdom would be the com- 
plex of military bases around Tabuk in the northwest or the pipe- 
line terminal and other oil facilities at Yanbu al Bahr on the Red 
Sea. More distant Saudi targets could be reached with aerial 
refueling. 

In spite of past differences and their considerable military 
strengths, the neighboring Islamic countries of Egypt and Syria were 
not regarded in 1992 as potential adversaries. In certain respects, 
Saudi Arabia's geographic position on the peninsula was a favorable 
one. The harshness of its interior desert practically limited over- 
land attack to the northwest corner facing Jordan and Israel and 
to the northeast corridor parallel to the Persian Gulf. Harassing 
attacks by air or sea could be very damaging, however, disrupting 
oil production and tanker traffic. 

Countries surrounding the Arabian Peninsula — although heav- 
ily armed — were poorly equipped to mount and sustain a full-scale 
invasion by sea or air. Saudi Arabia would be less prepared to deal 
with intervention by a neighboring power in one of the smaller states 
of the peninsula, using local disturbances or turmoil as a pretext 
and then expanding its position. The politically vulnerable gulf oil 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

states had been subject to outside intervention in the past; for this 
reason, Saudi Arabia and the smaller states had joined to form a 
system for collective security. 

Collective Security under the Gulf Cooperation Council 

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed in 1981 by 
the six Persian Gulf states of the Arabian Peninsula — Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emi- 
rates — to confront their security challenges collectively. The im- 
mediate objective was to protect themselves from the threat posed 
by the Iran-Iraq War and Iranian-inspired activist Islamism (also 
seen as fundamentalism). In a series of meetings, chiefs of staff 
and defense ministers of the gulf states developed plans for mu- 
tual defense and launched efforts to form a joint command and 
a joint defense network. 

Ground and air units of the six member states carried out several 
multilateral exercises between 1983 and 1987 under the code name 
of Peninsula Shield. Military assistance, funded mainly by Saudi 
Arabia and Kuwait, was extended to Bahrain for up-to-date fighter 
aircraft and a modern air base, and to Oman to improve its defen- 
sive capability at the Strait of Hormuz. The GCC planned to inte- 
grate naval and ground radar systems and to create a combined 
air control and warning system based on Saudi AW ACS aircraft. 
Problems of compatibility with different communication and elec- 
tronic systems, however, delayed the introduction of these pro- 
grams. In 1984 the GCC defense ministers agreed on the creation 
of a two-brigade (10,000-man) Peninsula Shield Force. This joint 
intervention force was based in Saudi Arabia near King Khalid 
Military City at Hafar al Batin under the command of a Saudi 
officer (see fig. 9). In addition to a headquarters staff, the force 
consisted of one infantry brigade of about 5,000 men with elements 
from all GCC states in 1992, according to The Military Balance. Its 
mission, however, had not been publicly defined. It was not clear, 
for example, whether the joint force would have authority to inter- 
vene in a domestic emergency. The force could be enlarged at a 
time of threat; it was apparently reinforced prior to the Persian 
Gulf War in 1991 but did not take part in the war as a distinct unit. 

In March 1991, after the conclusion of the Persian Gulf War, 
the six members of the GCC, together with Egypt and Syria, 
declared their intention to establish a deterrent force to protect 
Kuwait, with Egypt and Syria to provide the bulk of the troops 
and the GCC states to provide the financing. The plan subsequendy 
encountered a series of setbacks. At year's end, there appeared little 
chance that the Arab deterrent force would be installed. In the 



244 



National Security 



meantime, Kuwait had succeeded in obtaining security commit- 
ments from the United States and Britain and arranged for the 
prepositioning of United States military equipment. 

Threats to Internal Security 

Despite the political and military upheavals in surrounding coun- 
tries, Saudi Arabia's internal situation appeared to be under con- 
trol in 1992. Most Saudis seemed to accept the authority of the 
Al Saud and strict observance of Islamic law to ensure domestic 
stability. However, the kingdom's sudden exposure to international 
scrutiny after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 brought into sharp 
relief the polarization between the two competing forces of society — 
the powerful religious establishment and the liberal reformist 
elements. The modern sector pressed for greater popular partici- 
pation in decision making and for greater accountability by the 
government (see Other Groups, ch. 4). Criticism and anger over 
corruption by members of the royal family and other members of 
the elite were more openly expressed than previously. King Fahd 
promised that he would create a majlis ash shura (consultative council) 
to respond to political grievances. Such promises had been made 
in the past, however, with little result. 

Some potential for social instability arose from the modernists' 
belief that the ruling family remained too deferential to traditional 
Muslim interests. These liberal elements desired the opportunity 
for involvement in the political process and a share of political 
power. In May 1991, it was reported that even the conservative 
religious establishment had petitioned the government for a con- 
sultative assembly. This action was accompanied by demonstra- 
tions in several cities. Extremists accused the religious establishment 
of hypocrisy in adhering to Islamic practices and of the maldistri- 
bution of wealth, fueling resentments within broad segments of 
Saudi society. 

Marginal political groups of the left and right were considered 
illegal and their members were subject to arrest and detention by 
government security organs. These groups included the Organi- 
zation of Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula, the Arab 
Socialist Action Party, and the Party of God in the Hijaz. The siz- 
able alien population, estimated at 4.6 million in 1992 and rep- 
resenting more than half the labor force, was feared as a possible 
source of divisiveness as well as a disruptive influence on the think- 
ing and attitudes of the indigenous population. It was assumed that 
clandestine organs of external political movements such as the Pales- 
tine Liberation Organization (PLO) were represented in the labor 
force. Among the most numerous of the foreign workers were 



247 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Yemenis, who always tended to be regarded with suspicion. Be- 
cause many of these workers were employed in strategic economic 
sectors and in the oil industry, strikes and sabotage were constant 
dangers. In 1990 the Saudi authorities took measures to identify 
illegal residents and to regularize their status or deport them. These 
efforts intensified after the Persian Gulf crisis began, and about 
1 million Yemenis as well as Sudanese, Iraqis, and Palestinians 
were compelled to leave. 

In the oil-rich Eastern Province (Al Ahsa) lived between 200,000 
and 400,000 Shia. They had endured two centuries of Wahhabi 
subjugation and remained disaffected elements in Saudi society. 
Riots in late 1979 and early 1980 among the Shia were believed 
to have been inspired by taped messages of the Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Because Shia comprised possibly half of the labor force of the Ara- 
bian American Oil Company (Aramco), which from 1988 was called 
the Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi Aramco), the government 
treated their presence as a security problem. During the 1980s, 
the government bolstered its security forces in the area, while at 
the same time attempting to allay Shia resentment by responding 
to their social and religious grievances. Among other groups with 
a distinct identity within the kingdom were the Hijazis, who lived 
along the mountainous western coast extending to the holy cities 
of Mecca and Medina, and the tribes of Asir Province just north 
of Yemen. Although both groups benefited from the rising wealth 
of the country, they lacked sympathy for the traditional royalist 
regime and for the strict religious leadership. Accordingly, ques- 
tions of their fundamental loyalty to the Al Saud persisted. 

The likelihood of schisms within the royal family arising from 
policy differences or personal rivalries seemed remote but could 
not be completely discounted. Factional disputes could arise over 
such issues as the closeness of ties with the United States or curb- 
ing the power of the religious establishment. For the most part, 
the informal assembly of princes has succeeded in keeping rival- 
ries within bounds and has prevented internal differences from be- 
coming public issues. 

In view of elaborate security measures, such as the division of 
armed power between the regular military and the national guard, 
and the substantial benefits enjoyed by both officers and enlisted 
personnel, the possibility of an insurrection emerging from the 
armed forces was regarded as highly unlikely. Nevertheless, in 1991 
leaflets critical of royal princes were reportedly distributed in gar- 
risons. The influence of radical Islamists among soldiers and lower 
ranking officers was said to be growing. 



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National Security 



The military leadership has been free from serious conspiracies 
against the regime except for an abortive coup by air force officers 
in 1969. About 300 air force personnel were arrested even before 
the plot was set in motion. The dissidents were tried and sentenced 
to prison, but by the mid-1970s all had been released. High wages 
and privileges tended to keep discontent among the officer corps 
to a minimum. The appointment of many members of the royal 
family to military positions also provided a measure of protection 
against intrigue. The separate national guard, with its tribal roots, 
provided an additional safeguard against any threat from the mili- 
tary. 

The prestige of the House of Saud was closely associated with 
the protection of the holy places. When, in 1979, an armed group 
of about 500 religious extremists occupied the Grand Mosque of 
Mecca, the standing of the royal family was seriously affected. The 
insurgent leader condemned the Al Saud for corruption, declar- 
ing that the kingdom's rulers had forsaken the primary tenets of 
Islam. Security forces did not immediately respond to the occupa- 
tion because of the Quran's strictures against shedding blood in 
the holy place. Partly as a result of lack of coordination and poor 
discipline, it took troops, national guard, and security forces four- 
teen days of heavy fighting to oust the insurgents. Many people were 
killed. The occupation of the Grand Mosque was followed by riots 
and demonstrations by Shia dissidents, which were answered by 
the liberal use of firearms and the sealing off of major trouble spots 
by the national guard (see The Reign of Khalid, 1975-82), 

Followers of Ayatollah Khomeini tried to stir up trouble by dis- 
rupting the annual hajj, or pilgrimage to Mecca, on several occa- 
sions during the 1980s, but heavy security controls usually succeeded 
in preventing major incidents (see Pilgrimage, ch. 2). In July 1987, 
however, more than 400 people died as a result of a serious riot 
instigated by thousands of Iranian pilgrims. Khomeini called for 
the overthrow of the Saudi royal family to avenge the pilgrims' 
deaths. Saudi Arabia, in turn, accused Iran of staging the riots to 
support its demands that Mecca and Medina be internationalized 
as pan-Islamic cities. Several Saudi Shia were tried and executed 
for exploding bombs at Saudi oil facilities in 1988, probably as retali- 
ation by Iran and its sympathizers against restrictions on Iranian 
attendance at the annual pilgrimage after the 1987 riots. A number 
of bomb attacks were made on Saudi agencies abroad — primarily 
offices of the national carrier, Saudi Arabian Airlines. Saudi diplo- 
mats were assassinated by groups calling themselves the Party of 
God in the Hijaz, Soldiers of the Right, and Arab Fury. Both types 
of attack were thought to be the work of Saudi Shia instigated by 



249 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

elements of the Iranian government. Saudi Arabia accused Iran 
in connection with two bomb incidents during the 1989 hajj in ap- 
parent retaliation for Saudi restrictions against Iranian pilgrims. 
Sixteen Kuwaiti Shia were executed for these attacks (see Regional 
Security, ch. 4). 

Some easing of relations with Iran occurred after Khomeini's 
death in 1989. During the 1990 pilgrimage, more than 1,400 pil- 
grims were trampled to death or suffocated after they were stam- 
peded in an underground tunnel. The incident, however, was not 
linked to Iran. Disputes over the size of the Iranian contingent and 
rules governing their conduct prevented Iranians from participat- 
ing in the hajj for three years. In 1991 the Saudis accepted a quota 
of 115,000 Iranian pilgrims and allowed political demonstrations 
in Mecca. Although peaceful, the demonstrations included strident 
attacks on the United States and Israel. 

The Persian Gulf War placed new strains on the government's 
efforts to maintain the allegiances of both the modern, secular seg- 
ments of Saudi society and the traditional, religious elements. Al- 
though it offered some conciliatory gestures to the modernists, the 
government appeared adamant and ready to respond forcefully to 
any dissent against the authority of the Al Saud. 

The existence of a large and diffuse royal family, the vast ter- 
ritorial extent of the kingdom, and its widely scattered population 
centers reduced the likelihood that an attempt to overthrow Saudi 
rule could succeed. Still, the government continued to exercise con- 
trol over the information media and strictly supervised or prohibited 
independent interest groups such as political parties or labor unions. 

Islamic radicals were few in number but had undeniable in- 
fluence, projecting their messages from the public mosques and 
university classrooms. Their criticism that the government under 
King Fahd had weakened in its devotion to Islamic principles was 
difficult to silence because it was offered in an Islamic context. 
Islamist pressure for greater Islamization in education, the press, 
and foreign policy appeared to strengthen after the Persian Gulf 
War. 

The Armed Forces 

Under the king, who was president of the Council of Ministers 
(effectively prime minister) and commander in chief of the armed 
forces, the minister of defense and aviation exercised operational 
control and supervision of the Royal Saudi Land Forces (army), 
the Royal Saudi Naval Forces, the Royal Saudi Air Force, and 
the Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces (see fig. 10). The total personnel 



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National Security 



strength of the four services was estimated at 76,500 in 1991, ris- 
ing to 106,000 in 1992. 

A National Security Council (also known as the High Defense 
Council) had formal responsibility for setting defense policy. Its 
members included, in addition to the king and the minister of 
defense and aviation, the ministers of interior, foreign affairs, and 
finance and national economy, and the chief of staff of the armed 
forces. Ultimate decisions about security, however, rested solely 
with the king, assisted by such advisers as he chose to consult. 

Senior personnel, frequently princes of the royal family, usu- 
ally retained their positions for long periods in the Saudi system. 
The minister of defense and aviation, Amir Sultan, a full brother 
of the king, had been appointed to his position in 1962. Crown 
Prince Abd Allah, a half brother of the king, had been commander 
of the national guard for the same length of time. The chief of the 
general staff, with operational responsibility for the four services, 
held the rank of general; the chiefs of the individual services usually 
held the rank of lieutenant general. 

Similar to the organization of military staffs in the United States, 
the Saudi armed forces had four major sections: personnel (G-l), 
intelligence (G-2), operations and training (G-3), and logistics 
(G-4). The chiefs of the four sections were the principal advisers 
to the chief of staff, who invariably has been an army officer. The 
armed forces were further distributed among nine area commands. 
Their mission was to defend the integrity of the country's borders 
and to protect the country against foreign encroachments or inva- 
sion. During episodes of severe internal disorder, the armed forces 
had the additional mission of assisting the security forces in restoring 
public order. 

The national guard was under the personal control of the king 
acting through its commander, Amir Abd Allah, the heir appar- 
ent and first deputy prime minister. The national guard's com- 
mand structure was entirely separate from that of the regular armed 
services. Its mission was primarily internal security, including 
protection of the major oil facilities in the Eastern Province and 
assistance to the regular forces of public order against civil distur- 
bances. The service was also expected to assist the regular armed 
forces in repelling threats to the security of the kingdom's borders, 
as was the case when the national guard participated in the Persian 
Gulf War alongside regular army units. 

Royal Saudi Land Forces 

The army's strength of approximately 73,000 in 1992 was greater 
than the other three services combined and somewhat in excess of 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 




252 



National Security 



the national guard's active complement. The principal combat units 
were eight brigades: two armored, five mechanized, and one air- 
borne. There were five artillery battalions. A separate Royal Guard 
Regiment consisted of three light infantry battalions. According 
to Norman Friedman's Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait, the Saudi 
land forces had deployed two armored brigades and two mechanized 
brigades on the Kuwaiti border in December 1990 prior to Opera- 
tion Desert Storm. The disposition of the remaining ground units 
included a mechanized brigade on the western Iraqi border, a 
mechanized brigade on the Yemeni border, the Royal Guard Regi- 
ment in Riyadh, and the airborne brigade in reserve. The loca- 
tion of one mechanized brigade was not given. 

Despite the addition of a number of units and increased mobil- 
ity achieved during the 1970s and 1980s, the army's personnel com- 
plement has expanded only moderately since a major buildup was 
launched in the late 1960s. The army has been chronically under- 
strength, in the case of some units by an estimated 30 to 50 per- 
cent. These shortages have been aggravated by a relaxed policy 
that permitted considerable absenteeism and by a serious problem 
of retaining experienced technicians and noncommissioned officers 
(NCOs). The continued existence of a separate national guard also 
limited the pool of potential army recruits. Two months after the 
Persian Gulf War, in April 1991, the government announced that 
a decision had been taken to expand the ground forces sufficiently 
to provide a more convincing deterrent against threats to the king- 
dom' s borders. Possibly 90,000 or more troops would be recruited 
during the 1990s and organized into seven or eight divisions. With 
the expected organization of a reserve force, the total number that 
could be called upon in an emergency might reach 200,000. For- 
eign observers, however, aware of past failures to meet personnel 
goals, doubted that the limited manpower pool would permit a dou- 
bling of the size of the army. 

Smaller and less important than the national guard until the 
1960s, the army began to modernize after Egyptian incursions onto 
Saudi territory during the Yemeni civil war (1962-65). Radical 
Arab nationalism and the emergence of Marxist movements in 
nearby countries, as well as Israel's crushing defeat of Arab armies 
in the June 1967 War, also spurred efforts to build a credible ground 
force. The surplus of revenues from oil exports provided the means 
to spend lavishly on army facilities and advanced equipment. The 
first Saudi armored brigade, designated the Fourth Armored 
Brigade, was structured and trained along French lines. It was 
equipped with 300 AMX-30 main battle tanks and 500 AMX-10P 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

armored infantry fighting vehicles, both French-made (see table 12, 
Appendix). 

The other armored brigade, designated the Eighth Armored 
Brigade, was formed under United States guidance soon afterward 
in the late 1970s. To equip this brigade, Saudi Arabia purchased 
M-60A3 main battle tanks and M-113 armored personnel carriers 
(APCs) from the United States. In 1990 Saudi Arabia placed an 
order for 315 M1A2 Abrams, the most advanced United States 
tank; delivery was scheduled for 1993. Each brigade consisted of 
three tank battalions, a mechanized infantry battalion, and a sup- 
port battalion. The French-equipped armored brigade was stationed 
at Tabuk in the northwest and the United States-equipped brigade 
at Khamis Mushayt in the southwest. 

The army's four mechanized brigades had been converted from 
infantry brigades between the late 1970s and the mid-1980s and 
were equipped with a variety of United States and French armored 
fighting vehicles. Each brigade consisted of one tank battalion, three 
mechanized infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, and a sup- 
port battalion. The infantry brigade consisted of three motorized 
battalions, an artillery battalion, and a support battalion. The air- 
borne brigade consisted of two paratroop battalions and three spe- 
cial forces companies. Field artillery battalions were equipped with 
United States and French 155mm self-propelled howitzers and 
105mm and 155mm towed guns. The principal antitank weapons, 
many of them mounted on armored vehicles, were the United States 
TOW, the British Dragon, and the French HOT. Tactical air de- 
fense weapons included self-propelled guns, the French Crotale 
surface-to-air missile (SAM), and Stinger and Redeye shoulder- 
fired missiles. The army used transport and medical evacuation 
helicopters but had no assault helicopters. 

The most visible unit of the army, because of its deployment 
around Riyadh and wherever the king traveled in the country, was 
the Royal Guard Regiment. The Royal Guard had been autono- 
mous until it was incorporated into the army in 1964; neverthe- 
less, it remained directly subordinate to the king and maintained 
its own communications network. The mission of the regiment was 
protection of the House of Saud. Detachments accompanied the 
king as well as several other members of the Al Saud at all times. 
Mainly recruited from the tribes of Najd, guardsmen were selected 
on the basis of their loyalty to the king and the Al Saud. The regi- 
ment's equipment included light weapons and armored vehicles. 

The army's strength was normally concentrated at four large 
military cities, built at great expense in the 1970s and 1980s with 
the assistance of the United States Army Corps of Engineers. The 



254 



AMX-30 main battle tank used by the Royal Saudi Land Forces 
Courtesy Armed Forces Office, Royal Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington 

first of these cities was at Khamis Mushayt in the mountains of 
the southwest, about 100 kilometers from the Yemeni border. The 
second was at Tabuk, protecting the northwestern routes leading 
from Jordan, Israel, and Syria. A third site, Assad Military City, 
was at Al Kharj, about 100 kilometers southeast of Riyadh, where 
the national armaments industry was also located. 

The largest of the military cities, King Khalid, began function- 
ing in 1985 although construction continued throughout the 1980s. 
Located near Hafar al Batin close to the border area facing Kuwait 
and Iraq, King Khalid Military City was sited near the strategic 
Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline) road connecting Ad Dammam 
with Jordan. It was a self-contained city of 65,000, both military 
and civilian, built with a perimeter in the form of a huge octagon 
within which were a series of concentric smaller octagons. Houses 
and apartments for 6,500 families were provided, as well as numer- 
ous schools and mosques, power plants, shopping arcades, theaters, 
and clubs. Water was supplied by seventeen deep wells. Adjacent 
to the main installation were a hospital, race course, maintenance 
and supply areas, underground command bunkers, and antiaircraft 
missile sites. The logistic and other base resources at King Khalid 
Military City were indispensable to the allied buildup before the 
sweep into Iraq during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. It was reported 



255 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

that construction would begin in 1992 on a fifth military city in 
the Empty Quarter, 550 kilometers south of Riyadh. The new base 
would have a residential area to accommodate 20,000 people and 
a large air base with hardened aircraft shelters. The existing army 
base at Ash Sharawrah in the Empty Quarter was remote but im- 
portant because of its proximity to the Yemeni border. 

The equipment of the land forces came from a variety of sources 
but primarily from Western countries. However, in 1989 it was 
revealed that Saudi Arabia had purchased the intermediate range 
(2,600-kilometer) CSS-2 surface-to-surface missile (SSM) from 
China. According to The Military Balance, 1992-1 99 3 published by 
the International Institute for Strategic Studies, as of 1992 Saudi 
Arabia had a stock of thirty launchers and fifty missiles. Of lim- 
ited accuracy and reliability and with a payload of only 750 kilo- 
grams, the value of the SSMs was largely symbolic. Nevertheless, 
disclosure of the secret transaction — Saudi Arabia's first major ac- 
quisition of hardware from a communist country and a system that 
could strike anywhere in the Middle East and beyond — created an 
uproar in the United States. To placate Washington, King Fahd 
provided written assurances that the missiles would not be armed 
with chemical weapons, and Saudi Arabia later signed the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty to demonstrate that it had no intention 
of acquiring nuclear warheads. 

Royal Saudi Air Force 

As of 1992, the first line combat air strength of the Royal Saudi 
Air Force (RSAF) consisted of some 200 aircraft, organized into 
six fighter/ground-attack squadrons and five fighter-air defense 
squadrons. The personnel strength of the air force was estimated 
to be about 18,000. Although modest in comparison to the air power 
of neighboring countries, the RSAF was considered to be the most 
modern and effective of the Saudi services. Its mission was to de- 
fend the economic installations and the widely scattered popula- 
tion centers of Saudi Arabia against attack and, particularly, to 
repel air attacks or amphibious assaults against the country's highly 
vulnerable oil pumping stations, processing and loading facilities, 
and oil platforms in the Persian Gulf. 

The first-line combat fighters were deployed at four key airfields: 
Dhahran, to defend the main oil facilities of the Persian Gulf; At 
Taif, covering the ports and holy cities of the lower Red Sea; 
Khamis Mushayt, defending the Yemeni border zone; and Tabuk, 
to defend the key ports of the upper Red Sea area and Saudi air 
space adjacent to Jordan and Israel. These four bases and the air 
base at Riyadh were protected from air attack by Improved Hawk 



256 



Alpha jet of the Royal Saudi Air Force 
Courtesy Armed Forces Office, Royal Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington 

(I-Hawk) SAMs, hardened aircraft shelters, and underground com- 
mand posts. 

The RSAF was established in 1950 during the reign of Abd al 
Aziz. Its early air operations had been under control of the army. 
In its initial years, the air force was influenced chiefly by the Brit- 
ish, who provided aircraft and advisers and helped train Saudi pilots 
and maintenance personnel in the kingdom and in Britain. United 
States influence, emanating from the air base at Dhahran that was 
leased by the United States from 1952 to 1962, was also pivotal 
to the early development of the Saudi air force. Some United States 
aircraft were transferred to the RSAF from units operating at 
Dhahran and the United States Military Training Mission at 
Dhahran trained Saudi pilots and maintenance personnel. 

In 1972 the first of 114 Northrop F-5s were delivered to the 
RSAF, and, as of 1992, the air force still used three squadrons of 
later versions of the F-5 in the fighter- ground attack role, one squad- 
ron for reconnaissance, and a number of aircraft as advanced jet 
trainers. In 1984 first deliveries were taken of the more advanced 
F-15s. By 1992 the SAF had seventy-eight F-15s, including fighter 
conversion trainers (see Cooperation with the United States, this ch.). 

After the United States refused a Saudi arms request, Saudi Arabia 
turned to Britain to meet its requirements. In mid- 1988, it was 



257 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

announced that as part of a huge transaction, Saudi Arabia would 
acquire Tornado fighters from Britain in their strike and air defense 
configurations, plus Hawk jet trainers and Pilatus PC-9 trainers 
built in Switzerland and outfitted in Britain. As of early 1992, three 
of the RSAF fighter-ground attack squadrons were equipped with 
Tornadoes and three squadrons were equipped with F-5Es. Two 
air defense squadrons were equipped with Tornadoes and three 
squadrons were equipped with F-15Cs. The three transport squad- 
rons were equipped with C-130s in various versions and CASA 
C-212s, a medium transport of Spanish design. The two helicop- 
ter squadrons employed a variety of smaller rotary-wing aircraft 
(see table 13, Appendix). Undaunted by its previous failure to es- 
tablish an assured supply of combat aircraft from the United States, 
Saudi Arabia announced in late 1991 that it had placed an order 
with McDonnell Douglas for an additional seventy-two F-15s. It 
appeared doubtful whether the sale would be approved by the 
United States administration and the Congress. 

Because ground-based radar could not provide adequate ad- 
vanced warning of attacks on sensitive targets along the Persian 
Gulf, particularly from nearby Iranian air bases, Saudi Arabia or- 
dered five E-3A AW ACS aircraft in 1981. To allay Israel's con- 
cerns, the aircraft were equipped specifically for the defensive needs 
of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas only. The first aircraft 
reached operational status in 1987 in time to assist United States 
naval operations in the tanker war in the Persian Gulf. Training 
and support services were provided by the Boeing Corporation and 
a United States Air Force team. Congress required that the United 
States have substantial control over the use of the airplanes and 
a sharing of the AWACS data. 

In 1985 Saudi Arabia also contracted with a consortium headed 
by Boeing for the Peace Shield command, control, communica- 
tions, and intelligence (C 3 I) system. Its purpose was to link infor- 
mation collected by AWACS and ground-based surveillance radar 
with fighters and ground air defense, including the I-Hawk SAMs, 
to provide integrated air defense against attacks across the gulf and 
Red Sea and from the direction of Yemen. In 1991 it was announced 
that the Hughes Aircraft Corporation had assumed management 
of the project, which had been subject to delays in its completion. 

Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces 

Saudi air defense units were separated from the army in the 
mid-1980s to form a fourth service branch responsible for territorial 
air defense. The new fourth command was initially entrusted to 



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National Security 



Amir Khalid ibn Sultan Al Saud, son of the minister of defense 
and aviation. 

The air defense forces, with an estimated 4,000 personnel in 1992, 
had as their primary responsibility the operation of thirty-three 
SAM batteries. Of these, sixteen batteries were equipped with 128 
I-Hawk SAMs with a forty-kilometer range, which were emplaced 
around Riyadh, Ras Tanura, Dhahran, Jiddah, and key air bases 
at Khamis Mushayt, Hafar al Batin, and Tabuk, as well as the 
approaches to strategic oil facilities of the Eastern Province. The 
remaining seventeen batteries, forming a second line of air defense, 
were equipped with sixty-eight Shahine SAM fire units with a range 
of sixteen kilometers. These SAMs were a version of the French 
Crotale missile system mounted on AMX-30SA chassis. This mo- 
bile missile defense guarded the Saudi oil fields and other vital in- 
stallations. An additional seventy-three Shahine fire units were 
employed as static defense. Both the I-Hawk and Shahine systems 
were linked to AW ACS and to the Peace Shield command and con- 
trol system. In addition to the missile defense, the air defense forces 
were equipped with Vulcan 20mm self-propelled guns and 30mm 
guns mounted on AMX-30SA chassis (see table 14, Appendix). 

Royal Saudi Naval Forces 

The development of the navy as a guardian force in the Persian 
Gulf and Red Sea dates from 1974 when the Saudi Naval Expan- 
sion Program (SNEP) was initiated with the assistance of the United 
States. Previously, the navy had only a few obsolete patrol boats, 
landing craft, and utility boats. As of 1992, the main combat ves- 
sels were four guided-missile frigates and four corvettes, nine 
missile-armed fast attack craft, and four minesweepers. 

Between 1980 and 1983, the United States supplied four PCG-1 
corvettes (870 tons), each with eight Harpoon antiship missiles in 
addition to six torpedo tubes. Nine fast attack craft, also delivered 
in the early 1980s, were similarly equipped with Harpoon missiles. 
The principal combat ships of the navy were four French F-2000 
frigates (2,870 tons) commissioned in 1985 and 1986, each armed 
with a Dauphin helicopter, eight Otomat antiship missiles having 
a range of 160 kilometers, torpedo tubes, and a 100mm gun. In 
the same contract with France were two logistic support ships, 
twenty-four Dauphin helicopters, most armed with AS- 15 anti- 
ship missiles, and support programs for training and maintenance. 
Saudi Arabia had contracted to purchase three Lafayette-type 
frigates (3,700 tons) from the French, armed with Exocet anti- 
ship missiles, and a 100mm gun. The Lafayettes were scheduled 
to enter into service after 1995. Discussions had been held with 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

France and other countries for the supply of up to eight subma- 
rines. The large arms agreement with Britain in 1988 resulted in 
a contract for three Sandown-class minesweepers to be delivered 
between 1991 and 1993 (see table 15, Appendix). 

Naval personnel strength, which was less than 1,000 in 1974, 
had reached 9,500 by 1991, including 1,500 marines. The marines 
were organized as an infantry regiment and were equipped with 
140 armored vehicles of Spanish manufacture. It was reported in 
1991 that an expansion of the marine corps was contemplated and 
new inventory requirements were being prepared. 

The main naval headquarters were located at Riyadh. The navy 
was organized into the Western Fleet, with headquarters at Jiddah 
on the Red Sea, and the Eastern Fleet, with headquarters at Al 
Jubayl on the Persian Gulf. All four frigates were based in the Red 
Sea and the four corvettes in the Persian Gulf. Other naval facili- 
ties were located at Yanbu, Ad Dammam, and Ras al Mishab. 
The port of Ad Dammam had a large military sea terminal that 
proved fully adequate to handle United States and other cargoes 
during the buildup preceding the Persian Gulf War. The two main 
bases at Jiddah and Al Jubayl were constructed under SNEP. They 
were similar to the military cities of the army, with hardened com- 
mand centers, family housing, schools, mosques, shopping centers, 
and recreational facilities for naval personnel and their families, 
in addition to maintenance, logistics, and training facilities. 

Saudi Arabian National Guard 

Although not subordinate to the minister of defense and avia- 
tion and frequently referred to as a paramilitary or an internal secu- 
rity force, the national guard came to be regarded as a integral 
part of the Saudi military establishment with the modernization 
of its active units and its role in the Persian Gulf War. The force 
was a direct descendant of the Ikhwan, the tribal army that served 
Abd al Aziz so well during his long effort to retake the Arabian 
Peninsula for the House of Saud. After having to curb the indepen- 
dent military operations and excesses of the Ikhwan, Abd al Aziz 
permitted it to reappear as the so-called White Army (the name 
stemmed from the traditional Arab dress rather than uniforms worn 
by the members), which later became the national guard. It was 
not a reserve component similar to the national guard of the United 
States; at least part of it was an active-duty armed force existing 
parallel to, but separate from, the regular military service branches. 
The strength of the guard in 1992 was estimated at 75,000, but 
20,000 of that total served in a militia status, on call for mobiliza- 
tion rather than on daily active duty. 



260 



Trailer-mounted Hawk missile launcher 
Courtesy Armed Forces Office, Royal Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington 

Truck carrying Shahine surface-to-air missiles 
Courtesy Armed Forces Office, Royal Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington 



261 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

The head of the national guard for three decades since 1962 was 
King Fahd's half brother and designated successor, Amir Abd 
Allah. Three of Abd Allah's sons also held positions in the guard 
organization. The guard chain of command was completely separate 
from regular military channels, as was its communication system. 
Commanders of major units reported directly to Abd Allah, and 
he reported to the king. In the post-World War II era, as Arab 
monarchs in other countries fell to coups and revolutions, the Saudi 
royal family evidently decided that a parallel army such as the na- 
tional guard would be a form of insurance against coups. Its con- 
tinued existence was, however, also a matter of tribal and family 
politics. Abd Allah was considered the leader of the Shammar 
branch of the Al Saud, a rival source of power to the Sudairi branch 
that dominated the regular armed forces (see The Royal Family, 
ch. 4). 

Training of the national guard became the responsibility of the 
Vinnell Corporation of the United States in 1975. About 1,000 
United States Vietnam veterans were initially recruited to serve 
in the long-term training program designed to convert the guard 
into a mobile and hard-hitting counterinsurgency force that could 
also reinforce the regular army if necessary. These contractors were 
supervised by a United States military group with the designation 
Office of the Program Manager — Saudi Arabian National Guard 
(OPM-SANG). 

Extensive military infrastructure facilities have been built to en- 
sure the comfort and well-being of national guard units. Their major 
cantonments were in Al Ahsa Oasis near Al Hufuf and the major 
oil installations of the Eastern Province and at Al Qasim in Najd 
Province in an area where many of the tribal elements were re- 
cruited and most training was conducted. A large new housing 
project for guard personnel, with associated schools, shops, and 
mosques, has been constructed near Riyadh, also the site of the 
guard's military academy, the King Khalid Military College. Other 
national guard military cities were located at At Taif, Ad Dammam, 
and Jiddah. A new headquarters complex was built in Riyadh in 
the early 1980s. 

During the 1950s and early 1960s, the regular army and the na- 
tional guard were both small and of roughly equal strength. The 
guard suffered when the army's expansion was given priority, but 
in the 1970s the decline was reversed when the guard was converted 
to a light mechanized force with the help of United States advisers. 
Initially consisting of four combined arms battalions, the active- 
duty component had by 1992 been enlarged to two mechanized 
brigades, each with four infantry battalions, an artillery battalion, 



262 



F-2000 class frigate of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces 
Courtesy Armed Forces Office, Royal Saudi Arabian Embassy, Washington 

and engineering and signals companies. The guard's mobility over 
desert terrain was assured by 1,100 V-150 Commando wheeled 
APCs. Firepower came from 105mm and 155mm towed howitzers, 
106mm recoilless rifles, and TOW antitank missiles mounted on 
APCs (see table 16, Appendix). 

The second component of the national guard, made up of tribal 
battalions under the command of local shaykhs, was organized into 
four infantry brigades. These men, often the sons of local chiefs 
or of veterans of the original Ikhwan forces, reported for duty about 
once a month for the purpose of receiving stipends. They were 
provided with obsolete rifles, although many had individually ac- 
quired Soviet AK-47 assault rifles. Although neither particularly 
well trained nor well equipped, they could be counted on to be loyal 
to the House of Saud if called for service. Their enrollment in the 
guard was largely a means to bolster the subsidies paid to local 
shaykhs and to retain the support of their tribes. 

The national guard was swiftly deployed to the border area after 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and was actively engaged in the 
war, notably in the fighting to retake the town of Ras al Khafji (see 
Persian Gulf War, 1991, this ch.). After the war ended, it was re- 
ported that an enlargement of the national guard to eleven or twelve 
active brigades was contemplated. In addition, the Commando APCs 



263 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

were to be replaced by more than 1 ,000 eight- wheeled light armored 
vehicles (LAVs) manufactured by General Motors in Canada. The 
LAVs were to be mounted with a variety of armaments, such as 
25mm guns, kinetic energy guns, and TOW missile launchers. 

Training 

Any Saudi male citizen — including citizens who had been 
naturalized for at least five years — could apply for training as an 
officer if he met the physical and mental standards. Most officer 
candidates attended military preparatory schools in Riyadh and 
other cities, where they received free tuition if they committed them- 
selves to attend a military college upon graduation. The King Abd 
al Aziz Military Academy was the principal source of second lieu- 
tenants for the army. Designed for a capacity of 1 ,500 cadets, this 
modern facility was a self-contained small city about forty kilometers 
from Riyadh. The curriculum required three years of study, with 
successful completion leading to a bachelor of military science degree 
and a commission. After graduation the new second lieutenants 
attended a branch school for specialization in infantry, artillery, 
armor, ordnance, airborne units, the engineers, communications, 
military police, or administration. Officers in mid-career competed 
for places at the Command and Staff College at Riyadh to earn 
a master of military science degree, a required step toward pro- 
motion to the senior ranks. Selected officers also attended higher 
military colleges in the United States and other countries. 

A network of army schools trained NCOs in branch and special- 
ized services. Basic training of enlisted personnel was conducted 
by Saudi NCOs, but most subsequent training was carried out with 
the assistance of foreign military personnel or specialists under 
contract. 

Science graduates of technical institutions and universities could 
obtain direct commissions as second lieutenants. In September 
1990, the king issued a directive opening military training programs 
to all male university graduates without distinction as to geographi- 
cal and tribal balance, which had been factors in the past. 

Air force flight training took place at the King Faisal Air Academy 
at Al Kharj. The flight training consisted of a twenty-seven-month 
course that began with intensive instruction in the English language. 
British instructors under contract to British Aerospace (BAe — 
formerly the British Aircraft Corporation) held most of the faculty 
positions at the air academy as well as at the Technical Studies 
Institute at Dhahran, where Saudi aircraft technicians were trained. 

After successful completion of primary training, cadets were as- 
signed for several months of advanced training on British Strike- 
masters and Hawks, which had sufficient avionics and weapons 



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National Security 



for alternate use as light daytime interceptors. Prospective trans- 
port pilots and F-15 pilots were sent to the United States for ad- 
vanced training. 

A number of naval technical and training facilities were built 
with United States guidance. Much of the United States Navy's 
training in connection with its equipment deliveries, including that 
for enlisted men, was conducted at San Diego and at other United 
States training installations. In the 1980s, training and advisory 
responsibilities increasingly shifted to France, linked to the deliv- 
ery of major ship units. 

The Marine Training Institute at Jiddah, founded in 1982, had 
a capacity of 500 officers and NCO students. Officers could earn 
specialized degrees in mechanical, electrical, or electronic engineer- 
ing, general science, or military science. The general course for 
NCOs was of twenty-six months' duration. 

Personnel and Conditions of Service 

Saudi Arabia, a large country with a small population, has felt 
the strains of modernization, particularly since the mid-1960s. The 
military, because of the increasing complexity of its arms and equip- 
ment, has faced an ever-expanding requirement for technical skills 
within its ranks. As in many other countries — developing or devel- 
oped — competition for technicians has been very high among all sec- 
tors of the rapidly modernizing economy, and, for the military, 
retaining trained specialists has been difficult. 

Since the establishment of the kingdom, the Saudis have relied 
on volunteers to fill the ranks of the services. On several occasions, 
Saudi officials have indicated that a system of conscription would 
be introduced. A military draft has, however, never been instituted, 
presumably because it would be bitterly unpopular, difficult to en- 
force, and liable to introduce unreliable elements into the military. 
The intended radical increases in the size of the army and the na- 
tional guard would seem to necessitate some form of compulsory 
service. Nevertheless, in June 1991, the minister of defense and 
aviation declared that no conscription was needed because the rush 
of volunteers sometimes exceeded the capacity of training centers 
to absorb them. 

The government conducted regular advertising campaigns to in- 
form young Saudi males of the benefits available to them in the 
armed forces. Recruiting stations existed throughout the country; 
the government tried to strike a geographic balance by attracting 
a representative cross section of the population to the enlisted ranks. 
The officer corps was still predominantly composed of members 
of the Najd aristocracy. The national guard continued to rely on 



265 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

an old system of tribal levies to fill its ranks, yielding a composition 
much less representative of the nation as a whole. Guardsmen were 
recruited mainly from a few of the important camel-rearing tribes 
of Najd, reputedly the most trustworthy in the kingdom. 

The kingdom's population was 16.9 million, according to the 
1992 census; of this number, 12.3 million were Saudi nationals. 
This population level would be sufficient to maintain the desired 
strength levels of the regular armed services, assuming the needed 
education and skill levels were available. (Population statistics for 
Saudi Arabia, however, were regarded by some Western sources 
as unreliable.) According to the United States Government, an esti- 
mated 159,000 males reached the military age of eighteen each year. 
The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) reported that Saudi Arabia had 5.4 persons in the armed 
forces per 1,000 of population. This figure was far lower than the 
average for the Middle East as a whole (18.3 per 1,000 of popu- 
lation). 

The conservative Muslim attitude that strongly discouraged Saudi 
women from seeking jobs outside the home has eased only slightly. 
Some women worked in human services and medical occupations, 
but generally social and religious barriers precluded women from 
working in positions that would place them in public contact with 
men. Thus, the military services remained closed to female ap- 
plicants. 

The military enlistment period was three years; cash and other 
rewards were offered as inducements to reenlist. Pay scales were 
set at levels higher than that for other government service, and the 
military have been spared salary cuts that applied to civil servants. 
Allowances and fringe benefits were generous. The government 
spent huge sums of money to improve the amenities and comfort 
for personnel in order to increase the attractiveness of military 
careers. The military cities included excellent family housing for 
married officers and NCOs, as well as modern barracks for un- 
married personnel. The military cities also offered excellent schools 
and hospitals as well as convenient shopping centers and recrea- 
tional facilities. 

To attract applicants to the military profession, the Ministry of 
Defense and Aviation founded its own technical high schools and 
colleges, which offered subsidized education and granted degrees. 
Anyone seeking a commission by attending a military academy had 
to be eighteen years old and a citizen by birth or a naturalized citizen 
for at least five years. The candidate also had to be of good repu- 
tation, having neither been subjected to a sharia penalty nor im- 
prisoned for a felony within five years of the date of his application. 



266 



Saudi princes perform a traditional sword dance at the Janadriyah 
festival in 1985, sponsored by the Saudi Arabian National Guard. 

Courtesy Aramco World 

Officers were not free to resign. However, they enjoyed extensive 
benefits, including hardship pay for service in remote areas such 
as Ash Sharawrah in the southwestern desert. They were entitled 
to buy land and housing for themselves or as an income-producing 
investment with generously subsidized loans. Although officers were 
promoted on a regular basis, they were often frustrated by the lack 
of opportunity to assume increasing responsibility because of the 
small size of the services. 

As a result of the advanced technology inherent in the military 
modernization programs, large numbers of foreign military and 
civilian personnel have been needed to service and maintain 
weapons systems and to train Saudi personnel in their use. Although 
precise data were not available, it was estimated that in the late 
1980s about 5,000 United States civilians and 500 military tech- 
nicians and trainers and perhaps 5,000 British, French, and other 
Europeans provided this support. In addition, a considerable 
number of officers from Muslim areas — including Pakistanis, Jor- 
danians, Syrians, Palestinians, and Egyptians — were contracted 
on an individual basis, mostly in training and logistics assignments. 
As many as 11,000 to 15,000 Pakistani troops and advisers had 
been recruited to bring the two armored brigades to full strength, 



267 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

as well as to serve in engineering units and the air force. The 10,000 
troops in the armored service left the country beginning in late 1987, 
reportedly because Pakistan was unwilling to screen the Shia element 
from the force at a time when conflict with Iran seemed a possibility. 

Uniforms, Ranks, and Insignia 

Uniforms worn by personnel of Saudi Arabia's armed services, 
including the national guard, were closely patterned on the British 
and United States models that influenced those forces during their 
early development. The most common uniform colors were khaki 
or olive drab for the army and national guard, blue or white for 
the navy, and blue for the air force. Officers had semidress uni- 
forms for various functions and dress uniforms for formal occasions. 
All personnel wore berets, and officers also had visored caps. Mem- 
bers of the Royal Guard Regiment often wore the flowing white 
thaub (robe) and white kaffiyah and qutrah (traditional Arab head- 
gear of skullcap and scarf). Berets were usually of distinctive colors 
that designated branches, e.g., paratroops wore maroon, tank troops 
wore black, and the Royal Guardsmen — when in conventional 
uniforms — wore bright green berets. National guardsmen wore the 
traditional red-checkered Arab headdress, although some more 
modern units wore red berets. Tribal units often wore the thaub with 
crossed bandoliers. The brass badge worn by all ranks depicted the 
national symbol — a date palm with crossed sabers beneath a crown, 
all enclosed by a wreath. 

There were ten grades of commissioned officers in the army, navy, 
air force, and air defense force, corresponding to the grades of sec- 
ond lieutenant (ensign) to general (admiral) in the United States 
forces. The Saudi ranks in all services were known by the same desig- 
nations; for example, mulazim thani corresponded to second lieutenant 
in the army, air defense force, and air force and to ensign in the 
navy (see fig. 11). 

Enlisted rank structure was the same in all services, and ranks 
were known by the same terms. There were seven enlisted ratings 
plus the entry level of recruit. Chevrons to denote rank were worn 
on both sleeves; the recruit had no chevron. The NCO grades did 
not correspond exactly to those of the United States forces, and the 
Saudi army or air force warrant officer (the navy had none) cor- 
responded more closely to master sergeant or sergeant major than 
to any of the four grades of warrant officer in the United States forces 
(see fig. 12). 

Military Justice 

The administration of justice in the armed forces was regulated 
by the Code of Military Justice, decreed and published by the 



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minister of defense in 1947. It was applicable to all members of 
the armed forces, all retired personnel, and civilians working for 
the armed forces who committed crimes or offenses of a military 
nature or in violation of military regulations. Military trial courts 
operating under the authority of the Ministry of Defense and Avi- 
ation had jurisdiction over personnel subject to the code. Crimes 
in violation of the sharia, however, were under the jurisdiction of 
sharia courts. 

A military trial court consisted of officers, who had to be senior 
to the defendant if an officer were to be tried. The court included 
a president and four other voting members, plus a legal adviser, 
an attorney representing the government, and an attorney repre- 
senting the accused. Trial procedures were direct and uncompli- 
cated, and trials were conducted in a manner intended to protect 
the rights of the accused. The burden of proof was on the govern- 
ment. A case was brought to trial only after a thorough and im- 
partial investigation, after which a complete report of the alleged 
crime or incident was submitted to the military commander hav- 
ing jurisdiction, who then could recommend either trial or dismis- 
sal of charges. The court's decision could be invalidated or a 
sentence commuted by the minister of defense and aviation or the 
king for irregularities, omissions, evidence of prejudice, or evidence 
that pressure had been brought to bear. The king and the minister 
had sole power of review of sentences imposed by military trial 
courts, and, subject to their concurrence, the judgments of the courts 
were final. 

Punishable offenses under the Code of Military Justice were class- 
ified as felonies, misdemeanors, or disobediences. Felonies and mis- 
demeanors were subject to trial, and upon conviction a defendant 
could be sentenced to severe punishment or to disciplinary punish- 
ment as prescribed by the court. Disobediences were less serious 
offenses and were punishable administratively. 

Felonies punishable under the military code included high trea- 
son against the kingdom and disloyalty to the king or to the armed 
forces. Severe punishments were prescribed for those found guilty 
of such crimes. Military misdemeanors meriting the imposition of 
disciplinary punishment included such acts as misbehavior that 
brought discredit on the armed forces, misuse of authority, mis- 
use of military funds or equipment, agitation to leave the service, 
and violation of military regulations and directives. Disciplinary 
punishments ranged from forfeitures of pay and allowances for from 
one to three months to imprisonment for up to eighteen months. 
Disobedience and failure to obey orders were punished adminis- 
tratively. Punishments, which ranged from forfeiture of one day's 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

pay and imprisonment for twenty-four hours to imprisonment for 
forty-five days, were scaled according to the seriousness of the 
offense as prescribed in the Code of Military Justice. 

Defense Expenditures 

During the 1980s, Saudi Arabia's outlays on national security 
were among the highest in the world in spite of its relatively small 
population. In 1989 its expenditures of US$14.7 billion ranked 
eleventh among the countries of the world. Nonetheless, this level 
of spending reflected a declining trend from a peak of US$24.8 
billion reached in 1983. Budgeted defense expenditures maintained 
this gradual decline between 1988 and 1990. Actual defense ex- 
penditures rose dramatically in 1990, however, to almost US$31.9 
billion to meet the costs of additional arms and the contributions 
to United States and British military expenditures necessitated by 
the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait. The defense budget of US$26.8 
billion in 1991 included more than US$13.7 billion in contribu- 
tions to the United States, French, and British war efforts, but did 
not include projected heavy additional arms purchases. Saudi Ara- 
bia also contributed to the costs of other non-Western members 
of the coalition forces facing Iraq. 

In early 1991, Saudi officials estimated that during the first five 
months of the gulf crisis the country had earned roughly US$15 
billion in windfall oil profits arising from increased production and 
higher market prices, while assuming an additional US$30 billion 
in commitments related to the crisis. The latter figure included 
US$13.6 billion in new arms and equipment, US$2.7 billion in 
extra mobilization and deployment costs and civil defense, with 
the remainder consisting of grants and loans to other governments 
to offset the economic effects of the crisis. 

During 1983, when defense spending reached a peak, military 
expenditures per capita were at an annual level of nearly US$2,500. 
This amount was more than twice the per capita defense spending 
in the United States, and was not approached by any other coun- 
try except Israel, Iraq, and the other oil-exporting states of the Per- 
sian Gulf. As a consequence of the reduced rate of defense spending 
after 1983, military expenditures per capita had declined to US$897 
by 1989. 

The share of gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) origi- 
nally earmarked for defense in 1990 was 16.9 percent, materially 
below the peak of 22 percent reached in 1983 but still about twice 
as high as the Middle East as a whole. Defense outlays constituted 
35.5 percent of central government expenditures in 1989; this per- 
centage was also higher than the Middle East average of 32 percent. 



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The declining rate of defense spending between 1984 and 1990 
resulted largely from reductions in oil revenues that produced a 
negative growth rate for the entire economy. A secondary factor 
may have been the completion of several large-scale infrastructure 
projects. Arms imports, which accounted for 16 percent of the 
defense budget in 1983, had risen to 25 percent by 1988. The major 
contracts for weaponry placed with Britain, the United States, and 
France since 1988; the extraordinary expenses of the Persian Gulf 
War; and plans for expansion of the armed forces during the 1990s 
seemed certain to impose pressure on the defense budget for years 
to come. 

Foreign Involvement and Influence 

Until the 1930s, Abd al Aziz, concerned with conquest and the 
reestablishment of the House of Saud on the peninsula, showed 
little interest in developing armed forces for national defense, relying 
instead on British support and diplomacy. After the clash with 
Yemen in the early 1930s and the discovery of oil, the Saudi king 
recognized the need for a standing army and sought assistance from 
Britain, Egypt, and the United States. By the mid- 1940s, the Saudis 
were relying more on the United States than on any other coun- 
try, mostly because of the successful relations between Saudi offi- 
cials and Aramco. 

Only nominal sums were spent on defense until Saudi Arabia's 
involvement in the Yemeni civil war of the early 1960s. When the 
need for stronger national defense became apparent to the leader- 
ship, Saudi Arabia was obliged to turn to foreign sources for ar- 
maments, military training, and the construction of facilities. The 
long-standing military relationship between Saudi Arabia and the 
United States served as a foundation for the buildup of the defense 
forces and military infrastructure begun under Faisal. 

Cooperation with the United States 

Between 1947 and 1991 , Saudi Arabia's purchases under the For- 
eign Military Sales program of the United States Department of 
Defense totaled approximately US$60 billion. More than 80 per- 
cent of these purchases were for construction of infrastructure — 
bases and command and control facilities — together with main- 
tenance, spare parts, and training. Fewer than 20 percent of the 
purchases were for weapons. 

The first United States military mission of any consequence ar- 
rived in Saudi Arabia in 1943, but the first significant mutual 
defense agreement was not formalized until June 1951 . As a result 
of that agreement, a United States Military Training Mission 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

(USMTM) arrived for duty in the kingdom in 1953 to supervise 
all military assistance and training activities. Until the late 1960s, 
this assistance was provided primarily on a grant basis. During 
the reign of Saud, the government was continually faced with large 
budget deficits despite increasing oil revenues. By 1964, after Saud 
had been deposed and Faisal had become king, the country was 
on a better economic footing and it was able to pay for the major 
purchases of arms, infrastructure, and training services that fol- 
lowed. 

Initially, the primary purpose of the United States in establish- 
ing the special relationship with Saudi Arabia was to check the 
spread of Soviet influence in that area of the world and the conse- 
quent threat to Middle East oil. The Saudis were conscious of the 
Soviet danger, and the royal family was inherently anticommunist; 
nevertheless, because of proximity, Israel and Iran were perceived 
to be the most immediate threats to the security of the kingdom. 
Saudi Arabia did not want the Arabian Peninsula to become an 
arena of superpower contention and was opposed to the establish- 
ment of United States bases or to the stationing in the kingdom 
of large numbers of United States military personnel. 

After the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war, which triggered a sharp 
increase in oil prices, Saudi Arabia was able to allocate large sums 
to the modernization and training of the armed forces. Until the 
late 1980s, the primary areas of activity by the United States were 
the wide range of construction activities by the Army Corps of En- 
gineers, the Saudi Naval Expansion Program, and the Saudi Ord- 
nance Corps Program to establish an integrated logistics, supply, 
and maintenance system. In 1988 the Corps of Engineers completed 
the program that had kept it engaged in the kingdom for twenty- 
three years. 

President Jimmy Carter's proposal to sell advanced F-15 fighter 
aircraft to Saudi Arabia in 1978 and his proposal to loan and later 
to sell the kingdom AWACS aircraft after the outbreak of the Iran- 
Iraq War in 1980 touched off bitter disputes in Congress. The sale 
of the F-15s was approved under conditions that limited their range 
and offensive power because of fears that they could tip the regional 
balance against Israel. President Ronald Reagan decided the sale 
of the AWACS aircraft should proceed to help the Saudis guard 
against attacks on their oil installations. He urged that the trans- 
fer of five AWACS and seven aerial refueling tankers be approved. 
The package also included auxiliary fuel tanks for the F-15 fighters 
and more than 1 ,000 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. For Saudi Ara- 
bia, the purchase request became a test of the firmness of the rela- 
tionship, but for the United States it became a political nightmare 



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because Israel and its supporters in the United States raised strenu- 
ous objections to the sale. After lengthy congressional hearings and 
investigations, the package was narrowly approved with special re- 
strictions on the use of the AW ACS aircraft. 

In 1985 President Reagan sought authority to sell Saudi Arabia 
forty-two additional F-15s, antiaircraft missiles, Harpoon antiship 
missiles, and Blackhawk troop-carrying helicopters. Again, the 
proposal raised a storm of opposition in Congress and had to be 
withdrawn. In 1986 and 1988, scaled-down packages were intro- 
duced and eventually approved by Congress after Stinger anti- 
aircraft and Maverick antitank missiles were deleted. Among the 
approved items were Bradley fighting vehicles, TOW II antitank 
missiles, electronic upgrades for the F-15s, and twelve additional 
F-15s to remain in the United States until needed as replacements. 

United States arms transfer agreements with Saudi Arabia in- 
creased dramatically in 1990. Of a total of US$14.5 billion in con- 
tracts signed, US$6. 1 billion preceded the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
They included LAVs, TOW II launchers and missiles, and 155mm 
howitzers, all for the national guard; 315 M1A2 tanks; and thirty 
tank recovery vehicles. After the invasion, the United States hastily 
arranged a package that included F-15 aircraft; M1A2 and M-60A3 
tanks and other armored vehicles; Stinger, TOW II, and Patriot 
missiles; Apache helicopters; and about 10,000 trucks. 

A second phase of the arms package, worth an estimated US$14 
billion, was postponed in early 1991 to reassess Saudi needs in the 
postwar atmosphere in the Persian Gulf. It was reported to include 
additional F-15s, M1A2 tanks, AWACS aircraft, and Bradley fight- 
ing vehicles. As of 1992, the United States faced the question of 
reconciling Saudi Arabia's desire for further large-scale arms pur- 
chases to build its deterrent strength with the United States desire 
to limit the export of advanced weaponry to the volatile Middle 
East region. The issue was linked to negotiations over the prelimi- 
nary positioning of equipment for up to one army corps in depots 
on Saudi territory to permit the rapid deployment of United States 
ground forces in the event of renewed Middle East hostilities. 

Cooperation with Other Countries 

Although the United States was the dominant foreign influence 
in the post-World War II development of the Saudi military estab- 
lishment, the kingdom has regularly awarded contracts to other gov- 
ernments or to private corporations in other countries to avoid 
complete dependence on a single supplier. Britain and France have 
been the other two major recipients of Saudi contracts for weapons 
and equipment, maintenance, training, and construction of facilities. 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

According to ACDA statistics, Britain was actually the largest sup- 
plier of arms from 1985 to 1989, providing military goods and ser- 
vices totaling US$7.7 billion. France was second with $US7.0 
billion, and the United States was third with US$5.0 billion. Im- 
ports from China were US$2.5 billion, arising principally from the 
sale of the CSS-2 missile system. Among the major French trans- 
actions, disclosed in 1984, was a US$4.5 billion contract for a 
Shahine mobile antiaircraft missile defense system to guard the 
Saudi oil fields and other sensitive targets. In addition to selling 
Saudi Arabia tanks and other armored equipment in the 1970s, 
France was a leading supplier of ships and helicopters. 

During World War II, Britain, which had been the dominant 
foreign power in the Middle East for many years, and the United 
States coordinated their efforts to train and modernize Abd al Aziz's 
small armed forces. British training missions were active in the king- 
dom, and some Saudis were sent to Britain for military schooling. 
After the war, the United States took over most of the training and 
modernization of the Saudi military, but Britain continued to share 
in the contracts for arms, equipment, and services. For many years, 
a majority of Saudi combat aircraft were British Lightnings and 
Strikemasters manufactured by BAe, which had long-standing con- 
tracts to provide services and maintenance to the Royal Saudi Air 
Force. The company also operated the King Faisal Air Academy 
and the Technical Studies Institute. 

In 1986, after being thwarted in its efforts to purchase additional 
F-15s from the United States, Saudi Arabia responded by announc- 
ing the purchase of Tornado fighter-bombers and interceptors built 
by a British-led consortium, as well as Hawk jet trainers and Pilatus 
training aircraft. The advanced Tornadoes were offered without 
the restrictions on basing and armaments that the United States 
had imposed on its sale of F-15s to reduce the risk of their being 
used against Israel. In July 1988, the Saudis announced an agree- 
ment in principle to purchase US$20 to US$30 billion worth of 
aircraft and other military equipment and construction services from 
Britain over a ten-year period. The 1986 and 1988 agreements were 
sometimes referred to by the code names, Al Yamamah I and Al 
Yamamah II. Under Al Yamamah II, Saudi Arabia signaled its 
intention to acquire additional Tornadoes, jet trainers, British ver- 
sions of the Blackhawk helicopter, and minesweepers for the navy. 
The cost of the huge arms agreement was to be offset by proceeds 
from Saudi oil shipments and by British investments in military 
and civilian production plants in Saudi Arabia. 

Under an agreement announced in 1983, Spain has supplied 
Saudi Arabia with CASA C-212 transport aircraft, built as a joint 



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venture between Spain and Indonesia, as well as other equipment. 
In 1990 negotiations with West Germany over the sale of 300 
Leopard II tanks reportedly failed when Germany decided not to 
proceed in light of its policy against arms sales to areas of tension 
and what it viewed as its moral obligation to the state of Israel. 

Western Cooperation in Domestic Arms Production 

A small defense-manufacturing industry based on coproduction, 
offset, and licensing agreements with Western arms suppliers was 
still emerging in 1992. Saudi policy was to reduce its exposure to 
the political uncertainties of importing arms and to achieve a degree 
of self-sufficiency as a source of prestige in the Middle East. The 
chronic shortage of trained technicians and lack of skilled man- 
power, however, forced the industry to rely on foreign managers, 
technical assistance, and imported labor. Such joint ventures were 
entitled to industrial development loans, tax holidays, and other 
subsidies. 

During the 1970s, Saudi Arabia had been involved with Egypt, 
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in establishing the Arab Or- 
ganization for Industrialization (AOI). Its goal was to combine cap- 
ital of the gulf oil states with Egyptian production capabilities to 
create an arms industry located mainly on Egyptian territory. 
Although Egypt carried out a number of coproduction schemes 
under the AOI designation, the plan foundered because of Arab 
anger over Egypt's 1979 peace treaty with Israel. 

Saudi Arabia later established its own small arms industry at 
Al Kharj, producing United States and Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (West Germany) rifles, machine guns, and ammunition 
under license. In 1985 a royal decree by King Fahd led to the cre- 
ation of the General Establishment of Military Industries to over- 
see and coordinate the kingdom's existing and proposed domestic 
defense projects. In the same year, a contract was concluded with 
a Boeing-led consortium committing the consortium to US$350 
million worth of investments in Saudi Arabia as an offset to the 
cost of the Peace Shield air defense system. Under this arrange- 
ment, the Boeing group agreed to enter into a US$130 million joint 
project for an airframe maintenance facility and a US$1 17 million 
advanced jet maintenance and repair facility. A ten-year agree- 
ment was also concluded to develop a computer center and an air- 
craft hydraulics maintenance center, all to be built at King Khalid 
International Airport at Riyadh. The Boeing consortium also held 
a 50-percent interest in a local company to produce military tacti- 
cal radios. 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

The Al Yamamah I arms agreement with Britain committed BAe 
to offset US$7.5 billion in Saudi arms purchases with US$1.5 bil- 
lion of investments in Saudi Arabia. Three such projects were 
underway in 1991. They included a British- American joint ven- 
ture to produce missiles for Tornado fighter aircraft, the local as- 
sembly of heavy-duty trucks, and a BAe investment in an aluminum 
smelter at Yanbu. A West German company had built a plant to 
produce mortar shells and as of 1990 was negotiating a contract 
to produce tank and howitzer ammunition. 

Public Order and the Justice System 

The successful forging of the different tribes of the Arabian Penin- 
sula into a coherent nation during the first half of the twentieth 
century must be credited to Abd al Aziz and the House of Saud. 
If there were one singular element in Saudi society that explained 
the relative stability during the first sixty years of the kingdom, 
it was the allegiance that had been exhibited by a preponderant 
segment of the population to the Al Saud. Internal order and the 
continued existence of the monarchy, however, did not come auto- 
matically to the country simply because of the leadership and cha- 
risma of Abd al Aziz. Of great significance during his reign was 
the establishment of the country's basic security forces and a code 
of behavior intended to instill fear and respect for the law and obe- 
dience to it. 

With its tasks of preventing intertribal warfare and protecting 
the House of Saud from any possible threat, the national guard 
has been the primary agency for upholding the security of the 
government. The loyalty of the guard has, however, been more 
than blind allegiance to the person of the king. In 1964, when the 
kingdom was in trouble under King Saud, the guard supported 
Faisal and the Al Saud in deposing the monarch, acting as an in- 
strument in a controlled process of succession. Under its com- 
mander, Abd Allah, one of the powerful princes in the kingdom, 
the national guard remained an important factor in national sta- 
bility in 1992. It was, however, increasingly being supplanted by 
more modern agencies of control under the Ministry of Interior 
that had the king's full brother, Amir Nayif, at its head and another 
full brother, Amir Ahmad ibn Abd al Aziz, as the deputy minister. 

Traditionally, the allegiance of the people has been to the tribe 
and to the extended family (see Diversity and Social Stratification; 
Cultural Homogeneity and Values, ch. 2). One of Abd al Aziz's 
truly significant accomplishments was to implant the concept of al- 
legiance to the House of Saud and by extension to the government 
and the judicial system. Also important was the recognition by the 



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Saudis of their ethnic identity as an Arab people and their reli- 
gious identity with Wahhabi Islam. Each aspect of a person's day- 
to-day conduct could be categorized as being within the bounds 
of acceptable behavior or outside those bounds, with no distinc- 
tion between the secular and the religious spheres. Few Saudis chose 
to live outside the law, and their basic attitudes supported an or- 
derly society. 

In theory, all persons, including the king and foreigners, were 
equal before the law and subject to both the sharia and law by 
decree. In practice, however, members of the royal family and other 
leaders have rarely been brought to public trial. Cases involving 
foreigners have often been handled outside the court system, fre- 
quently by deportation. 

Law Enforcement 

In the limited public security structure inherited from the Otto- 
man Empire, police work was done informally and justice was ad- 
ministered by local or tribal authorities. Gradually, during the reign 
of Abd al Aziz, modern organs of government were introduced and 
became responsible for maintaining public order. By royal decree 
in 1950, Abd al Aziz created a general directorate to supervise all 
police functions in the kingdom, and a year later he established 
the Ministry of Interior, which has since been in charge of police 
matters. Subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, general directorates 
charged with maintaining internal security included Public Secu- 
rity, Investigation, Coast Guard, and Special Security. The offices 
of the deputy ministers for administration, national security affairs, 
and immigration and naturalization, and the Internal Security 
Forces College were all on the same organizational level as the four 
general directorates. Governors of the amirates reported directly 
to the minister of interior (see fig. 8). 

In return for their loyalty and the maintenance of peace and order 
in the tribal areas, the king provided subsidies to the shaykhs and 
a minimum of government interference in tribal affairs. Under this 
system, offenses and breaches of the peace were punished by the 
responsible shaykh. The national guard acted as a support force 
to quell disturbances or restore order if tribal authority could not. 

The public security forces, particularly the centralized Public 
Security Police, could also get emergency support from the national 
guard or, in extremis, from the regular armed forces. The Public 
Security Police, recruited from all areas of the country, maintained 
police directorates at provincial and local levels. The director general 
for public security retained responsibility for police units, but, in 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

practice, provincial governors exercised considerable autonomy. 
Provincial governors were frequently senior amirs of the Al Saud. 

Since the mid-1960s, a major effort has been made to modernize 
the police forces. During the 1970s, quantities of new vehicles and 
radio communications equipment enabled police directorates to oper- 
ate sophisticated mobile units, especially in the principal cities. 
Helicopters were also acquired for use in urban areas. Police uni- 
forms were similar to the khaki and olive drab worn by the army 
except for the distinctive red beret. Policemen usually wore side- 
arms while on duty. 

Dealings with the security forces were often a source of difficulty 
for foreigners in the kingdom. Ordinary policemen could be im- 
patient with those who did not speak Arabic and, often, were illit- 
erate. Darker- skinned workers were said to be treated more roughly 
than Europeans or North Americans. Everyone connected with a 
serious crime or accident could be detained until the police had 
investigated matters. 

The police security forces were divided into regular police and 
special investigative police of the General Directorate of Investi- 
gation (GDI), commonly called the mubahith (secret police). The 
GDI conducted criminal investigations in addition to performing 
the domestic security and counterintelligence functions of the Minis- 
try of Interior. The Directorate of Intelligence, which reported 
directly to the king, was responsible for intelligence collection and 
analysis and the coordination of intelligence tasks and reporting 
by all intelligence agencies, including those of the Ministry of 
Defense and Aviation and the national guard. 

An important feature of domestic security was the Ministry of 
Interior's centralized computer system at the National Informa- 
tion Center in Riyadh. The computer network, linking 1,100 ter- 
minals, maintained records on citizens' identity numbers and 
passports, foreigners' residence and work permits, hajj visas, ve- 
hicle registrations, and criminal records. Reports from agents and 
from the large number of informants employed by the security ser- 
vices were also entered. Officials of the Directorate of Intelligence 
had authority to carry out wiretaps and mail surveillance. 

The Special Security Force was the Saudi equivalent of a spe- 
cial weapons assault team (SWAT), such as had been incorporated 
into police forces in various parts of the world. Reporting directly 
to the minister of interior, the force was organized after the poor 
performance of the national guard during the revolt at the Grand 
Mosque at Mecca in 1979. The force was equipped with UR-416 
armored vehicles from West Germany and nonlethal chemical 
weapons. According to The Military Balance, 1992-1993, the force 



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had a personnel strength of 500 in 1992, although estimates from 
other sources have ranged much higher. It was reported in 1990 
that the antiterrorism unit of the Special Security Force was being 
disbanded and its German training staff repatriated. 

The strength of the Coast Guard was 4,500 as of 1992 and of 
the Frontier Force 10,500, according to The Military Balance, 1992- 
1993. The Frontier Force patrolled land borders and carried out 
customs inspections. The Coast Guard deployed its units from ports 
along the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea with a primary mission 
to prevent smuggling. Among its varied inventory of craft, the larg- 
est were four 210-ton offshore patrol craft acquired from West Ger- 
many in 1989. Two were based at Jiddah and two at Ad Dammam. 
The Coast Guard also had about thirty large patrol craft, 135 in- 
shore patrol craft, and sixteen British-built Hovercraft. 

An unusual, if not unique, internal security force in Saudi Arabia 
was the autonomous and highly visible religious police, or mutawwiin 
(see Glossary). Organized under the authority of the king in con- 
junction with the ulama, the mutawwiin were charged with ensur- 
ing compliance with the puritanical precepts of Wahhabism. A 
nationwide organization known in English as the Committees for 
the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (also seen as Com- 
mittees for Public Morality), the mutawwiin had earned a reputation 
for fanaticism and brutality that had become an embarrassment. 
The Al Saud, however, has seemingly been reluctant to confront 
the ulama in a showdown. Primarily, the mutawwiin enforced public 
observance of such religious requirements as the five daily pray- 
ers, fasting during Ramadan, the modesty of women's dress, and 
the proscriptions against the use of alcohol (see Wahhabi Theol- 
ogy, ch. 2). 

Once an important instrument of Abd al Aziz for upholding stan- 
dards of public behavior, by the early 1990s the ultraconservatism 
of the mutawwiin had become an anachronism, contrasting with 
the modernization processes working in other sectors of society. 
The government has occasionally disciplined overzealous mutawwiin, 
following complaints from a foreign government over treatment 
of its nationals. After a series of raids on rich and influential Saudis 
in 1990, the government appointed a new and more compliant 
leader of the religious police. 

The religious police had the legal right to detain suspects for 
twenty-four hours before turning them over to the regular police 
and were known to have flogged detainees to elicit confessions. They 
often used switch-like sticks to beat those perceived to be in viola- 
tion of religious laws. Foreign workers, including some from the 
United States, have been targets of harassment and raids. According 



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Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

to one estimate, there were about 20,000 mutawwiin in 1990. Most 
mutawwiin wore the traditional white thauh, were salaried, and were 
regarded as government employees. Some incidents of harassment 
have been attributed to self-appointed vigilantes outside the regu- 
lar religious police hierarchy. 

Criminal Justice System 

The judicial system is founded upon the sharia, particularly the 
Hanbali school of Sunni Islam, in accordance with a ruling by King 
Abd al Aziz in 1926. The Hanbali system of jurisprudence, which 
rejected analogy as a source of law and gave prominence to the 
traditions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, was regarded 
as especially rigid by most Muslim jurists. If there were no guidance 
in Hanbali texts, however, Saudi jurists could refer to other schools 
or exercise their own reasoning. 

Two categories of crime are delineated in the sharia: those that 
are carefully defined and those that are implicit in the requirements 
and prohibitions of the sharia. For the first category, there are spe- 
cific penalties; for the second, punishment can be prescribed by 
a judge (qadi) of a sharia court. A third category of crime has de- 
veloped through the years as a result of various governmental 
decrees that specified codes of behavior and regulations considered 
necessary to maintain public order and security. The first two 
categories are tried in sharia courts. The third, dealing with cor- 
porate law, taxation, oil and gas, and immigration, is handled ad- 
ministratively by government officials (see The Legal System, 
ch. 4). 

The sharia carefully defines crimes — such as homicide, personal 
injury, adultery, fornication, theft, and highway robbery — and pre- 
scribes a penalty (hadd) for each. Various degrees of culpability for 
homicide and bodily injury are recognized depending on intent, the 
kind of weapon used, and the circumstances under which the crime 
occurred. Homicide is considered a crime against a person rather 
than a crime against society in which the state administers justice 
of its own volition. Under the sharia, the victim or the victim's fam- 
ily has the right to demand punishment, to grant clemency, or to 
demand blood money (diyd) — a set payment as recompense for the 
crime. 

An act of self-defense is recognized as a right nullifying crimi- 
nality. Retaliation is permitted to the male next of kin of the vic- 
tim by killing the criminal in the case of a homicide or exacting 
the same bodily injury that was inflicted on the victim. Acceptance 
of diya is, however, considered preferable under the sharia. In cases 
involving death or grievous injury, the accused is usually held 



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incommunicado. Imprisonment before trial can last weeks or even 
several months. The right of bail or habeas corpus is not recog- 
nized, although persons accused of crimes are sometimes released 
on the recognizance of a patron or employer. The accused is nor- 
mally held not more than three days before being formally charged, 
but it is common for detainees to be held for long periods if the 
investigation is incomplete. 

At trials for minor offenses, qadis hear complaints and then cross- 
examine plaintiffs, defendants, and any witnesses. The judge as- 
signs great significance to a defendant's sworn testimony, although 
the testimony of two women is required to equal that of one man. 
In the absence of two witnesses, oral confessions before a judge 
are almost always required for conviction. Trials are held without 
jurors and are generally closed. They are normally held without 
counsel, although lawyers can advise the accused before the trial. 
Attorneys may also be allowed to act as interpreters for those un- 
familiar with Arabic. Consular access is not usually permitted dur- 
ing the trials of foreign nationals. After guilt or innocence is 
determined, a sentence, if appropriate, is imposed by the judge. 
In certain criminal cases, punishment can be referred to a local 
governor or shaykh for sentencing upon the advice of a local Mus- 
lim jurist or the ulama. 

Appeals against judges' decisions are automatically reviewed by 
the Ministry of Justice or, in more serious cases, by a court of ap- 
peal. In the early 1990s, there were two sharia courts of appeal, 
one sitting in Riyadh and the other in Mecca. Appeals are heard 
by panels of three judges except for sentences of death or amputa- 
tion, which can only be adjudicated by a panel of five judges. De- 
cisions of the appellate courts are final except for sentences of death 
and amputation. Cases of capital punishment are automatically 
referred to the king for final review. 

Crime and Punishment 

The incidence of crime was considered to be relatively low in 
Saudi Arabia, and violent street crime was particularly unusual. 
Crime rates had, however, risen with the presence of foreign work- 
ers. An increase noted in the level of petty crime in 1989 was linked 
to unemployed Saudis and to Yemeni residents of the kingdom. 
The severity of penalties and the rigid system of enforcement were 
credited by both officials and ordinary citizens with contributing 
to the high standards of public safety. Supporters of severe punish- 
ment believed that, although carried out infrequently, a behead- 
ing or stoning reminded the people that such penalties remained 
in force. Some observers disagreed, citing cultural traits and the 



283 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

social forces bearing on Arabs of the peninsula as the main inhibiting 
factors. According to the Statistical Yearbook published by the Ministry 
of Finance and National Economy, the most common crimes in 
1988 were theft (7,553 cases), the production, sale, and consump- 
tion of alcohol (5,085 cases), altercations and quarreling (3,651 
cases), and moral offenses (2,576 cases). There were fifty-six mur- 
ders and 340 cases of attempted and threatened murder. There were 
twenty-nine cases of arson and 574 cases involving forgery or 
fraud. 

Crimes subject to the death sentence included murder, apostasy 
from Islam, adultery, drug smuggling, and sabotage. Under cer- 
tain conditions, rape and armed robbery could also lead to execu- 
tion. Executions could be carried out by beheading, firing squad, 
or stoning of the convicted person in a drugged state. All seven- 
teen executions carried out in 1990 were by beheading. 

The sharia sets forth rigorous requirements for proof of adultery 
or fornication. For the crime of adultery, four witnesses to the act 
must swear to having witnessed the crime, and if such an accusa- 
tion does not hold up in court, the witnesses are then liable to 
punishment. No one was executed for adultery in 1990, although 
during 1989 there were reliable reports of nonjudicial public ston- 
ings for adultery. 

Under the sharia, repeated theft is punishable by amputation 
of the right hand, administered under anesthetic. Because of its 
severity, a number of qualifications have been introduced to mitigate 
the punishment. If the thief repents and makes restitution before 
the case is brought before a judge, the punishment can be reduced; 
furthermore, the victim can demand recompense rather than 
punishment or can grant a pardon. Highway crime was considered 
a crime against public safety and thus subject to more severe punish- 
ment. Aggravated theft can be punished by cross-amputation of 
a hand and a foot. Such cases have been unusual, but Amnesty 
International reported four of them in 1986. In 1990 fewer than 
ten hand amputations took place, at least five of which were ad- 
ministered to foreigners. 

Flogging with a cane was often imposed for offenses against 
religion and public morality, such as drunkenness and gambling 
and the neglect of prayer requirements and fasting. Although the 
flogging was painful, the skin was not broken. The purpose was 
to degrade rather than cripple the offender and serve as a deter- 
rent to others. United States citizens have been flogged for alcohol- 
related offenses, usually receiving from thirty to 120 strokes. A 
Kuwaiti sentenced to prison in connection with terrorist bombings 



284 



National Security 



in Mecca was condemned to receive a total of 1,500 lashes over 
the course of his twenty-year sentence. 

In 1987, based on a ruling by the ulama, drug smugglers and 
those who received and distributed drugs from abroad were made 
subject to the death sentence for bringing "corruption" into the 
country. First-time offenders faced prison terms, floggings, and 
fines, or a combination of all three punishments. Those convicted 
for a second time faced execution. By the end of 1987, at least nine 
persons had been executed for offenses that involved drug smug- 
gling, most of them non-Saudis. According to the police, the an- 
tidrug campaign and the death penalty had by 1989 reduced 
addiction by 60 percent and drug use by 26 percent. By late 1991 , 
more than 110 drug sellers had been arrested since the law was 
put into effect. Saudi officials claimed that the kingdom had the 
lowest rate of drug addiction in the world, which they attributed 
to the harsh punishments and the pious convictions of ordinary 
Saudis. Drug use was said to persist, however, among wealthy youn- 
ger Saudis who acquired the habit abroad. Drug users allegedly 
included some members of the royal family, who took advantage 
of their privileged status to import narcotics. 

Prison Conditions 

The administration of the kingdom's prisons was under the su- 
pervision of the director general of public security. Unsanitary and 
overcrowded prison conditions prior to King Faisal's reign were 
supposedly corrected after reforms adopted since the late 1960s. 
Nevertheless, it was clear from various published reports during 
the 1980s that conditions for most prisoners were very unpleasant. 
According to Saudi Arabia: A MEED Practical Guide published in 1983 
by the Middle East Economic Digest, up to 200 prisoners might 
share a single room. Basic food was provided, usually eaten by hand 
from the floor, although prisoners' families often supplemented their 
diets. Inmates slept on a bare floor; in some cases, they were pro- 
vided with a pad, but no mattress. They had to supply their own 
blankets. There was little ventilation, and a hole in the floor served 
as a toilet. Saudi prisons were not dangerous or violent, and treat- 
ment for ordinary inmates was not cruel. Little attention was given 
to rehabilitation or training for a trade after confinement, however. 
Boredom was a particular problem. According to the MEED guide, 
there was no provision for parole, but most prisoners were released 
for good behavior after serving three-quarters of their sentences. 
The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1988, published 
by the United States Department of State, also described condi- 
tions as severe in some institutions, although not intentionally 



285 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

degrading. Prisoners were liable to suffer heat stroke and some- 
times complained of difficulty in obtaining adequate medical treat- 
ment. The Department of State said that the Saudi government 
was making efforts to expand and improve prisons, but substan- 
dard conditions persisted, especially in deportation centers where 
large numbers of foreigners were held prior to deportation. 

Human Rights 

Saudi Arabia has been cited by several international human rights 
monitoring groups for its alleged failure to respect a number of 
basic rights. London-based Amnesty International reported receiv- 
ing credible testimony from political prisoners who alleged they 
were arbitrarily arrested, held in prolonged detention without trial, 
and routinely tortured during interrogations. Torture methods in 
the Mubahathat (office of secret police) prisons included months 
in solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, beatings to the soles of 
the feet, suspension by the wrists from ceilings or high windows, 
and the application of electric shocks to all parts of the body. Am- 
nesty International cited reports that sixty-six persons had been 
detained without charge or trial for radical Shia activity, although 
forty-one of these, as well as other political opponents of the govern- 
ment, were released in 1990 on the occasion of a royal pardon for 
more than 7,000 common criminals. 

The human rights organization Middle East Watch, the Min- 
nesota Lawyers International Human Rights Committee, and the 
International Committee for Human Rights in the Gulf and the 
Arabian Peninsula issued reports in 1991 and 1992 that detailed 
extensive use of torture in Saudi prisons as a means to extract con- 
fessions from detainees. Prisoners reportedly signed confessions to 
crimes they had not committed in order to escape physical and psy- 
chological torture. As of October 1992, human rights organiza- 
tions had identified forty-three political prisoners who had been 
detained for more than one year without formal charges. Several 
prisoners are alleged to have died while in police custody. 

The Department of State reported in early 1991 that there was 
no automatic procedure for informing a detainee's family or em- 
ployer of his arrest. Embassies usually heard of the arrest of their 
nationals informally within a few days; official notification took 
several months. A policy requiring Ministry of Foreign Affairs ap- 
proval of consular access to prisoners has caused delays in consu- 
lar visits. 

In spite of calls after the Persian Gulf War for modernization 
of laws and relief from the influence of strict Islamism in the im- 
position of punishment, the royal family showed little disposition 



286 



National Security 



to liberalize the criminal justice system. As of early 1992, the con- 
servative religious establishment seemed to have solidified its abil- 
ity to block reforms of the codes of law and judicial procedures that 
were the sources of increasing domestic and international criticism. 

Among various works analyzing Saudi Arabia's defense posture, 
The Gulf and the West: Strategic Relations and Military Realities by 
Anthony H. Cordesman covers a range of topics, including de- 
velopment of the armed forces, modernization of the air force, var- 
ious United States arms packages, and the naval confrontation in 
the Persian Gulf. Additional details on Saudi defense allocations 
and the arms buildup through the early 1980s are presented in 
Nadav Safran's Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security. The Middle 
East, published by the Congressional Quarterly in 1991, includes 
a concise discussion of military sales from the United States politi- 
cal perspective and a summary of events in the Persian Gulf crisis. 

Limited treatment of the role played by Saudi Arabia in the gulf 
war can be found in the work on Operation Desert Storm by 
Norman Friedman, Desert Victory, and in James Blackwell's, Thunder 
in the Desert, and in an article by David A. Fulghum in Aviation Week 
and Space Technology. 

The aggression of Iraq against Kuwait and the decline of the 
Soviet threat in the Middle East have reduced the relevance of most 
earlier analyses of the strategic situation in the region. Several 
studies are still pertinent to Saudi Arabia, however. In Arms and 
Oil: U.S. Military Strategy and the Persian Gulf, Thomas L. McNaugher 
considers how Saudi Arabia deals with both external and domes- 
tic security threats as part of a broader review of United States 
military interests in the region. Saudi Arabia and the United States, 
a report prepared in 1981 by the Congressional Research Service 
of the Library of Congress, is still a useful appraisal of Saudi ex- 
ternal and domestic security concerns and the strategic interests 
shared by the two countries. In Saudi Arabia: The West and the Secu- 
rity of the Gulf, Mazher A. Hameed examines the geopolitical en- 
vironment in the gulf and the range of threats to the United States 
and the West. 

A readable account of earlier Saudi military history can be found 
in The Kingdom: Arabia and the House ofSaud by Robert Lacey . Several 
aspects concerning the armed forces, military production, and the 
administration of justice are treated in Saudi Arabia Unveiled by 
Douglas F. Graham. The operation of the judicial system and the 
Saudi record on human rights are briefly examined in the annual 



287 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices of the Department of State 
and annual reports by Amnesty International. 

Much of the data in the foregoing chapter concerning the size, 
organization, and equipment of the Saudi armed forces are based 
on The Military Balance, published annually by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, and on Jane's Fighting Ships. (For 
further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



288 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Students, Teachers, and Institutions by Level of Education, 

1990-91 

3 Health Facilities and Medical Personnel, 1987-88 Through 

1990-91 

4 Government Budget, 1986-91 

5 Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1985-89 

6 Oil and Gas Reserves, Discoveries, and Production, 1986-90 

7 Petroleum Exports, 1986-91 

8 Direction of Oil Exports by Region, 1986-90 

9 Production of Major Crops, 1985-86 Through 1989-90 

10 Direction of Trade with Industrialized and Developing Coun- 

tries, 1987-91 

11 Balance of Payments, 1986-90 

12 Major Equipment, Royal Saudi Land Forces, 1992 

13 Major Equipment, Royal Saudi Air Force, 1992 

14 Major Weapons, Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces, 1992 

15 Major Equipment, Royal Saudi Naval Forces, 1992 

16 Major Equipment, Saudi Arabian National Guard, 1992 



289 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 



When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 0.04 inches 

Centimeters 0.39 inches 

Meters 3.3 feet 

Kilometers 0.62 miles 

Hectares (10,000 m 2 ) 2.47 acres 

Square kilometers 0.39 square miles 

Cubic meters 35.3 cubic feet 

Liters 0.26 gallons 

Kilograms 2.2 pounds 

Metric tons 0.98 long tons 

1.1 short tons 

2,204 pounds 

Degrees Celsius 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit 

(Centigrade) and add 32 



291 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Table 2. Students, Teachers, and Institutions by 

Level of Education, 1990-91 1 

Level of Education Males Females Total 
Students 2 

Primary 919,949 768,934 1,688,883 

Intermediate 279,770 216,594 496,364 

Secondary 127,042 114,231 241,273 

Higher 

University colleges 3 73,166 37,562 110,728 

Girls' colleges 19,570 19,570 

Total higher 73,166 57,132 130,298 

Total students 1,399,927 1,156,891 2,556,818 

Teachers 

Primary 55,381 45,321 100,702 

Intermediate 20,559 15,159 35,718 

Secondary 8,195 8,058 16,253 

Higher 

University colleges 3 7,251 1,407 8,658 

Girls' colleges 135 979 1,114 

Total higher 7,386 2,386 9,772 

Total teachers 91,521 70,924 162,445 

Institutions 

Primary 4,806 3,574 8,380 

Intermediate 1,766 1,057 2,823 

Secondary 581 486 1,067 

Higher 

University colleges 3 67 67 

Girls' colleges 11 11 

Total higher 67 11 78 

Total institutions 7,220 5,128 12,348 

1 Table includes only institutions under the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, 
and the Directorate General of Girls' Education. 

2 Female students are under the supervision of the Directorate General of Girls' Education except those 
female students at university colleges. 

3 Includes girls' sections. 

Source: Based on information from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, 
1410-1411 [1990], Riyadh, 1991, 119, 121. 



292 



Appendix 



Table 3. Health Facilities and Medical Personnel, 1987-88 
Through 1990-91 * 





1987-88 


1988-89 


1989-90 


1990-91 




157 


162 


162 


163 


Beds 


25,902 


26,315 


25,918 


25,835 


Primary health-care centers . . . 


1,438 


1,477 


1,639 


1,668 


Physicians 


11,326 


11,940 


12,617 


12,959 




25,986 


27,169 


28,266 


29,124 


Pharmacists and technicians . . . 


12,793 


14,013 


15,125 


15,329 



* Includes Ministry of Health facilities only. In 1990-91 other ministries and government bodies had 
thirty-one additional hospitals with 3,785 beds. In addition, sixty-four private hospitals had 6,479 
hospital beds. 



Source: Based on information from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Annual Report, 
1410-1411 [1990], Riyadh, 1991, 125-26. 



Table 4. Government Budget, 1986-91 1 
(in millions of riyals) 2 





1986 


1987 


1988 


1989 


1990 


1991 


Revenues 














Oil 


164,500 


154,250 


74,183 


73,525 


n.a. 


85,910 


Other 


49,600 


45,750 


32,743 


31,775 


n.a. 


32,090 




214,100 


200,000 


106,926 


105,300 


n.a. 


118,000 


Expenditures 














Human resources 
















30,413 


24,533 


23,689 


23,388 


24,004 


25,869 


Transportation and 














communications . . . . 


22,173 


14,497 


10,904 


9,493 


8,516 


8,006 


Economic resources 














development 


12,533 


9,081 


6,615 


5,888 


5,039 


4,719 


Health and social 














development 


16,134 


12,892 


11,094 


10,806 


10,634 


11,239 


Infrastructure 














development 


9,833 


6,924 


4,299 


3,555 


2,807 


2,586 


Municipal services 


17,063 


11,890 


8,110 


7,017 


5,430 


5,520 


Defense and security . . 


79,892 


63,956 


54,226 


50,080 


47,812 


48,689 


Public administration . . 


43,928 


38,584 


30,974 


25,058 


31,345 


29,188 


Government lending 














institutions 


17,500 


9,300 


3,590 


590 


n.a. 


n.a. 




10,529 


8,343 


6,145 


5,325 


4,873 


7,184 


Total expenditures . . 


259,998 


200,000 


159,646 


141,200 


140,460 


143,000 


BALANCE 


-45,898 





-52,720 


-35,900 


n.a. 


-25,000 



n.a. — not available. 

1 As of 1986, Saudi Arabia changed from a fiscal year based on the Islamic lunar calendar to a fiscal 
year beginning December 31 and ending December 30. 

2 For value of the riyal — see Glossary. 



Source: Based on information from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Research and Statistics 
Department, Statistical Summary, 1410-1411 [1990], Riyadh, 1991, 123. 



293 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Table 5. Gross Domestic Product by Sector, 1985-89 
(in millions of constant 1970 riyals) * 



Sector 


1985 


1986 


1987 


1988 


1989 


Agriculture, forestry, and 












fishing 


3,193 


3,673 


4,275 


4,736 


5,068 


Crude petroleum and natural 












gas 


7,402 


11,160 


9,578 


11,672 


11,581 


Other mining and quarrying . . . 


182 


177 


173 


175 


181 


Petroleum refining 


2,383 


2,481 


3,191 


3,673 


3,369 


Other manufacturing 


3,071 


2,985 


2,975 


3,064 


3,186 


Electricity, gas, and water 


979 


1,033 


1,093 


1,159 


1,218 


Construction 


4,259 


3,732 


3,627 


3,446 


3,428 


Wholesale and retail trade 


8,417 


8,097 


7,956 


7,877 


7,798 


Transportation and 












communications 


4,522 


4,398 


4,293 


4,336 


4,358 


Finance, real estate, and 












business services 


4,833 


4,084 


3,995 


4,066 


4,115 


Community, social, and 














864 


829 


819 


845 


858 


Producers of government 












services 


5,185 


5,199 


5,175 


5,191 


5,329 




369 


312 


337 


810 


658 


Imputed bank service charges . . 


-355 


-337 


-323 


-317 


-322 


TOTAL 


45,304 


47,823 


47,164 


50,733 


50,825 



* For value of the riyal — see Glossary 



Source: Based on information from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Research and Statistics 
Department, Statistical Summary, 1410-1411 [1990], Riyadh, 1991, 132-35. 



Table 6. Oil and Gas Reserves, Discoveries, 
and Production, 1986-90 1 



1986 



1987 



1988 



1989 



1990 



Oil 2 

Reserves 

Saudi Arabia 167 167 252 258 259 

Divided Zone 3_ 3 3 3 2_ 

Total reserves 170 170 255 3 261 3 261 

Cumulative discoveries 223 225 226 233 235 

Gas 4 

Reserves 

Saudi Arabia 142 177 180 181 n.a. 

Divided Zone 6 6 6 6 n.a. 

Total reserves 148 183 186 187 n.a. 

Discoveries 13.1 7.4 0.0 4.5 2.0 

n.a. — not available. 

1 As published. 

2 In billions of barrels. 

3 Based on reestimation. 

4 In trillions of cubic feet. 

Source: Based on Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, Annual Statistical Bulle- 
tin, 1991, Vienna, 1991, 11. 



294 



Appendix 



Table 7. Petroleum Exports, 1986-91 
(in millions of barrels per day) 

1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 





3.270 


2.420 


3.030 


3.340 


4.820 


6.740 


Refined products 














Base oils 


0.028 


0.015 


0.038 


0.011 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Gasoline 


0.142 


0.220 


0.252 


0.263 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Kerosene and jet fuel .... 


0.041 


0.091 


0.100 


0.155 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Diesel oil 


0.183 


0.260 


0.225 


0.119 


n.a. 


n.a. 




0.062 


0.136 


0.203 


0.209 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Other 


0.002 


0.000 


0.001 


0.001 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Total refined products . . 


0.458 


0.722 


0.819 


0.758 


0.734 


0.612 


Liquid petroleum gas 


0.298 


0.334 


0.402 


0.417 


0.530 


0.615 


TOTAL 


4.026 


3.476 


4.251 


4.515 


6.084 


7.967 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from United States, Embassy in Riyadh, 1991 Oil Survey: 
Saudi Arabia, July 1991, n.p. 



Table 8. Direction of Oil Exports by Region, 1986-90 
(in percentages) 



Region ; 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 



Asia 40.5 50.1 43.3 43.7 46.7 

Western Europe 34.6 22.3 24.1 21.8 18.4 

North America 18.6 21.6 26.0 29.9 27.2 

Latin America 5.7 4.4 4.6 2.7 3.7 

Africa 0.6 1.6 2.0 1.9 4.0 



TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Saudi Arabia: Recent 
Economic Developments, Washington, 1990, Table 25, 74. 



Table 9. Production of Major Crops, 1985-86 Through 1989-90 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 1985-86 1986-87 1987-88 1988-89 1989-90 



Barley 120 154 285 331 362 

Citrus fruits 11 27 27 35 35 

Dates 457 503 514 518 520 

Eggplant 39 37 65 83 83 

Grapes 83 86 93 96 100 

Sorghum 43 117 126 163 200 

Tomatoes 327 427 401 437 463 

Watermelons 364 420 428 455 461 

Wheat 2,290 2,649 3,267 3,285 3,464 



Source: Based on information from Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Research and Statistics 
Department, Statistical Summary, 1410-1411 [1990], Riyadh, 1991, 121; and Ministry 
of Finance and National Economy, Central Department of Statistics, Statistical Year- 
book, 1408 [1988], Riyadh, n.d., 591. 



295 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Table 10. Direction of Trade with Industrialized and 
Developing Countries, 1987-91 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 



Exports 

Industrialized countries 



Japan 


5,128 


4,106 


4,943 


8,427 


9,174 


United States 


4,477 


5,265 


7,284 


10,652 


1 1 ,049 


West Germany 


307 


556 


283 


263 


1,137 


Other 


4,985 


5,459 


6,163 


8,754 


12,971 


Total industrialized 












countries 


14,897 


15,386 


18,673 


28,096 


34,331 


Developing countries 












Asia 


4 290 


4,711 


5,157 


8,475 


10,887 


Middle East 


1,948 


1,996 


2,498 


4,089 


3,008 


Latin America 


907 


948 


660 


1,478 


1,375 


Africa 


316 


420 


396 


1,121 


988 


Other 


194 


201 


305 


l!o92 


1,072 


Total developing 












countries 


7,655 


8,276 


9,016 


16,255 


17,330 




50 


75 


52 


65 


58 


Total exports 


22 602 


23,737 


27,741 


44,416 


51,719 


mports 












Industrialized countries 












Japan 


3,470 


3,483 


3,014 


3,689 


4,292 




3,069 


3,540 


3,843 


4,022 


7,229 


West Germany 


1 556 


1,575 


1,324 


1,774 


2,656 


Other 


6,873 


7^229 


7^559 


9^068 


13,154 


Total industrialized 












countries 


14,968 


15,827 


15,740 


18,553 


27,331 


Developing countries 














3,303 


3,555 


3,140 


3,154 


4,845 


Middle East 


710 


889 


964 


915 


831 


Latin America 


302 


426 


337 


388 


435 




202 


285 


184 


376 


433 


Other 


501 


645 


634 


523 


549 


Total developing 














5,018 


5,800 


5,259 


5,356 


7,093 




124 


157 


154 


160 


163 


Total imports 


20,110 


21,784 


21,153 


24,069 


34,587 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statis- 
tics Yearbook, 1992, Washington, 1992, 341-42. 



296 



Appendix 



Table 11. Balance of Payments, 1986-90 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1986 


1987 


1988 


1989 


1990 




20,125 
17,066 


23,138 
18,283 


24,315 
19,805 


28,299 
19,231 


44,283 
21,490 




3,059 


4,855 


4,510 


9,068 


22,793 


Service exports 

Service imports 


13,944 
20,995 
-7,051 


13,114 
19,506 
-6,392 


12,809 
15,651 
-2,842 


13,012 
20,766 
-7,754 


12,502 
23,365 
-10,863 


Official transfers, net .... 


-3,000 
-4,804 


-3,300 
-4,935 


-2,499 
-6,510 


-2,200 
-8,342 


-4,401 
-11,637 


Unrequited transfers, 

net 


-7,804 


-8,235 


-9,009 


-10,542 


-16,038 


Current account balance . . 


-11,796 


-9,772 


-7,341 


-9,228 


-4,108 


Direct foreign 

investment 

Portfolio foreign 


967 
3,451 


-1,175 
6,150 


-328 
3,057 


-312 
-1,786 


n.a. 
n.a. 


Direct foreign investment, 
net 


4,418 


4,975 


2,729 


-2,098 


n.a. 


Bank deposits 


-4,561 
4,319 


-1,423 
8,862 


-2,216 
5,308 


473 
7,346 


-2,417 
1,147 


Other capital, net 


-242 


7,439 


3,092 


7,819 


-1,270 


Capital account balance . . 


4,176 


12,414 


5,821 


5,721 


-1,270 


Change in reserves (minus 
sign means increase) . . . 


7,620 


-2,642 


1,520 


3,507 


5,378 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statis- 
tics Yearbook, 1992, Washington, 1992, 610-11; and Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency, Research and Statistics Department, Statistical Summary, 1410-1411 [1990], 
Riyadh, 1991, 120. 



297 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Table 12. Major Equipment, Royal Saudi 
Land Forces, 1992 



Type and Description 



Country 
of Origin 



Estimated in 
Inventory 



Tanks 

AMX-30 France 300 

M-60A3 United States 400 

Armored vehicles 

AML 60/90 armored cars France 235 

AMX-1 OP infantry fighting vehicles -do- 500 + 

M-2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles United States 200 

M-l 13 personnel carriers -do- 1,700 

EE- 11 Urutu personnel carriers Brazil 30 

Panhard M-3 personnel carriers France 150 

Self-propelled artillery 

M-109A1B/A2 155mm howitzers United States 100 

GCT 155mm howitzers France 60 

Towed artillery 

M-56 pack 105mm United States 24 

M- 10 1/102 105mm (in store) -do- 40 

M-l 98 155mm -do- 90 

Multiple rocket launchers 

ASTROS II 180mm Brazil 70 

Mortars 

107mm, 120mm various 400 

Antitank guided weapons 

TOW, self-propelled United States 200 

M-47 Dragon Britain n.a. 

HOT, self-propelled France 90 

Recoilless rifles 

75mm, 84mm, 90mm, 106mm various n.a. 

Surface-to-surface missile launchers 

CSS-2 intermediate range China 30 

Surface-to-air missiles 

Crotale France n.a. 

Stinger United States n.a. 

Redeye -do- 500 

Helicopters 

UH-60 Blackhawk (transport) -do- 1 7 

SA-365N medical evacuation France 6 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 120. 



298 



Appendix 



Table 13. Major Equipment, Royal Saudi 
Air Force, 1992 

Country Estimated in 

Type and Description of Origin Inventory 

Fighter-ground attack aircraft 

F-5E Tiger II United States 52 

Tornado IDS Britain 45 

Air defense aircraft 

F-15C Eagle United States 78 

Tornado ADV Britain 24 

Reconnaissance aircraft 

RF-5E Tiger United States 10 

Transport aircraft 

C-130E/H Hercules , . -do- 41 

L-100-30HS (hospital) -do- 5 

CASA C-212 Spain/Indonesia 35 

Airborne early warning 

E-3A United States 5 

Jet fighter conversion trainer 

F-5B/F ' -do- 35 

F-15D -do- 20 

Training 

BAC-167 Strikemaster Britain 32 

Hawk Mk 60 -do- 30 

Pilatus PC -9 Britain/Switzerland 30 

Tankers 

KE-3A United States 8 

KC-130H -do- 7 

Helicopters 

AB-205 Iroquois Italy 8 

AB-206B Jet Ranger -do- 13 

AB-212 Agusta -do- 27 

KV-107 Kawasaki Japan 7 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-193, London, 1992, 121. 



299 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Table 14. Major Weapons, Royal Saudi 
Air Defense Forces, 1992 



Type and Description 



Country of 
Origin 



Estimated in 
Inventory 



Surface-to-air missile launchers 

Improved Hawk United States 

Shahine (mounted on AMX-30SA) France 

Shahine (static defense) -do- 
Antiaircraft guns 

M-163 Vulcan 20mm, self-propelled United States 

30mm (mounted on AMX-30SA) France 

Oerlikon-Buhrle, 35mm Switzerland 

Bofors L-70 40mm (in store) Sweden 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 121. 



16 
17 

73 



92 
50 
128 
150 



300 



Appendix 



Table 15. Major Equipment, Royal Saudi Naval Forces, 1992 

Date Commissioned 

Type and Description Origin Number or Entered Service 



Frigates 

Medina class (F-2000), 2,870 
tons, Otomat missiles, 100mm 
gun 

Corvettes 

Badr class (PCG-1), 870 tons, 
Harpoon missiles 

Fast attack craft 

As Siddiq (US 58-m), Harpoon 

missiles 

Dammam (Jaguar) torpedo 

craft 

Mine warfare 

MSC-322 minesweepers 

Sandown class minesweepers . . 

Amphibious 

Landing craft, utility (LCU) 610 

type 

Landing craft, medium 
(LCM) 



Helicopters 

AS-365N Dauphin (20 with 
antiship missiles, 4 search and 
air rescue) 

AS-332 B/F Super Puma (6 with 
torpedoes, 6 with AM 39 
Exocet missiles) 



France 

United States 

-do- 
West Germany 



United States 
Britain 



United States 

United States/ 
West Germany 



France 



-do- 



24 



12 



1985-86 

1980-83 

1980-82 
1969 



1978-79 
1991-93 



1989-90 



* — being delivered, 
n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from Jane's Information Group, Jane's Fighting Ships, 1991-92, 
Coulsdon, United Kingdom, 1991, 473-78; and The Military Balance, 1992-1993, 
London, 1992, 120-21. 



301 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Table 16. Major Equipment, Saudi Arabian 
National Guard, 1992 

Country Estimated in 

Type and Description of Origin Inventory 

Armored personnel carriers 

Y-150 Commando, wheeled United States 1,100 

Towed artillery 

M-102 105mm howitzers -do- 30 

M-198 155mm howitzers -do- 4 

Recoilless rifles 

M40A1 106mm -do- n.a. 

Antitank guided weapons 

TOW missiles -do- n.a. 

n.a. — not available. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1992-1993, London, 1992, 121. 



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2d Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House 
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1990. 

Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Prac- 
tices for 1990. (Report submitted to United States Congress, 102d, 
1st Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, and House 
of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs.) Washing- 
ton: GPO, 1991. 

Department of State. Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990. 

Washington: 1991. 

Department of State and Defense Security Assistance 

Agency. Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance: Fiscal Year 
1992. Washington: 1991. 

(Various issues of the following publications were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Aviation Week and Space Technology; 
Economist [London]; Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: 



323 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Saudi Arabia [London]; Facts on File; Foreign Broadcast Informa- 
tion Service, Daily Report: Middle East and North Africa; Jane's Defence 
Weekly [London]; Joint Publications Research Service, Near 
East/South Asia Report; Keesings Record of World Events [London]; Mid- 
dle East International [London]; New York Times; and Washington Post.) 



324 



Glossary 



Al — Uppercase connotes family or belonging to, as in Al Saud (q. v.), 
or Al Sudairi; lowercase represents the definite article the, as 
in Rub al Khali. 

Al Saud — Literally, the House of Saud; the patrilineal descendants 
of Muhammad ibn Saud. 

amir — Strictiy speaking, commander. In Saudi Arabia, amir often 
means prince, but can mean governor of a province. 

barrels per day (bpd) — Production of crude oil and petroleum 
products is frequently measured in barrels per day and often 
abbreviated as bpd. A barrel is a volume measure of forty-two 
United States gallons. Conversion of barrels to tons depends 
on the density of the specific product. About 17.3 barrels of aver- 
age crude oil weigh one ton. Light products such as gasoline 
and kerosene would average close to eighteen barrels per ton. 

Divided Zone — Originally a shared area between Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. Each country annexed its half of the zone in 1966 but 
continued to respect the other country's right to the national 
resources in the whole zone. 

downstream — The oil industry views the production, processing, 
transportation, and sale of petroleum products as a flow process 
starting at the wellhead. Downstream includes any stage be- 
tween the point of reference and the sale of products to the con- 
sumer. Upstream is the converse. Upstream of the wellhead 
includes exploration and drilling of wells. 

fatwa — An authoritative legal interpretation by a mufti or religious 
jurist that can provide the basis for court decision or govern- 
ment action. 

fiscal year (FY) — Initially based on Islamic lunar year (see Preface). 
Since December 1986 based on Gregorian calendar. Fiscal year 
begins December 31 and runs through following December 30. 

GDP (gross domestic product) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy over a 
period of time, such as a year. Only output values of goods 
for final consumption and investment are included because the 
values of primary and intermediate production are assumed 
to be included in final prices. GDP is sometimes aggregated 
and shown at market prices, meaning that indirect taxes and 
subsidies are included; when these have been eliminated, the 
result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates that 



325 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 

deductions for depreciation of physical assets have not been 
made. See also GNP. 
GNP (gross national product) — The gross domestic product (q. v. ) 
plus the net income or loss stemming from transactions with 
foreign countries. For Saudi Arabia, GNP in the 1970s and 
early 1980s was significantly larger than GDP because of sur- 
plus oil revenues. GNP is the broadest measurement of the out- 
put of goods and services by an economy. It can be calculated 
at market prices, which include indirect taxes and subsidies. 
Because indirect taxes and subsidies are only transfer payments, 
GNP is often calculated at factor cost by removing indirect taxes 
and subsidies. 

hadith — Tradition based on the precedent of the Prophet Muham- 
mad's words and deeds that serves as one of the sources of Is- 
lamic law. 

hijra — Literally, to migrate, to sever relations, to leave one's tribe. 
Throughout the Muslim world, hijra refers to the migration 
to Medina of Muhammad and his early followers. In this sense, 
the word has come into European languages as hegira. 

hujar (collective pi.) — Refers to the agricultural settlements of the 
Ikhwan (q.v.), which combined features of religious missions, 
farming communities, and army camps. Word from same root 
as hijra; has sense of separation from previous affiliation. 

Ikhwan — The brotherhood of desert warriors, founded by Abd al 
Aziz, who were settled in the hujar (q.v.). 

imam — A word used in several senses. In general use, it means 
the leader of congregational prayers; as such it implies no or- 
dination or special spiritual powers beyond sufficient educa- 
tion to carry out this function. It is also used figuratively by 
many Sunni (q.v.) Muslims to mean the leader of the Islamic 
community. Among Shia (q.v.) the word takes on many com- 
plex meanings; in general, however, and particularly when 
capitalized, it indicates that particular descendant of the House 
of Ali who is believed to have been God's designated reposi- 
tory of the spiritual authority inherent in that line. The iden- 
tity of this individual and the means of ascertaining his identity 
have been major issues causing divisions among Shia. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established along with the 
World Bank (q.v.) in 1945, the IMF is a specialized agency 
affiliated with the United Nations and is responsible for stabiliz- 
ing international exchange rates and payments. The main busi- 
ness of the IMF is the provision of loans to its members 
(including industrialized and developing countries) when they 
experience balance of payments difficulties. These loans 



326 



Glossary 



frequently carry conditions that require substantial internal eco- 
nomic adjustments by the recipients, most of which are develop- 
ing countries. 

majlis — Tribal council; in some countries, the legislative assem- 
bly. Also the audience of the king, amir (q.v.), or shaykh (q.v.) 
open to all citizens. 

mutawwiin — Literally, those who volunteer or obey; sometimes 
known by popular name of Committees for Public Morality, 
or more formally, as the Committees for the Propagation of 
Virtue and Prevention of Vice. 

riyal (SR) — Saudi Arabia's currency unit. Riyal is pegged to the 
International Monetary Fund (q.v.) special drawing right 
(SDR — a unit consisting of a basket of international curren- 
cies) as SR4.28 = SDR1. In May 1993 the exchange rate was 
SR3.75 = US$1 , a rate that had not changed since June 1 , 1986. 

sharia — Islamic law. 

sharif (Arabic pi., ashraj) — Specifically, one who has descent from 
Muhammad through his daughter Fatima. Literally, noble, ex- 
alted, having descent from illustrious ancestors. Frequentiy used 
as an honorific. 

shaykh — Leader or chief. Applied either to political leaders of tribes 
or towns or learned religious leaders. Also used as an honorific. 

Shia (from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali) — A member of the smaller 
of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shia supported the 
claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the caliphate 
and leadership of the Muslim community, and on this issue 
they divided from the Sunni (q.v.) in the major schism within 
Islam. Later schisms have produced further divisions among 
the Shia over the identity and number of imams (q.v.). Most 
Shia revere Twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to be 
hidden from view. 

spot oil — Oil sold on the open market without any precontractual 
arrangement. 

Sunni — The larger of the two great divisions of Islam. The Sunni, 
who rejected the claims of Ali's line, believe that they are the 
true followers of the sunna, the guide to proper behavior set 
forth by Muhammad's personal deeds and utterances. 

Wahhabi — Name used outside Saudi Arabia to designate adher- 
ents to Wahhabism (q.v.). 

Wahhabism — Name used outside Saudi Arabia to designate offi- 
cial interpretation of Islam in Saudi Arabia. The faith is a pu- 
ritanical concept of unitarianism (the call to the oneness or unity 
of God — ad dawa lil tawhid) that was preached by Muhammad 



327 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



ibn Abd al Wahhab, whence his Muslim opponents derived 
the name. 

waqf — In Muslim law, a permanent endowment or trust, usually 
of real estate, in which the proceeds are spent for purposes desig- 
nated by the benefactor. Usually devoted to charitable purposes. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International De- 
velopment Association (IDA), the International Finance Cor- 
poration (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established in 1945, has the pri- 
mary purpose of providing loans to developing countries for 
productive projects. The IDA, a legally separate loan fund but 
administered by the staff of the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to 
furnish credits to the poorest developing countries on much easier 
terms than those of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded 
in 1956, supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans 
and assistance specifically designed to encourage the growth of 
productive private enterprises in the less developed countries. 
The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private foreign investment 
in developing countries against various noncommercial risks. The 
president and certain senior officers of the IBRD hold the same 
positions in the IFC. The four institutions are owned by the 
governments of the countries that subscribe their capital. To par- 
ticipate in the World Bank group, member states must first be- 
long to the International Monetary Fund (IMF — q. v.). 



328 



Index 



Abbasids, 10 

Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud, 
3, 195; battles of, 234; British support 
for 21, 28; client-patron relations under, 
70; death of, 28; descendants of, 191, 
231; exiled to Kuwait, 20; expansion 
under, xxi, 15, 50, 84, 191, 234; goals 
of, 23; grandsons of, 107; Ikhwan 
under, 23-24, 25, 84, 118; as Khadim 
al Haramayn, 24; League of Arab States 
formed by, 237; meeting of, with Roose- 
velt, 222; modernization under, 26, 47- 
48; official recognition of, 21; oil con- 
cessions under, 134; oil revenues under, 
113-14; problems of, 25; religion under, 
87-88; rise of, 20-24; rule of (1926-53), 
24-28; settlement of beduin by, 118; 
succession to, 28; support of Muslim 
community for, 25, 26; Wahhabism as 
cohesive device under, 83-84 

Abd al Aziz Military Academy, 264 

Abd Allah ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, 24, 
214; as commander of national guard, 
xxv, 38, 209, 231, 251, 262, 278; as 
crown prince, 43, 196, 207, 231; diplo- 
matic missions of, 42; as second deputy 
prime minister, xxii, 38 

Abd Allah ibn Faisal, 19, 20 

Abd Allah ibn Rashid, 17 

Abd Allah ibn Saud ibn Abd al Aziz, 16; 
executed, 16 

Abd Allah ibn Thunayyan, 20 

Abd al Wahhab, Muhammad ibn, 21; al- 
liance of, with Muhammad ibn Saud, 
xxi, 15, 80, 195; attack by, on Shia, 14, 
80; background of, 14; condemnation 
of polytheism by, 81-82; death of, 16; 
ideas of, 14,81, 234; search by, for po- 
litical support, 14-15; significance of 
theology of, 14 

Abd ar Rahman Al Saud, 20 

Abqaiq oil field, 148; gas-oil separation 
plant in, 154; oil production in, 149 

Abu Ali Island, 59 

Abu Bakr: as caliph, 9, 12, 75; death of, 9 
Abu Dhabi: border with, 38, 51 
Abu Hadriyah oil field, 148; production, 
149 



Abu Hanifa, 79 

Abu Safah oil field, 148 

Abu Talib: death of, 8; protection of Mu- 
hammad by, 7-8 

Ad Dahna, 52 

Ad Dahna desert, 56 

Ad Dammam: airport, 168; national 
guard in, 262; naval base, 260; port of, 
167 

ad dawa lil tawhid. See Islam, Wahhabi 

Ad Dibdibah plain, 56 

Ad Diriyah, 15; captured by Tursun, 16, 
17, 81; as center for religious studies, 
81; origins of Al Saud in, 13; recap- 
tured by Turki, 17 

Aden, 221 

Administration of Scientific Research and 

Fatwa, xxvi 
Administration of Scientific Study, Legal 

Opinions, Islamic Propagation, and 

Guidance, 209 
adoption, 69 
adultery, 285 

Afghanistan: military aid to, xxvii, 192, 
228; Soviet invasion of, 42, 225, 241-42 

Africa: economic assistance to, xxvii, 192; 
sharia in, 79 

Africans: in Eastern Province, 62; in 
Hijaz, 62; as slaves, 63 

agricultural development: under Khalid, 
39; in pre-Islamic period, 5 

agricultural settlements {see also hujar), 21 

agriculture, 171-77; constraints on, 171; 
environmental impact of, 171; expan- 
sion of, 129; export crops, 171; govern- 
ment modernization of, 174; growth 
rate, 130, 131-32, 133, 176, 177; in- 
efficiency in, 124; labor force in, 133; 
modern, 174-77; oasis, 52, 117; private 
investment in, 132, 176; restructuring 
of, 171; subsidies for, 122, 124; tradi- 
tional, 171-72; water consumed by, 
xxviii, 57, 160, 171, 176 

ahl al hall wa al aqd, 207-8; function of, 
207; number of, 207 

ahl at tawhid. See Islam, Wahhabi 

Ahmad ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, 41 , 278 

air defense force, 250, 258-59; batteries 



329 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



of, 259; commander of, 258-59; em- 
placement of, 259; established, 32, 233; 
number of personnel, 231; uniforms, 
ranks, and insignia, 268 
air force, 250, 256-58; combat readiness 
of, 232-33, 256; creation of, 257; 
deployed, 256; flight training, 264; in- 
signia, 268; materiel, 256, 257-58; in 
military hierarchy, 232; mission of, 
256; number of personnel, 231; organi- 
zation of, 256; ranks, 268; training, 
257, 258; uniforms, 268 
airports: construction of, 121, 122, 123 
Al Ahsa. See Eastern Province 
Al Ahsa oasis, 56; national guard in, 262; 
Shia community in, 85; water resources 
in, 57 

Al Amar: mineral deposits at, 162 

al Amiri, Rashid Salim, 146 

Al Aqsa Mosque: fire in, 36 

Al ash Shaykh, xxi, xxv; collaboration of, 
with Al Saud, xxi, 80, 195, 208-9; po- 
litical power of, 209 

Al Banah Province, 203 

Al Barri oil field, 148; gas-processing 
plant in, 153; oil production in, 149 

Al Buraymi Oasis: border through, 51; 
demarcation agreement (1975), 37; set- 
tlement of dispute over, xxiii, 33, 51 

Al Bu Said dynasty, 221 

Algeria, 42, 226 

Al Ghawar oil field, 148; gas-oil separa- 
tion plant in, 153; gas production in, 
149; oil production in, 149 
Al Hasa. See Eastern Province 
Al Hudud ash Shamaliyah Province, 203 
Al Hufuf, 56; captured by Abd Allah, 19; 
Ismailis in, 13; lack of development in, 
41; Ottomans driven from, 21 
Ali, 75; assassination of, 9, 12; as caliph, 
10, 12, 76; war of, with Muawiyah, 11, 
12 

Alireza family, 210 
Al Jafurah desert, 56 
Aljawf, 53, 203 
Al Jazirah, 211 

Al Jubayl industrial complex, xxviii, 121, 
163, 260; construction of, 39, 86; ef- 
fect of Persian Gulf War on, 59; gas 
fraction plants at, 153; growth of, 164; 
number of industries in, 163; popula- 
tion of, 164 

Al Khafji oil field, 148 



Al Kharj, 53 

Al Kharsaniyah oil field: production, 149 

Al Madinah Province, 203 

Al Madinah al Munawwarah. See Medina 

Al Marjan oil field, 148; production, 149 

Al Masani: mineral deposits at, 162 

Al Murrah tribe, 209; relationship of, with 
monarchy, 70; subdivisions of, 68-69 

Al Qasim Province, 203; climate in, 58; 
national guard in, 262 

Al Qatif: captured by Abd Allah, 19; cap- 
tured by Muhammad Ali, 17; lack of 
development in, 41; Shia riots in, 40- 
41, 86; water in, 172 

Al Qatif oil field, 148; production, 149 

Al Qurayyat Province, 203 

Al Qusaibi family, 210 

Al Rajhi family, 210 

Al Rashid, 53; accord of Abd al Aziz with, 
26; alliance of, with Al Saud, 17; Al 
Saud exiled by, xxi, 3; defeated, 21, 
234; expansion of, 234 

Al Saar beduin, 71 ; roles of women in, 74 

Al Saud, xxi, 3, 4, 12, 53; Abd al Aziz 
faction, 207; Abd Allah faction, 207; Al 
Faisal branch, 204; Al Jiluwi clan, 206; 
Al Kabir clan, 206; alliance of, with Al 
Rashid, 17; alliance of, with British, 
235; alliance of, with Muhammad ibn 
Abd al Wahhab, 15, 80, 193; Al Sudairi 
clan, 204-6; Al Thunayyan clan, 205; 
collaboration of, with Al ash Shaykh, 
xxi, 80, 105, 208-9; denounced by 
Nasser, 225; dominion in Najd, xxi, 

13, 15, 28; economy under, 113, 119; 
exiled, 16; exiled to Kuwait, xxi, 3, 20; 
expansion of, throughout Arabian 
Peninsula, 19, 234; family infighting, 
20, 248; as governors, 203; jihad by, 
18; loyalty to, 70, 278; male members 
of, 4, 191, 204; and merchant families, 
210; modernist faction, xxv, 207; ori- 
gins of, 13; Ottoman attempts to de- 
stroy, 234; political authority of, 15, 17, 
84, 90, 119, 191, 250; political dynam- 
ics in, 204-8; political factions in, 
206-7; political machinations of, 20; 
reaction to, 15; religious authority of, 
xxiv, 17, 82-83, 84, 90, 208; rise of, 

14, 19, 21; Shia opposition to, 85-86; 
Sudairi Seven faction, 206-7; tensions 
among, 195-96; terrorist attacks against, 
36; traditionalist faction, xxv, 207; 



330 



Index 



tribute paid to, 18, 19, 83-84; and 
Wahhabism, 13-16, 17, 47 

Al Uqair Convention, 50 

Al Uthmaniyah oil field: gas-oil separa- 
tion plant in, 154; gas-processing plant 
in, 153 

Al Yamamah I military agreement, 276, 
278 

Al Yamamah II military agreement, 276 

American Petroleum Institute (API), 148 

amirate councils, 204 

amirates, xxiv, 204; governors of, 203 

Amnesty International, 86, 284, 286 

Anayzah tribe, 209 

An Nadwah, 212 

An Nafud, 52, 53; water in, 172 
An Nafud desert, 56 
AOC. See Arabian Oil Company 
AOL See Arab Organization for Industri- 
alization 

API. See American Petroleum Institute 
Apicorp. See Arabian Petroleum Invest- 
ment Corporation 
apostasy wars, 9 

Arab community: influence on, 43 
Arab conferences: Faisal's influence on, 

36; of 1973, 37 
Arab Fury, 249 

Arabia: British interest in, 19-20 

Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) 
{see also Saudi Arabian Oil Company), 
29, 118, 136; foreign employees of, 138; 
infrastructure development by, 137, 138; 
roles of, 137; Saudi employees of, 138; 
Saudi participation in, 138-39; scholar- 
ships, 137; Shia employees of, 41, 85, 
248; training programs, 137-38 

Arabian Oil Company (AOC): concession, 
140, 148; damage to facilities of, 151, 
154; ownership of, 140-41; ports oper- 
ated by, 157 

Arabian Peninsula: conquered by Mu- 
hammad ibn Saud, 4, 195; geologic 
structure of, 51; percentage of, occupied 
by Saudi Arabia, 49; Wahhabism in, 19 

Arabian Petroleum Investment Corpora- 
tion (Apicorp), 165 

Arabic language, 4, 64 

Arab-Israeli conflict, 227, 243 

Arab-Israeli peace talks, 227 

Arab League. See League of Arab States 

Arab Monetary Fund, xxviii 

Arab nationalism, 224-27, 253; as theme 



of foreign policy, 212-13, 224 
Arab News, 212 

Arab Organization for Industrialization 
(AOI), 277 

Arabsat. See Arab Satellite Communica- 
tions Organization 

Arab Satellite Communications Organiza- 
tion (Arabsat), 168 

Arab Socialist Action party, 247 

Arab unity, 29, 224-26; interpretation of, 
224; opposition to, 30 

Aramco. See Arabian American Oil Com- 
pany 

armed forces, xxv, 231, 250-73; basic 
training, 264; conditions of service, 
265-68; conscription, 265; develop- 
ment of, 273; enlisted personnel, 264; 
enlistment incentives, 266; enlistment 
period, 266; expansion of, xxvii, 232; 
foreign involvement in, 273-78; hier- 
archy in, 232; Islamists in, 248; under 
Khalid, 31; king as commander in chief 
of, 194; manpower of, 231, 251; ma- 
teriel, xxvii, 254; missions of, 251; 
modernization of, 267, 274, 276; non- 
commissioned officers, 264; officer can- 
didates, 264; officer corps, 265, 267; 
officer training, 264; organization of, 
251; pay and benefits in, 248, 249, 266, 
267; personnel, foreign, 234, 267; qual- 
ifications for, 266; recruitment for, 265; 
royal family in, 249; security measures 
in, 248; technicians, competition for, 
265; training, 264-65, 273, 274, 276; 
uniforms, ranks, and insignia, 268 
Armed Forces Hospital Heart Center, 105 
army, 250, 251-56; airborne brigade, 
254; combat units of, 253-54; deploy- 
ment of, 254; Eighth Armored Brigade, 
254; Fourth Armored Brigade, 253; in- 
fantry brigade, 254; insignia, 268; ma- 
teriel, 254, 256; mechanized brigade, 
254; in military hierarchy, 232; modern- 
ization of, 32, 253; number of troops 
in, 231, 251, 253; organization of, 253; 
in Persian Gulf War, 240; ranks, 268; 
recruitment for, 253; reserves, 253; 
training, 222; uniforms, 268 
Ar Riyadh, 211 
Ar Riyadh Province, 203 
ashraf, 17; lineage of, 63 
Ash Sharawrah army base, 256 
Ash Sharquiyah Province, 203 



331 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Ashura, 12 

Asia: economic assistance to, xxvii, 192; 
oil exports to, 116, 128, 151-52, 153, 
183 

Asir, 51, 52, 203, 236, 248; climate in, 
57; connection of, with Yemen, 62; 
monsoons in, 58; size of, 52; topogra- 
phy of, 52; water resources in, 57 

asl, 63 

Assad Military City, 255 

As Saffaniyah oil field, 148; gas-oil sepa- 
ration plant in, 153, 154; gas produc- 
tion in, 149; oil production in, 149 

As Summan Plateau, 53 

At Taif: air base, 256; national guard in, 
262; siege of, 9, 82 

At Taif School of Theology, 96 

austerity program, 30 

awaali, 64 

Az Zuluf oil field, 148; export terminal, 
156-57; gas-oil separation plant in, 
153; oil production in, 149 

Badiyat ash Sham, 53 

Badr, Muhammad al (imam), 237 

BAe. See British Aerospace 

Baghdad, 10 

Baghdad Pact, 29 

Bahrain, 5, 62; in Gulf Cooperation 
Council, 42, 217, 244; military as- 
sistance to, 244; oil discovered in, 136 

Ba Khashab family, 210 

Bandar ibn Sultan ibn Abd al Aziz Al 
Saud, 205 

Bangladesh, 227 

Bani tribe, 209 

Bankers' Security Deposit Account (BSDA), 
180 

banking, 177-82; activities, 181; regula- 
tions, 180 

Bank of International Settlements, 185 

banks, 178; commercial, 180-81; foreign, 
178, 180 

Battle of Sabalah, 236 

bayah, 80 

Baz, Abd al Aziz ibn (shaykh), xxvi, 89, 
198 

beduin {see also nomads), 71; black, 68; 
Christian, 6; diet of, 72; economy of, 
71-74; etymology of, 71; and farmers, 
symbiosis between, 71-72, 117, 171, 
172; government support of, 71; 



Ikhwan movement among, 21; Mu- 
hammad's sojourn with, 8; protection 
by, 172; settlement of, 118; urban mi- 
gration by, 74; women, roles of, 74 

Bin Ladin family, 210 

Bir at Tawilah: mineral deposits at, 162 

Boeing Corporation, 258, 277 

border disputes, xxii-xxiii, 38; with Iran, 
33; with Jordan, 33; with Oman, 51; 
with Qatar, 33, 50; with Yemen, xxvi, 
221, 236, 242, 243 

borders, 49-51; with Abu Dhabi, 38, 51; 
with Iraq, 4, 50; with Jordan, 4, 50; 
with Kuwait, 50; with Oman, 38, 49; 
with Qatar, 50; with Republic of 
Yemen, 4, 49-50; with United Arab 
Emirates, 49 

borrowing, commercial, 185 

Britain: allies of, 23; cultivated by Abd 
al Aziz, 21, 235; diplomatic relations 
with, 29, 31; interest of, in Arabia, xxii, 
19-20, 23, 50, 236; invasion of Egypt 
by, 29, 237; materiel from, xxvii, 234, 
257, 273, 275, 276, 278; military as- 
sistance from, 19, 257, 273, 275, 276; 
military assistance to Kuwait from, 
247; military personnel from, 267; mili- 
tary training provided by, 257, 264; in 
Persian Gulf War, 240, 272; support 
of, for Abd al Aziz, 28; terrorist attacks 
against, 36; trade with, 228 

British Aerospace (BAe), 278; military 
training by, 264 

brotherhood. See Ikhwan 

BSDA. See Bankers' Security Deposit 
Account 

Buraydah, 53 

Bureau of the Presidency of the Council 

of Ministers, 203 
Burqan oil fields: discovered, 50 
Byzantine Empire, 4 



California Arabian Standard Oil Com- 
pany (CASOC), 136 

caliphs, 9, 75, 76; imperial expansion of, 
9 

Camp David Accords, xxiii, 39, 225; at- 
tempt to devise alternative to, 42-43 

Canada: materiel from, 264; oil exports 
to, 151, 183; trade with, 183 

capital account, 184-85; inflows, 184; out- 
flows, 116, 126, 184-85 



332 



Index 



caravan routes, 53 

Carter, Jimmy: Khalid's meeting with, 
39; materiel supplied under, 223, 274 

C ASOC . See California Arabian Standard 
Oil Company 

censorship, 212 

census, 60, 266 

Central Planning Organization, 32, 128 
children: custody of, 65, 66; number of, 
108 

Christians: under Islamic rule, 9, 76-77; 
Muhammad's contact with, 8; Ortho- 
dox, 6; in pre-Islamic Arabia, 6 

civil rights, 49 

civil servants, 201; number of, 201 
Civil Service Board, 201 
Civil Service Bureau, 201 
clans, 7, 68 

client-patron relationship, 70, 172; 
abolished, 83 

climate, 57-58; rainfall, 58; relative hu- 
midity, 57-58; temperature, 57, 58; 
winds, 58 

Coast Guard, 281 

coastline, 4 

Code of Military Justice (1947), 268-69; 
punishments under, 269-72 

Cole, Donald, 68 

Command and Staff College, 264 

Committees for the Propagation of Vir- 
tue and Prevention of Vice (mutawwiin), 
xxiv, 198; attempts to reform, 31; fan- 
aticism of, 281; government support 
for, 88; number of, 282; organization 
of, 88; role of, 83, 88, 89, 281 

Committees for Public Morality. See Com- 
mittees for the Propagation of Virtue 
and Prevention of Vice 

Committee for the Defense of Rights 
under the Sharia, xxvi 

communications, 123, 168; construction 
of, xxvii, 122; investment in, 132 

Commonwealth of Independent States, 59 

constitution: Quran as, 86, 194 

construction sector: decline of, 162; 
growth rate of, 130, 131, 133; labor 
force in, 133 

Consultative Council, xxxiv; desire for, 
89, 191, 193-94, 210, 247; members of, 
xxiv; promises to establish, xxiv, 31, 
41, 89, 193-94, 247 

Continental Shelf Agreement (1968), 33 

Council of Ministers, 37-38, 180, 



199-201, 210; appointments to, 210; 

authority of, 199; created, 199; crown 

prince in, 199; under Fahd, 199-301; 

king in, 250; members of, xxvi, 199; 

reorganized, 38 
Council of Senior Ulama, xxv-xxvi, 209; 

relationship of, with government, 208 
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 

1988, 285 

coups d'etat, attempted: by air force, 249; 
in Bahrain, 42 

courts. See sharia courts; specialized courts 

crime, 283-85; categories of, 282; causes 
of, 282; deterrents to, 283; drug- 
related, 285; rate, 283; self-defense in, 
282; sentences for, 284; types of, 284 

criminal justice system {see also judicial 
system; sharia courts), 282-83; appeals 
in, 283; defendants' rights in, 282-83; 
foreign nationals in, 284; procedure in, 
282-83; punishment in, xxv, 284; trials 
in, 283 

cultural homogeneity, 62 

currency {see also money), 177-78; de- 
valued, 28; foreign, 178; indigenous, 
177-78 

current account, 184; deficit, 184; financ- 
ing, 185; service payments, 184 



Damascus, 10 

Dar at Tawhid, 96 

death: causes of, 106; rate, 106 

debt: long-term, 186 

defense spending, xxvii, 117, 272-73; 
decline in, 272; in infrastructure, 273; 
on materiel, 273; per capita, 272; as 
percentage of federal spending, 272; as 
percentage of gross national product, 
272; on training, 273 

democracy: rejection of, xxv 

demonstrations. See political demonstra- 
tions 

Department of Religious Research, Mis- 
sionary Activities, and Guidance, 103, 
109, 198 

desalination plants, 57; construction of, 
xxvii, 122; effect of Persian Gulf War 
on, 59 

deserts, 4; climate in, 58 

Desert Victory: The War for Kuwait (Fried- 
man), 253 

development, xxii, 86, 106-9; human 



333 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



resource, 128, 130, 132; need for, 
xxvii, 29; plans. 128-32: of Riyadh, 
123 

development plans: first (1970-75), 128; 
second (1975-80), 128-30: third 
(1980-85). 130-31: fourth (1985-90), 
61. 97. 131-32: fifth (1990-95), xxviii, 
61, 97, 132 

development policy: sedentarization en- 
couraged by. 72 

Dhahran air base. 256; construction of. 
222; leased to United States, 29. 223. 
257; in Persian Gulf War. 223 

Dhahran International Airport, 168 

dhimmis, 76, 77 

diet: of beduin, 72 

diplomatic corps: appointments to. 210 
Directorate General of Girls' Education. 

97 

Directorate of the Coast Guard, 279 
Directorate of Intelligence. 280 
Directorate of Public Security. 279, 285 
Directorate of Special Security, 279 
disease. 106 

Divided Zone. 50; gas reserves in. 151; 
oil exploration in. 140; oil production 
in. 151: oil reserves in. 148 

divorce: custody of children after, 65: fre- 
quencv of. 66; and genealogy, 69; set- 
tlement payment. 65 

drug: addiction, xxv, 285; smuggling, 
xxv, 284, 285 

dust storms. 58 

Eastern and General Syndicate. 134 
Eastern Petrochemical Company (Sharq), 
165. 166 

Eastern Province, 53-56; economy of. 
113: education in, 96; electrification of, 
138; ethnic diversity in, 62; expansion 
of Abd al Aziz into. 84; government as- 
sistance for, 86; governor of, 199; na- 
tional guard in, 262; oil in, 148; impact 
of oil on. 1 18; oases in. 4: Shia distur- 
bances in. xxiii. 41. 86, 122; Shia popu- 
lation in, 62, 85, 248; water resources 
in, 57, 172 

Eco Fuel. 165 

economic development: under Fahd, 38 
economic pohcv. 119-133; in 1990s, 

125-28; during oil boom. 1 19-24; after 

oil price crash. 124-25 



economic redistribution: raiding as means 

of, 70 

economy: attempts to diversify, xxviii, 
114. 186; basis of, 1 13; changing struc- 
ture of, 132-33; dissatisfaction with, 90; 
effect of Persian Gulf War on, 1 16-17; 
factors transforming, 117-18; impact of 
oil on. 118. 119. 120; Persian Gulf War 
as stimulus to, 127-28; problems in, 
125 

education {see also schools), 96-104; bud- 
gets for, xxviii; developed secondary, 
100; effect of, on family, 107; empha- 
sis on, 32; of girls, xxii, xxv, 97; goals 
of. 98: government responsibility for, 
96; government spending on, 33, 97, 
101. 122: graduation rate, 100; Islamic 
influence in, 250; military, 266; modern- 
ization of, xxvii; need for, 29; under 
Ottoman rule. 96; as percentage of 
budget. 33: policy. 98: public. 97, 129; 
religious. 96; of royal family, 207; in 
rural areas, 48; under second develop- 
ment plan, 129; secular, 96; segregation 
in. 108; subsidies for, 122: technologi- 
cal, 100; vocational, 33 

education, higher, 33, 98; access to, 98, 
100 

education system: size of, 97; structure of, 

97 

education of women: goals of, 98; success 
of, xxv, 98-100, 108 

EEC. See European Economic Commu- 
nity 

Egypt: Al Saud exiled to, 16; in Arab Or- 
ganization for Industrialization, 277; 
Arab sanctions against, 39; and Arab 
unity, 224; diplomatic relations with, 
43-44; guestworkers from, 60; involve- 
ment of. in Yemen civil war, 33, 220, 
237-38; military personnel from, 267; 
military relations with, 29; in Persian 
Gulf War, 226, 240; as a political 
center. 10; rehabilitation of, xxiii, 226; 
relations of. with Israel, 225; relations 
of. with Soviet Union, 30; relations 
with, xxiii, 19, 29-30, 39, 225, 243; 
sharia in. 79; teachers from, 101; towns 
bombed by, 220, 238, 241, 253; in 
United Arab Republic. 30 

Eisenhower, Dwight D., 29 

Eisenhower Doctrine, 29 



334 



Index 



electric power, xxvii, 123, 174; consump- 
tion of, 159; distribution of, 41, 122, 
138; generation, 122, 158, 159; ineffi- 
cient use of, 124; organization of, 158; 
problems with, 158; subsidies, 176 

Electric Utility Lending Program, 159 

employment: in government, 104; growth 
of, 133; for low-skilled workers, 61; for 
Saudis, 62; of university graduates, 61; 
of women, xxv, 61 

Empty Quarter (Rub al Khali), 50-51, 
242; military city constructed in, 256; 
oil exploration in, 139 

English language, 264 

environment: effect of Persian Gulf War 
on, xxviii, 58-59 

Ethiopia: military aid to, xxvii, 192, 241; 
Muhammad's supporters exiled to, 8 

ethnic diversity, 62-64; in Eastern Pro- 
vince, 62; in Hijaz, 62; and social 
stratification, 63 

Europe: imports from, 183; oil exports to, 
151, 164-65, 183; trade with, 117, 183 

European Economic Community (EEC), 
165; negotiations of, with Gulf Cooper- 
ation Council, 126 

expansion, Islamic, 9, 15, 50; by Al Saud, 
19, 81 

exports (see also under individual products), 
228; of crops, 171 ; of natural gas, 163, 
183; nonoil, 183 ; of oil, 183; oil as per- 
centage of, 134 

Fahd ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud: consulta- 
tive council proposed by, 193-94, 247; 
Council of Ministers under, 199-201; 
defense system under, 231; as deputy 
prime minister, xxii, 38, 196, 205; in- 
terpretation of Quran under, 82-83; as 
king, xxi, 43-44, 196; oil industry 
under, 145; succession of, xxiii, 43, 
206; visit of, to United States, 222 

Fahd Plan, 43, 226-27 

Faisal ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud: accessi- 
bility of, 31-32; assassinated, xxii, 37, 
196, 206; background of, 32; defense 
organization under, 231; education 
under, 97, 122; executive powers held 
by, 30, 31, 237; ideals of, 32; influence 
of, on Arab community, 36; as king, 
xxii, 17, 19, 20, 31-32, 196; reform 
program under, 31; support for, 205, 



279; United States support for, 31; visit 
of, to United States, 222 

Faisal ibn Turki Al Saud, 195; descen- 
dants of, 204, 206 

family: as basis of identity, 65; corporate 
responsibility binding, 67; effects of 
modernization on, 107; extended, 107; 
household, 107-8; importance of, 64- 
65; patriarchal, 67; values, 106-7; 
women in, 65-66 

family structure: adjustment of, 69; patri- 
lineage in, 65 

FAO. See United Nations Food and Agri- 
culture Organization 

farmers: and beduin, symbiosis between, 
71-72, 117, 171, 172; loans to, 176; 
subsidies for, 174-76 

Fatima, 75 

Fertile Crescent, 10 

financial sector: organization of, 178; re- 
form of, 126 

fishing, 177; effect of Persian Gulf War 
on, 59, 177 

food: import of, 183 

foreign assets, 185-86 

foreign business, 123; agent fees for, 123; 
government assistance to, for mining, 
162; investments required of, 125; ne- 
cessity for participation of, 121 

foreign exchange, 185 

foreign inhabitants (see also guestworkers): 
distribution of, 62; number of, 60, 247 

foreign liabilities, 185-86 

foreign policy, 212-28; under Fahd, 38, 
42; Islamic influence in, 250; and oil 
boom, 120; themes of, 212-13 

foreign relations, 29; conservative revival 
in, 87; Islam as a factor in, 191 

France: diplomatic relations with, 29, 31; 
invasion of Egypt by, 29, 237; materiel 
from, 233, 234, 259-60, 272, 275; mili- 
tary assistance from, 19, 253-54, 273, 
275; military personnel from, 267; mili- 
tary training by, 265; in Persian Gulf 
War, 240, 272; trade with, 228 

frankincense, 5 

Friedman, Norman, 253 

fuels: subsidies for, 122 

fundamentalists. See Islamists 



gas, liquid petroleum (LPG), 153 

gas, natural: export of, 183; fraction 



335 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



plants, 153; gathering system, 121, 
153, 163; output, 133; pipeline for, 163; 
pricing policy, 153; production capac- 
ity, 149-51, 153; reserves, 149-51; sub- 
sidies for, 159 
gas-oil separation plants (GOSPs), 149, 
153, 154 

GCC. See Gulf Cooperation Council 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
General Audit Bureau, 201 
General Directorate of Investigation, 279, 
280 

General Electricity Corporation, 159 
General Establishment of Military Indus- 
tries, 277 
General Motors of Canada, 264 
General Organization of Social Insur- 
ance, 182 

General Petroleum and Mineral Organi- 
zation (Petromin), 199; activities of, 
curtailed, 139-40; exploration by, 139; 
formed, 119, 139; manufacturing by, 
163; mining by, 162; responsibilities of, 
140; restructured, 125, 141 

General System of Preferences, 165 

geography, 49-59; natural regions and 
topography, 51-56 

Germany, Federal Republic of (West 
Germany): armaments plant built by, 
278; materiel from, 280; trade with, 
228 

Germany, Nazi: arms agreement with, 
237 

Getty Oil Company: concession, 140, 
148; facilities, damage to, 140, 151, 
152, 154; ports operated by, 157 

Ghassanids, 76 

GNP. See gross national product 
GOSPs. See gas-oil separation plants 
government: assistance for Eastern 
Province, 86; assistance for indigent pil- 
grims, 94; assistance to develop min- 
ing, 162; budget, xxviii; budget deficit, 
xxviii, 116; conservative revival in, 87, 
88; debt, 178-80; education as goal of, 
96; education policy, 98; foreign assets 
of, 185; funding for study abroad, 103; 
investment, 164; involvement in agri- 
culture, 174; ownership of, in Arabian 
Oil Company, 140-41; policy toward 
Shia, 85; relationship of, with Council 
of Senior Ulama, 208; role in develop- 
ing manufacturing, 162-64; service im- 



ports, 183; structure of, 193-204; 
support of beduin by, 71; support to pil- 
grimage, 94; tribal view of, 70-71 

government, local, 31, 203-4; organiza- 
tion of, 204 

government agencies, 201 

Government Development Bonds, 180 

government revenues, 124-25; oil reve- 
nues as percentage of, 134; sources of, 
125 

government spending, 117; on education, 
122; on infrastructure, 130, 174; 
planned, 129; under Second Develop- 
ment Plan, 129-30; on specialized 
credit institutions, 18; under Third De- 
velopment Plan, 130 

government subsidies, 186; end of, 125; 
for electricity, 176; for gas, 159; objec- 
tives for, 123-24; rationale for, 122; for 
shaykhs, 279; targets of, 122; for water, 
176 

governors, 37-38, 203-4, 289; duties of, 
203; majlis held by, 203 

Grain Silos and Flour Mills Organization 
(GSFMO), 176; procurement pro- 
gram, 176 

Grand Mosque: pilgrimage to, 92-93; 
siege of, xxiii, xxiv, 39-40, 86, 122, 
208, 216, 249, 280; violence at, 217 

grand mufti, xxvi, 209 

Great Depression, 28 

Great Nafud desert. See An Nafud desert 

Great Rift, 51 

Grievances Board, 201, 203 

gross domestic product (GDP): under 
First Development Plan, 128; growth 
rate, 130, 131; nonoil, 132-33; under 
Second Development Plan, 129; struc- 
ture of, 132 

gross national product (GNP): defense 
spending as percentage of, 272 

GSFMO. See Grain Silos and Flour Mills 
Organization 

guestworkers, xxiv, 48, 211, 277; at- 
tempts to reduce necessity for, xxviii, 
61, 100; crime committed by, 282; 
harassed by religious police, 281; num- 
ber of, 60, 122; origins of, 60-61, 228; 
residency requirements for, 61 

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 244- 
47; economic integration with, 131; es- 
tablishment of, xxiii, xxvii, 38, 42, 218, 
244; goals of, 42, 219, 244; members 



336 



Index 



of, 42, 217-18, 244; military organiza- 
tion of, 244; multilateral exercises of, 
244; negotiations of, with European 
Economic Community, 126; relations 
with, 217-20 
Gulf of Aqaba, 49 

hadith, 75; interpretation of, 82-83 
Hafar al Batin, 244 

Hail, 53, 203; battle of, 21 ; captured, 23, 
24, 235; expansion of Abd al Aziz into, 
84 

Hajar: mineral deposits at, 162 
halaqat, 96 

Hamadi, Saadun, 145 

Hanbal, Ahmad ibn, 70 

Hanifs, 6, 76 

haram, 82 

Harb tribe, 209 

harrat. See lava beds 

Hasan, 13; assassinated, 76 

Hashimite clan, 7; accord of Abd al Aziz 
with, 26 

health (see also medicine), 104-6 

health care: free, 129; government com- 
mitment to improve, 104; investment 
in, xxvii, xxviii, 132; modern, 105; in 
rural areas, 48; under Second Develop- 
ment Plan, 129; subsidies for, 122; 
traditional, 105-6 

health education, 105 

health facilities: construction of, 33, 41, 
121; number of, 104 

health planning, 104-5; objectives of, 105 

health professionals: foreign, 104; train- 
ing of, 104-5; women as, 108 

health research, 105 

hegira. See hijra 

Hejaz Railway, 117, 167 

High Defense Council. See National Secu- 
rity Council, 251; members of, 251 

Higher Council of Qadis, 209 

Higher Ulama Council, xxvi 

hijab (veil); revival of, xxiv, 87, 108 

Hijaz, 5, 51, 62-63; British interests in, 
23; connection of, to Ottoman Empire, 
62; control of, 13, 15, 19; economy of, 
113; education in, 96; elite in, 64; eth- 
nic diversity in, 63; expansion of Abd 
al Aziz into, 84, 195, 235; monasteries 
in, 76; participation in, 87; pre-Islamic 
religion in, 6; recaptured, 16, 21; size 



of, 52; topography of, 52; water 
resources in, 57, 58 

Hijazis, 248 

hijra, 8, 75 

Himalayas, 59 

Hopkins, Nicholas, 70 

House of Saud. See Al Saud 

housing, 123; construction, 129 

Hughes Aircraft Corporation, 258 

hujar (agricultural settlements), 21-23, 84, 
118; religious significance of, 23 

human rights, 286-87 

Husayn (ibn Ali), 12, 76; assassinated, 
12, 76; tomb of, 82 

Husayn, Saddam, 239; support for oppo- 
sition to, 214 

Hussein (king of Jordan), 37 

Hussein (sharif), 23-24; defeat of, 24, 234 



Ibn Hayyan. See National Plastics Com- 
pany 

Ibn Sina. See National Methanol Com- 
pany 

Ibn Zahr. See Saudi- European Petrochem- 
ical Company 
Ibrahim (son of Muhammad Ali), 16 
Id al Adha, 93 
Id al Fitr, 79 
Iffat (queen), 97 
ijtihad, 82 

Ikhwan, 21, 30, 235-37, 260; battles of, 
xxii, 23-24, 195, 235; criticism by, of 
government, 86; defeated, xxii, 26, 
236; establishment of, 21, 84, 118, 235; 
fanaticism of, xxii, 23, 25-26, 84, 85, 
235, 236; invasion of Transjordan by, 
24; missionaries, 85; problems caused 
by, 26; restrained by Abd al Aziz, 24, 
25 

Ikhwan Rebellion (1928-30), 84 
imam, xxi, 12, 13, 17, 64, 79, 85; Abd 

al Aziz as, 21 
Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic 

University, 96, 102, 103, 104 
IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
immunization, 106 

imports, 129, 183; food, 183; government 
service, 183; military, 183; sources of, 
183, 228 

income distribution, 171 

India: guestworkers from, 60, 228; as po- 
litical center, 10; sharia in, 79 



337 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Indians: in Eastern Province, 62; in Hijaz, 
62 

Indonesia: sharia in, 79 

Indonesians: in Hijaz, 62 

industrial cities, 121, 158 

industrialization, xxiii, xxvii, 120-21, 
186; factors motivating, 121; goals of, 
157-58; private-sector role in, 166 

industrial sector: expansion of, 129; gov- 
ernment spending on, 130; licenses is- 
sued to, 166; nonoil, xxviii; subsidies 
for, 122 

infant mortality, 106 

inflation, 122 

infrastructure: development of, xxvii, 
121-22, 128, 129, 131, 273; govern- 
ment spending on, 130, 174; invest- 
ment in, 120; oil industry, 118; 
problems with, 123; quality of, 123; 
spending on, 121; transportation, 167 

Institute of Public Administration, 61, 
201 

intellectual activity: in the Middle Ages, 
10 

Intelsat. See International Telecommuni- 
cations Satellite Corporation 
interest: prohibition against charging, 178 
internal security, 231; threats to, 247-50 
Internal Security Forces College, 279 
International Committee for Human 
Rights in the Gulf and the Arabian 
Peninsula, 194, 286 
International Institute for Strategic Stud- 
ies, 231, 256 
International Marine Satellite system, 168 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 128 
International Telecommunications Satel- 
lite Corporation (Intelsat), 168 
Investigation and Control Board, 201 
investment: government, 130, 132; of oil 
revenues, 115; private sector, 131, 158; 
required of foreign businesses, 125 
IPSA pipelines, 156 
Iran, 62, 207; conflict with, xxvi, 192; 
cooperation of, in Persian Gulf War, 
146, 193, 213, 216, 217, 242; effect of 
Persian Gulf War on, 59; hegemonis- 
tic intentions of, 38; oil exports to, 116, 
128; relations with, 146, 193, 213, 
216-17 

Iranian Islamic Revolution (1979), 39, 
86, 192, 216, 238, 242; impact of, on 
foreign relations, 213; impact of, on oil 
prices, 144 



Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), 42, 219, 225, 
238-39, 241; air force in, 232; impact 
of, on oil prices, 144, 185; impact of, 
on oil production, 151; as impetus for 
forming Gulf Cooperation Council, 
218, 244; materiel for, 223; support for 
Iraq in, 192, 214, 216, 238-39, 242 

Iraq, 9, 50, 226; Arabs in, 4; and Arab 
unity, 224; army of, 242; border with, 
4, 50; financial aid to, in Iran-Iraq 
War, 192-93; guestworkers from, ex- 
pelled, 127, 248; hegemonistic inten- 
tions of, 38: invasion by, of Kuwait, 
xxvi, 116, 126, 144, 146, 193, 214, 220, 
239; oil exploration in, 136; relations 
with, xxvi, 213-14; Republican Guard 
of, 242; support for, in Persian Gulf 
War, 61, 192, 221; threat by, to invade 
Kuwait, 145-46, 239 

Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone, 50, 214 

Iraq-Saudi Arabia Nonaggression Pact 
(1989), 145 

irrigation, 57, 171, 174 

Islam: conception of time in, 78; develop- 
ment of, 74-77; ethical conduct in, 79; 
as factor in foreign relations, 192; fast- 
ing in, 78-79; five pillars of, 78; forced 
conversion to, 9; government support 
for, 74; holidays of, 87; importance of, 
3; interpretation of, 48; political impor- 
tance of, 191; popular practices in, 14; 
prayers, 78; promotion of, 84; ritual 
obligations of, 78; sharia, 79-80: as 
theme of foreign policy, 212-13, 227- 
28; as a way of life, 75 

Islam, Ibadi, 11 

Islam, Shia {see also Shia community; 
Twelvers; see also under individual sects), 
xxiii, 10, 84-86; differences of, with 
Sunni Islam, 76: origins of, 12, 76; 
Wahhabi attack on, 14, 15 

Islam, Sunni: differences of, with Shia 
Islam, 76; prophets in, 77; sharia, 79- 
80; tenets of, 77-80 

Islam, Wahhabi {see also Ikhwan; Wah- 
habi community); as cohesive device, 
83-84; conformity in, 83, 48; estab- 
lished in Arabia, 15, 21; influence of, 
on Arabia, 80, 84; objectives of, 82; po- 
litical implications of, 14, 47, 64; reac- 
tion to, 15; religious fervor of, 21; 
theology of, 80-84; unitarian principle 
of, 14 ' 



338 



Index 



Islamic Awakening, 89-90 
Islamic calendar, 8, 75 
Islamic Development Bank, 94 
Islamic Front for the Liberation of 

Bahrain, 218 
Islamic fundamentalists. See Islamists 
Islamic law. See sharia 
Islamic period, early (622-700), 6-10 
Islamic summit conference: of 1965, 32; 

of 1969, 36; of 1981, 43 
Islamic University of Medina, 96, 102, 

104 

Islamic values, 119; and cultural homo- 
geneity, 64-68; and modernization, 
47-48 

Islamism, xxiv, 86-91; factors contribut- 
ing to, 90; goals of, 86; popular reac- 
tion to, 90-91; of Qadhafi, 42; rise of, 
86 

Islamists: government suppression of, 
89-90; Grand Mosque seized by, 39- 
40, 86; influence of, on military, 248; 
pressure by, on government, 250; pun- 
ishment of, 40; as security threat, 244, 
247 

Ismailis, 12-13 

Israel, 119; Arab conference judgment of, 
36; invasion of Egypt by, 29, 237; in- 
vasion of Lebanon by, 226; opposition 
to, 223; proposed Arab recognition of, 
43; as security threat, 243 

Italy, 228 

Jabal an Nur, 92 

Jabal Shammar, 17, 20 

Jabal Tuwayq, 51, 53, 56; water re- 
sources in, 57 

Jamjum family, 210 

Japan: imports from, 183, 228; oil exports 
to, 164-65 

Jerusalem, 36 

Jews: under Islamic rule, 9, 76, 77; in 
Medina, 76; as monarchs, 6; Muham- 
mad's contact with, 8; in pre-Islamic 
Arabia, 6; role of, 6 

Jiddah, 236; airport, 123, 168; foreign 
population in, 62; merchants in, 117; 
national guard in, 262; oil refinery, 154 
port of, 167 

jihad: by Al Saud, 18, 81; as Muslim 
duty, 79 

Jizan, 203; climate in, 57; port of, 167 



Joint Forces Commands, 240 
joint ventures, xxviii, 125, 142, 155, 165, 
277 

Jordan, 226; assistance to, 222; border 
with, 4, 50; financial support for, 37; 
guestworkers from, xxvi, 60; military 
personnel from, 267; Palestine Liber- 
ation Organization recognized by, 37; 
relations of, with Israel, 36; relations 
of, with Syria, 42; relations with, xxvi, 
29, 221-22; support by, for Iraq in Per- 
sian Gulf War, 192, 222 

journalists, 212 

judiciary, 31 

judges, 64 

Juffali family, 210 

Juhaiman al Utaiba, 39, 86 

June 1967 War, 36, 223, 225, 238 



Kaaba, 40, 75; attack on, 13; pilgrimage 

to, 92-93 
Kaki family, 210 
Kamil family, 210 
Karbala: sacked, 15 
kauf, 58 

Kennedy, John F., 31, 223 

Khadim al Haramayn, xxi, 24, 94, 216 

khadira, 63 

Khalid Division, 240 

Khalid ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, 205; 
agricultural development under, 39; as 
crown prince, xxii, 32, 196, 206; death 
of, xxiii, 43, 206; as deputy prime 
minister, 31; as king, 37-43, 196; lead- 
ership style, 37-38; preparation of, 37; 
succession of, xxii, 37; visit of, to 
United States, 222 

Khalid ibn Saud Al Saud, 19 

Khalid ibn Sultan Al Saud: as com- 
mander of air defense forces, 258-59; 
as commander of armed forces in Per- 
sian Gulf War, 205, 239 

Khalid tribe, 209 

Khalifa, Ali, 146 

Khamis Mushayt Military City, 255; air 

base at, 256 
Kharijite movement, 10-12; ideals of, 11 
Khartoum Conference (1967), 36 
Khashoggi family, 210 
Khaybar: lava bed, 52; siege of, 9 
Khomeini, Sayyid Ruhollah Musavi (aya- 
tollah), 40, 41; export of revolutionary 
ideology of, 85-86, 238, 249 



339 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Khurays oil field: gas-oil separation plant 

in, 153 
khuwa, 70 

King Abd al Aziz International Airport, 
168 

King Abd al Aziz University: expansion 

of, 102; funding for, 32 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: legitimacy of, 

84; meaning of name of, xxi, 3-4; 

proclaimed, xxii, 3, 113, 191, 195, 234; 

stages of establishment of, 21 
King Fahd International Airport, 168 
King Fahd Medical City, 104 
King Fahd University. See University of 

Petroleum and Minerals 
King Faisal Air Academy, 264 
King Faisal University, 101 
King Khalid Eye Specialist Hospital, 105 
King Khalid International Airport, 168, 

277 

King Khalid Military City, 255; popula- 
tion of, 255; resources of, 255 

King Khalid Military College, 262 

King Saud University {see also Riyadh 
University): colleges in, 101, 105 

Korea, Republic of (South Korea): guest- 
workers from, 228; oil refining assets 
in, 115, 155 

kuttab, 96 

Kuwait, 36; Al Saud exiled to, 3, 20; 
border with, 50; guestworkers from, 60; 
in Gulf Cooperation Council, 42, 217, 
244; Iraqi invasion of, xxvi, 116, 126, 
144, 146, 193, 214, 220, 239; Iraqi 
threat to invade, 145-46, 239; military 
assistance from, 244; oil production 
levels, 145; ownership of, in Arabian 
Oil Company, 140-41; protection of, 
244, 247; relations with, 213 

Kuwait, city of: liberation of, 240 

labor, 133-34; disturbances, 85; organi- 
zation of, 74 

labor force: changes in, 133; domestic, 
133; foreign, 48, 60-61, 100, 122, 133; 
growth of, 133; in oil industry, 134; 
percentage of women in, 61, 108 

Lakhmids, 77 

land: arable, 49; area, 49; distribution, 

118, 174 
lava beds (harrat), 52 
law enforcement, 279-82 



League of Arab States (Arab League), 

226; established, 237; peacekeeping 

force in Lebanon, 38 
Lebanese National Assembly, xxiii, 43 
Lebanon: civil war in, xxiii, 38, 42, 43; 

Israeli invasion of, 226 
legal system, 201-3 
Lend-Lease program, 237 
Libya, 36, 42, 226; and Arab unity, 224; 

rejection by, of Fahd Plan, 43 
literacy rate, 96 

literature: conservative revival in, 87 
livestock, 177 

living standards: increase in, 114, 186; 

maintenance of, 117; plans to improve 

Shia, 41 
loans: to farmers, 176 
LPG. See gas, liquid petroleum 
Luberef. See Petromin Lubricating Oil 

Refining Company 

Madain Salin, 6 

Madinat al Jubayl as Sinaiyah: effect of 

Persian Gulf War on, 59 
Madinat an Nabi. See Medina 
Maeena, Khaled al, 212 
magazines, 212 

Mahd adh Dhahab gold mine, 162 

main code, xxiv, 194 

majlis (court): purpose of, 198-99 

majlis ash shura. See Consultative Council 

Makkah Province, 203 

Malik ibn Anas, 10, 79 

Manifah oil field, 148; production, 149 

manufacturing, 162-66; government in- 
volvement in, 162-64; growth rate, 
130, 131, 133; private investment in, 
132, 158, 162, 166; shift to, 162 

Marine Training Institute, 265 

maritime claims, 51 

marriage: age at, 108; arranged, 66; and 
genealogy, 69; housing arrangements 
in, 66; interethnic, 63; polygynous, 66; 
political alliance by, 71; women in, 
65-66 

materiel: acquisition of, xxvii, 184; air 
force, 274-75; army, 254, 256; at- 
tempts to purchase from United States, 
224; from Britain, xxvii, 234, 254, 272, 
275, 276; from China, 276; domestic, 
277-78; foreign, 273; from France, 
233, 234, 254, 272, 275, 276; from 



340 



Index 



Germany, 277, 280; high technology, 
233; sources of, 256; from Spain, 
276-77; from United States, xxvii, 39, 
234, 238, 254, 272, 274-75, 276, 277 
mawlid, 87-88 

Mecca: captured by Abd al Aziz, 3, 
23-24, 236; captured by Tursun, 16, 
234; foreign population in, 62; gover- 
nor of, 199; importance of, 10; mer- 
chants in, 117; Muhammad's return to, 
9; origins of, 6; pilgrimages to, 6, 78, 
79 

media, 211-12; control over, 250; Islamic 
influence in, 250 

Medina, 52, 75; captured by Abd al Aziz, 
3, 236; captured by Tursun, 16, 234; 
foreign population in, 62; governor of, 
199; importance of, 10; Jewish popu- 
lation in, 76; Shia shrines in, destroyed, 
82 

mehr (divorce settlement), 65 
merchant families, 64; political power of, 
210 

Middle Ages (700-1500), 10-13 
Middle East: imports from, 183; main- 
taining political stability in, 213 
Middle East Economic Digest, 285 
Middle East Watch, 286 
military: imports, 183; justice, 268-72 
Military Balance, The, 244, 256, 280-81 
military cities: construction of, 254-56; 

facilities in, 266 
military threat, 241-44; likely targets, 243 
military training: by Britain, 234; by 

France, 234; by United States, 233 
military trial courts, 269; members of, 

269; procedures of, 269 
mining and quarrying, xxviii, 160-62; 

government assistance to develop, 162; 

growth in, 131 
Ministry of Agriculture and Water, 176, 

199 

Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 199, 
203; created, 32 

Ministry of Communications, 199 

Ministry of Defense and Aviation, xxv, 
199, 231, 269, 280; education by, 266; 
medical facilities of, 104 

Ministry of Education, 97 

Ministry of Finance and National Econ- 
omy, 128, 180, 199, 284 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 199, 286 

Ministry of Health, 199; created, 32; ob- 
jectives of, 105 



Ministry of Higher Education, 199 
Ministry of Industry and Electricity, 140, 
166, 199 

Ministry of Information, 199, 212 
Ministry of Interior, 199, 203, 231, 278, 

279; medical facilities of, 104 
Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Endowments, 

Call, and Guidance, xxvi 
Ministry of Justice, 199; created, 196, 202 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 199, 

203 

Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, 
199 

Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 

Resources, 141, 199 
Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs, xxvi 
Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs and Reli- 
gious Trusts, xxvi, 92, 199 
Ministry of Planning, 128, 133, 199 
Ministry of Post, Telephone, and Tele- 
graph, 199 
Ministry of Public Works, 199 
Minnesota Lawyers International Human 

Rights Committee, 286 
missionaries, 81, 85 
Mitsubishi Gas Company, 165 
Mobil Oil Company: joint ventures with, 
142, 155 

modernization, 119; of agriculture, 184; 
effects of, 33, 107; under Faisal, xxii, 
32-33; and Islamic values, 47-48; pace 
of, 33, 122; and traditionalism, conflict 
between, 47, 87, 207, 247 

modesty values, 48, 67 

monarch: advisers to, 251; as commander 
in chief of armed forces, 194, 250; pow- 
ers of, 194-95, 196; as prime minister, 
194; relationship of, with qadis, 202 

monarchy, 194-98; political legitimacy of, 
4, 90, 195; significance of pilgrimage 
for, 93-94; succession to, xxiv, 196-98; 
and tribe, 69-71 

monasteries, 6, 76-77 

money (see also currency), 177-82; ex- 
changers, 181 

monsoons, 58 

Morgan Bank, 185 

Morocco, 36, 42 

mosque: prayers in, 78 

Mount Arafat, 93 

Muawiyah: as caliph, 12, 76; cousin of 
murdered Uthman, 76; war of, with 
Ali, 11, 12 



341 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



mubahith. See General Directorate of In- 
vestigation, 280 
muezzin, 78 

Muhammad (the Prophet), 77; back- 
ground of, 7-8, 74-75; battles by, 9, 
75; birth of, 6-7; contact of, with Chris- 
tians and Jews, 8; death of, 9; descen- 
dants of, 63, 76; education of, 8; exile 
of supporters of, 8; hijra of, 8; marriage 
of, 8; preaching by, 8, 75; return to 
Mecca, 9; revelations to, 8; tribal af- 
filiation of, 7 

Muhammad Ali (Ottoman commander): 
Al Saud exiled by, 16, 234; defeat of, 
19; war by, 16 

Muhammad al Muntazar, 12 

Muhammad ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, 
196, 206 

Muhammad ibn Saud, 3, 204, 206; alli- 
ance of, with Muhammad ibn al Wah- 
hab, xxi, 15, 80; Arabian Peninsula 
conquered by, 4; death of, 15; support 
of, for Wahhabis, 15 

Muslims {see also Islam): designation of, 
77; duties of, 78 

Muslims, Shia. See Shia community 

Muslim courts. See sharia courts 

mutawwiin. See Committees for the Propa- 
gation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice 

Mutayr tribe, 209 

muwahhidun. See Wahhabis 

myrrh, 5 

Nabatean Kingdom, 5, 6 
Naimi, Ali, 138 

Najd, 51-53; Al Saud dominion in, xxi, 
13, 15, 28, 234; Christians in, 77; cli- 
mate in, 58; control of, 19, 195, 234; 
geographic divisions in, 62; influence 
of, 64; isolation of, xxiii, 13, 62; recap- 
tured by Abd al Aziz, 3, 21, 234; recap- 
tured by Turki, 17; topography of, 53; 
Wahhabism in, 13, 82; water in, 172 

Najran, 6, 203; climate in, 57 

Nasif family, 210 

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, 29; denunciation 
of Al Saud by, 225, 237; opposition to, 
29-30; plot to assassinate, 30 

national guard, 118, 203, 279, 280; Abd 
Allah as commander of, xxv, 38, 199, 
209, 231, 262, 278; chain of command 
in, 262; combat readiness of, 232-33; 



combat units of, 262-63; expansion of, 
262, 263; facilities, 262; headquarters, 
262; loyalty of, 278; materiel, 264; 
medical facilities of, 104; mission of, 
231, 251, 278; modernization of, 260; 
number of personnel, 231, 260; organi- 
zation of, 209, 263; in Persian Gulf 
War, 239, 251, 260, 263; security mea- 
sures in, 249; training, 262; tribal levies 
for, 265-66 
National Information Center, 280 
National Industrial Gases Company, 165 
National Methanol Company (Ibn Sina), 
165 

National Plastics Company (Ibn Hay- 
yan), 165 

national security: agriculture and, 124; 
external threats to, 232 

National Security Council, 251 

national symbol, 268 

natural gas liquids pipeline, 153, 156 

navy, 233, 250, 259-60; craft of, 259; 
fleets of, 260; headquarters, 260; insig- 
nia, 268; marine corps, 260; materiel, 
233; number of personnel in, 231, 260; 
in Persian Gulf War, 240; ranks, 268; 
uniforms, 268 

Nay if ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, 205; as 
head of internal security, xxv, 231, 278; 
as minister of defense, 199 

Nazir, Hisham Muhi ad Din, 115 

Neste, 165 

Nestorians, 6 

newspapers, 211; religion articles in, 87; 
self-censorship of, 212 

NGL. See natural gas liquids 

nizam. See main code 

nomads (see also beduin), 172; as camel 
herders, 71-72; decline in number of, 
72-74; geographic distribution of, 62; 
pastoral, 171; resource systems of, 117; 
settlement of, encouraged by develop- 
ment policy, 72, 174; as sheep herders, 
72; as Wahhabis, 21 

Northern Arabia, 53 

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, 256 

Nura: marriage of, to Talal, 17 

oases, 4; agriculture in, 52; in Hijaz, 52; 

in Najd, 53 
October 1973 War, xxii, 36, 119, 225, 

238, 274 



342 



Index 



Office of Beduin Affairs, 198 

Office of the Program Manager — Saudi 

Arabian National Guard (OPM- 

SANG), 262 
Ojjeh family, 210 

oil {see also petroleum), 186; consumption, 
152-53; discovery of, xxii, xxvii, 3, 28, 
113, 117, 134, 191; effect of, xxvii, 3; 
grades of, 148-49; importance of, to 
West, 114; marketing, 155; as reason 
for Persian Gulf War, 114; spills, 59; 
sulfur levels in, 149 
oil boom: economic policy during, 1 19-24 
oil concessions: to Americans, 136, 140; 
area for, 136-37; to British, 134; to Jap- 
anese, 140; modifications in, 136; taxes 
on, 136 

oil embargo, xxii, 29, 36-37, 119, 274; 
instigation of, 225; participation in, 141 

oil exports, 151-53, 162-53, 155, 183; ap- 
proach to, 1 16; markets for, 116, 151 — 
52, 228; as percentage of total exports, 
134; taxes on, 119; terminals, 156-57; 
total, 151 

oil fields, 118; terrorist attacks on, 249 
oil industry, 117, 134-157; growth rates 
in, 131; history of, 134-41; impact of, 
on Eastern Province, 118; impact of, 
on economy, 118, 119; infrastructure 
for, 118; labor force in, 134; structure 
and organization, 141-42; taxes on for- 
eign, 119 

oil market, 228; impact of Persian Gulf 

War on, 146 
oil pipelines, 137, 155-57; expansion of, 

155; shut down, 155, 156 
oil policy: under Fahd, 38, 43, 145, 147 
oil prices: attempt to stabilize, 145; crash 

of, in 1986, xxiii, 43, 115, 124; decline 

of, 144; impact of production on, 134; 

increase in, 144; netback, 144; policies, 

142-47 

oil production, 151-53; capacity, 148-49, 
152; capacity, expansion of, xxviii, 
114-15, 117, 127, 154; under First De- 
velopment Plan, 128; increase in, 151; 
and international economy, 114; pace 
of, 120, 125, 127, 128, 131, 132, 133, 
140, 141; as percentage of total OPEC 
production, 134, 144; during Persian 
Gulf War, 146; policies, 114, 134, 
142-47; rationale behind, 142; short- 
term, 142-44; swing, 144 

oil refineries: damage to, 152; repair of, 



154; upgrade of, 154 

oil refining: capacity, 152-53, 155; in- 
creases in, xxviii, 133; overseas, 147; 
plans to purchase capacity, 115, 147; 
quality, 162; technological develop- 
ments in, 149 

oil reserves, 148-49 

oil revenues: under Abd al Aziz, 113-14; 
drop in, xxiii, 43, 116, 124, 131, 272; 
increase in, 119, 191; as percentage of 
total revenues, 134; uses for, 119, 120 

oil wells: effect of Persian Gulf War on, 59 

Olayan family, 210 

Oman, 5, 220; border with, 38, 49; ef- 
fect of Persian Gulf War on, 59; in Gulf 
Cooperation Council, 42, 217, 244; 
military assistance to, 244; tribute col- 
lected from, 19 

OPEC. See Organization of the Petrole- 
um Exporting Countries 

Operation Desert Shield, 127, 193, 214, 
220, 223-24, 239; ulama approval of, 
208 

Operation Desert Storm, 127, 141, 146, 
232, 239; cost of, 232; deployments in, 
253 

OPM-SANG. See Office of the Program 
Manager — Saudi Arabian National 
Guard 

Organization for Public Services and Dis- 
cipline, 201 

Organization of Arab Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries, 165; oil embargo by, 
36-37 

Organization of Islamic Revolution in the 
Arabian Peninsula, xxv, 247 

Organization of the Islamic Conference, 
xxvii 

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC): output, 134; quota 
system, 115, 144, 145 

Organization of the Islamic Conference: 
of 1981, 41-42 

Ottoman Empire, 16, 81, 195; accommo- 
dation to, 19; attempt to destroy Al 
Saud, 234; driven from Al Hufuf, 21; 
education under, 96; recognition of 
Abd al Aziz by, 21; sharia in, 79; sul- 
tan deposed in, 24 

Pakistan, 227; guestworkers from, 60; 
military personnel from, 267-68; sharia 
in, 79 



343 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Palestine: Arabs in, 4; demands for liber- 
ation of, 29; guestworkers from, ex- 
pelled, xxvi, 127; military personnel 
from, 267 

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), 
222, 247; acceptance by, of Fahd Plan, 
43; and Arab unity, 224; financial sup- 
port for, 227; recognized by Jordan, 37; 
support for Iraq in Persian Gulf War, 
227 

Palestinian problem, 39, 42, 243 
Palestinians, 39, 226-27; Arab support 
for, 36; desire for state for, 43; expelled, 
248; rejection by, of Fahd Plan, 43 
Palmyra, Syria, 5 

Party of God in the Hijaz, 247, 249 
PDRY. See Yemen, People's Democratic 

Republic of 
Peace Shield air defense network, 233, 

258, 259, 277 
Peninsula Shield, 244 
Peninsula Shield Force, 244 
Pension Fund, 182 

Persian Gulf, 10; effect of, on tempera- 
ture, 57; rights in, 33 

Persian Gulf states: Khalid's visits to, 38 

Persian Gulf War (1991), 193, 214, 
239-40; air force in, 232, 239-40; al- 
lied forces in, 239; conservatism in- 
spired by, 87; countries supporting Iraq 
in, 61, 192, 221, 227; damage to oil in- 
dustry, 140, 152; defeat of Iraq in, 242; 
effect of, on economy, 116-17, 185; ef- 
fect of, on environment, xxviii, 58-59; 
effect of, on foreign policy, xxvi, 217, 
226; expense of, 272; impact of, xxviii- 
xxix, 49, 250; logistics of, 239-40, 255; 
national guard in, 251, 260, 263; oil as 
reason for, 114; oil consumption dur- 
ing, 162; Saudi armed forces in, 205, 
233-34; as stimulus to economy, 127; 
trade during, 142 

Persians, 6; expelled, 9 

Petra, Jordan, 5 

petrochemical industry, 164 

Petroline pipeline, 156 

Petrolube. See Petromin Lubricating Oil 
Company 

Petromin. See General Petroleum and 
Mineral Organization 

Petromin Lubricating Oil Company (Petro- 
lube), 142 

Petromin Lubricating Oil Refining Com- 
pany (Luberef), 142 



Pharaon family, 210 

Philippines: guestworkers from, 60, 228 

physicians, 104-5 

PIF. See Public Investment Fund 

pilgrimage, 10, 40, 91-94; accommoda- 
tions for, 91; addressed by king, 94; 
duty of, 78, 79; government support 
for, 94; guild of special assistants for, 
92; income from, 28; Iranians barred 
from, 250; performance of, 13; politi- 
cal demonstrations during, 216, 249; 
pre-Islamic, 6, 75; rituals of, 92-93; 
significance of, 93-94; special visas for, 
92; suspended, 13; transportation for, 
91 

pilgrims: deaths of, 94, 250; demonstra- 
tions by, 94; experiences of, 91; num- 
ber of, 91-92; ritual purification of, 92 

Place of Abraham, 93 

Plain of Arafat, 93 

PLO. See Palestine Liberation Organi- 
zation 

Point Four economic aid mission: termi- 
nated, 29 

political activity: in the Middle Ages, 10 
political associations: prohibited, 247 
political dissidence, xxix, 48-49; repres- 
sion of, xxv 
political dynamics, 204-11 
political ideology: religious purpose in, 
15, 80-81 

political protest, 247; conservative revival 
in, 87; during pilgrimage, 216; by Shia, 
122, 216; by women, 88 

political representation: demands for, 49 

population {see also census), 59-74, 266; 
death rate, 106; distribution of, 49, 62- 
64; diversity of, 62; estimates of, 59, 
60; growth rate, 60; indigenous, 60; in- 
fant mortality rate, 106; official, 59-60; 
percentage of, in urban areas, 107; 
projected, 60; rural, 48; Shia commu- 
nity as percentage of, xxiii, 84, 85 

ports, 157; construction of, 121, 122, 129 

prayer, 78 

pre-Islamic period, 5-6; religion in, 6 

Press Law of 1964, 212 

prisoners: political, 64, 86 

prison system: conditions in, 285-86; tor- 
ture in, 286 

private sector: foreign assets of, 185; in- 
vestment by, 158, 166; role in indus- 
trialization, 166 



344 



Index 



protectionism: effect of, 126 

Public Investment Fund (PIF), 164, 181 

Public Lands Distribution Ordinance 
(1968), 174 

public projects: need for, 29 

Public Security police, xxv, 279-80; deal- 
ings of, with foreigners, 280; equipment 
for, 280; local commanders, 203; re- 
cruitment for, 279; uniforms, 280 

qabila, 63; intermarriage of, 63; patrilineal 
descent in, 63; status differentials in, 63 

Qadhafi, Muammar al, 226; declared a 
heretic by ulama, 226; Islamic radical- 
ism of, 42 

qadis: relationship of, with monarch, 202 

Qahtan tribe, 209 

Qatar: in Arab Organization for Indus- 
trialization, 277; border dispute with, 
50; in Gulf Cooperation Council, xxvii, 
42, 217, 244; Wahhabism in, 5 

Qatif oasis: Shia community in, 85 

Quran, 9, 75; as constitution, 86, 194; in- 
terpretation of, 82-83; prohibition in, 
against charging interest, 178 

Qurayshi, Abd al Aziz, 210 

Quraysh tribe, 7, 74, 209; activities of, 
7; battles by, 9 

Qusaibi, Ghazi al, 210 

Rabigh oil refinery, 154 
radio, 168, 212; opposition to, 26; reli- 
gious programming on, 87 
railroads, 167 
rainfall, 171; in Yemen, 5 
Ramadan: fasting during, 78-79 
Ras al Khafji, 59, 240, 263 
Ras al Mishab naval base, 260 
Ras al Muajjis port, 157 
Rashid, Muhammad ibn, 20 
Ras Tanura oil refinery, 152, 154 
Ras Tanura port, 156 
Reagan, Ronald, 274 
Red Line Agreement, 134-36 
Red Sea, 49; effect of, on temperature, 57 
reform: of government, 31; social, 31 
regional security, 213-24; as theme of for- 
eign policy, 212-13 
religion (see also under individual sects), 
74-94; importance of, to politics, 15; 
indigenous, 76, 77; pre-Islamic, 76-77; 
prohibition of non-Muslim, 88-89 
riots: by Shia Muslims, 86 



river of sand. See Ad Dahna desert 
Riyadh, 53; air base at, 256; airport, 123, 
168; captured by Abd al Aziz, 21, 234; 
development of, 123; governor of, 199; 
national guard headquarters in, 262; 
population of, 107; recaptured by 
Turki, 17 
Riyadh Chamber of Commerce, 62 
Riyadh oil refinery, 154 
Riyadh Stock Exchange: proposed, 126 
Riyadh University (see also King Saud 

University), 96; established, 97 
roads: construction of, 121, 122, 129 
Romans, 6; expelled, 9 
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 222, 237 
Royal Commission for Al Jubayl and 

Yanbu, 163 
Royal Diwan, 198-99 
Royal Greenland Company, 160 
Royal Guard, 236-37, 253, 254; equip- 
ment of, 254; mission of, 254; uni- 
forms, ranks, and insignia, 268 
Royal Saudi Air Force. See air force 
Royal Saudi Air Defense Forces. See air 

defense force 
Royal Saudi Land Forces. See army 
Royal Saudi Naval Forces. See navy 
Rub al Khali. See Empty Quarter 
Rub al Khali Desert, xxiii, 52, 56; topog- 
raphy of, 56 
Rub al Khali oil fields, 148 
rural areas: education in, 48; electricity 
in, 159; health care in, 48, 105; popu- 
lation in, 48 

SAAB. See Saudi Arabian Agricultural 

Bank 
Saba, 5 
Sabaeans, 6 

Sabic. See Saudi Basic Industries Corpo- 
ration 

Sadat, Anwar as, 225; assassination of, 
225; Camp David Accords signed by, 
xxiii, 225; Soviet advisers expelled by, 
225 

Sadr ad Din Agha Khan, 13 

Sakakah, 53 

Salim ibn Subhan, 20 

Salman ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, 205 

saluba, 68 

SAM A. See Saudi Arabian Monetary 
Agency 



345 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



Samarec. See Saudi Arabian Marketing 

and Refining Company 
sand storms, 58 
Sassanid empire, 4 
Saud al Kabir, 206 

Saudi Arabia: A MEED Practical Guide, 285 
Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank 

(SAAB), 176, 181; loans by, 176 
Saudi Arabian Fertilizer Company, 165 
Saudi Arabian Marketing and Refining 

Company (Samarec), 115; creation of, 

125, 140; management of, 142; respon- 
sibilities of, 142 

Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), 

126, 183, 199; created, 119, 178; func- 
tions of, 178-80, 185; government debt 
financed by, 178-80; restrictions on, 
180 

Saudi Arabian Oil Company (Saudi 
Aramco) (see also Arabian American Oil 
Company), 114-15, 139; capital for, 
117, 185-86; control by, 148; electric- 
ity generation managed by, 159; gas 
production by, 154; gas reserves of, 
151 ; joint venture of, with Texaco, 125; 
management of, 141-42; production 
by, 127; responsibilities of, 141, 159; 
revenues, 134; Shia employed by, 85; 
water exploration by, 57 

Saudi Aramco. See Saudi Arabian Oil 
Company 

Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (Sabic), 
117, 127, 163; development plans, 165; 
exports by, 183; financing plans, 166, 
185-86; industries owned by, 164; in- 
vestment by, 164; profits of, 164 

Saud ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, 16, 236; 
deposed, xxii, 31, 196, 206, 278; dis- 
content with, 29; extravagance of, 28; 
as king, xxii, 28, 195, 237; plans for 
privatization, 132; in plot to assassinate 
Nasser, 30, 237; powers abrogated by, 
30, 237; societal changes under, 29; 
visit to United States, 29, 222; and 
Yemen civil war, 36 

Saud ibn Faisal, 19, 20, 206 

Saud ibn Muhammad ibn Muqrin, 4 

Saudi Consolidated Electric Company 
(Sceco), 127, 158-59 

Saudi Credit Bank, 181 

Saudi- European Petrochemical Company 
(Ibn Zahr), 165 

Saudi Fund for Development, 182 



Saudi Gazette, 212 

Saudi Industrial Development Fund 
(SIDF), 159, 181; loans from, for manu- 
facturing, 162, 166 

Saudi Naval Expansion Program (SNEP), 
259, 260, 274 

Saudi News, 212 

Saudi Ordnance Corps program, 274 
Saudi Press Agency, 212 
Saudi Public Transportation Company, 
167 

Sceco. See Saudi Consolidated Electric 

Company 
scholarships, 31 

schools: construction of, 33, 41, 121; en- 
rollment, 97; for girls, 33; primary, 33; 
private, 96; religious, 96; secondary, 33 
Schwartzkopf, H. Norman (general), 239 
segregation, 48, 67-68; values, 48, 108-9 
service sector: growth rate, 130, 131, 133 
setting, 3-5 
Seveners, 12-13 

Shadqam oil field: gas-processing plant in, 
153 

Shafii, Muhammad ibn Idris ash, 80 
shahada, 11,1% 
shamal, 58 

Shammar tribe, 53, 209 

sharia, 75, 279; demands to enforce, 49, 
82-83; as legal system, 201-3, 282; per- 
sonal status in, 65; schools of, 10, 
79-80; source of, 194; as source of po- 
litical legitimacy, 191; taxes under, 18 

sharia, Hanafi, 79 

sharia, Hanbali, xxi, 10, 14, 80, 202, 282; 
interpretation of Quran in, 82-83; in- 
terpretation of sunna in, 82-83 

sharia, Maliki, 10, 79-80 

sharia, Shafii, 80 

sharia courts (see also specialized courts), 
202; of appeals, 202; cases heard by, 
202 

Sharif of Mecca, 23; accord of Abd al Aziz 
with, 26 

Sharq. See Eastern Petrochemical Com- 
pany 

Shatt al Arab waterway, 42 

shaykhs: role of, 69-70; subsidies for, 279 

Sheba. See Saba 

Shia community (see also Islam, Shia): co- 
optation of, 41; cultural affiliations of, 
62; discrimination against, 85, 210; in 
Eastern Province, 62, 85, 248; employed 



346 



Index 



by Aramco, 41, 85, 248; government 
policy toward, 85; opposition of, to Al 
Saud, 85-86; as percentage of popula- 
tion, xxiii, 84, 85; political activism of, 
42, 64; as political prisoners, 64, 86; re- 
lations of, with Wahhabis, 85; riots by, 
40-41, 86, 210, 248; size of, 85; social 
status of, xxiii, 41, 64 

Shiat Ali, 75, 76 

Shukhaybirat gold mine, 162 

SIDF. See Saudi Industrial Development 
Fund 

slavery: abolition of, 31 
slaves: Africans as, 63; intermarriage of, 
63 

smuggling, 243 

SNEP. See Saudi Naval Expansion Pro- 
gram 

Socal. See Standard Oil Company of Cali- 
fornia 
social security, 31 

social services, 186; development, xxviii, 
131; investment in, xxvii, 132; labor 
force in, 133, 134; subsidies for, 122 

social stratification, 62-64; and ethnic 
diversity, 63 

Socony-Vacuum {see also Mobil Oil), 136 

Soldiers of the Right, 249 

Somalia, 227 

South Korea. See Korea, Republic of 
South Korean Lucky Group, 165 
Soviet Union: Afghanistan invaded by, 
42, 225, 241-42; attempt to counteract, 
xxvi, 192, 222, 228, 253, 274; collapse 
of, 242; Egyptian relations with, 30; re- 
lations of, with North and South 
Yemen, 39, 42; relations of, with Syria, 
42; support by, for South Yemen, 38, 
241 

Spain: materiel from, 276-77 
specialized courts {see also sharia courts), 
202-3 

Special Security Force, 280; antiterrorism 
unit of, 281 ; personnel strength of, 281 
Sri Lanka: guestworkers from, 60, 228 
Ssangyong Oil Refining Company, 155 
Standard Oil Company of California 

(Socal), 28, 136 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, 
136 

Star Enterprises, 125, 155 

Statistical Yearbook, 284 

stock exchange, 126, 182; activity, 182; 



investments in, 182 
Strait of Hormuz, 244 
strikes, 29 

students: restrictions on, 29; studying 
abroad, 29, 102-3, 137; and urbaniza- 
tion, 47 

subsidies. See government subsidies 
Sudan, 226; guestworkers from, expelled, 
xxvi, 127, 248; support by, for Iraq in 
Persian Gulf War, 192 
Suez Canal: nationalized, 29, 237 
Sulayman family, 210 
Sultan ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud, 204; in 
line for succession, 196; as minister of 
defense, xxv, 32, 205, 231, 251 
sunna, 75; interpretation of, 82 
Supreme Judicial Council, 202 
Supreme Oil Council, 141, 142 
Syria, 7, 207, 222, 226; Arabs in, 4; 
guestworkers from, 60; military person- 
nel from, 267; rejection by, of Fahd 
Plan, 43; relations of, with Jordan, 42; 
relations of, with Soviet Union, 42; re- 
lations with, 213, 243; in United Arab 
Republic, 30 
Syrian Desert, 10, 53 
Syrians, 6 

Tabuk Military City, 255; air base at, 256 

Tabuk Province, 203 

Taimiya, Taqi ad Din ibn: political the- 
ory of, xxi 

Talal ibn Abd al Aziz Al Saud: as minister 
of finance, 30 

Talal (son of Faisal ibn Turki): marriage 
of, to Nura, 17 

Tapline. See Trans- Arabian Pipeline 
Company 

taxes: as almsgiving, 78; under Al Saud, 
18; on oil concessions, 136 

teachers: foreign, 100-101; training of, 
101; women as, 101 

technical experts, 47 

Technical Studies Institute, 264 

technocrats, xxiii-xxiv; desire of, for con- 
sultative council, 191, 210, 247; emer- 
gence of, 191, 210; influence of, 210-11 

telephones, 168 

television, 168, 212; educational, xxii; es- 
tablishment of, 33; religious program- 
ming on, 87 



347 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



terrorism, 36; Iranian sponsorship of, 
218-19, 249; Libyan sponsorship of, 
226 

Texaco: joint venture of, with Saudi 
Aramco, 125 

Tihamah lowlands, 51, 52 

trade {see also exports; imports), 183; 
balance, 184; with Europe, 117; labor 
force in, 133, 134; in pre-Islamic pe- 
riod, 5-6 

traditionalism, 3; government suppression 
of, 89-90; increase in, 107; inspired by 
Persian Gulf War, 87; manifestations of, 
87, 107; and modernization, conflict be- 
tween, 47, 87, 207; and women, 48 

Trans- Arabian Highway, 167 

Trans- Arabian Pipeline Company (Tap- 
line), 255; capacity of pipeline, 137; pipe- 
line shut down, 155; tax problems, 137 

Transjordan: Ikhwan invasion of, 24, 234 

transportation, 167-68; bottlenecks in, 
129; construction, 167; development of, 
128, 129, 174; infrastructure, xxvii; in- 
vestment in, 132; for pilgrimage, 81- 
92, 94, 168; ports, 122, 129, 156, 157, 
167-68; private, 74; public, 167; rail- 
roads, 167; roads, 167 

treasury bills, 180 

Treaty of Jiddah (1927), 51 

Treaty of Mohammara (1922), 50 

tribal affiliation, xxiii, 4, 7, 63; impor- 
tance of, 62, 64-65, 67, 69, 71, 278; 
influence of, in politics, 210; and 
monarchy, 69-71; in national guard, 
209, 263; and occupation, 63; Wah- 
habism as cohesive device in, 83-84 

tribal organization, 3, 7, 63, 68-69; for- 
mation of subdivisions, 68-69; patrilin- 
eage in, 63, 65 

Truman, Harry S, 222 

Turkey: effect of Persian Gulf War on, 
59; oil exports to, 128; as a political 
center, 10; water imported from, 160 

Turki ibn Abd Allah Al Saud, 1 7, 26; as- 
sassinated, 19 

Tursun, 16 

Twelvers, 12; beliefs of, 85; objections of, 
to Wahhabism, 14-15; origins of, 12, 
76; rituals of, 12 

UAE. See United Arab Emirates 
ulama, 63-64; criticism by, of govern- 



ment, 86, 209; members of, 208; num- 
ber of, 208; political role of, xxv, 191, 
207, 208-9, 226; support of, for Abd 
al Aziz, 25 
Umar: as caliph, 12, 75; death of, 12 
Umar Abd ar Rahman, 212 
Umayyads, 9-10, 76; overthrown, 10 
Umm al Qura University, 102 
UN. See United Nations 
Unayzah, 53 

unemployment, xxv, 90, 104, 283; com- 
pensation, 31 

United Arab Emirates (UAE): in Arab 
Organization for Industrialization, 277; 
border with, 49; formation of, 33; in 
Gulf Cooperation Council, 42, 217, 
244; oil production levels, 145 

United Arab Republic, 30 

United Nations (UN): estimates of popu- 
lation, 60 

United Nations Environmental Pro- 
gramme, 59 

United Nations Food and Agriculture Or- 
ganization (FAO), 57, 177 

United Nations Security Council Reso- 
lution 598, 219-20 

United States, 3, 237; arms transfer 
agreements with, 275; condemnation of 
attack on Egypt, 29; Dhahran air base 
leased to, 29; importance of oil to, 114, 
222; imports from, 183; materiel ac- 
quired from, xxvii, 39, 233, 238, 258, 
272; military assistance from, 49, 233, 
254, 257, 259, 273, 276; military as- 
sistance to Kuwait from, 247; military 
personnel from, 267; military relations 
with, xxvi, 233, 273-75; military train- 
ing of Saudis by, 222, 223, 233, 258, 
262, 264, 264, 273; mutual defense as- 
sistance agreement (1951), 222-23; oil 
embargo against, 36; oil exports to, 
151, 152, 183; oil refining assets in, 
1 15; in Persian Gulf War, 240, 272; re- 
lations with, 29, 39, 192, 213, 222-24; 
Saud's visit to, 29; support for Faisal, 
31; technical assistance from, 178; ter- 
rorist attacks against, 36; trade with, 
183; university students in, 103 

United States Air Force, 258 

United States Arms Control and Disarm- 
ament Agency, 266 

United States Army Corps of Engineers: 
infrastructure constructed by, 222, 233, 
254-56, 274 



348 



Index 



United States Central Command, 239 
United States Department of Defense, 

232; Foreign Military Sales program, 

273 

United States Department of State, 285, 
286 

United States Geological Survey, 160 
United States Military Training Mission 

(USMTM), 223, 257, 273-74 
United States Navy: training by, 265 
universities: Aramco scholarships, 137; 

government funding for, 101; women 

in, 101, 102 
university graduates: employment of, 61, 

104; number of men, 61; number of 

women, 61; in religious studies, xxv, 

104 

University of Petroleum and Minerals, 
32, 101 

urban areas: percentage of population in, 
107 

urbanization, xxiii, 106-9; caravan cities, 

6; effects of, xxv, 47-48, 107; in pre- 

Islamic period, 5-6 
urban migration, 107, 118; by men, for 

work, 48, 74 
USMTM. See United States Military 

Training Mission 
Utaiba tribe, 209 

Uthman: assassination of, 9, 10, 76; as 

caliph, 12, 75 
utilities, 158-60; expansion of, 129; 

growth rate, 130, 132, 133; subsidies 

for, 122 

veil. See hijab 

Vela Marine International, 139, 141, 157 
Vinnell Corporation, 262 

Wadi ad Dawasir, 53 
Wadi ar Rummah, 53 
Wadi as Sirhan, 53 
Wadi as Surr, 53 
Wadi Bishah, 52 
Wadi Tathlith, 52 

wadis: in Hijaz, 52; in Najd, 53; in 

Northern Arabia, 53 
Wadi Sawawin: mineral deposits at, 162 
wages, 29; of guestworkers, 61 
Wahhabi community {see also Ikhwan; 
Islam, Wahhabi): disparagement of 
Shia by, 64, 85; objection of, to poly- 
theism, 12, 14, 85 



Wahhabi movement: and Al Saud, 
13-16, 47, 195; impact of, 5; in Najd, 
82, 195; nomads in, 21; origins of, 4, 
13, 80 

waqf, 78 

Wasia aquifer, 57 

water, xxvii, 57, 123; consumed by 
agriculture, 57, 160, 171; consumption, 

159, 160; distribution facilities for, 
xxvii, 122; distribution problems, 159; 
rights, 172; sources of, xxvii-xxviii, 57, 

160, 172; subsidies for, 176 
West: importance of oil to, 114 
Western influence, 86; Islamism as reac- 
tion to 90 

Western technology, xxii; introduced by 

Faisal, 32-33 
West Germany. See Germany, Federal 

Republic of 
White Army, 28, 118, 236, 260 
women: academic excellence of, 98-100, 
108; beduin, 74; chaperons for, 88, 
103-4, 108-9; control of, 68, 106-7; 
economic independence of, 66; educa- 
tion of, 98, 101, 102; employment of, 
61; family affiliation of, 65-66; forbid- 
den to drive, 74, 88, 109; literacy rate 
of, 96; marriage of, 65-66; occupations 
of, 108; percentage of, in work force, 
61; prayer by, 78; protest by, against 
driving prohibition, 88, 109, 211; re- 
strictions on, 74, 88, 109, 266; roles of, 
48, 68, 74; rural, 48; segregation of, 48, 
67-68; sexual modesty of, 67; social de- 
pendence of, on men, 69; study abroad 
by, 103-4, 109; support of, 66; travel 
by, 88, 103-4, 108-9; university gradu- 
ates, 61; veiling of, 67-68; in work 
force, 61, 108 
World Bank: membership in, 127 
World Health Organization (WHO), 106 
World War II, 237-38; military assistance 
in, 276; neutrality in, 237 

Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, 115, 138, 210 
Yanbu: naval base, 260; port of, 157, 167 
Yanbu al Bahr industrial complex, xxviii, 
121, 163; aluminum smelter at, 278; 
construction of, 39; gas fraction plants 
at, 153; growth of, 164; number of in- 
dustries in, 163; population of, 164 
Yanbu oil refinery, 154 



349 



Saudi Arabia: A Country Study 



YAR. See Yemen Arab Republic 
Yathrib {see also Medina), 9, 75 
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of 
(PDRY— South Yemen), 226, 241; ex- 
cluded from Gulf Cooperation Council, 
42, 220; military aid to, 192; relations 
with, 38; Soviet support for, 38, 39, 42 
Yemen, Republic of, 7, 242; border dis- 
pute with, xxvi, 221, 236, 241, 242-43; 
border with, 4, 49-50; connection of, 
with Asir, 62; guestworkers from, 60; 
rainfall in, 5; relations with, 220-21; 



support by, for Iraq, 61, 192, 221 
Yemen Arab Republic (YAR — North 
Yemen), 36, 238, 241; aid to, 221, 242; 
excluded from Gulf Cooperation Coun- 
cil, 42, 220; relations with, 38; Soviet 
relations with, 39, 42 
Yemen civil war, 30, 33; Egyptian involve- 
ment in, 33, 220, 237-38, 253; Saudi 
involvement in, xxvii, 33, 220, 238 
Yemenis: in Eastern Province, 62; ex- 
pelled, xxvi, 61-62, 127, 221, 242, 248; 
suspicion of, 248 



350 



Contributors 



Eleanor Abdella Doumato is Lecturer in History at the Univer- 
sity of Rhode Island and the author of numerous articles on 
the Middle East. 

Eric Hooglund currently serves as Editor of the Middle East Jour- 
nal; he has taught courses on the Middle East at several univer- 
sities. 

Helen Chapin Metz is Supervisor, Middle East/Africa/Latin 
America Unit, Federal Research Division, Library of Congress. 

Fareed Mohamedi is Senior Economist, Petroleum Finance Com- 
pany, and author of articles on the Middle East and interna- 
tional oil affairs. 

William Smyth is an independent author who writes on the Mid- 
dle East; he served as Visiting Assistant Professor at Emory 
University from 1989 through 1991. 

Jean R. Tartter is a retired Foreign Service Officer, who has written 
extensively on the Middle East and Africa for Country Study 
volumes. 



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